The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[slapout9]

One of my CGSC instructors (retired officer) has this book coming out next month. He argues our fixation with Clausewitz is responsible for us becoming strategically muddled.

He's let some of it fly in my classes so far, my opinion is he has created a strawman of Clausewitz and the whole center of gravity concept. He believes the trinity only applied in his era, and is irrelevant.

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

Provocative, to say the least. I got into quite a debate with him in class over some of it, and the moral implications therof. The instructor told me point blank he didn't like being lectured at by a student, so I have shut up on it.

I have paraphrased (perhaps inaccurately) some of the arguments made. Will have to wait for the book to appropriately and fairly respond to the arguments. Recommend Wilf review it for SWJ though.

Man I can hardly wait for the book!!! Sherman waged war against rich people, the secret to all victory. Judging from the table of contents it is going to be some book. Just like the original American system of Economics(it was actually called that) is superior to Keynes, Sherman is superior to St. Carl. When America starts to think for itself instead of trying to apply dead peoples theories to todays problems we will start winning again and making money to boot. Somebody invite the author to the SWC council. Get me his contact info and I'll do it.

[Cavguy]

Here's some more details from his lecture that were missing from the OP:

1) Theory that a certain percentage has to die. Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

2) Ease of entry=harder insurgency. War weariness is a big factor.

3) Centers of Gravity don't exist. Only CoG that matters is perception of the populace that submits. External actors rarely can change internal cultures much, only pacify (see US South for 120 or so years after Civil War, etc.)

4) Clausewitzian trinity only works in monarchy-dictatorial systems, falls apart in anything less than total conflict. Even the Prussians and Napoleon never got the "single, decisive battle" they wanted.

Best as I can recall on the arguments half. Will have to wait for the book. A number of counter-arguments were brought up in class, along the lines of the above, both historical challenges (cases it didn't work), and moral challenges (who's signing up to mass murder civilians?), as well as a sense the version of Clausewitz he challenges is a strawman constructed for that purpose. I have the feeling that CvC is like the Bible, you can interpret what you want out of him, which is kind of a supporting argument for Mr. Melton's thesis in a roundabout way. However, he sees a lot of sympathy for the Jominian formula of war.

[Ken White]

that Clausewitz has had undue affect on US thinking -- more correctly, the Germans have had undue effect on US military thinking and practice. The Germans and Clausewitz got a lot of stuff right and they do things that work for them. Unfortunately, we adopted some of their practices that do not work well for us. One prime example is our generalist approach to officer education and management. It works for the Germans because they have a great General Staff corps. We do not have that so it doesn't work nearly as well for us.

I agree with Melton that the center of gravity thing is vastly overused -- I do not agree with him that Jomini had much to offer and I suspect Billy Sherman had no use for Jomini either. The formulaic approach has not worked for the US Army in the many variations I've seen tried over the last 60 plus years. We're stil trying to do that to convince Congress we use objective measures to promote people...

Slap, I hear you on making war on the rich -- problem is that the poor get caught up in that and suffer even more while the rich tend to float out and survive. Sherman and Carl both were superior in their wars and their times. We just live in a different time.

I do agree that we are capable of doing our own thing and that we do better when we stop trying to copy others. Winston Churchill said "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried all other options." What Winston missed is that we try the methods of others, find out they don't work for us and then finally cobble together an American way of doing it. We need to stop trying to imitate others. We are not they. They are not we. They are wee, we are not...

[Steve the Planner]

March to the Sea

I'm taken with Slap's comments on making war on the rich.

One day, as I walked through Al Rasheed hotel, a deputy governor from northern Iraq insisted I meet with a Shiek and have my picture taken. It would assure my safety throughout the north.

Met this resplendently dressed Omar Sharif-turned-Saudi Multi-millionaire. Very nice chap. Plenty of US credentials, and free as bird to travel wherever he liked. Afterwards, I scurried off to find out who he was. Not on anybody's charts, but I figured it out easily enough. He was the head of oil smuggling operations around Bayji, probably in for a visit from Jordan/Syria or wherever.

