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  1. #1
    Council Member jonSlack's Avatar
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    Speaking strickly of "leg" infantry.

    In my mind, the foundation should be a 3 man buddy team. Fire team is two 3 man teams. One 3 Soldier element is lead by the SGT team leader and the 3 Soldier element is lead by a competent E-4 or junior SGT, preferably a CPL instead of a SPC. A squad is 13: Two six Soldier fire teams and a squad leader. Platoon is 3 squads and then the platoon headquarters with Signal MOS RTO, 13F forward observer, and medic, all organic to the platoon, as well as 2 three man M240B machine gun teams.

    Three Soldier buddy team weapons: One M203, one SAW, and the SPC/CPL leader in every other buddy team carries an M4/M16/M14 as the situation requires. Team leaders, squad leaders, platoon leader, and platoon sergaent carry M4/M16 with optics and IR/laser designators. Machine gun team: gunner carries a M240B and an M4 and the AG and the ammunition bearer in the team both carry M4/M16s. The AG would double as the spotter and group leader and would carry an optic and IR/laser designator on his weapon to help the gunner put rounds on target.

    For wheeled and mechanized forces, the platoon described above would also have a vehicle section lead by a SSG. The SSG is responsible for the vehicle crews and once the "crunchies" are dismounted he is also responsible for getting the vehicles where they are best able provide supporting fires. I do not understand the value in having 11B (and 21Bs) driving Bradleys, perhaps a return of the 11M (and 12F, respectively) MOS? Also, if fighting in a linear conflict environment, the PSG could take control of the vehicle section, or a part of it, for logistics runs while the rest of the platoon digs in or otherwise remains in a stationary position as the situation mandates.

    As the fight changes you change the weapons mix based on the mission.

    For breaching: Infantry squads/platoons can handle their own manual, mechanical, and ballistic breaching with the issuing and training on shotguns and "SWAT style" battering rams and other speciality tools. For explosive breaching, you task organize an element from the Sapper company, "Echo" company, now organic at the battalion level. You build in redunancy by having the 11Bs learn about demolitions by training and qualifying with explosives with the Engineers and by sending them to advanced course like the Urban Breacher course.

    I do not think that platoons need to be lead by CPTs. Platoons should be lead by a 1LT while a 2LT shadows/learns and is there to assume leadership of the platoon if needed. I was a "platoon XO" of a combat engineer platoon for a couple months and I learned an immense amount from the 1LT I worked with/for, more than I learned from the company commander honestly.

    I think that the Army should lengthen LT time to atleast 4 years and keep 2LT time to 18 months. I also think that the "day count" for TIG should start when the officer hits a platoon and begins his/her shadow time while TIS would continue to be counted the way it is now.

    And, while I am on my soapbox: All newly commissioned 2LTs should go through the following prior to attending OBC: CLS, Level 1 Combatives, a week to two week long hands-on course covering BFT, FBCB2, and current radio systems (SINCGARS, ANCDs, MBITRs, ICOMs, satellite phones, TACSAT...), a week to two weeks of weapons (Mk19 on down to include hand grenades and perhaps the bayonet assault course) PMI and standard qualification along with an introduction, with familiarzation fire, with optics and the various designators, and an introductory weeklong classroom symposium, with assigned reading, covering the history and basics of COIN and also "cultural awareness" courses on the current relevant culture(s) (New 2LTs will get firehose fed 3rd generation/"march-up" tactics at their OBC). Also, the new 2LTs should get option of attending airborne and/or air assault prior to OBC. However, they should wait until after their OBC to attend schools like Ranger or Sapper Leader.

    This block of instruction could easily be given at any of the major TRADOC basic training posts like Benning or Leonard Wood.

    I get the impression the new BOLC was supposed to do something like that, but it mutated into what the new ROTC graduates call "Camp 2."

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    Quote Originally Posted by jonSlack View Post
    I do not think that platoons need to be lead by CPTs. Platoons should be lead by a 1LT while a 2LT shadows/learns and is there to assume leadership of the platoon if needed. I was a "platoon XO" of a combat engineer platoon for a couple months and I learned an immense amount from the 1LT I worked with/for, more than I learned from the company commander honestly.
    If there really is an advantage to having an assistant platoon leader, what would be the matter with making him the RTO also? Well, other than the obvious jokes that will ensue about how many officers it takes to operate a radio. He can learn quite a bit from following the platoon leader around. He can also learn quite a bit by always monitoring the net. It also keeps an enlisted man available for duties within a squad.

