The Result of Losing Korea?

[Menning]

Thank you for leaving what I consider a controversial post. I agree with Tom Odom's comments. As much as I wish we decisively defeated N. Korea, the political situation was not in favor of escalating a land war in Asia. As a democracy, political consideration is paramount in war decision making. Public support waned for the Korean War after stalemate persisted beginning in the spring of '51. Our war-weary citizens would not have stood for a large war in Asia only six years after WWII peace was concluded.

Vietnam was a reaction to a number of different things, including Kennedy's impotence regarding the construction of the Berlin Wall and the disastrous Bay of Pigs operation. Mao's Revolutionary War concept also resonated outside China, with its implementation by Ho Chi Minh and Giap during the war in Indochina.

Losing a war is not necessarily detrimonious to a superpower. Hell, the Brits lost during the "Great Game" in Central Asia but it hardly affected their power. The "win" in the Boer War was less than decisive. The Russians may have lost the Russo-Japanese War, but they continued to influence world affairs for the next 100 years.

What is necessary to remember is losing in Iraq is not the end of the world for the U.S. I feel it might actually suit our strategic goals. The first, keeping extremists divided and fighting amongst themselves in a country far away from our own, siphoning their energy. Two, if the situation escalated into a regional war, Syria and Iran would have to engage. Their involvement would aid our goals-weakening their state governments through fiscal and human loss. Third, if chaos broke out in the Middle East, might the U.S. not have a reason to intervene in the region to "protect our interests?" Our interests would be oil fields and oil production. Who knows where we might cordon off and control.

Real politik is not naivete; it is based on fact and a sense of what public support for military operations might be.

[CR]

Menning, I agree that just six years after WWII, the American public would not have tolerated a more bloody and protracted war. But political leaders should not get the nation involved in conflicts it knows the nation does not support. If the need to enter conflict is so vital to national interests that leaders believe the nation must get involved, then it is the responsibility of those leaders to explain clearly to the American people: why war is necessary, the goal, and how the country will achieve that goal. In short, political leaders must mobilize the nation, lead, and pursue policies and strategies that will result in victory. When there are setbacks, leaders must adjust and regain momentum while maintaining national will until victory is achieved.

I like your points about Vietnam being a reaction to a number of things, many of which were instances of U.S. weakness.

I don’t see how losing in Iraq…failing to achieve something close to our objectives or whatever…will in the end be in our best interests. Playing enemies off against each other, prolonging strife and suffering of people in the region with the eventual possibility/expectation of having to invade again would not help America. The best outcome is a stable, secure, and peaceful Iraq, with some form of representative government allied with the United States. Successfully killing, capturing, and dismantling hostile terrorist and insurgent groups would be part of this outcome, as well as seriously weakening regional actors hostile to U.S. interests. Keeping our enemies divided and siphoning their energy will never result in decisive victory, which is what the U.S. should strive for.

But realistically speaking, the U.S. probably just didn’t have the will to win in Korea and Vietnam…obviously. I think this is bad…but not the end of the U.S., just like Iraq won’t be. However, the U.S. will be weakened by defeat. Who knows what would happen with other state and non-state actors in the event of a U.S. defeat, but whatever happens probably won’t strengthen the U.S. position in the world.

[VinceC]

This is an interesting debate.

To my mind, Great Powers must fight many different kinds of conflicts, balancing aims with resources. Some of our more important victories, such as the Cold War, involved sometimes intense restraint on the use of force while pursuing strategic rather than tactical victories.

The U.S. military has not really fought many clear-cut victories. In the Revolutionary War and War of 1812, Britain more or less quit fighting but preserved and possibly enhanced its national standing and empire for the next century.

The Mexican-American War was probably a major, lasting victory in that the United States was able to annex California and New Mexico. However, these events still inform our sometimes tense relations with Latin America, whereas most Americans are unaware the war involved a U.S. military occupation of Mexico City.

The U.S. Civil War had a decisive military victory, but the postwar period had many unsatisfactory elements, including the successful use of terror tactics to undermine the role of Federal troops in ensuring voting rights for all citizens. With the passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, barring Federal troops from safeguarding polling booths and protecting desegregated state legislatures, the country remained effectively partitioned for generations.

The United States only really asserted itself as a Great Power beginning with the Spanish American War, which resulted in a sort of ambivalent and short-lived empire. The Panama Canal was an important use of military power and administration in a non warfighting role. In World War I, the United States contributed to victory, but the peace was deeply flawed -- The Central Powers realized they were militarily defeated and achieved an armistice to prevent the destruction of their homelands.