We never touched the moneyed class in Iraq, cause they operate from across the borders. Open borders were not a part of Clauswitz's milieu, but there is the long story of the House of Rothschild. Napolean, to fund his Russian escapade, needed to sieze the treasury of the richest man in Europe, the Elector of Hesse (A fortune made from mercenary work just like Prince). The Elector wisely moved the money to the Rothschild's basement in Frankfurt, and they made so much for him while holding it that he could clip coupons. Napolean didn't fair so well...

My take on the Clauswitz assault follows Mike F: Unity of Command.

I think the fighting part went fine. Where we blinked, and blew it was all on the civil side. I suspect that the political imperative to turn it over too quick (pass the political hot potato of "occupier") kept us from actually occupying decisively, and, for both countries, that's where we went wrong.

Do we act decisively to re-occupy the central government as one option not on the table in current discussions. And what would come next????

[Schmedlap]

He advocates a US way of war based on the style most articulated by Sherman, total war and mass destruction to crush the willingness of the targeted society to resist. He figures this historically as 5-18% of the relevant population as KIA. The reason populations should suffer is to humiliate the warrior class and show that they are impotent to protect their society.

When I read that, I didn't interpret that as, "let's all sign up to slaughter civilians," nor did I read it as him advocating "kill x% in order to achieve Y effect." I assumed that he was looking at examples in which total war concluded with a definitive surrender. For example, total war with Japan resulted in lots of dead civilians, but resulted in a comparatively orderly transition from a country mobilized for war to a country demobilizing for peace. I think a good case can be made that this was partly due to the people having their will crushed (although having the emperor tell them to put the kibosh on the kamikazes probably didn't hurt, either).

I think the hole in his theory - from what little I have gleaned from it without reading the book - is how you make it work in practice. Are we supposed to goad adversaries into total war, so that we can fight on our terms?

[William F. Owen]

1) Theory that a certain percentage has to die. Rationale is that the "warrior" caste has to be humbled in the eyes of its people as being unable to protect them. If the people don't perceive military capitulation insurgency will continue.

Clausewitz would agree. Speaks to the setting forth of policy, and trinity of people, leaders and military.

2) Ease of entry=harder insurgency. War weariness is a big factor

.
Again Clausewitz would agree. War is Politics.

3) Centers of Gravity don't exist. Only CoG that matters is perception of the populace that submits. External actors rarely can change internal cultures much, only pacify (see US South for 120 or so years after Civil War, etc.)

So CoG do exist. A CoG is that from which the enemy draws all his strength. Can a CoG be targeted? Different thing entirely. CoG do exist. You sometimes cannot find them or use them, but CvCs identification or conceptualisation is extremely useful.

4) Clausewitzian trinity only works in monarchy-dictatorial systems, falls apart in anything less than total conflict. Even the Prussians and Napoleon never got the "single, decisive battle" they wanted.

Absolute Rubbish! If anyone really believes that, then they never read CvC. He would also seem to have fallen foul of not realising that CvC never talked about how. He talked about "why" in the broadest sense.
Hannibal never got his decisive battle either - but Wellington did! Read CvC. He explains it!

Will have to wait for the book. A number of counter-arguments were brought up in class, along the lines of the above, both historical challenges (cases it didn't work), and moral challenges (who's signing up to mass murder civilians?), as well as a sense the version of Clausewitz he challenges is a strawman constructed for that purpose.

I am waiting, but it seems to me that he is setting up CvC on a the basis of what people think he said, versus what he actually said and meant. If he is, then it's intellectually lazy, and misleading.
Moreover war is not about killing. I assuredly involves killing, indeed it is defined by it, but killing is merely one instrument, and war itself is entirely instrumental.

