Cultural deterrence?

[Rex Brynen]

This is a complex issue, and not one which can be examined without fully understanding the Islamic view of the world (or weltanshauung).

I would argue that there isn't an Islamic view of the world, but rather a variety of understandings of Islam that in turn only comprise part of the attitudinal prism of any individual or group.

[Tukhachevskii]

I would argue that there isn't an Islamic view of the world, but rather a variety of understandings of Islam that in turn only comprise part of the attitudinal prism of any individual or group.

I think we might have to agree to disagree on that. I think, from the sources I've read (which are dotted about the SWC), that there is a core cluster of concepts that are mutually reinforcing around which differing practices gravitate and upon whom the pull varies according to situation. The metaphors aren't too helpful I'm afraid but I would argue that there is a "generative" centre (not Chomsky's generative grammar but a similar sort of idea) or an ethico-practical episteme which demarcates the interor and exterior of the Islamic field (as discursive practice) which seesm to gell with what Muslims and various Muslim written texts would argue. I think the Ituzu works above are probably much cleaer than I could ever be (I abonded theory during Uni during my post-structuralist literary phase and regret it now, it's useful if only for furnishing a common vocabulary).

[ganulv]

The metaphors aren't too helpful I'm afraid but I would argue that there is a "generative" centre (not Chomsky's generative grammar but a similar sort of idea) or an ethico-practical episteme which demarcates the interor and exterior of the Islamic field (as discursive practice) which seesm to gell with what Muslims and various Muslim written texts would argue.

Yeah, but Java ain’t Mali and Mali ain’t Saudi Arabia.

[Dayuhan]

It's worth asking whether the "predisposition" is entirely a function of Islam.

You could argue that what we call Islamic radicalism is largely a reaction to the same toxic batch of colonial/neocolonial/postcolonial unpleasantness that drove so much of the world toward leftist radicalism not so long ago. According to that argument the same basic motivations coalesced around a different ideological base in different environments, and we should be paying less attention to the ideological base and more to the driving impulse.

I'm not saying that argument is 100% right or universally applicable, but there is merit in it and it shouldn't be ignored.

[jmm99]

If Situational Action Theory seems material to you, a similar construct by Lonnie Athens, Violent Encounters : Violent Engagements, Skirmishes, and Tiffs may also help to float your boat.

From the author’s study of violent and nonviolent offenders and nonoffenders’ accounts, he drewtwo main conclusions about the interaction that takes place between the perpetrator and victim when violent crimes are committed. First, these crimes are committed during violent encounters that encompass five stages: (1) role claiming, (2) role rejection, (3) role sparring, (4) role enforcement, and (5) role determination. Second, based on how many of these stages are completed, violent encounters can be divided into three subtypes: (1) engagements, (2) skirmishes, and (3) tiffs. Violent dominance encounters that go through all five stages constitute engagements, those that enter only four of the stages constitute skirmishes, and those that enter only three of the stages constitute tiffs. Thus, for any theory to provide a complete explanation of violent crimes, it must be able to account for not only violent engagements but also violent skirmishes and tiffs.

More refs to Athens' reserach in this post; see especially, his conclusion re: group violence which is quoted in full in that post.

Athens has a number of examples where the initial "victim" - via provocation of one sort or another - becomes the aggressor who avenges the initial insult and then some. E.g., the case at p.26 (pdf) of Violent Encounters.

Regards

Mike

[Tukhachevskii]

Yeah, but Java ain’t Mali and Mali ain’t Saudi Arabia.

True in a geographical sense. But in a richer sense Muslims have things in common which transcend time and place; they pray 3-5 times a day, toward Mecca, go on Hajj, read the Quran, valorise Muhammad as "the walking Quran" i.e., as the perfect example of Muslims man to be emulated - an Islamic Archetype in Jungian terms (A'isha), etc. These and other discursive practies demarcate them from whatever locale they may be in whether its Coventry (UK), Kandhar or Ohio or Buenos Aires. This universal Umma, only a potentiality beofre- limited by time, space and the "netwroks of government (to borrow frm Duetsch) was sundered when the capliphate and its successor systems were sundered. Modernity, especially communications that transcend the political limitations of geographical dispertion have reconnected the elements opf the system reinforcing and revivifying the system (which was always latent). But thats IMO and I'm still struggling with putting that down in a manner acceptable to journal editors of whatever ilk (i.e., in some kind of ordinary language)

[ganulv]

True in a geographical sense.

