Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[Bill Moore]

Nonsense. It has everything to do with Wahhabism and KSA.



Again more non-sense. The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia is about power, not religion. They are the competing regional hegemons in the Gulf, and Iran is inherently the stronger state by size, population, and resources. KSA's response has been to increase relations with the U.S., export terrorism, and build its alliance of Gulf kingdoms. At the same time, it has been desperate to shore up its religious legitimacy lest it face a revolt at home from the religious base.



The Saudis care less that the Syrian leadership is not Sunni than they care that Syria, since its independence, has been one of the leading voices of Arab nationalism and a competitor for regional hegemony; first through control of the opposition to Israel. KSA joined the Syrian civil war to destroy the ally of its main adversary, Iran, not because they're concerned about which prayers the Assad family uses.

AP I don't understand why Westerners at this point in time deny that much of this conflict is certainly about religion. The Sunni and Shia divide was certainly over interpretation of religion, as was the jihad that established the original caliphate which extended into Spain. There is always politics involved, but I think it is a mistake to believe we will solve the current conflict between Shias and Sunnis through a combination of political and economic structural changes. There are clearly two major sets of actors in this conflict, states and non-state. State actors leverage religion to pursue political ends, while non-state actors leverage states to pursue religious ends.

The politics is always local argument tends to fall apart when you see Islamists (and others) coming from around the world to support their particular religious sect (or extremist group based on religion). Politics are ultimately about identity groups, and if the identity group is based on religion and transcends state borders, and the goals of those identity groups (in some cases) are get everyone to submit to their particular religious view then how can we rationally deny it is a religious war? Are other factors, important factors involved? Most certainly, but we can't erase the religious aspect just to make it conform to our theory about conflicts and war.

King Jaja makes important points, as do other religious groups who are being targeted by the Islamists. We can ignore them and look at the world differently, but that doesn't change the underlying reality of why people are fighting. A theory is only good as long as it works, our political theories of conflict don't explain what is happening today. I disagree with Outlaw that this conflict has nothing to do with Christians, they're certainly being targeted throughout much of the Muslim world by Islamists. That leads to formally normal citizens like Slapout, embracing extremist ideas of their own and the character of the conflict evolves/changes over time. King Jaja may be able to spread light on this, but even 20 years ago various international Christian groups were smuggling arms into Nigeria to help the Christians battle/defend themselves against the Muslims. This wasn't sponsored by any state, but by religious groups. It is a multi-dimensional problem of which religion plays a significant role.

[KingJaja]

AP I don't understand why Westerners at this point in time deny that much of this conflict is certainly about religion. The Sunni and Shia divide was certainly over interpretation of religion, as was the jihad that established the original caliphate which extended into Spain. There is always politics involved, but I think it is a mistake to believe we will solve the current conflict between Shias and Sunnis through a combination of political and economic structural changes. There are clearly two major sets of actors in this conflict, states and non-state. State actors leverage religion to pursue political ends, while non-state actors leverage states to pursue religious ends.

The politics is always local argument tends to fall apart when you see Islamists (and others) coming from around the world to support their particular religious sect (or extremist group based on religion). Politics are ultimately about identity groups, and if the identity group is based on religion and transcends state borders, and the goals of those identity groups (in some cases) are get everyone to submit to their particular religious view then how can we rationally deny it is a religious war? Are other factors, important factors involved? Most certainly, but we can't erase the religious aspect just to make it conform to our theory about conflicts and war.

King Jaja makes important points, as do other religious groups who are being targeted by the Islamists. We can ignore them and look at the world differently, but that doesn't change the underlying reality of why people are fighting. A theory is only good as long as it works, our political theories of conflict don't explain what is happening today. I disagree with Outlaw that this conflict has nothing to do with Christians, they're certainly being targeted throughout much of the Muslim world by Islamists. That leads to formally normal citizens like Slapout, embracing extremist ideas of their own and the character of the conflict evolves/changes over time. King Jaja may be able to spread light on this, but even 20 years ago various international Christian groups were smuggling arms into Nigeria to help the Christians battle/defend themselves against the Muslims. This wasn't sponsored by any state, but by religious groups. It is a multi-dimensional problem of which religion plays a significant role.

I don't know about Christian groups smuggling arms to local Christians in Nigeria, but we've had a low intensity religious war between Muslims and Christians going on in Northern Nigeria for close to 20 years - the roots of this conflict even go further in the past.

If you listen carefully to Boko Haram, they tap into the grievances of Muslims - there have been massacres in Yelwa, Kaduna, Dogo na Hawa - pitting each side against the other.

About 10 - 30,000 people killed last decade - this was before Boko Haram

[KingJaja]

Let me also add that I'm not sure the US fully understands what's going on here - it is focused on "terrorism" with a minor focus on "social justice", but one thing that escapes the attention of many US analysts is this: the post-colonial order in Afrika and the Middle-east is being challenged.

