Yemen: all you want (2011-2015)

[davidbfpo]

As Crowbat has noted the anti-Yemeni coalition has put a naval blockade in place; open source radar sites show civilian aircraft are avoiding the Yemen.

In Sanaa the khat shops are still open, often the only shops that are (from Twitter). IIRC all the khat is imported and very likely to be flown in - it is consumed fresh. Now will the blockade stop kat supplies?

[davidbfpo]

Within an article by Robert Risk, in The Independent, is this unexpected factor for KSA, with my emphasis:

Perhaps half of the Saudi army is of Yemeni tribal origin. Saudi soldiers are intimately – through their own families – involved in Yemen, and the Yemen revolution is a stab in the guts of the Saudi royal family.

Link:http://www.independent.co.uk/news/wo...-10140145.html

[davidbfpo]

From:http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ye...kes-1944829381

[davidbfpo]

An excellent article from The Daily Telegraph explained the continuing role of ex-President Saleh. Here are a few snippets and yes he remains in the Yemen, unlike the President:

...last week, the man with a record of doing deals with anyone who will keep him in power was once again proving that his cunning should never be underestimated.While Tehran has denied any involvement, one person who is undoubtedly helping the Houthis is Mr Saleh. Having fought tooth and nail against the Houthis himself during his time in power, he has now joined their side, instructing cronies and relatives in the army to join forces with the rebels. Thus has a small local rebellion become a nationwide civil war - and thus has the wily Mr Saleh maneouvred himself back into the centrestage of power. A Machiavellian leader even by the standards of Middle East, Mr Saleh once observed that ruling turbulent Yemen was like “dancing on the heads of snakes”. But his own spectacular comeback - by a man steeped in deals with tribal leaders, regional powers, and even al-Qaeda - has made many wonder whether he may the biggest serpent of all.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...try-apart.html

[davidbfpo]

Oryx blog has two short comments on the bombing of Yemeni military assets. First the few remaining Scud SSM:http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.uk/2015...sh-yemeni.html

Secondly the Yemeni Air Force, especially its few Mig-29s:http://spioenkop.blogspot.co.uk/2015...ng-yemeni.html

[CrowBat]

Most useful for orientation on Yemen, is this article by a BBC-reporter that toured the country:
Meeting the Houthis - and their enemies

She really went 'everywhere', from Sana'a to Sa'ada, then into the Bayda Province (AQAP and now Daesh strongpoint), and then back to Aden.

Since US seems to only be interested in al-Qaida and IS/ISIL/Daesh, particularly interesting should be these two paragraphs:

...
In other parts of Bayda, some people say al-Qaeda isn't tough enough. Ahmad Khamis, a prominent local jihadist, says he loves Islamic State.

"IS is a reality and they control land. They will take over districts and will engage in direct battle. They won't retreat from battle, just like in Iraq" he says. "This is our hope to be ruled by Islam and freed from Shia occupation."
...

With Saudis doing their best to bomb the crap out of Yemeni Army (they seem to be very insistent in failing to hit Houthis, although declaring nearly every Yemeni who sided with Houthis for 'Houthi'), they are de-facto acting as Daesh's air force.

[davidbfpo]

A short NY Review of Books article, which praises the BBC documentary (see Post 117 for details and link) and has some great lines, for example and no doubt controversial too:

As one Yemeni said to me: “One group of Houthi fighters is worth a hundred drones.” Houthi fighters have been fighting al-Qaeda and various Sunni Islamist groups for years now.

It ends with:

This could be the beginning of a civil war that will deepen no matter how many bombs the Saudis drop. It is also likely to make Yemen a greater threat to the rest of the world. But the real tragedy is that all this is happening in a country where shared traditions were always the rule, laughter and qat-chewing were in every house, and sectarian differences meant almost nothing until recent years.

Link:http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog...houthi-enigma/

Incidentally is the rifle carried in the only photo a Garand minus its magazine or an even older US-made rifle? Photo below.

[davidbfpo]

Zoha Waseem @ Kings War Studies has this commentary 'Operation Decisive Storm: when Riyadh calls on Islamabad':http://strifeblog.org/2015/03/31/ope...-on-islamabad/

She ends with:

For the time being, Pakistan does not appear to be in a position to send boots on the ground, both because of militancy at home – for which it needs troops and resources to continue counter-terrorism operations – and also because there can be no easy exit strategies following such a deployment. It further needs to keep its focus on the instability at its western border with Afghanistan, and hostility on the Line of Control. But events are still unfolding and Nawaz Sharif is likely to be under tremendous pressure to cooperate with the royal family. How this cooperation will be justified in the face of Pakistan’s internal security concerns remains to be seen.

