intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners
intent:
* from fusing & interpreting recce reports
* from prisoners
Thus I was ordered to:Originally Posted by Fuchs
Make reports on enemy activity and locations
Capture prisoners.
Discover the enemy's intent NEVER featured in a stated mission.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
While "determine the enemy's intent" may have never been a stated mission, having and understanding of the full enemy situation: composition (what and possibly who-what unit or unit type) disposition (where-location(s)), capabiities (what he is able to do) AND intentions (he is likely planning on doing) is important for the commander to make correct decisions.
Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.
Could the HBCT use a CAB instead, sure, but with only two it limits the flexibility of the exiting HBCT.
A similar epiphany is occuring at the division, corps and JTF levels with the realization that the "old" dic cav and ACRs are gone and that the Battlefield Surveillance Bdes lack the resources to execute many their old tasks (conduct guard, conduct cover force, conduct economy-of-force, conduct reconnaissance-in-force etc). Div and above cdrs are now having to employ a BCT instead.
Well I believe commanders should base decisions on what is actually known about the enemy and not what is suspected. One of our huge doctrinal faults is basing plans on predicted enemy courses of action, and not on actual observed enemy courses of action.
True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy. That does not leave you open to deception unless you are very stupid and the enemy knows you are watching. Fighting the enemy (nose punching) is an entirely different objective, which basically tells the enemy you've found him.Somebody has to go up and punch the guy in the nose in order to determine actual intent. By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Amen Brother!
Last edited by davidbfpo; 06-30-2010 at 08:55 PM. Reason: Fix quote
R&s
A bit of semantics here too, I think.True reconnaissance is merely finding and observing the enemy.
Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.
A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,
A time and a place for both types of gathering intel.
My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.
COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.
An intersesting note to me is that a USMC Division has both a Recon Bn (with the sneak and peek types) and a LAV Bn for "Classic" CAV missions.
TAH
Last edited by davidbfpo; 06-30-2010 at 08:56 PM. Reason: Fix quote
Words matter
Nor do I.Some folks use the terms two reconnaissance and surveillance inter-changably. I do not.
IMO, its even more simple. Reconnaissance is seeking. Surveillance is watching. Both are normally done by the same folks.A basic functional distinction often proposed is that surveillance tends to be more passive, the watch and listen mode, while reconnaissance tends to be more active,
I think the "fight for information" is less useful, than "seek to contact." Contact may just mean locating the enemy and not blundering into them 25m the wrong side of the ridge line.My real basic issue with the BCT Recon Sqdrns was that they are out of step with current tactical reality and lack the ability for "Fight for Information" that now appears the more likely need, at least in Major Combat Operations.
You still need to find the enemy. Different type of enemy, that's all.COIN/Stability Ops is a whole other ballgame.
Good stuff TAH. You've clearly given this stuff some thought and that is always good regardless of my pedantry!
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
That's exactly what it would take...
and is easier said than done.No one here is suggesting that, only saying that all the aggressive recon work in the world will not reliably and accurately provide you intentions. You ascertain capabilities and infer probabilities but you cannot determine intent.By restricting ourselves to passive surveillance, we open ourselves up to deception by the other side.
Operational deception is a problem for MI analysts and commanders, not for recce folks in the field. They report what they have.
Large-scale deception works rarely, and almost never without the assistance of the fooled ones. The German army had almost no air reconnaissance on the Eastern Front after summer of 1944 and never got seriously surprised again.
Large operations require large preparations.
I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.
Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.
Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.
Everything can be misunderstood - even orders (charge of the light brigade...).
Sigh. Yeah -- but...
True -- and they can be and have been fooled by tactical deception...Totally true -- and a belief that they knew the opponents intent lulled them into not expecting the magnitude of the attacks. Thanks for recalling that...I'm sure it was possible to learn about Tet in advance as well, but sometimes MI and commanders provoke being fooled by being too fixed in their beliefs.How?Nevertheless, recce can yield the opposing commander's intent.True and no one here is saying that it is as nearly as I can tell. However, recall that some Commander, somewhere, is going to make use of those reports to determine capabilities and to try to infer probabilities. He will not in most cases be able to get into the mind of his opponent.Again - judgment of recce reports is not the problem of recce folks in the field.
What Wilf and I are saying is that you can ascertain capabilities and even, if you're lucky -- or really good -- probabilities but you can not determine the opposing commanders intentions. Further, that even if you were able to do so, he can change in a second to do something unexpected and you can be working of what was or has become an erroneous conclusion. You have to ass u me intentions, never a good plan...
Probabiliy versus Intention
Ken and Wilf say potato Luchs and I say patato
Within some limits, agressive recon/recce gives you insights into what the enemy may do next. However, there is a chance that that's exactly what the sneaky SOB wants you to think.
Target on the Mover ???
Hmm... enough of an epiphany to actually *do* something about it? (Besides dismantling the last heavy ACR on schedule, of course...)
It's funny, whenever I hear of proposed changes (read: increases) in headquarters or intelligence personnel, I see leaders reaching for the rubber stamp that says "Approved" - REGARDLESS of the rationale. ...but when it comes to increasing combat power, it's always met with a cautious "Well, there's a lot to consider..."
