Gen Jones on Face the Nation, 4 Oct

[kotkinjs1]

The transcripts aren't out yet so I'm paraphrasing here, but:

Did anyone catch when Bob Schieffer questioned the general about the conventional wisdom regarding our assumption that if we pull out and the Taliban again take power in Afghanistan and that, by default, would mean al-Qaeda would follow and set up shop again?

And the general's reply?? He said that was 'hypothetical' and he'd rather not answer or address that.

Huh? "Hypothetical?!?" That's the fundamental assumption that our entire follow-on U.S. strategy is based on! The National Security Adviser can't even seem to back up the "conventional wisdom" that tells us that we can't separate the "threat" of the Taliban from al-Qaeda. If he can't tell us on national TV that by allowing the Taliban to regenerate and assume power in AFG will again allow the 'safe-haven' to form inviting al-Qaeda back in, then why are we taking any action? Nation-building, COIN+, or anything else?

The "defined" linkage between the threat to our vital national interests al-Qaeda poses and the nonsense in the strategic 'threat' of the Taliban is the foundation for everything we are doing right now and everything McChrystal is calling for. If Gen Jones won't publicly stay on that bandwagon or even comment on that assumption beyond saying it's only 'hypothetical,' it just reinforces why we need a strategic reassessment, not the rearranging of COIN or CT deckchairs that's currently underway.

[Ken White]

of international geopolitics where 'strategy' is defined not by militarily sound or logical measures but by national partisan politics, where 'military operations' all have a domestic content driver, where the sands shift constantly and the road signs are routinely jumbled and turned -- by the very people who told you to go in that sand pile by those roads...

It's like the opening scene in the old 'Mission Impossible' TV series; "Your mission, should you decide to accept it, Mr. Phelps...and that should any team member be caught or killed, the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of your actions." Heh. Not to worry. You get used to it after a while.

[davidbfpo]

Link to an interview on why Afghanistan: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ghanistan.html

Note there is no UK equivalent to the National Security Adviser, although there are a number of civil service filled posts on security issues.

davidbfpo

[Greyhawk]

He said that was 'hypothetical' and he'd rather not answer or address that.

From that one could infer there are those who would have it one way and those who would have it another, and that this argument is one fault line separating two sides of an internal administration debate, and the General (ret) isn't going to publicly air his view.

Or that somehow hypotheticals aren't part of the discussion, and they're only addressing realities. Like choosing strategy without discussing cost (say, number of troops needed to execute, for example) I'm not sure exactly how that would work.

As to whether AQ returns to Afghanistan or not I'm not sure it matters either way. Regardless of where al Qaeda's hypothetical next "base of operations" is I think it would be nice to be able to make a convincing case to that hypothetical nation's government that we're a reliable long-term partner.

[John T. Fishel]

resources is simply NOT a strategy. Perhaps, one could call it a policy?

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

resources is simply NOT a strategy. Perhaps, one could call it a policy?

Cheers

JohnT

That would at best be a passionate desire or perhaps a longing wish...

Click your heels 3 times, Dorothy...

[William F. Owen]

of international geopolitics where 'strategy' is defined not by militarily sound or logical measures but by national partisan politics, where 'military operations' all have a domestic content driver, where the sands shift constantly and the road signs are routinely jumbled and turned -- by the very people who told you to go in that sand pile by those roads...

Sort of begs the essay question, "When is Counter-Insurgency not Strategy?"

[Zack]

They already have a safe-haven in FATA anyhow (as safe as AQ can be anyhow). It is good to note that Afghanistan controlled by the Afghan Taliban probably will not allow AQ to set up shop again, but the bigger question to ask is about the validity of the whole safe haven argument in the first place. How did we come to the conclusion that AQ needs camps to be effective? A safe haven ala FATA or Afghanistan is neither needed for planning, funding, or executing a plot.

[davidbfpo]

They (AQ) already have a safe-haven in FATA anyhow (as safe as AQ can be anyhow). It is good to note that Afghanistan controlled by the Afghan Taliban probably will not allow AQ to set up shop again, but the bigger question to ask is about the validity of the whole safe haven argument in the first place. How did we come to the conclusion that AQ needs camps to be effective? A safe haven ala FATA or Afghanistan is neither needed for planning, funding, or executing a plot.

Zack,

I suspect domestic politics in the USA primarily dictate the use of preventing AQ current or future use of a safe haven in Afghanistan; it is an easy argument to use and quite emotional. Plus difficult to argue against without being labelled "appeaser" or defeatist.

If you were to tell the public a safe haven is not required for AQ inspired or directed acts of terror, that would lead to far wider and effective challenges to the choices made. Preserving the long term future of Pakistan / India / South Asia is not an argument that resonates on the "high street'.

Politically and bureaucratically when there are so many demands for attention and resources labelling AQ terrorism as a foreign based threat enables it to become an over the horizon issue.

Just a few moments pondering.

davidbfpo

[tequila]

It is good to note that Afghanistan controlled by the Afghan Taliban probably will not allow AQ to set up shop again, but the bigger question to ask is about the validity of the whole safe haven argument in the first place.

Why is a probability? I have yet to find any post a convincing argument why the Afghan Taliban would not allow AQ to come back --- assuming AQ wanted to, of course.

Despite our aerial bombing, the Pak Taliban seem to have no problem hosting AQ. Indeed, without AQ the Pak Taliban would probably not have ever come into being.

[Entropy]

AQ has now been "holed up" in Pakistan for longer than it was hosted by the Taliban in Pakistan. It's not clear whether or not they've "put down roots" and decided to stay. Their current position seems relatively secure since we and the Pakistanis have not been able to located and kill the top-tier leaders. So, I think an argument could be made that they are likely to stay where they are rather than enter a fractious post-US Afghanistan.

[Zack]

Why is a probability? I have yet to find any post a convincing argument why the Afghan Taliban would not allow AQ to come back --- assuming AQ wanted to, of course.

Despite our aerial bombing, the Pak Taliban seem to have no problem hosting AQ. Indeed, without AQ the Pak Taliban would probably not have ever come into being.

I think we have to make arguments that they would allow AQ back in, not the other way around. They were kicked out in 2001 because of AQ and Mullah Omar has suggested (I'll see if I can find a source for you) that were the Afghan Taliban to regain power in Kabul, that they would not allow AQ free reign. This is the default position in my opinion. It would be a rather poor decision on the part of the Afghan Taliban to let AQ back in after they had seized power.

[IntelTrooper]

Sort of begs the essay question, "When is Counter-Insurgency not Strategy?"

When it's ajar? Oops, wrong riddle...