My recollection from a news report in 2014 is that the KSA hosted a military exercise then, on the northern border, with Egypt, Pakistan and the USA.

Given the historical relationship between KSA and Pakistan I wonder if Pakistan has a full-time, in country liaison staff. Even seconded officers and men.

[CrowBat]

They do, i.e. there is.

BTW, presently, there is a joint exercise of Saudi and Pakistani special forces - apparently run somewhere near the border to Yemen.

That said, it seems that Pakistani population is not particularly keen to go fighting for Sauds, no matter how much these might be ready to pay. So, the government didn't bring a final decision - yet. That's the reason for all the related controversy in the media.

Meanwile, Sudanese AF Su-24Ms are deployed at King Khalid AB and flying strikes over Yemen...

[omarali50]

Right now it seems the Saudis want to list Pakistan as a member of the "coalition" and Pakistan won't fully confirm it at their end, but lets them do so in their briefings etc (where a Pakistani flag is displayed).
Unless a full scale ground invasion is part of the plan (which would be the stupidest plan since whenever), there probably wont be any significant ground presence needed. Maybe a few thousand troops to guard the border against Yemeni counter-attack while the "coalition" continues to bomb and blockade? that might be sell-able in Pakistan as "defense of Saudi Arabia", not "invasion of Yemen". Certainly that is what tPakistani pro-military social media people seem to be stressing (that they would only go to defend Saudi Arabia, custodian of the two holy places, etc etc).

What IS the plan? To bomb Yemen till forces within Yemen decide to say uncle and create a pro-Saudi regime? That does sound doubtful. But I cannot think of any other sensible plan either...I am not looking for classified information. Just imagine you are the planner of this operation. What could your plan POSSIBLY be?
Very curious.

[CrowBat]

This is not so much about 'what would WE (Westerners) do', but what are 'THEY' (Saudis + allies and Houthis + allies) going to do.

There is a new 'king' in Riyad, with his favourite son as MOD. Both inexperienced, and with heaven-only-knows-how-much-preparation-for-problems-facing-them (even the age of the new MOD is unknown!). Surrounded by a bunch of military commanders, not few of whom are religiously motivated (some have relatives in Yemen, like nearly 50% of all Saudis), most of whom are driven by opportunity to earn 'few extra bucks' too, but also to 'show American infidels that they've learned their business'. And so, they've opened the page 1 of the checklist and are going through it, point by point: declare the other party for terrorists and allies of Iran, demonize them, control the media (no problem, since they have enough money), motivate your troops with what they need (religion, in the case of Saudi military), create coalition, launch air strikes...

Now comes the crucial issue: 'boots on the ground'. Problem No.1: Saudis don't like fighting their wars. They prefer paying others to do so... Problem No.2: even a biggest dilletant in Riyad knows that any full-scale invasion of Yemen is likely to end in an utter catastrophe. And now that the Saudis started this, they have to end it too. They imposed an ultimatum and now must stick to it, it's a matter of honour: nothing short of total defeat of 'Iranian dogs' (read 'Houthis') is going to do....

Solution A is 'on hand': because there's that legend that Pakistan is ah such a big friend of its Arab allies, always providing help (see sending troops to act as 'Bahraini military' and kill Bahraini protesters), always winning wars (ho-hum!), and because already grandpa has pumped billions into Pakistan... well, the lackeys should now return some of all the favours. Isn't that natural? But Islamabad is not as keen: military is busy fighting two insurgencies at home, and nobody curious to cause even more problems by provoking Iran...

Solution B: Egyptians... damn Egyptian army just smashed the Islamists in the Sinai, although entirely untrained in COIN. Isn't that nice? But hell: Egyptians still have too many bad memories about fighting Zaidis in yemen in the 1960s, and are not the least keen to go there. Even promising Sissi to cover all the expenses of that voyage is not working.

What's left...?

Solution C: OK, then Hadi, and his mix of few shaken army units, Local People's Committees, Southern separatists (including a nice dose of Marxists), AQAP and even some of increasingly strong Daesh in Yemen have to do the job. RSAF provides air support, RSGF planning and supplies, Yemenis and Jihadists do their fighting for themselves.

Didn't Americans do the same already back in Bosnia of 1994-1995...?

That's about all that exists as a 'plan' there.

There is a 'Plan B' too, of course: should everything else not work, Saudis can keep on bombing 'Houthis' until these accept a cease-fire, like they did in 2010.

If nothing else, now they have their own production line for Paveway IIs, so they'll not run themselves dry of these (like they did in 2010)...