I just have a thing about impressing upon non-Muslims that not all Muslims live in the Middle East. In fact, most don’t—there are more Muslims living in Hausaland than in Saudi Arabia, and Indonesia is the country with more Muslim residents than any other. And predominately Muslim societies vary as much or more than predominately Christian societies do. While I have the feeling that most Americans probably imagine all predominately Muslim nations to be as religiously intolerant as Saudi Arabia or Iran (which I understand to be noticeably more tolerant than Saudi Arabia) during the five weeks I spent in Burkina Faso last summer I was not prosthelytized to a single time. This did not fail to make an impression on someone who grew up in Western North Carolina as a Methodist and regularly was told that they don’t preach the Bible in my church.

But regardless of local variation the Ummah is real. Using this reality as the basis of a new caliphate would seem to be the dream of Al-Qaeda types and the nightmare of John Birch types. My impression is that the vast majority of Muslims living in Metro Detroit and Jakarta are not much interested.

[Bob's World]

It's a lot like the old adage, of "if a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, does it make any noise?"

A similar condition is true for the ideological messages of those seeking to conduct UW abroad or to stir up insurgency at home. Such a leader must employ some type of ideology; but if the message does not speak to the target audience it will fall flat; or equally, if the target audience is satisfied with their governmental situation they will likely not bite even if the message is one they could generally get on board with.

Ideology just does not 'radicalize' a populace, government does. Ideology is just the nudge to get them moving in a certain direction to do something about it.

So "radical Islam" falls flat on Muslim populaces that are largely satisfied with their governance situation; and certainly falls flat on non-Muslim populaces even if they are dissatisfied with their governance.

Governments love to "blame-shift" and blaming ideology is an time honored favorite fall guy.

Best for those who are attempting to counter such efforts to not agonize over the message so much and instead focus on the target populace, attempt to empathize with that populace as to how they might perceive their governance along certain critical criteria, and then focus efforts on competing more productive messages that are linked to addressing those reasonable concerns about the nature of governance.

[Dayuhan]

Ideology just does not 'radicalize' a populace, government does. Ideology is just the nudge to get them moving in a certain direction to do something about it.

The problem with this formulation is that most of the rage is not directed at their governments. It's directed at perceived aggression against Muslims, Muslim territory, and Islam in general. It's directed generically at "the West" and at the US as the most visible, powerful symbol of the west. A great deal of it traces back not to frustration with their own governments, but to a culture of what Bernard Lewis calls "aggressive self-pity", to some extent reaching across the Muslim world but strongest in the Arab community. It draws on the deep past of gradual European encroachment and fading Muslim influence, on colonialism and neocolonialism, on the situation with Israel, on recent American actions, and a great deal more. It's a pretty toxic stew and it cannot be reduced solely to misgovernment.

If Saudi Arabia were transformed tomorrow into a democracy, the people who hate Israel, the US, and the west today would still hate them tomorrow, and Saudis would still fund and join AQ's efforts to drive the infidel out of the land of the faithful.

[marklewis1979]

Thanks guys,

These replies are exactly what I was hoping for. I completely agree that local political conditions require examination to help explain reactions, and David, your comments about why Denmark, and why then, perfectly illustrate the issue.

I also fully agree with Tukhachevskii in that there would not be such on-demand success for violent rioting in the Islamic world, or Islamic cultural pockets in the West, if it were not for a fundamentally receptive audience, and this point will be a foundation to my thesis. Also, thank you for directing me to the paper on situational action theory. This is precisely the subject matter I need to incorporate into the paper.

I have a mountain of research ahead of me, so these referrals are gold!

-Mark