Chaotic Dynamics: A Novel Approach to Intelligence Analysis in Asymmetric Warfare

[Beelzebubalicious]

Jeff, I agree with what you're saying in principle, but to do so, you'd essentially have to "erase" someone's mental models, memories, etc. and then replace them with these artificial ones. Makes me think of the Jason Bourne book and movie series...

I think what Brian writes echoes what's written in the "Power of Impossible Thinking". That is (paraphrasing), you need to continuously challenge your mental models, test them, reconstruct them and remain flexible and open to intuition (vs. the voice that says it should be this or that). The best way to do this is to immerse yourself in other cultures, preferrably other countries.

I've lived in 3 countries (more than 2 years each - Japan, Eritrea and now Ukraine) and while my degree of immersion varied, in the first two, I was 90% immersed and while I learned a whole lot about the culture(s) I was living in, I learned as much about myself and my own cultural and personal models. I still make a hell of a lot of mistakes, but one thing I have learned is never, never assume that I know what's going on or that my assumptions are right or real. I always try and triangulate my information sources if I can.

The problem with analysts is that if they're analyzing data in an office in Langely, then they're at a double disadvantage. They have their own American models and then they have their CIA training and culture to overcome. Kind of hopeless if you ask me. Hence, the efforts like these, I suppose.

By the way, Brian, the model you propose is pretty damn similar to the Peace Corps (I am a returned volunteer). I have a lot of interesting examples from my time in Eritrea. One construct or model I could never overcome was "time" and my sense of it. I tried, but could never fully embrace the Eritrean concept of time. Another simplistic, but interesting example, was how many Peace Corps volunteers used to "dress down" in an attempt to be closer to their colleagues, however, this was their own model and assumption. Eritreans are a very proud people and even the poorest would take meticulous care of their clothes and alwasy try to be as presentable as possible. Dressing down was indulgent and even offensive to some (even your poorest American is much wealthier than most Eritreans).

Well, I'm now too long-winded, but it's a subject I find very interesting. By the way, I found the link to Dr. Johnston's work. His whole study is published here.

[Rex Brynen]

The problem with analysts is that if they're analyzing data in an office in Langely, then they're at a double disadvantage. They have their own American models and then they have their CIA training and culture to overcome. Kind of hopeless if you ask me. Hence, the efforts like these, I suppose.

I do have to say that there is some real quality product coming out of the IC--much, much better, I think, than many people presume.

That having been said, there is the problem of the analyst being cocooned in an organizational box. It is more of a potential problem in the US IC, where its possible to spend 95%+ of your time at (say) interacting with colleagues from your own agency, and very little reaching across DC to share (differing) perspectives with people in other branches of government, let alone the NGO, academic, (etc) communities. In the past couple of years ODNI and the NIC have been trying to address this, with some success.

In smaller ICs, there simply aren't enough folks in the analytical community to make this sort of organizational cocooning possible (although there are obviously other serious problems with a smaller analytical community).

A related complication for the US IC is that US diplomats are either restricted, self-restricted in their functioning in some countries of high interest, or not even present at all. Given the very considerable value of quality diplomatic reporting, this can be quite the disadvantage.

[wm]

I am going to go out on a limb here and suggest that the reason that the folks in the Harvard study did not see the gorilla is less due to the fact of “inattentional blindness” and more due to the fact of intentional focussing, AKA tunnel vision. If I am directed to look for a certain thing, I will tend to devote myself to that hunt. I will not attend to other things that might merit my attention because I have chosen to exclude them. Consider a “Where’s Waldo” picture as a case in point. In the back of Martin Handford’s books, one will usually find a list of other things to find in the pictures besides Waldo. When hunting for Waldo though, how often does one notice his dog Woof, his arch-enemy Odlaw, Professor Whitebeard, Wanda, or Wilma, not to mention all the other “punnily” described items in those lists?

Over and above the issue of selective attention, I suspect that we ought to consider some things like the nature of certainty, proof, and truth with more than just a passing handwave. The article’s single paragraph summations of Platonic and Aristotelian epistemology are massive oversimplifications, and therefore, distortions of some very detailed analyses. They set up the poles of a debate that still rages today. In that light, I’d suggest, as a minimum, that the work of a few 20th Century philosophers and mathematicians be consulted. Ludwig Wittgenstein’s work, On Certainty is extremely insightful. In it he suggests that what often passes for verification of the truth is like buying several copies of the same newspaper and re-reading the same story (speaks to Rex's point about staying in the same agency). I heartily endorse R.G. Collingwood’s work on re-enactment in the philosophy of history as well as his consideration of absolute presuppositions and philosophical method. Godel’s incompleteness theorem is noteworthy for the fact that it shows the limits to proofs. I recommend reading the debate on the problems with translation and conceptual schemes between WVO Quine and Donald Davidson. The Confucian notion regarding rectification of names might be worth looking at too. And, while we’re at it, how about a look at a few Zen koans and the parables of Jesus to try to reframe the boxes in which we tend to do our conceptualizing?

