Airforce may be be going out of business

[Icepack6]

In 1997, we (I was assigned to the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office) suggested DoD significantly invest in UCAVS. The CONOPS was not the "tastes great-less filing" arguments of manned (expensive) vs un-inhabited (less expensive) aircraft for CAS, but a combining capabilites using both. Think F/A-18F or F-15E, and tethering 4-6 UCAVS to the mother ship via TADILC or Link 16. As mission requirements surface, a single UCAV is handed over to a terminal controller for employment. By using UCAVS with a human-in-the-loop in a tactical air commander (airborne) mode, one could stretch defense dollars while, arguably, increasing availability exponentially. After a lot of money was spent in analyzing this possibility and assessing the maturity of technologies required (they were ready), the USAF Heismanned the idea during the 1997 QDR by ignoring the results of the study. Eleven years later, we see UCAVs only on the advertising pages of of professional journals. . . . and now have the F-22/F-35 discussion butressing the "Old think" of the USAF as they see new aricraft only in the context of legacy missions (i.e., replacements for Eagles and Falcons).

[Presley Cannady]

Not only that, but let us not forget about software bugs.
How many times have each of us cursed Bill Gates when we get some kind of glitch associated with a software programming error?

Microsoft has a different, more expansive set of problems to deal with than the embedded arch required for UAV control.

Just think how many KSLOC (thousands of software lines of code) would have to be written and, at best only partially, debugged to get a fully automated or remotely piloted drone capability that comes close to matching what a human does in an aircraft moving at supersonic speeds.

On the order of 1e5. Outside of the front-end web developer space, debugging is only the first, most basic step in a test path. Given a defined envelope of requirements, unit, functional and performance testing harnesses ensure to at least a high degree of reliability (compared to a human) in a target system. And these test suites run in seconds to hours, as opposed to months and years for similar validation in manned pilot programs.

"Oops" just doesn't quite cut it when you get a 404 error and your Predator launched Hellfire flies into Hagia Sophia in Istanbul instead of Balla Hissar in Kabul.

If a contractor's selling you onboard software that interoperates via web services, you probably should drag him, his contracting officer and DASD Acquisitions into court. Beyond that, a lot of things would have to go wrong for a computer to mistake two targets thousands of miles away and successfully prosecute to full error. It's the equivalent of a human pilot, his combat commander, and dozens of others going full retard. On the other hand, the real problem is whether unmanned software is better able than a human being (who is undoubtedly relying on software anyway) to discriminate a target from a school a few dozen yards away. Or, barring that, if a computer can abort as reliably as a man.

[tankersteve]

OK, I have read this thread from end to end.

Certainly the hang-up or beef many of us have (those of us in the dirt world) is the AF crying for funding after years of watching them have facilities worlds beyond the other services. I think the other services see the Air Force as having forgotten that it is in the military and the mission, not people, come first.

The idea of a limited capability aircraft for COIN is outstanding. An aircraft along the lines of an OV-10 would be very useful. As you stand up the indigenous forces of the host nation, you could turn those aircraft over to them and buy new ones for yourself with the latest avionics/electronics, at a fraction of the cost of a new fighter jet. Wikipedia has some descriptions of what the original OV-10 design specs were to be and I think that would be an interesting aircraft. Perhaps a biplane to fit the 20 foot wingspan?

You have to wonder what we were thinking with F15/F16s providing aerial reconnaissance over Iraq and Afghanistan. We wanted the observation but the tradeoff of wear and tear on the airframes is questionable.

The Air Force likes to talk about having been on a war-time footing since Desert Storm. Well, we certainly didn't hear that back in the 1990s. Perhaps if they had mentioned it, they could have gotten new fighter aircraft (same models, just newer) through Congress. I suspect they didn't want to raise the issue too loudly because it would hurt recruiting and support for newer models of aircraft. Of course, as many here have mentioned, war-time footing for the Air Force (when not in an actual aircraft) means the danger of intermittent satellite TV...

