A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?



Quote Originally Posted by Rob Thornton View Post
SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.

What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.

I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch)



A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.

The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.

Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.

Best, Rob