Taliban successes in the North

[FieldMarshal]

It is interesting to note that Gormach district is mentioned in this new article, and Wikipedia says it is 97% Pashtun. Wikipedia of "Gormach district" also said it was part of Badghis province which is 62% Tajik and only 28% Pashtun as a whole. But wait, another Wikipedia says Gormach is NOW (as of Dec 2008) part of adjacent Faryab province...which is 53.5% Uzbek, 27% Tajik, and just 13% Pashtun. See the problem? A small Pashtun district that the Taliban is "invading" is surrounded by non-Pashtuns.

First of all. Afghan population data is notouriosly unreliable. That said, the article is about Qeysar, not Gormach. The TB allready controls Gormach, this story is about how they are effectively advancing into Uzbek dominated Qeysar and taking control over Uzbek villages unchecked.

[Cole]

First of all. Afghan population data is notoriosly unreliable. That said, the article is about Qeysar, not Gormach. The TB allready controls Gormach, this story is about how they are effectively advancing into Uzbek dominated Qeysar and taking control over Uzbek villages unchecked.

They specifically mention Gormach and other northern districts and provinces that are admittedly much different circumstances in some cases (Kunduz, Baghlan). However look at the acknowedged simplistic ethnic breakdown in this article. For folks looking at the chart unfamiliar with province locations, look at the small brown L-shaped area along the northern border with green Tajiks to the south and red Uzbeks to the east:

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-...ic-fault-lines

And Qeysar is next to Gormach and part of a small Taliban stronghold surrounded by Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Sure, the census may not be all that exact, but if 13% of a 833K-1 miilion Faryab citizens are Pashtun, how are you getting 300,000 Pashtuns? Are you counting 100,000 Kuchis...which still leaves a bit over 200,000.

[carl]

Four things struck me about this article.

The first is that it describes an invasion and occupation of an area by an outside force that then ruled mostly by terror. The villagers had no real choice in the matter though some perceived service is provided; and the occupiers aren't locals. The scene is reminiscent of the the opening scenes in the Magnificent Seven, bandits move in and take the place over.

The second thing is that the American force briefly fought the Taliban and then withdrew, according to the article, because of concern about property damage and disrupting the observation of Ramadan! If the article is correct, a big if, whoever was in charge of that unit handed the Taliban a victory for rather poor reasons.

Thirdly, the Taliban have a huge mobility advantage. They are described as using the desert and motorcycles almost as the Vikings used the sea. They drive around and strike from the desert at will. The Faryab governor implies we are not doing much about it.

The fourth thing is, surprise surprise, the threat is coming from Pakistan.

[carl]

I wanted to edit my previous post to include the following but I forgot how.

If the story reflects the actual situation, this may not be a hearts and minds, good governance type of thing, this is just a matter of killing bandits. That may be a simpler matter of arranging village self defense forces with reliable back up, simpler but still not so easy.

If it is more a matter of killing bandits, maybe the reasons given for the US unit pulling back reflect somebody overthinking the matter and considering things that don't matter so much if you are simply going after criminal gangs. This is total speculation on my part.

It is hard to effectively kill bandits if you can't pursue them effectively. MRAPs and Humvees don't have the mobility to catch dirt bikes. Helos are great but there aren't very many. Does a way have to be found to match the mobility dirt bike riding Taliban? I read long ago that in the 19th century the Argentine Army could not handle the Indians of the Pampas because they couldn't catch them. They couldn't catch them because the Indians always rode with strings of horses so they could continuously change mounts. When the Army began operating with strings of horses they could handle them. Are we in a similar situation?

[FieldMarshal]

The real key take-away from the article is not that it is bandits taking over, but rather that the insurgency in the North-West of a different flavour than in the south or the east.

The over-simplification that the insurgency in Afghanistan is a Pashtun endeavour and that "the others" are on "our side" is simply not accurate. It ignores the fact that there are several significant Uzbek terrorist groups and insurgent networks that have been operating throughout Afghanistan and Central Asia for a long time. It also ignores the fact that among the common Uzbek there is little love for the Afghan government, who is widely regarded as a tool for a corrupt, Pashtun elite from Kabul who has done little to nothing for the Uzbeks in the North. It also ignores that the Taliban at the height of their power was able to recruit a significant amount of both Uzbeks and to a certain extent Tajiks.

This is the context this article needs to be read in. When now the Uzbek villages of Qeysar are facing an "invasion" of Taliban insurgents operating out of the Taliban controlled areas of Northern Badghis, they are faced with a simple choice. The government, that they generally have little love for, and the CF in Faryab, a province of about 1.2 million inhabitants, are less numerous than the current ANSF/CF force maintaining control over the town of Marja in Helmand. They may not have a natural inclination towards the Taliban, but the situation right now dictates that they follow the basic rule of Afghan village life developed over the last 30 years: accept the strongest party in your neighbourhood.

What then about Dostum and his structure you might ask? Well. The trend is clear. His structure is crumbling at a very fast pace at the moment. Just over the last two months several of his old commanders has been assassinated as well as the kidnapping of one of the Junbesh parliamentary candidates by insurgents. His response? A couple of rants on Aina TV and little else.

Just to give you an indication. The total number of security forces in Faryab is one ANA kandak, 1300 ANP and one field artillery battalion for a popualtion of about 1.2 million. Do the math, and you'll see that there is little to prevent the insurgents from dominating the villages in the countryside.

[davidbfpo]

All too often the focus is in the South and East, not the North:

Some of them quiver in diffraction only a few miles away from Mazar-e-Sharif, the provincial capital.

Four weeks after the Taliban announced the beginning of their annual spring offensive, the insurgents have quietly taken over most of Balkh.

(Later) Or maybe because they realize that they are trapped, as Afghans have been forever, between armed men in different uniforms contesting their wretched land. Maybe they are simply hoping to get through the latest torment.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...lages?page=0,1

Note the author is not an 'embedded' journalist.

[davidbfpo]

Hamid Hussain, our irregular contributor on the Pakistani Army and other factors, has provided a commentary on the situation today, which also looks to what may happen. See attachment.

An assumption challenged:

Everyone is assuming that a friendly northern Afghanistan will be happy to host U.S. bases but things are changing quite rapidly. There is slow and steady rise of resentment even in the north against the presence of U.S. troops due to suspicion, war weariness and fear that these installations will invite attacks. There will be debate and significant opposition from various segments of Afghan population against a long term U.S. presence.