There is state failure and yes, there is state formation. Somalia is a failed state, it gave rise to terrorism, but it also gave raise to Somaliland - a de facto, not de jure state under international law. In the 20 odd years in which the rest of Somalia failed, Somaliland has done remarkably well in building its own institutions.

Just like US prefers to maintain the fiction that Congo is a "state", it persisted in maintaining the fiction that a united Iraq can exist without a brutal, unifying dictator. ISIS has triggered what was always going to happen - a partition of Iraq & has also created new facts on the ground.

US has spent the past 50 years maintaining French, British & Portuguese spheres of influence in the developing World without asking deep questions about the "hows" and the "whys" of "state formation" in these parts of the globe.

US is invested in the Sahel, ostensibly to check the "spread of terrorism" - but has anyone asked about the roots of the Toureg rebellions of 1962 -64, 1990 - 95 and 2012 in Mali?

US intervenes, then it looks like Iraq again - a lot of the underlying issues were kept hidden by the French, then US discovers a lot of stuff it should have known going in.

[AmericanPride]

US has spent the past 50 years maintaining French, British & Portuguese spheres of influence in the developing World without asking deep questions about the "hows" and the "whys" of "state formation" in these parts of the globe.

I think this is central to what is going on in Iraq. Compared to the West, all of the states in the Middle East are relatively young (some exception could be argued for Iran and Turkey). Iraqi state formation never achieved the level of stability found in Europe - and this problem existed before the emergence of organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS. The collapse (read: destruction) of the Iraqi state in the midst of the revival of militant Islam created an opportunity for the formation of such groups.

[AmericanPride]

AP I don't understand why Westerners at this point in time deny that much of this conflict is certainly about religion. The Sunni and Shia divide was certainly over interpretation of religion, as was the jihad that established the original caliphate which extended into Spain. There is always politics involved, but I think it is a mistake to believe we will solve the current conflict between Shias and Sunnis through a combination of political and economic structural changes.

Bill - in my analysis, religion (and other forms of identity) are frames through which to view political and economic structures. Between 1948 and 2014, the structures in the Middle East have remained remarkably resilient - minus the revolution in Iran and the destruction of Iraq. What has changed however is that the post-War frames of colonial-anticolonialism, nationalism, republicanism, and of course the Cold War have all disappeared. This started in 1973 with the defeat of the Arab republics of Syria and Egypt, spelling the death of Arab nationalism. What has occurred since then? 1979 was the seminal year for the emergence of militant Islam - seizure of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia; the Iranian revolution; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. These events set into motion the strengthening of Islamism as an organizing principle and so the structural conflicts that were present before (i.e. Iranian-Saudi animosity) took on a religious tone. This is not to say that religion is unimportant - it absolutely is important. But I think it's difficult to argue that it is the cause of the current strife in the Middle East when the problems existed long before the emergence of militant Islam as a credible movement in its modern incarnation.

There are clearly two major sets of actors in this conflict, states and non-state. State actors leverage religion to pursue political ends, while non-state actors leverage states to pursue religious ends.

This is true in the post-1973 period. Who here remembers the communist Palestinian terrorist organizations like the PFLP and the DFLP or consider them serious threats to international security today? The paradigm has shifted from nationalism to religion but that doesn't mean the nature of the base conflict has also fundamentally changed.

The politics is always local argument tends to fall apart when you see Islamists (and others) coming from around the world to support their particular religious sect (or extremist group based on religion).

I agree - religion is a powerful organizing principle. But even during the Cold War, ideological militants also behaved similarly, just not on the same scale.

Politics are ultimately about identity groups, and if the identity group is based on religion and transcends state borders, and the goals of those identity groups (in some cases) are get everyone to submit to their particular religious view then how can we rationally deny it is a religious war? Are other factors, important factors involved? Most certainly, but we can't erase the religious aspect just to make it conform to our theory about conflicts and war.

I don't think religion can or should be ignored. But I also don't think (1) resolving whatever religious grievance is presumably at the heart of the conflict will actually end the conflict or (2) that understanding the nuances of the theology is helpful in understanding a path towards conflict termination. Twenty years ago ISIS did not exist. Ten years ago it was in its infant stages. Now militants are flocking to its banner - what has changed? I don't think it's because people are any more zealous than usual or because the ISIS message is more relevant now than previously; this is a path of conflict escalation created by the break down of civil society in Iraq framed by religion. The Arab world has been an ideological desert since 1973 and Arab nationalism is virtually non-existent, so that leaves religion as the only credible organizing principle with which to frame conflict. Minus the semantics, would the grievances and justifications be fundamentally different if religion was replaced by, say, nationalism or communism? I doubt it. The disputes between Iraqi-Iran, KSA-Iran, Israel-Arabs, etc would still be present.

