Just applying Kitson's distinction. Same root cause, Subversion as it grows, Insurgency once the violence exceeeds a certain level (just to show I don't have to come up with my own approach for everything, and to throw Wilf a well-earned bone). But it is these causal conditions of insurgency at the roots of this whole mess that must be the main effort focus of good (effective) COIN. Too often we slave away at defeating the symptoms as they manifest and largely ignore the root causes.
This gets to the crux of my work; and why I see Karzai's efforts with reconciliation as the key to success in Afghanistan, regardless of what General we put in charge of the military coalition efforts. The coalition's military efforts have to be a supporting effort to a supporting effort (Afghan military efforts) for there to be true success. But that is not how we're approaching this.
By focusing on what Karzai is doing at the GIROA level we get at the actual heart of the insurgency. If he is unwilling to go all in on addressing the causal factors, then that is the metric we are looking for in terms of beginning our down-sizing of military effort. We can't just be the goon squad that keeps him in power.
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