One last point about using native speakers as translators: ever have anyone ask you if you want gravy on your spaghetti?*

Usually, one is a native speaker of only one language. Native speakers of Iraqi Arabic are English As A Second Language (ESL) speakers. They will have the same kinds of cultural disconnects when trying to get the words right for their English native speaking employers. And, that is without consideration for such things as idiolects, regionalisms, colloquialisms, and slang. My Nebraska-born father described a heavy rain storm as “a trash mover and a gully washer,” my New Hampshire-born grandmother talked about “ it raining pitchforks and hammer handles,” my Paris-born French teacher said it was “raining halberds” and most other folks I know say ”it’s raining cats and dogs.” While I might describe a certain car as “cool” or “hot,” my 10-year old describes it as a “sick” car. My brother-in-law might describe that same car as “the balls” or “the nuts.” We live within a few miles of each other and are, supposedly, speaking the same English. Now, that’s chaos!





*If you live in and around Chelsea, Massachusetts, "gravy" is what you probably call the tomato sauce put on pasta.

[Brian Hanley]

Beelzebubalicious - The difference betweent that and the Peace Corps is that you are going in to develop a network of people that work for you in a business. Seriously, I think there is no better way to create a network that will give you "ins" into the real world. You aren't going to hobnob with the poor, you are going to get into the world of the rich and powerful. But aside from that, yes, it's got its similarities.


JeffC - The real concern I have with your proposal above is that it presumes that you even could create a simulated society of terrorists. The problem with that is that anything you come up with will be from your own map of the world. In this, Osama and his boys have an advantage over us. They know how we think and work because we broadcast it everywhere. We don 't even try to listen to what they are saying. If you are serious about it, and have no other resource, I would recommend following Al Jazeera and the major newspapers in Tehran, Lahore and Riyadh. It will be one hell of an eye-opener, that's for sure. I'm sure there must be a translated version of those available somewhere in the vast federal government bureacracy.

The first time you read an article on the front page of a major Arab paper that says, in all seriousness, that Israelis are harvesting Arab children to put their blood in passover matzoh, and you see that the author is a PhD professor at the university - well, you'll begin to realize how very different things are.

To really get inside the head of a fanatic though, one either has to have been one (of some religious persuasion) or else have been very close to one or more. Personally, I think one of the best resources we have in the USA on how those guys think is people like Falwell. They, like Osama, are "people of the book" and take its dictates as literally as possible. They both motivate large numbers of people. (Hope I didn't offend anyone here by saying that. They have different ideological maps, very different.)

[Rex Brynen]

We don 't even try to listen to what they are saying.

That's simply not the case, Brian--the IC is full of people who know their files well, spend enormous time listening to public (and not-so-public) discourse, and write some excellent analytical product.

There will always be some things that we don't know because of the challenges of collection, the "other side's" OPSEC and CCD efforts, the complexities of human decision-making, the array of relevant variables, the challenges of prediction, etc.

Ted is absolutely right in highlighting the central importance of good recruitment, training, professional development and mentoring, and field (and, i would add, cross-disciplinary or interagency) familiarity.

[Brian Hanley]

That's simply not the case, Brian--the IC is full of people who know their files well, spend enormous time listening to public (and not-so-public) discourse, and write some excellent analytical product.

OK. I sit corrected. However, I have not seen much evidence of it getting to people that need it or want it. And I'd say that includes the public. This is an ideological war first and foremost. I would still recommend going direct to translations before analysis for most. It makes the case better.

[JeffC]

JeffC - The real concern I have with your proposal above is that it presumes that you even could create a simulated society of terrorists. The problem with that is that anything you come up with will be from your own map of the world.

--- I'm certain that such a facility can be built and staffed inside Iraq or Egypt, possibly even Israel. And while it certainly wouldn't be perfect, it definitely would break apart the former mindset or mental model of the analysts that attended it, and replace it with one more in tune with that of an Islamic extremist.

--- More importantly, my suggested scenario is just a starting off point. I'm sure it would require a great deal of testing with alternate scenarios before the best solution would be arrived at.