I have the feeling that CvC is like the Bible, you can interpret what you want out of him, which is kind of a supporting argument for Mr. Melton's thesis in a roundabout way. However, he sees a lot of sympathy for the Jominian formula of war.

Well where I am, we have entire groups of learned men, who just study the Torah and many other sacred texts - and argue all day and for many years.

I do not cling to CvC as a sacred text, but until I read and studied "On War" I really had very little idea as to what the aims and purpose of Warfare were.
CvC does need to be held to rigour and holding CvC to rigour is the best way to learn about what he wrote.

[slapout9]

Do we act decisively to re-occupy the central government as one option not on the table in current discussions. And what would come next????

In the South it was called Reconstruction and because Lincoln still had the power to create Greenbacks it was not going to cost the American taxpayer one red cent.....just like he financed the Civil War. That was the greatest lesson of all that has been completely passed over by so called Historians and Ph'd types. In fact it was an Army Colonel that showed him how to do it and it was so successful that some say Lincoln was assassinated for it.

[Bob's World]

Grant will likely always be my favorite US General. One of his greatest accomplishments that he receives little credit for is the strategy to target the will of the Southern populace as his main effort (to which he tasked Sherman in Georgia and the Carolinas; and ultimately Sheridan in the Shenandoah to execute), while he supervised Meade in the supporting, but critical effort of defeating Lee's Army and taking Richmond (in that order).

He, IMO, was the first leader to not only understand that merely killing soldiers or capturing capitals was enough in wars between nations, as it had been in the West for generations in wars between Kingdoms.

However, and this is a big however, not all wars are the same, I would be careful to extrapolate the success of this model developed by Americans during the era of America's rise, as the either "the American way of war" or as a model for all future war. Very dangerous, both counts. It works for what it was, and should continue to be applied to. It would be absolutely counter-productive to apply such an approach to resolving a conflict within a nation.

Because all wars are unique based upon the totality of the circumstances; and wars between states are a very different category than wars within states. The American Civil War was not an insurgency; it was a clear break along geographic, cultural, and political lines. It truly was a "War between the states" not a "war within the states." I add this, because many like to hold up our civil war as an example of the invalidation of the American principle of of the right to insurgency codified in our Declaration of Independence.

[slapout9]

Slap, I hear you on making war on the rich -- problem is that the poor get caught up in that and suffer even more while the rich tend to float out and survive. Sherman and Carl both were superior in their wars and their times. We just live in a different time.

I do agree that we are capable of doing our own thing and that we do better when we stop trying to copy others. Winston Churchill said "You can always rely on the Americans to do the right thing -- after they have tried all other options." What Winston missed is that we try the methods of others, find out they don't work for us and then finally cobble together an American way of doing it. We need to stop trying to imitate others. We are not they. They are not we. They are wee, we are not...

Ken, it is true that the poor suffer but they are going to suffer anyway.....but when the rich start to suffer all the sudden peace starts breaking out all over the place.

[William F. Owen]

Because all wars are unique based upon the totality of the circumstances; and wars between states are a very different category than wars within states. The American Civil War was not an insurgency; it was a clear break along geographic, cultural, and political lines. It truly was a "War between the states" not a "war within the states." I add this, because many like to hold up our civil war as an example of the invalidation of the American principle of of the right to insurgency codified in our Declaration of Independence.

Was the US Civil War a "Hybrid War?" - Were any of the actions by Irregulars, part of an insurgency? Was is a "Complex War" or a simple War?

Kind of begs the question as to why we don't opt for a unitary model of war?

[Bob's World]

Was the US Civil War a "Hybrid War?" - Were any of the actions by Irregulars, part of an insurgency? Was is a "Complex War" or a simple War?

Kind of begs the question as to why we don't opt for a unitary model of war?

And always have been. I just don't know how this whole "hybrid" fad helps anything, and here is why: As I look at warfare, the key to determining how to best resolve a conflict is to understand the purposes of the combatants first, then their tactics.