On the other side: Houthis, Zaidis by background, proud, stubborn, traditional rulers of what once used to be the Imamate of Yemen. Suffering from treachery by Saudi provintial wannabes since 1970, and even more so since Saudis began openly supporting Wahhabists in Yemen, in the early 1990s. Fed up of taking orders from anybody. They've overcome all the obstacles on their way back to power: they've destroyed the (once powerful) Hashid Tribal Federation and removed all the possible competition from other Zaidi tribes; they've defeated the AQAP; they have Saleh and loyal military units at least on their side (if not under control).... Means: they control most of guns - and the party that controls most of guns in Yemen is the party that rules....

'Elections'? They know in Yemen, these are for show only. Saudi kings want a 'democratically elected and legal government back in power'? If they want a democratically elected president in power, they can start at home. 'Arab intervention'? Is hurting Saleh's troops, if at all; but mostly civilians - and thus galvanizing the latter around Houthis.

For the time being, they know they can cause enough troubles to the Saudis along mutual border to keep them busy for at least a few months. They seem convinced they can fight Hadi, Separatists, AQAP, and increasingly strong Daesh in Yemen at the same time too. Or at least keep them at bay.

Whatever happens, they'll not give up this time.

[CrowBat]

WSJ discovering what we were talking about on ACIG.info forum a week ago (indeed, on the same morning the Saudis began bombing Yemen):

...Yemenis once supportive of the Saudi-led bombing campaign against Houthi rebels in their country are turning against the operation as civilian casualties mount and vital economic infrastructure is destroyed by airstrikes, including one on Wednesday that killed 39 employees at a dairy factory far from rebel-held areas.
...

Even those who cheered the Saudi intervention against Houthi rebels are now appealing for its end. Last week, Riyadh assembled a coalition of 10 regional countries to counter the Iran-linked Houthi militants as they expanded across the country and forced Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi to flee last week to Saudi Arabia.
...
Abdulaziz Jubari, the head of the Justice and Peace party and a chief supporter of Mr. Hadi, denounced the Saudis’ ongoing assault, saying the toll on civilians and Yemen’s infrastructure was too high. Mr. Jubari joined the president’s entourage last weekend during the Arab League talks in the Egyptian resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, where many regional heads of state applauded Riyadh’s intervention.

“We backed President Hadi and attended the Arab League hoping to meet Arab leaders and try to end the crisis in Yemen. We had no intention this was going to be a war against our own people,” said Mr. Jubari. “The Saudi war against Yemen must stop immediately.”
...
“We hate the Houthis, but they never attacked us or destroyed our property. Why don’t the Saudis just kill the head of the Houthis and save Yemen? It’s the Houthis that they want, but it seems that Saudi is trying to destroy Yemen instead,” said Lutfi a Mahbashi, a San’a resident who lives near the capital’s heavily-bombarded airport.
...

Congrats - Salman, Obama & Co KG GesmbH...

[Firn]

I have no idea about the conflict but past evidence as in history suggests that such wars are quite easy to start but tend to be far harder to get 'won', in the sense that they fulfill their supposed political purpose by interventionists. As far as I understand the successes of the 'Houthi' made possible partly by the weakness and former actions of institutions, factions and players supported by the Saudis and other forces convinced quite a few in Riyad and other places that an direct intervention by air and sea might the in their (their who?) interest. If the Saudis and their non-Yemenite allies have no stomach, as CrowBat suggested, for a longer war with ground forces then they must rely that the so far losing allied factions do a much more successfull job at fighting and ruling. Western coalitions with plenty more experience, ressources and expertise could do only so much or so little in other wars, so I would be surprised how much of an impact that part of the 'Saudi' strategy will have.

In short this war is the continuation of lots of rather complicated politics in their full sense with the injection of other, military means - a war which seems poised to continue for a long time even if the external bombing campaign diminishes or stops...

[davidbfpo]

Amidst all the commentaries I spotted one in the WaPo, which IMHO deserves posting. Why?

A week on the Syria thread, in response to a question by Flagg, I posted using the title Egypt's Vietnam a link to a book 'Nasser's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power' by Jesse Ferris, pub. 2012:http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/B00...A=0&pldnSite=1

In Post 45 Crowbat added a lengthy review:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=21961&page=3

Anyway scene set, the WaPo opinion:http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/02/op...ia-egypt.html?

[CrowBat]

Sigh...

Sounds like Ferris does not know that the Imamate of Yemen joined Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic...

...nor that the coup attempt in Jordan (and British military intervention prompted by call for help from king Hussein) took place in 1958 (at the time of US intervention in Lebanon), not in 1956...
(In 1956, 'everything was fine' in Jordan, because Hussein asked the British to leave and established very close relations to Egypt; between others, these resulted in Egypt donating a number of British-made Vampire jets to Amman just two days before tripartite invasion better known as the 'Suez Crisis/War'.)