In truth, the real historic aberration may have been World War II. The U.S. was uniquely (though not totally) united around the war aim and willing to achieve total victory over enemy militaries and peoples, followed-up by forceful plans to dominate and transform former enemy societies. The confluence of factors which created World War II is unlikely ever to be repeated.

The decisive destruction of an enemy force is a military tactic. Compelling or convincing an adversarial society to alter behavior or comply with demands is a strategic goal, and this can be achieved through many means.

[CR]

VinceC, thanks for your insight. There certainly have been times when the U.S. military had mixed results and that is one of the things I tried to articulate with this post, while asking the question: what are the consequences of not achieving victory? Concur completely that destructive force is only part of a strategy, but it is probably the one aspect of strategy that most underpins the others. Ultimately, the capacity to destroy external threats is what makes civilization and national survival even possible (I did not mean to destroy, but the capacity to destroy). That is not to say that destructive force alone leads to success--it doesn't--but having the capacity to use it and decisively use it when necessary completely changes a nation's standing in the world. Case in point: the Soviet Union.

The Soviets weren't a particularly strong economic power or moral authority; western nations paid attention to them because they were aggressive and feared. Russia's influence declined considerably after the break-up of the Soviet Union as its military might diminished. This led to independence for Eastern Europe as these countries knew they no longer had to fear Soviet coercion. The world is paying more attention to Russia now that it has announced plans to develop new technology and weapons systems and showcased a willingness to exert aggression, i.e. harassment and suspected assassination of dissidents and political enemies, strong arming neighbors by withholding gas and oil, and so on.

If North Korea did not, apparently, possess a few nuclear weapons with the potential capacity to create more and have a perceived willingness to use/share them under the right circumstances, no one would be nearly as concerned about them as if it possessed a purely conventional army. And if North Korea did not have a formidable conventional army either, no one would care much for what it said or did at all. Had we defeated the North Korean communists 55 years ago, certainly no one would be worried about them now.

The reason anyone even pays attention to Islamic terrorists is because they commit extreme acts of violence and threaten to commit more if they do not get what they want. When a nation loses credibility in the area of using influence and force (in all its forms—the “many means” to compel an adversary that you mention) to achieve national objectives and protect national interests, those who have no qualms about using force against that nation or its interests will fight it. We must ask ourselves what the result of America's mixed military success and lack of resolve means to our enemies, but also to our allies. Your brief summary of American military history brings up some very valid points; perhaps U.S. success as a result of WWII was so dramatic and unprecedented that it caused some to forget that maybe the U.S. has not historically had too many clear-cut victories. Maybe it also speaks well of the U.S. in that it could be or could have been much more coercive in its use of power (belligerent), but has historically chosen not to do so.

Who knows whether events leading to a national effort on the order of WWII will ever again coalesce. It depends a lot, I think, on how strong we allow our enemies to become and what they decide to do to us and our allies when they possess a certain level of political, military, and economic strength. Our enemies are very clear on what they want to do and it is not in our best interests. If they were strong enough and if the U.S. and its allies were weak enough, I think we have to take them at their word and believe they would try to kill, subjugate, and conquer as much of the West as possible. I know you said that great powers must often fight different-sized conflicts of varying import and can accept varying outcomes. This is the case, but I am not so sure this is a good thing or the right thing over the long term. If the U.S. and its allies had a track record of consistent, decisive victory in conflicts large and small, its enemies or potential enemies would not be as bold in challenging them. Isn’t that a good thing for the United States?

Vince, what do you think the current and future consequences are for America with its mixed history of success in conflict? For its allies? How do you think America’s enemies perceive this and how do you think they will exploit it?

[VinceC]

Vince, what do you think the current and future consequences are for America with its mixed history of success in conflict? For its allies? How do you think America’s enemies perceive this and how do you think they will exploit it?

My experience is in international cooperation, and that's where my personal opinions and preferences lie. The American ideal in the international arena, unlike earlier empires, is based on the notion that we are exporting our founding principles -- Democracy; life, liberty and pursuit of happiness; free markets; tolerance, etc. -- and that our means to promote and attain these principles are an ever-changing work in progress.

Collectively, the people of United States have shown again and again they seek to lead the world not by the authoritarian application of strength but by moral example, and they want to lead the world toward democracy and mutual tolerance. That was actually one of Lincoln's strongest motives in fighting to maintain national union -- he believed splitting the country would prove that the founding ideals were not strong enough to sustain a cohesive nation.

In the 21st century, if we want to lead like-minded nations and peoples (many of which owe their current existence to our actions) we must lead by example, by consensus and by persuasion. This is tough, but more enduring than the alternatives. I think like-minded allies and partners include the NATO members; the European Union and its aspirants; the Pacific Rim democracies and partners, such as Australia and South Korea; the emerging democracies in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent polling shows that Muslim-majority countries also seek democratic government and religious freedom, but on their own terms, not imposed by outsiders.