Tactics are something you must deal with, but the design of your operation must be shaped to address the opponents purpose for action. Certainly an insurgency and a state on state war can and will likely employ a mix of approaches to achieve their desired ends. This is human nature. But the combatants are both the protectors of ones political positions; and the means to get to ones political objectives. Understanding the political objectives and the role of the populace as the human terrain in which the conflict is taking place is critical.

So, for me, I toss "hybrid warfare" up onto the same shelf where you have (rightfully) tossed 4GW. Both are simply efforts to describe what we don't understand in terms that we do understand; and IMO, both are off track. War is constantly evolving and never changing (paradox) and is almost always hybrid in execution. Understanding the political perspective and objective of one's opponent gets you closer to determining how to best prevent them from getting to what they seek, and in turn disrupt or defeat the support to their own operation.

[M-A Lagrange]

4) Clausewitzian trinity only works in monarchy-dictatorial systems, falls apart in anything less than total conflict. Even the Prussians and Napoleon never got the "single, decisive battle" they wanted.

Absolute Rubbish! If anyone really believes that, then they never read CvC. He would also seem to have fallen foul of not realising that CvC never talked about how. He talked about "why" in the broadest sense.
Hannibal never got his decisive battle either - but Wellington did! Read CvC. He explains it!

Do not want to add a cocorico here but Austerlitz was a decisive battle, at least for some times... Just like Waterloo. At least, Napoleon forced the British to put foot on the continent.
I am not that specialist of Clausewitz but he made the theory of the decisive battle almost at the same time Napoleon was conducting his wars.
You cannot deny the influence of Napoleon wars on Clausewitz work. The breaking point is clearly coming from Napoleon campaigns. At least the historicall context explains how there is a before and an after Napoleon just like there is a before and an after Clausewitz in the western/European understanding and conduct of war. (For both).
Little short as assumption. And this does not give a blank check to conduct mass casualties wars. Far from it.
As said Tom, does the guy have an idea of what is a 10% population losses? I believe in the first shock phase, so the stunning effect avoid any complication during the hold and stabilization phase.
Makes a lot of people! Just for that, the argument cannot stand.

[Bob's World]

Also critical to take into account in such discussions is if one is discussing:

A. How to win a battle,

B. How to win a campaign,

C. How to win a war,

D. How to prevail in a nation's overall objective across a span of peace and wars.

I would offer that each is very different and must be considered uniquely as well. A common mistake seems to be not to differentiate at all, or to apply what might be logical to one to another where it may not apply as well.

[Steve Blair]

Sorry, Cavguy, but your instructor lost me the exact second he refused to engage in a meaningful discussion of his ideas with you. That's what good educators are supposed to do. He also seems to ignore (as many do) the impact of our own army's organization on any attempt to absorb a German (or French) staff system. The great split between the Staff and Line prior to Root's modifications (and others that came about after the Spanish-American War) left deep scars, and I do think that it really hampered how we looked at and developed a staff. This is especially true when it's combined to the traditionally low opinion held by the body politic of a standing military.

And I agree with Bob...not all wars are the same. One of my side projects (that I might actually finish someday...) is an examination of officers who served successfully in the Civil War and then transitioned to fighting Indians. It's an interesting adaptation to look at.

[Ron Humphrey]

Ken, it is true that the poor suffer but they are going to suffer anyway.....but when the rich start to suffer all the sudden peace starts breaking out all over the place.

Gotta be careful with that one. Quite often if things get rough the rich simply relocate and the poor get stuck not only suffering but having to figure out how to dig themselves out on their own (Sans large influx of fundage from aforementioned rich). It's a fairly delicate balance.


On a different note

Niel , I wonder what your esteemed professors opinion is of the CSI paper written by Paret and Moran
CVC- Two letters on Strategy?

[Steve the Planner]

Slapout:

"In the South it was called Reconstruction and because Lincoln still had the power to create Greenbacks it was not going to cost the American taxpayer one red cent.....just like he financed the Civil War. That was the greatest lesson of all that has been completely passed over by so called Historians and Ph'd types. In fact it was an Army Colonel that showed him how to do it and it was so successful that some say Lincoln was assassinated for it."