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    Council Member jonSlack's Avatar
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    If there really is an advantage to having an assistant platoon leader, what would be the matter with making him the RTO also? Well, other than the obvious jokes that will ensue about how many officers it takes to operate a radio. He can learn quite a bit from following the platoon leader around. He can also learn quite a bit by always monitoring the net. It also keeps an enlisted man available for duties within a squad.
    The purpose of the A/PL for a new 2LT to learn "the ropes." Initially, that may be following the PL everywhere they go. However, as the 2LT develops, the PL would hopefully begin to entrust him/her with leading sections of the platoon, like leading the outer cordon on a small platoon level cordon and knock.

    With "vehicle-centric" operations and with the miniturization of electronics leading to the smaller "brick" SINCGARs and now the MBITRs, I do know if there is a need for the traditional radio humping RTO. However, with all the digital systems organic within a platoon now other than the radio, a Signal MOS Soldier adds value as being the hands down SME on those systems.

    I described the Signal MOS Soldier as an RTO. A better duty description would be something like "Digital and Communications Systems Specialist" and his realm would encompass radios, FBCB2/BFT, PLGRs/DAGRs, and any other mission related communications or computer equipment is carrying like toughbooks and digital cameras.

    When talking about the small radios like the MBITR, I do not see a reason why both the PL and A/PL would not both carry and monitor them, even if the A/PL is still in the "follow the PL" everywhere stage.

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    Here's a link to a pdf document about Marine Corps distributed operations. It sort of goes along with what we've been talking about here in that the Marine Corps DO squad design is very similar to the one Bill Long advocated.

    http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/SV/DO%20Cap...20Jan%2005.pdf

    Evidently this platoon/squad organization was tested. I've never heard anything about it being adopted.

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    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rifleman View Post
    Here's a link to a pdf document about Marine Corps distributed operations. It sort of goes along with what we've been talking about here in that the Marine Corps DO squad design is very similar to the one Bill Long advocated.

    http://www.mcwl.usmc.mil/SV/DO%20Cap...20Jan%2005.pdf

    Evidently this platoon/squad organization was tested. I've never heard anything about it being adopted.
    Former Marine Westhawk has a post about DO experimentation at the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab and in Afghanistan...

    ... The Marine Corps is actively experimenting with distributed operations concepts. The latest issue of Proceedings, the professional journal of the U. S. Naval Institute, described the training and employment of a Marine Corps DO-capable rifle platoon in northeast Afghanistan earlier in 2006. Prior to its deployment to Afghanistan, 1st Platoon, Company B, 1st Battalion, 3rd Marines was sent to two training bases in California. There, it was given special attention by a training team from the MCWL, joined by teams from the British Royal Marines and the Australian army. The results from the platoon’s subsequent experience in Afghanistan are classified. But as a result of that experience, a Marine Corps battalion is now undergoing an upgrade to DO status and will deploy to combat next year...

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    Default Response to Chris Albon

    Quote:
    Originally Posted by Bill Moore
    Rifleman,
    Actually I there is a point in a conflict where you shift from infantry formations to constabulary formations. I don't know if the Army can afford to stand up full time constabulary units, so more likely it will be the next unit in line designates so many Bns to train as constabularies during their pre-mission train up.

    Are there any case studies of this type of dual formation unit?
    Chris,

    Please see responses to my RFI for PRC measures for links to this. Go to Small Wars Communities of Interests, then RFI's and Member's Projects, then see my RFI for Popualtion and Resource Control Measures. The Council provided numerous references. I tried to paste the link here, but couldn't get it to take. Bill
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 02-03-2007 at 09:21 PM. Reason: Trying to get the link to take