The qualities of a strong, capable leader are the same for nations as they are for individuals. If we think back to the best leaders we've served, it is likely the majority of them were consensus builders who showed restraint and paid attention to sound advice from subordinates. As co-inheritors (with our allies) of the ideals (and fallacies) of Western Civilization and values, our ideal of leadership is little changed from those principles outlined by Shakespeare in his 94th Sonnet:

They that have power to hurt and will do none,
That do not do the thing they most do show, [ie., those who restrain themselves from doing what they most clearly are capable of doing]
Who, moving others, are themselves as stone,
Unmoved, cold, and to temptation slow,
They rightly do inherit heaven's graces
And husband nature's riches from expense;
They are the lords and owners of their faces,
Others but stewards of their excellence.

Unlike more martial societies, the Western ethic is to use "force as a last resort" and demonstrate that the most effective use of power is to restrain its use, as was done so carefully in the Cold War. An interesting application of U.S. military power took place with the intervention in Haiti. The threat, delivered by a trusted intermediary, that American paratroopers were in the air and en route to Port au Prince, prepared for combat, was enough to convince the regime to capitulate and accede to the international supervision of an elected government.

If the United States leads by moral example and secures international legitimacy with others who want to promote shared values, then setbacks are collective problems, not just our problems. This in turn allows us to continue our moral leadership, which is based as much on the Marshall Plan and sticking with South Korea after the 1953 armistice as it is on the World War II fire-bombing of German and Japanese cities.

Bolshevism is not a bad analogy to the world's current assault by radical Islamists who seek worldwide governance. Their concerns are class-based as well as culturally based. They seek to reshape and transform societies on a new ideal, replacing what they view to be corrupt and worn-out ideas and concepts that they find oppressive. Bolshevism was a genuine world threat from perhaps 1905 until the late 1980s, and it lingers in many places still. It took over nations and whole regions. It inspired passionate young fanatics who could care less about macro-economic (or theological) principles, but who had no more exciting prospects in their lives than to energetically pursue revolution and upheaval (this is in part an offshoot of the human evolutionary need for young adults to forcefully break away from the tribe, which is why teenagers can be such a pain in the *** even when they're just trying to borrow the car, not blow you up). Today, Bolshevism and Communism have been proved to be dead-end ideas, and they are extremely unlikely to spark enough collective enthusiasm to overthrow any sitting governments. But it pretty much took a century, a terrible and violent century, for that to happen. And Bolsevism was beaten as much by ideas and collective prosperity as it was by the application of military power. Which is not to say that military power -- and threat of its use -- did not play a central tactical role in the strategic victory.

[Sargent]

What is necessary to remember is losing in Iraq is not the end of the world for the U.S. I feel it might actually suit our strategic goals. The first, keeping extremists divided and fighting amongst themselves in a country far away from our own, siphoning their energy. Two, if the situation escalated into a regional war, Syria and Iran would have to engage. Their involvement would aid our goals-weakening their state governments through fiscal and human loss. Third, if chaos broke out in the Middle East, might the U.S. not have a reason to intervene in the region to "protect our interests?" Our interests would be oil fields and oil production. Who knows where we might cordon off and control.

Pardon me while I stray from history.... I would like to add the particularly unorthodox view that a loss in Iraq might, if handled properly, be useful to American strategic objectives in this struggle. I would submit that the target audience in this struggle is not Al Q or any of the other sub/inter/supra-national insurgent groups. Rather, it is the rest of the world that is mostly on the fence. I think that this population bristles at the way that the US acts in the world -- whether their interpretations are correct is irrelevant -- and that a show of humility might go a long way to mollifying that irritation. If defeat in Iraq were handled correctly, and with a large degree of magnanimity, the US could probably end up ahead of the game.

Quite frankly, as much as there was an intense desire to strike back in the aftermath of 9/11 -- and I'm a New Yorker, the loss is still incomprehensible to me -- a better course of action might have been to work on the problems that lead these young men to join such movements as Al Q. Had American actions been targetted to shore up the support of the world's population as a means of making the existence of such groups increasingly untenable, we might be in a very different place today. (Ok, I'm no Pollyanna -- this problem might have been solved only to be replaced by another, just as the Cold War ended only to be replaced by another threat. But we're dealing with one problem at a time, because otherwise our heads would explode.) Skip the war and go straight to the Marshall Plan. If we were going to send troops to the Middle East, it ought to have been as the Palestinian defense force. Because as people have pointed out in this thread, war winning is not about the battlefield but the peace that follows. How you shape that is what really matters in war.