We won WWII not by having the best stuff but having the most of pretty good stuff. Since the Air Force pilots are top notch, how about getting more 'good enough' birds, like upgraded F15/16 and having the ability to flood the airspace with more of them. The sheer numbers and their pilot's ability would outweigh the lack of technical uber-superiority.

Of course, to keep the cost of all these extra pilots down, we might have to have warrant officers flying them - not sure if AF could stomach that - institutional prejudice.

Perhaps the real beef here is the appearance (and likely just appearance) that the AF is much more interested in protecting it's sexy image of flying off in the wild blue yonder. Unmanned aircraft are not sexy. I truly think any officer could be trained to make the decision of shooting/not shooting, thus killing the AF hangup of having flight-qualified officers commanding armed UAVs. But the AF has a strange class/caste system where the flight-rated folks dominate and are treated differently. This could be a real upset to the culture. The AF will reply that the Army Chief of Staff and the key general officer commands only comes from the combat arms branches. True, but for the most part, in the Army, unless you are a commander, you really are not that special unless you have a lot of rank. In the AF, a rated officer is operating in a different sphere than his non-rated counterparts (not peers - they aren't).

I don't think the AF is going out of business. I do believe in the need for air superiority. I just think the AF doesn't have all its priorities in proper alignment and the very culture of the AF will have to change to properly affect this.

We need limited numbers of air superiority frames, and lots of drones for ISR and bombing. We might have to get by on simpler airframes, but we could use more of them. The AF might need warrants. Maybe they fly the drones.

I just hope the next administration and AF secretary take a realistic approach to this mess.

Tankersteve

[120mm]

Tankersteve -

I've corresponded with one of the USMC types who developed the OV-10, and the 20 foot wingspan is completely achieveable using a large chord wing, and avoiding malicious USAF efforts to kill the program/air craft through over-speccing. Ironically, though the USAF tried to kill the concept, they ended up buying them and using them during VN.

The original aircraft did not resemble the finished aircraft. But the concept of a rough field/no field aircraft that can be used (at low cost) to FTF with forward ground forces, drop ordnance, carry personnel and mark targets, without the typical rotary wing support issues is tempting.

[Entropy]

Tankersteve,

The Air Force likes to talk about having been on a war-time footing since Desert Storm. Well, we certainly didn't hear that back in the 1990s.

I was in the Navy during the 1990's and I certainly heard the AF make those kind of complaints. In particular, I remember the AF complaining about the "gruelling" 3 month deployments to OSW, how it was negatively affecting their equipment and training, how they need more money to offset those effects, and their suggestion the Navy should do more. It made us Navy guys laugh because we were probably on month 4 or 5 of a six-month deployment - something we got to do every 18 months with lots of little deployments in between. Of course, at that time, the Navy and Marines were the only true expeditionary services and the AF didn't really have the mindset or organization to conduct OSW in the most effective and efficient manner.

[Stevely]

The idea of a limited capability aircraft for COIN is outstanding. An aircraft along the lines of an OV-10 would be very useful. As you stand up the indigenous forces of the host nation, you could turn those aircraft over to them and buy new ones for yourself with the latest avionics/electronics, at a fraction of the cost of a new fighter jet. Wikipedia has some descriptions of what the original OV-10 design specs were to be and I think that would be an interesting aircraft. Perhaps a biplane to fit the 20 foot wingspan?

This won't happen because it would greatly upset the patronage system of the military-industrial-congressional complex. This would mean a lot less $$$ flowing into congressional districts and aerospace contractors' coffers, which would mean political death before the idea could ever really take hold.

Of course, this idea may sound more attractive as the reality sinks in that the nation (not just the government) is flat broke, but by then even el cheapo OV-10 style aircraft will seem like an extravagance.

[Cliff]

so I am still catching up here.

In previous discussions on the topic, Cliff has implied or said that there's very little or no difference in CAS efficiency between platforms...

The implication of all that being that the USAF is getting better at CAS -- no question form me on that. The further implication was that platforms were seen by the CAS recipients as immaterial and thus there was no reason not to go for multipurpose birds.

Ken-

My point wasn't that platforms aren't immaterial - but that the effects are the most important issue. If an A-10 bingoes out before it can get the job done, even if it has the best pilot, the B-52 that still has gas will be better.