[slapout9]

1979 was the seminal year for the emergence of militant Islam - seizure of the Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia;

And where might this Grand Mosque be located? Could it be in a city I found out it had already been done and was used as part of a winning Strategy by our present opponents? Could it be if we professionally study and discuss how our enemy uses religion to control and defeat a population, instead of reacting emotionally, we (USA) might find a way to win or at least solve a dangerous situation?

[AmericanPride]

And where might this Grand Mosque be located? Could it be in a city that I was attacked by the moderator Gang for mentioning as a target, because I found out it had already been done and was used as part of a winning Strategy by our present opponents? Could it be if we professionally study and discuss how our enemy uses religion to control and defeat a population, instead of reacting emotionally, we (USA) might find a way to win or at least solve a dangerous situation?

The destruction of a holy city in one of the world's most prominent faiths is not a serious proposition.

[slapout9]

The destruction of a holy city in one of the world's most prominent faiths is not a serious proposition.

Why did they do it then?

[AmericanPride]

Why did they do it then?

Inside the Kingdom by Robert Lacey provides good context and consequences for the incident on Saudi Arabia. In it, he describes how the material prosperity of KSA in the 1970s triggered a religious reaction (not unlike other societies that experience similar changes). The surprise and audacity of the event shocked the Saudi leadership, and in the hopes of repairing their religious legitimacy as they built their material wealth, the Saudi state made a deliberate decision to move closer to its own religious right to appease the anxiety about modernization and Western influences. For al-Otaybi and his men in particular who seized the mosque - they thought they were ushering in the arrival of the Mahdi and the overthrow of the House of Saud. They were all killed or executed.

Now your 'strategy' of annihilating a religious city - well, that's a guaranteed method to create more al-Otaybis, bin Ladens, and al-Bahgdadis.

4. What possibly could be the West's "long-term plan" for countering these narratives since it no longer has the military might nor the legitimacy to enforce its will on people in the developing World - nor a narrative that gels with the World's poor?

There is no long term plan. The U.S. does not do long-term strategy and what strategy it does do, it does not do very well.

[JMA]

Now your 'strategy' of annihilating a religious city - well, that's a guaranteed method to create more al-Otaybis, bin Ladens, and al-Bahgdadis.

And what will be created by the destruction of Christian sites by radical Muslems?

[KingJaja]

The destruction of a holy city in one of the world's most prominent faiths is not a serious proposition.

I'm going to deviate a bit here - I don't agree with your thesis on religion, i.e. that is is a "mere organizing principle". The Muslim Brotherhood was formed as long ago as the 1920s.

Okay, if we assume that politics is major factor driving religious movements in the Middle-east; what politiks is responsible for the rise of Evangelical Christianity in the Developing World - from the slums of Lagos to the favelas of Brazil?

I'm from an interesting nation; Nigeria - you can see a rise in religious fundamentalism in both major religions - Islam & Christianity.

I'm not sure this has to much to do with Middle-east politics.

[KingJaja]

This may be unrelated, but I must say it because I live in Lagos, Nigeria - not New York or London.

1. Religious narratives are gaining traction in the developing World. The attraction is not primarily political, it is spiritual.

2. These narratives are "accessible" to the poor in the way no Western narrative is likely to ever be.

3. What is is the "Western narrative"? Is it capitalism - that doesn't work for the poor? Or "freedom" - that the West often abandons for expediency (whether it is Paul Kagame in Rwanda or Al Sisi in Egypt)? How is the West going to fight this "battle of ideas"?

4. What possibly could be the West's "long-term plan" for countering these narratives since it no longer has the military might nor the legitimacy to enforce its will on people in the developing World - nor a narrative that gels with the World's poor?

[ganulv]

This may be unrelated, but I must say it because I live in Lagos, Nigeria - not New York or London.

1. Religious narratives are gaining traction in the developing World. The attraction is not primarily political, it is spiritual.

2. These narratives are "accessible" to the poor in the way no Western narrative is likely to ever be.

They’re not always so primarily spiritual as you let on. In the 1980s the Guatemalan dictatorship was actively supportive of Pentecostalism, and association with evangelical communities provided a measure of safety at a time when Catholicism = Liberation Theology = Communism in the eyes of the generals. Hezbollah is avowedly Islamist, and they don’t separate that fact from their development and political activities.

I don’t think there is a blanket response to your questions/comments. It just depends on the locale.

[Bill Moore]

This may be unrelated, but I must say it because I live in Lagos, Nigeria - not New York or London.

1. Religious narratives are gaining traction in the developing World. The attraction is not primarily political, it is spiritual.