The problem in Afghanistan arises out of the constitution which, arguably applies.

If the elections are, at the least, "challenged" to the extent that no clear winner is yet certifiable, then who sits at the head of Afghanistan's government?

As I understand it, past President Kharzai is likely to achieve, in the end, a fractious, but minimal victory, while his challengers can not must a majority.

On the table is the theory of a Unity Government, but putting that in practice is a whole different matter.

The UN, as I understand it, has the authority to decertify the election and move for "something else." Thus, the big portent of Eide and Galbraith.

The implicit suggestion, at present, is that (1) the present constitutional and national structure, whether as adopted or as applied, will not produce a positive result for Afghan's as a whole, nor further NATO/US objectives in stability; and (2) it may be time for a revisit to the structure, whether styled as a constitutional convention, national debate, loya jirga, or whatever.

What lessons, if any, have Afghans learned from the recent experience, and how would they propose to address it?

If, in order to answer that question, an Interim Government needs to be put in place, I believe the UN mandate provides for that radical surgery. Is it necessary?

[Ron Humphrey]

to a lesson that hopefully would have been learned from our Iraq experience.

If one plans to hands the reigns over to a stable local govt you must have those reigns firmly in hand yourself in order to do so. We don't want to occupy and thats not necessarily a bad thing but you sure as heck have to own something to be able to give it away.

Probably way to much of an oversimplification but still...

[Steve the Planner]

Ron:

Right.

In dumb-ass civilian terms, it might be termed a "gap" in the title chain.

Something about 'you can't convey what you don't own."

Steve

[William F. Owen]

I am not that specialist of Clausewitz but he made the theory of the decisive battle almost at the same time Napoleon was conducting his wars.
You cannot deny the influence of Napoleon wars on Clausewitz work. The breaking point is clearly coming from Napoleon campaigns. At least the historicall context explains how there is a before and an after Napoleon just like there is a before and an after Clausewitz in the western/European understanding and conduct of war.

I am not a specialist in Clausewitz either. I merely read and studied him to the degree I believe is useful, and as a minimum to understanding what he actually said and did not say.

Clausewitz did not say talk about THE decisive battle. He talked about the need for Decisive battles that gained you benefit in terms of strategy.

He also made broad useful observations, such as only Major engagements can bring about Major success - so don't plan for small tactical actions to have major strategic payoffs! - that they might, does not mean you should plan for them to do so.

IMO, (and others) what he was cautioning people against was continually irrelevant tactical action that gained no strategic benefit. EG: Hannibal.

Yes, CvC was writing soon after the time of Napoleon but he was also strongly influenced by Roman and Greek military history, as well as a whole range of other European Wars and Rebellion against the Crown in the Americas.

[slapout9]

STP, I don't think we can Re-occupy A'stan because we never occupied it in the first place, which is part of the problem. I don't understand this theory of starting a war with someone and then thinking that if you have an election right in the middle of the war that everything will be alright

Now we have an illegitimate government that is receiving huge amounts of financial aid from the US while we do the fighting and the dying....WTF?

Also Sherman had an IED problem to, you know how he solved it? He had the civilians who would not tell him where the torpedo's(that is what they called land mines in the Civil War) were march down the road in front of his columns! The IED problem was solved real quick. Put that in an IO campaign for A'stan......I know we can't do that but we should......tie rich folks to the of front Humvee"s and search for IED's.....hey that sorta rhymes.

Also the first thing Sherman did was prepare a SPECIAL TAX MAP and his march to sea went right through the richest parts of Georgia where he collected his food and supplies and burned bridges,tore up rail roads and knocked down telegraphs. In short he made the rich folks poor and feel pain, he did not target civilians directly he targeted their support system more than anything. Victory because he new how to make a good Systems Map