Based on experience, that latter was counter intuitive -- but I'm old and not current so I couldn't weigh in on that other than broadly philosophically. Until I did some unscientific research and talked to soldats and Marines recently returned from both theaters and asked specific questions. Anecdotal results for your edification follow:

● The perception of CAS being platform immaterial is dependent on who is asked. Joe could care less as long as satisfying booms are heard; Staff Officers are even less concerned with anything other than the end result. Thus the people most likely to be asked and to answer will say, ala the M4 which is the only rifle most have used; "It's good..." OTOH, ask the Officers and NCOs who ask for, use and see up close CAS and they'll almost universally tell you that the platform they select, given a choice by the JFAC / TACP or whomever, will be in order: The A-10, or then an Apache; then a Cobra and then any other -- with the Afghan guys putting in B1 /52 after the Hoptiflopter gunships and before fast birds.

● They do this because the Hog and Gunship pilots fly slower, fly lower, are far more accurate and, very importantly, are used to doing the mission and can and will talk to guys on the ground in depth and in knowledgable terms about what they see from the air. They're willing and able to talk in terms the ground guys identify with and this is not true with respect to any of the fast movers.

Your reference to being used to doing the mission, talk in depth/knowledgable terms, etc are, in my opinion, the key. Being low and slow is an advantage, I agree... but TRAINING is the key. Hawgs are awesome at CAS because it is what they train to. Eagles are good at Air Superiority because it is what they train to... in flying the pilot and his training is huge. Yes the jet matters.... but pilot skill is worth at least as much, if not more. I've seen the best jets out there get schooled by guys driving obsolete jets... because the guy in the older jet knew what he was doing.

Interestingly enough, A-10 and F-15C folks get along really well, because they are both single-mission communities that train really hard to be good at one thing.

● The Marines are still perceived as doing CAS a little better than the USAF (by both Army and Marines and as is only to be expected, it is after all a doctrinal tenet for the Corps as opposed to a must do but unloved mission) and a part of this is their total willingness and ability to use their pods to provide eyes in the sky, they routinely volunteer to do it. They see it as part of the job while the perception is that most USAF fast movers don't like to bother with it. The British and Dutch also got good comments (and their Apaches particularly so).

It's unfortunate that this attitude pervades... in particular the work-ups of fast jet units for the desert have been focusing lately on NTISR and CAS... to the exclusion of almost all else. Trust me, USAF crews WANT to do these missions... sounds like a perception problem for us.

● This also confirms what both Cliff and Entropy said, that training and coordination are important. I'd merely add that while that's certainly true, the type of training is most important.

● I think it does however, certainly raise a significant question on platforms; not least that the type and planned use of the platform affects the mindset of its operator...

Definitely agree on the training part - that is huge. Also need to work on the coordination- that is a huge part of the training.

I raise the unwanted dead not to debate the need for the Air Force or for air superiority -- those are givens -- nor to pick further squabbles or argue about or for platforms (reminder; I'm an F-22 and an F-35 supporter ) but merely to add some more information to the discussion. It is, as I said, totally anecdotal information and from a small (but I think knowledgeable and reliable) sample, however, it tracks to me and is probably worth at least some consideration by you guys in Blue...

Awesome words Ken. I wonder what kind of capture of data like this is going on from the folks down at Maxwell? I hope they are looking at things like this.

Entropy said:

I think that is where we are headed personally. Who knows, maybe one day the JTAC will BE the CAS pilot. Wouldn't that be cool?

I've mentioned it before, and I know folks may not have heard, but the USAF for the last 2 yrs has been hugely ramping up the number of UAVs we have deployed. Part of that was taking guys from all fighters and sending them to UAVs at younger ages. The good part has been that we have taken a bunch of guys with great experience at CAS, NTISR, CAS, etc and transfered it to the UAV communities. Prior to this the majority of UAV folks didn't have a lot of experience with this sort of thing. My understanding is the UAV as a Killer Scout is already happening. It would be tough to have a UAV be a FAC, only because the UAV has a hard time evaluating the run in for the striker... but it probably isn't far off either.