2. These narratives are "accessible" to the poor in the way no Western narrative is likely to ever be.

3. What is is the "Western narrative"? Is it capitalism - that doesn't work for the poor? Or "freedom" - that the West often abandons for expediency (whether it is Paul Kagame in Rwanda or Al Sisi in Egypt)? How is the West going to fight this "battle of ideas"?

4. What possibly could be the West's "long-term plan" for countering these narratives since it no longer has the military might nor the legitimacy to enforce its will on people in the developing World - nor a narrative that gels with the World's poor?

1. Spiritual fills a void (most humans are spiritual, intellectual, and physical), and also provides a narrative that explains what is happening in the world. I think AQ and Islamist narrative resonates because so far it does explain what is happening in the world to many poor and not so poor people. Early 2000s, there was an article in the San Antonio Times that expressed surprise in how many Mexican Catholics were converting to Islam, the reporter interviewed a few converts, and they said Islam explains what is happening in the world and fills a void that Christianity didn't. It would be interesting to explore that further and identify what that void is, and if it is the same void that leads some Muslims to take an extremist path.

2. Agree very strongly, but our Department of State doesn't seem to recognize this. This may be an unfair comment, but we tend to keep pushing the same narrative even though it fails to resonate with only a few educated people at tea parties and who have some degree of wealth. We're not so good at sensing ground truth in the masses who are living off a dollar or so per day.

3. I think the Western narrative is freedom, democracy, and capitalism (free markets). Freedom means different things to different people, an Islamist may desire to be free of Western forms of government so he can impose his views and laws on others. Democracy is a messy form of government, and young democracies are highly unstable and the majority fail. I tend to agree with Churchhill that it is the least bad form of governance, but you can't transition to a democracy overnight. Certain conditions must be created over decades related to education, economics, social norms, etc. before it has a chance to develop. Capitalism and free markets mean competition, when there is competition there are losers and winners, and those living off a dollar a day are going to compete effectively against those that have means (money, education, networks, etc.). Capitalism will likely be losing proposition for the economically oppressed, and simply expose them to more exploitation. Again we need to identify transitional/condition setting objectives to enable that transition if we insist on keeping this as a goal.

4. In my opinion we need to slow our roll and deeply self-reflect about what we want to accomplish in the world, what can be accomplished, and what is moral. I'm just one voter among millions, and I'm not aware of any politicians in our country running on that platform, so it is just another worthless set of ideas from one concerned American.

[carl]

And where might this Grand Mosque be located? Could it be in a city that I was attacked by the moderator Gang for mentioning as a target, because I found out it had already been done and was used as part of a winning Strategy by our present opponents? Could it be if we professionally study and discuss how our enemy uses religion to control and defeat a population, instead of reacting emotionally, we (USA) might find a way to win or at least solve a dangerous situation?

Slap, rather than flattening those places, which I think would be unwise, how about taking them? I don't mean us taking them, I mean other Muslims taking them from the Saudis. Where is it written that the House of Saud must have authority over those places? Why not the Kurds, or the Turks or the Malaysians? Why should those lazy, fat trouble making Saudis have them if they refuse to shape up? IS is eventually going to go after those places anyway and the Saudis couldn't stand against those guys but others could. Maybe we should look at openly backing a side in the contest that is occurring within Islam between the takfiri killers and everybody else. If the takfiris win the contest it will be all of Islam against the rest of the world. That is what they are aiming to bring about. We should recognize that and try to figure out how to stop it.

[slapout9]

Slap, rather than flattening those places, which I think would be unwise, how about taking them? I don't mean us taking them, I mean other Muslims taking them from the Saudis. Where is it written that the House of Saud must have authority over those places? Why not the Kurds, or the Turks or the Malaysians? Why should those lazy, fat trouble making Saudis have them if they refuse to shape up? IS is eventually going to go after those places anyway and the Saudis couldn't stand against those guys but others could. Maybe we should look at openly backing a side in the contest that is occurring within Islam between the takfiri killers and everybody else. If the takfiris win the contest it will be all of Islam against the rest of the world. That is what they are aiming to bring about. We should recognize that and try to figure out how to stop it.

It's already happened sort of anyway and Bin Laden name was all over it. This is part of Muslim prophecies. A false Mahdi would attack Mecca and fail!!!!!!!thye beleive it happened in 1979. The real Mahdi will lead the Black Flaged Muslim Armies to conquer Iraq and Afghanistan or so the prophecy goes.Watch the link below.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nV6m8K21O8Y

[slapout9]

Link to Pat Lang comment on ISIS Tactics.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/sic_s...-damshtml.html

[slapout9]

Link not working for me.

try this this one and scroll down to 7 AUG 2014 for the post I am talking about.

http://turcopolier.typepad.com/