It's as if increases in support are seen as the "mature" thing to do - but I don't ever see anyone saying "Enough!" We'll end up with an army composed of just one rifle squad and 500k+ of "multipliers".
Amen, brother Sabre, Amen...It's funny, whenever I hear of proposed changes (read: increases) in headquarters or intelligence personnel, I see leaders reaching for the rubber stamp that says "Approved" - REGARDLESS of the rationale. ...but when it comes to increasing combat power, it's always met with a cautious "Well, there's a lot to consider..."
It's as if increases in support are seen as the "mature" thing to do - but I don't ever see anyone saying "Enough!" We'll end up with an army composed of just one rifle squad and 500k+ of "multipliers".
Personally I have come to look at tactical headquarters expansion as a sort of TDA creep into the field force.
Tom
Amen and Amen, again.
See a five year old argument regarding the modular BCT:
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/milreview...g05/melton.pdf
LTC Melton describes a model for modular BCTs that would have resulted in a reduction of 8 BN/BDE HHCs, instead of the increase in 10 BN/BDE HHCs in each division. Our "transformation" increased headquarters, instead of reducing them.
Interestingly, he was my tactics instructor at CSGC last year ... He also has a book, The Clausewitz Delusion. he also had a humorous in-class riff on the US Army's fascination with tents (when indoor space is available) and TOC-mahals.
Can the CABs provide the armored reconnaissance mission required by the BCT commander? If so does it make sense to replace the ARS with a third CAB or reinforce the ARS with armor and additional scouts?
What's the mission.
What are all the METT-TC factors? Have to know those to answer your question.
A TOE is an administrative tool to aid budgeteers and planners, the most inflexible of all bureaucrats. Organization for combat rarely is straight TOE for many reasons. Thus, in broad measure, how many sub-elements or widgets are assigned is not terrible important for comabt operations; what counts then is what you actually have available. Over rigid adherence to TOE design is a part of the problem. Training is another part...
The whole point with the BCT concept was to be modular and adapt unit fill and assignments to the job at hand. Too many try to forget that. Two maneuver Bns not enough; assign a third. Need more Recon capability, plug it in...
The massive juggling of which BCTs went where in Afghanistan and Iraq was in part a measure to force flexibility. Unfortunately, a good practice and idea was ruined by the type of war we were fighting; it just wasn't appropriate in wars where continuity of effort is far more important than in MCO.
The problem with the modular approach is lack of flexibility of both the institution and some commanders. The same thing that killed the old Pentomic design -- lack of flexibility on the part of the senior officers. They are raised in a structured instead of a chaotic environment, then thrown into the chaos of combat and many -- not all; the good 20% or so do not -- have trouble adapting to the rapid thinking and flexibility required. They want stability and constancy. Unfortunately, in warfare, you can't really have that. Our training and education again let us down...
In a sense I stated the latter position in my re-arranged HBCT. Re-org the HBCT recon/scout platoons to put all in the ARS. Organize them in platoons of 6. Assign HMMWV scout platoons (6 vehicles for doctrinal stanardization) to each CAB. Limit the roles/missions of the CAB scouts. If they need more combat power, they can either assign one of their own combat platoons or request a CFV platoon thru Bde from the ARS.
Too much time, effort and resources has been spent under the umbrella of recon = unit. Recon is a MISSION, NOT a Unit! Any/all maneuver combat units (including most types of combat support units) should be able to conduct platoon/company level recon (Route, Area, Zone).
Agree with both up to a point...
Point 1, what if the reports we are intercepting are part of the enemy's deception plan?
Point 1.1 BCT has only a very limted capability in its MICO to accomplish directly got the BCT CDR. An attack by a "Re-org" ARS can achieve the results shortly after contact.
Point 2. See above about who has the capability to conduct (hint the Counter-Intel and/or the HUMINT folks in the MICO, assuming they have the correct language capability).
Point 2.1 While some EPWs will get nabbed "steathly" the majority will come following a successful attack. Consider the Brits in the Fauklands, the Italians in WW2, the Iraqis in the first Gulf War....
The ARS was designed based on the "Quaility of Firsts" (Now out of Voque). It was intended to be a Recon-pull Organization. May have worked great twenty years ago. Against any OPFOR that is well-trained, well-armed and primarilty dismounted the wheels begin to come off as it crosses the LD.
We tried the same "Recon by Steath" approach in WW2 with the mounted Cavalry/Recon units. Mounted fails against anything other then lmited resistence. Dismounted can, given time and suitable terrain work but the overall OPTEMPO must allow for it.
Of course you can do that -- should do that
but will it give you that enemy commanders intentions or merely his capabilities and some indications? I don't think either of those will put you inside the mind of an opposing commander. Not to mention a good deception plan can lead one astray. Badly...
This is partly semantic but it has very real and important point. You can learn things, assess what you've learned and usually determine possibilities and even occasionally, enough to ascertain probabilities -- however you must consider that the other guys is at least as smart and experienced as are you and is as capable of a startling and innovative effort. Not stating his 'intentions' is simply to avoid the mindset "that's what he's going to do..." That's a strong human predilection without reinforcing it by believing you might have learned his intentions.
It is simply avoiding target fixation. More particularly, potentially wrong target fixation...
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