120 said:

I've corresponded with one of the USMC types who developed the OV-10, and the 20 foot wingspan is completely achieveable using a large chord wing, and avoiding malicious USAF efforts to kill the program/air craft through over-speccing. Ironically, though the USAF tried to kill the concept, they ended up buying them and using them during VN.

The original aircraft did not resemble the finished aircraft. But the concept of a rough field/no field aircraft that can be used (at low cost) to FTF with forward ground forces, drop ordnance, carry personnel and mark targets, without the typical rotary wing support issues is tempting.

The OV-10 isn't survivable except in a very low threat environment. The AF is actively buying T-6s for the COIN role.... in AFSOC. If the enemy has any reasonable SAM capability, OV-10s aren't much of an option... and when I talk SAMs, I am not talking MANPADs, although for AC-130s and OV-10s those are bad enough. SA-11s or SA-13s are even more bad news...

The other problem with the OV-10 or T-6 is that its advantage in many folk's mind is a drawback... the slow speed means that CAS jets take a long time to get to the right folks unless they happen to be right there. To get the same response time, you need a lot more aircraft... and the ones who aren't employed are wasted effort. In a COIN fight this isn't as big an issue... in a hotter war (I would argue even a small war in the medium range - say OIF 2004 or so) you will lose out on capability.

CAS is definitely an art... requiring a lot of training for both the FACs and the flyers. Both sides need to continue working at it.

V/R,

Cliff

[William F. Owen]

The OV-10 isn't survivable except in a very low threat environment. The AF is actively buying T-6s for the COIN role.... in AFSOC. If the enemy has any reasonable SAM capability, OV-10s aren't much of an option... and when I talk SAMs, I am not talking MANPADs, although for AC-130s and OV-10s those are bad enough. SA-11s or SA-13s are even more bad news...

OV-10s operated successfully in and over one of the most dense air defence environments ever seen, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From my own research, I see nothing to indicate that OV-10 loss rates were excessive. In think only 12 were lost to enemy action, in the SEA theatre in 1970.

The other problem with the OV-10 or T-6 is that its advantage in many folk's mind is a drawback... the slow speed means that CAS jets take a long time to get to the right folks unless they happen to be right there. To get the same response time, you need a lot more aircraft... and the ones who aren't employed are wasted effort. In a COIN fight this isn't as big an issue... in a hotter war (I would argue even a small war in the medium range - say OIF 2004 or so) you will lose out on capability.

OK, but OV-10 can operate far further forward and from far more austere environments than ever AH-64s. IIRC an OV-10 could deploy carrying it's ground crew tech, two pilots and all it's spares for >100 hours of operation. It could also drop 500lbs of re-supply by parachute.

The USMC also did formation flying trials for the OV-10 to flight re-fuel from a KC-130.

A modern OV-10 could easily have a sensor and weapons fit comparable or even better than an AH-1W, or AH-64. The OV-10 also has far better visibility than a T-6, and two engine safety.

The OV-10 is also a far better blend of cost versus effect, for the conflicts we see in Afghanistan and Iraq. This also applies to some UAV capabilities.

CAS is definitely an art... requiring a lot of training for both the FACs and the flyers. Both sides need to continue working at it.

Isn't all combat flying an art? CAS was pretty much perfected in SEA and then actively forgotten by the USAF.

[120mm]

I still have an article somewhere about the Army's ARES trials back in the '80s, and according to their data, if memory serves, small, simple fixed-wing aircraft can maintain flight profiles that make them surprisingly survivable in even high threat environments.

But unfortunately, that article is in a box, having moved 10 times since I last read it, and no digits....

Bottom line, the USAF position vis-a-vis a true utilitarian COIN aircraft has been, and continues to be that they are not survivable enough to buy. I agree with WILF on this, though.

[Rifleman]

The coolest plane the high tech, high speed USAF has ever had:



Anyone know how survivable it was in Vietnam?

Ken, surely you've had your hide saved by one of these before?

[Ken White]

Ken, surely you've had your hide saved by one of these before?