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    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    And, while I am on my soapbox: All newly commissioned 2LTs should go through the following prior to attending OBC: CLS, Level 1 Combatives, a week to two week long hands-on course covering BFT, FBCB2, and current radio systems (SINCGARS, ANCDs, MBITRs, ICOMs, satellite phones, TACSAT...), a week to two weeks of weapons (Mk19 on down to include hand grenades and perhaps the bayonet assault course) PMI and standard qualification along with an introduction, with familiarzation fire, with optics and the various designators, and an introductory weeklong classroom symposium, with assigned reading, covering the history and basics of COIN and also "cultural awareness" courses on the current relevant culture(s) (New 2LTs will get firehose fed 3rd generation/"march-up" tactics at their OBC). Also, the new 2LTs should get option of attending airborne and/or air assault prior to OBC. However, they should wait until after their OBC to attend schools like Ranger or Sapper Leader.
    Jonslack, the Marine Corps already gets that with its Basic School (6 months) period of instruction for all newly minted 2ndLts before they go to their MOS school. The thrust of it is to get them basically trained to operate at the level of a rifle platoon commander. I've always wondered why the Army didn't have a similar system.

    SGTMILLS, pls define what BOG means. I think I know but want to make certain, because I want to delve deeper into this subject.

    Aside from having been both a rifle platoon and weapons platoon commander, I was also a troop once, and had the opportunity to attend the Corps' squad leader course. I've also had some very interesting self-education in vintage distributed operations, from the Long Range Desert Group and the Rhodesian Light Infantry/Rhodesian African Rifles. To that end, I've done a lot of reading on how the Rhodesians organized for COIN ops, and the tactical scenarios they faced are very interesting. Much of it is anectdotal, but illuminating nonetheless.

    I'm going to chew on this and try to push out a cogent reply over the weekend. The following are my notes to pull initial thoughts back together again:

    -current communication capabilities PRR/MBITR
    -SAW vs. GPMG
    -Permanent structure and task designations vs. basic units that can perform all tasks
    -How the mobility platform changes the dynamic
    -Rhodesian distributed operations (time/space, communications, fire force ops, etc.)
    -Support weapons (SMAW/AT-4/SMAW-D: whatever happened to that?)
    do we need new ones to reflect the threat
    -Common operational picture tools (e.g. urban warrior, the now-defunct Land Warrior)
    -Calkie White input if applicable
    -DMR vs. ACOG in application
    -fighter leader concept
    -being at the point of decision vs. point of friction

  8. #8
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    I just clipped back through an earlier post and MCWL document provided by Rifleman, and it made me sit back and ponder these "Specific (additive) capabilities of a DO Platoon":

    -Conduct mounted and dismounted combat patrols at extended ranges

    -Interdict and/or destroy enemy forces
    •Direction of Fire Support Assets
    •Direct assault (greater lethality -increased ranges and close assault)

    -Secure and Hold Key Terrain (at extended ranges)
    •LZ, Bridge, Road Junction, Hill top, etc.

    -Conduct ITG and provide guides to the Main Force

    --Conduct tactical preparations in support of the Main Force
    •Provide a “skeleton”to fall in on (i.e. SBF position)
    •Provide an in-position Fire Support Team to assault elements

    -Conduct zone reconnaissance patrols in greater depth and breadth

    -Control or Influence key avenues of approach (isolate target area)

    Mixed with mobility upgrades, we would have a force that remarkably looks a lot like a Long Range Desert Group patrol (mixed with a small band of Stirling's merry men).

    It makes me ask the question of how well a DO platoon would do in the littorals and inherently built-up areas, because if you read the LRDG/SAS history closely, they almost always got into trouble behind enemy lines when they came across locals who weren't necessarily on their side.

    The same thing holds true for the SF team that had a running gunfight after becoming compromised during roadwatch duty during the Gulf War, as well as the SAS patrol of McNabb notoriety. Now it seems that the team led by Lt Murphy, USN (and Medal of Honor recepient come 22 Oct) in Afghanistan ran into the exact same problems.

    I think we tend to forget that when dealing with an even remotely organized enemy, it's not necessarily that he will find you and kill you, but rather one of the locals will find you...and then the enemy will come and kill you.

    There is a lot of fieldcraft to snooping and pooping around the battlefield, and as with other skills, we are losing this in our current endeavours.

    Anyone know if the DO folks are reading about the LRDG? I've got a whole shelf of books they are welcome to browse. They may learn some minor tactics that have always been known.

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