...even less so that there was a 'cold war' between Egypt and the USSR between 1958 and 1966, caused by Soviet refusal to support Nasser's spread of pan-Arabism... (during this time Nasser expected Soviets to help him, even launch military interventions in support of specific coups, for example in Iraq and Jordan, but Moscow refused this; for most of these years, Egyptians thus minimalized their relations to the USSR to that of 'customer and arms merchant', i.e. Moscow had nothing to say in Cairo).

...or that the Yemeni Civil War didn't end with withdrawal of Egyptian troops in late 1967: they were replaced by Soviets, that not only provided even more aid to the Republicans than Egyptians ever could (between others, they established the Yemeni Air Force), but actually launched a military intervention in which their troops were fighting on the side of Republicans. That war ended only with a cease-fire in 1970.

He's also failing to put something else within context: a laicist Egypt vs. Wahhabi Saudi Arabia (supported by British, Israel, Iran, and Jordan) and Zaidi Yemeni Royalists... Shouldn't that be important from modern-day POV?

Instead, he's once again failing to understand the reason for Johnson-Nasser rift (Mechan's death) and explains 'Egypt gravitated toward the Soviets'...

...or that once this war was over, Saudis began sponsoring spread of Wahhabism within Yemen - even more so once the former British Protectorate of Aden, cum Southern Arabian Federation, cum People's Democratic Republic of (Southern) Yemen sided with Soviets, in mid-1970s...

...which is what led to final destabilisation of Yemen...

Overall, he's is beginning to sound 'politically correct', rather than 'historically accurate'.

[CrowBat]

Back to topic: here some highly interesting insights into Yemen from ex SEAL instructor that served there for years:

...Biography: Captain Robert A. Newson, U.S. Navy, is a Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) officer who most recently led strategy and concept development for the Naval Special Warfare Command. Previously, he commanded Special Operations Command (Forward) in Yemen and Naval Special Warfare Support Activity, a cross-functional intelligence operations command, and served as director of the Joint Interagency Task Force – Counter Terrorism. Captain Newson is a graduate of the University of Kansas and the Naval Postgraduate School with distinction. He is a PhD candidate at the University of San Diego.

CTC: Can you briefly describe your role and experiences in Yemen in 2010-2012, and what your key takeaways were from a strategic U.S. counterterrorism perspective?

CAPT Newson: I was the commander of Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) Forward (SOC FWD) in Yemen. SOC FWD was an extension of SOCCENT, part and parcel with the command in Tampa. It was a task force with minimal staff and a joint force that primarily trained and advised Yemeni partners, but we also conducted civil affairs and military information support operations. And we were deeply embedded with the embassy and their activities.
...

[Bill Moore]

Back to topic: here some highly interesting insights into Yemen from ex SEAL instructor that served there for years:

A lot of good insights that most in special operations would refer to as the same challenges we have faced for years in many locations, specifically when it comes to capacity building and how SOF basically had its hands tied behind its back when it came to authorities and an outdated cold war security cooperation system. SOF did what they could within policy guidelines, and as noted in the interview CAPT Newson saw the potential for mission failure and recommended a UW back up plan to continue the fight against AQ if the security cooperation mission failed. I have little confidence that ever progressed beyond a discussion.

Our ineptness in this area is why, and the only reason why, I opined we shouldn't support the Syrian resistance. Technically and tactically we're quite good, but our policies restrict us to the point where failure is almost guaranteed.

[davidbfpo]

Crowbat, Bill and others,

Fully agree the CTC interview with the SOF veteran who served in Yemen is valuable.

The link is:https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-vie...eign-relations

I did post it awhile ago (Post 110 refers) and here are my comments:

It has some insight on the byzantine nature of working with and not working with Yemeni partners.

His best line, with my emphasis:

I am very concerned that we are pricing ourselves out of small wars.

[CrowBat]

I already 'suspected' you've posted it, but lacked time to check. Sorry for a double, David.

For me, another interesting point was him pointing out the Houthis are the most eager around to fight the AQAP (and similar characters). Pity no way of building a coalition with them was found (and, surely enough: Saudis would've done whatever is possible to prvent this from happening, anyway). This Saudi-led attack might easily drive them into Iranian hands...

In that sense: because Saudis are 'just bombing around', but not advancing into nothern Yemen, Houthis and YA have got plenty of opportunity to grab Aden now.

And without Aden... well, Saudis & Co have just wasted plenty of kerosene and expensive LGBs...

Bellow an attempt to reconstruct situation in Aden today...

[CrowBat]

A video from KKAB (or some similar place), showing Bahraini, Egyptian, Jordanian and UAEAF's F-16s that are participating in Op Decisive Storm:
https://www.youtube.com/embed/IIoo3cqHozg

Bahrainis and Egyptians were announced on the first day, but not sighted before.