That's been done by F4U, F2H, F9F, F86, AT-28, A4D, F4B and C, F51s (one of which we inadvertently shot down... ), Meteors, F100, B26, B57 and even B52s plus several kinds of Helicopters at one time or another but no Spads...

[Presley Cannady]

Perhaps the real beef here is the appearance (and likely just appearance) that the AF is much more interested in protecting it's sexy image of flying off in the wild blue yonder. Unmanned aircraft are not sexy. I truly think any officer could be trained to make the decision of shooting/not shooting, thus killing the AF hangup of having flight-qualified officers commanding armed UAVs. But the AF has a strange class/caste system where the flight-rated folks dominate and are treated differently. This could be a real upset to the culture. The AF will reply that the Army Chief of Staff and the key general officer commands only comes from the combat arms branches. True, but for the most part, in the Army, unless you are a commander, you really are not that special unless you have a lot of rank. In the AF, a rated officer is operating in a different sphere than his non-rated counterparts (not peers - they aren't).

We're missing a couple game-changing caveats here:

1. There is no multi-role UCAV in existence yet. The technology can handle reconnaissance, some deep interdiction and that's it. Autonomous or even remote strategic bombing, air-to-air and mid-air refueling remain a long way off. Hell, we haven't even automated similar tasks in the Navy onboard ships traveling slower than a Plymouth Horizon going up hill.

2. UCAVs today are essentially retrievable cruise missiles with human training wheels. The real debate isn't over shoot authority--both Navy and USAF reconciled themselves to that fact decades ago--but over how expendable those platforms are. And given the susceptibility of remote control to such environmental factors such as lightspeed lag and weather, the less expendable your UCAV the more likely you're going to have somebody in the sky looking out for it. Remote-control only narrows the scope of knowledge involved by eliminating flight medicine from training. You still need someone with a graduate understanding of aviation, and the reqs of effective flying haven't changed much in over a century. You're still going to have people with skill sets ranging from navigation to meteorology to aerodynamics with hands on the stick.

3. Full autonomy even in the ground attack and reconnaissance missions lies twice beyond USAF's 2025's vision of the future. That has nothing to do with a resistant culture, it has to do with the fact that there isn't yet an AI smart enough for cheap enough to integrate terrain mapping, threat evaluation and aircraft status to reliably implement countermeasures in deviance from the mission. Hell, there may never be. If these things are to be anything more than expensive cruise missiles or RC aircraft, then this is a hurdle we have to overcome.

[Bob's World]

Don't save all of your abuse for our brothers in blue.

Co-worker and friend is a Marine F/A-18 pilot, who was gently, but firmly told to stand down when he put together a paper making the case that Marine air was going the wrong direction in seeking stealth capability and Joint Strike Fighters, (how stealthy can you be below 1000' supporting ground troops) and should be considering platforms such as the Skyraider.

[reed11b]

Don't save all of your abuse for our brothers in blue.

Co-worker and friend is a Marine F/A-18 pilot, who was gently, but firmly told to stand down when he put together a paper making the case that Marine air was going the wrong direction in seeking stealth capability and Joint Strike Fighters, (how stealthy can you be below 1000' supporting ground troops) and should be considering platforms such as the Skyraider.

Unfortunately that whole argument has been deeply tainted w/ Sparkyisms and it will take time to heal the damage caused there. At one point I was working on a paper to compare cost efficiencies of using less expensive to operate helicopters in decentralized taskings compared to higher operating cost helicopters in more centralized taskings. Sparks caught wind of it and contacted me and insisted that the story needed to be about the then current LUH program and trailer mounted helicopters. Of course that was not something that could work, and I was annoyed to the point of dropping the idea before completion. Now whenever I see an idea supported by Sparks and crew, I have a tendency to reject it out of hand. Some of the ideas are good, even if Sparks et al. really do not understand them.
Reed

[Fuchs]

OV-10s operated successfully in and over one of the most dense air defence environments ever seen, the Ho Chi Minh Trail. From my own research, I see nothing to indicate that OV-10 loss rates were excessive. In think only 12 were lost to enemy action, in the SEA theatre in 1970.



