Stratfor's Approach to OIF phase 5,6,7?

[slapout9]

Ironhorse, The Stratfor plan looks a lot like what Westhawk was recommending. I do not have access to the full Stratfor document but from what you have posted it is very close. How successful it would be I have know idea, but it appears they were thinking along the same lines. RTK did an analysis of the Westhawk plan on another thread pointing out some weaknesses.

[Ironhorse]

I suggest taking a read of Looking Beyond a Surge: The Tests a New US Strategy in Iraq Must Meet, by Cordesman at CSIS. Although not as "prescriptive" as StratFor attempts to be, it is far more insightful in its analysis.

Ironhorse, The Stratfor plan looks a lot like what Westhawk was recommending. I do not have access to the full Stratfor document but from what you have posted it is very close. How successful it would be I have know idea, but it appears they were thinking along the same lines. RTK did an analysis of the Westhawk plan on another thread pointing out some weaknesses.

Jedburgh, got it. Slapout, I believe you're referring to this post in this thread. Thanks both for expanding my view. Need something to read this afternoon, as the Pats are going to put a whoopin' on in 1st quarter, and it will be all over.

[jcustis]

Ironhorse,

I'd intended to weigh in on the Stratfor mention in your reply, but don't know why I never got around to it.

-Withdraw U.S. forces to containment positions:
Bulk in southern Iraq, in Shiite territory (watching them, esp for Iran influence) and buffering Shiite / Iran influence from Saudi Arabia.
-Smaller force w/ Kurds (they have more organic capability, and aren't main effort)
-Let the Sunnis have Al Anbar. Influence through diplomacy and local partners, esp. Saudia Arabia. Dicey, but less so than some of the other diplomatic miracles we're counting on.
-Let the Iraqis solve their own problems, in a contained, mitigated environment. Maybe still ugly, but lightest shade of gray feasible.

I'd actually argue that we have essentially been in containment positions for the past three years, because a lot of operational employment has been containment in nature. I think I brought this up on the SWC before, but I sat in on a relief-in-place in-brief from the outgoing task force to my task force commander and staff. One of the statements made by the battalion commander was very telling. To paraphrase him, he said, "This agricultural area down here is full of bad guys. We don't go down here because you're guaranteed to get IED'd on these restrictive roads." Confused and pissed off is an understatement. Last time I checked, we were supposed to go after the bad guys and deal with the people. Now I understand the pressure that the Bn cmdr faced, because his primary mission was not winning hearts and minds, but ensuring that a LOC remained open for coalition movement. He could not effectively conduct operations to deal with the threat to his piece of the LOC, because he did not have enough troops (and those he did have were tasked poorly, in my opinion) to do more than site forces at OPs along the side of the highway, hoping to catch IED layers in the process.

Moving to so called "buffer areas" is definitely a recipe for disaster, especially if we were to do so for force protection aims. That's part of our current problem as well...we've been so worried (and to some degree, rightly so) about wrapping troops in pillows that we've made them less effective at the business of engaging the population. I'll have to provide examples down the road, but tha's always been a burn with me.

I don't know what they want us to do from these buffer positions, but if I had to move, say an infantry battalion, from one of these zones and travel 100 km to deal with a flare up where the ISF need help to mitigate the bad guys, I'm back in Street Without Joy mode. It's already bad enough because we cannot secure 100% of our LOCs. If we would be expected to orient outwards toward Iran and Syria, from these buffer positions, then the ISF would have take the lead on all their operations. Are they capable of that yet? If not, then when? The Stratfor assessment would have to wait until we've hit that benchmark.