OK, but OV-10 can operate far further forward and from far more austere environments than ever AH-64s. IIRC an OV-10 could deploy carrying it's ground crew tech, two pilots and all it's spares for >100 hours of operation. It could also drop 500lbs of re-supply by parachute.

The USMC also did formation flying trials for the OV-10 to flight re-fuel from a KC-130.

A modern OV-10 could easily have a sensor and weapons fit comparable or even better than an AH-1W, or AH-64. The OV-10 also has far better visibility than a T-6, and two engine safety.

The OV-10 is also a far better blend of cost versus effect, for the conflicts we see in Afghanistan and Iraq. This also applies to some UAV capabilities.



Isn't all combat flying an art? CAS was pretty much perfected in SEA and then actively forgotten by the USAF.

A three-barrel 20mm Gatling gun in a turret below the fuselage was tested, together with the OV-10D's gimballed thermal sensor. That was pretty much a gunship capability, but the turret and gun proved to be a bit too much (drag and weight) IIRC.
A modern OV-10 could be a phenomenal aircraft.

The British had some activity in the area of a SAC/COIN aircraft as well:
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread186160/pg1

[William F. Owen]

Now whenever I see an idea supported by Sparks and crew, I have a tendency to reject it out of hand. Some of the ideas are good, even if Sparks et al. really do not understand them.

Concur.

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 19 Dec 08: America's Self-Destroying Air Power: Becoming Your Own Peer Threat

.....Almost every major aircraft development program is in so much trouble that the replacements are stuck in a morass of procurement and development problems, cost explosions, and rifts within the Department of Defense. Fifth-generation tactical aircraft are affected by significant delays and cost increases.

The F-22 has almost tripled in unit cost. Meanwhile, the planned procurement quantity has been reduced from 750 to 183. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter faces a similar fate, and may not be ready in time to replace aging legacy fighters, creating a ―fighter gap in the Air Force‘s and Navy‘s inventories. The strategic capabilities are not less affected by these problems. A new bomber is planned, as the previous B-2B program escalated in cost by a factor of at least 300 percent, and was reduced to roughly one fifth of its original force goal. Finally, a program to replace the almost 50-year old air refueling tanker is stuck in a political tug of war caused by the Air Force‘s mismanagement of the program. Meanwhile, maintenance costs to keep the legacy fleet operational are increasing rapidly.

There now are fewer program alternatives if any key program runs into trouble, failed methods of cost analysis are still in play without adequate cost-risk analysis or use of regression analysis.The pressure to ―sell‖ programs by understating cost and risk have all combined to push air modernization to the crisis point. Current plans for aircraft modernization are not affordable unless aircraft costs are sharply reduced, deliveries are delayed years longer than planned, or funding shifts to lower cost variants or upgrades of older types. The only alternative is a major increase in real defense spending.

This report examines how these problems affect the tactical, strategic, and enabling capabilities of US air power. It draws on recent government data and news reports to reveal the state of current strategic air power and identify the challenges the next administration will face for future force planning and budgeting......

Complete 54-page report at the link.

[Stevely]

That is a fascinating and depressing find, Jedburgh, thanks for posting the link. It seems it's one of those things where everyone knows at some level things are seriously out of whack and have for some time (just read back to the beginning of this thread), but seeing a systematic exposure of the details doesn't fail to shock.

[Surferbeetle]

Bloomberg Website, posted 2 Jan 2009.

To boost cooperation between NASA and the Pentagon, Obama has promised to revive the National Aeronautics and Space Council, which oversaw the entire space arena for four presidents, most actively from 1958 to 1973.

The move would build ties between agencies with different cultures and agendas.

“Whether such cooperation would succeed remains to be seen,” said Scott Pace, a former NASA official who heads the Washington-based Space Policy Institute. “But the questions are exactly the ones the Obama team needs to ask.”

[carl]

There is a very interesting article in the current Atlantic magazine about air combat, F-15s and F-22s. Regardless of your position in our F-22 vs. the world debate, it is a very good read.

http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200903/air-force/5

(moderator: i don't know how to set up a link. this is the best i could do. Added by Moderator, works fine thank you).