The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War (catch all)

[William F. Owen]

Thanks for the link, I have found Cordesman to be one of the most honest and realistic observers of the wars of the early 21st Century

...and I used to agree with that, till I saw these slides. While what he writes is vastly more accurate than I have seen in most open sources, there are some omissions, and some mistakes that indicate that this may have been a bit of a "rush job."

For example, the IDF had working examples of every ATGM and AT weapon they encountered in the Lebanon, prior to the war. They weren't "got by Military intelligence". They just went out on the market and brought them.

The statement "swarming works" indicates a lack of tactical and operational understanding and I don't think he would ever make that comment to a professional military audience.

IMO, the J.P. Storr article in the RUSI journal remains the most accurate and measured assessment of the ground war.

[slapout9]

Have to agree with Wilf on this one. The IDF report calling it Stand Off Fire Power operations is a more accurate title and description. It had little or nothing to do with EBO. However don't make the mistake that Air Power cannot be used to influence Political Leadership. The Air Strike against Syria (that never happened) where they turned off their entire Air Defense system to directly attack their target and then tell Syria to keep their mouth shut is good example of what can be done.

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

[slapout9]

Excellent report especially the their 13 principles of war. And like I have always said the enemy understands exactly what EBO is....we don't.

[William F. Owen]

As this subject is extremely dear to my heart, I submit that this is a fascinating document and mostly a very useful one. However,

Out of the 400 tanks involved in the fighting in southern Lebanon, 48 were hit, 40 were damaged, and 20 penetrated. It is believed that five Merkavas were completely destroyed.
Clearly, Hezbollah has mastered the art of light infantry/ATGM tactics against heavy mechanized forces.

In context, out of 400 MBTs
48 MBTs hit - 12% hit
40 damaged – 10 % damaged.
20 penetrated – 5% penetrated.
5 destroyed. - 1.25% destroyed.

These were achieved over 30 days in the some of the best anti-tank terrain on the planet. These are, as I understand it, overall loss rates, from IED/Mine, ATGM and RPG. I know from my own sources that 2 of the total losses were IED and one to an AT-3.

[Rank amateur]

As this subject is extremely dear to my heart, I submit that this is a fascinating document and mostly a very useful one. However,



In context, out of 400 MBTs
48 MBTs hit - 12% hit
40 damaged – 10 % damaged.
20 penetrated – 5% penetrated.
5 destroyed. - 1.25% destroyed.

These were achieved over 30 days in the some of the best anti-tank terrain on the planet. These are, as I understand it, overall loss rates, from IED/Mine, ATGM and RPG. I know from my own sources that 2 of the total losses were IED and one to an AT-3.

Out of the 48 hit: 83 % were damaged, 42% were penetrated and 10% were destroyed.

[Tom Odom]

These were achieved over 30 days in the some of the best anti-tank terrain on the planet.

Absolutely correct. South Lebanon is deceptive in that what appear to moderate hills are actually limestone formations riven with deep cuts and switch backs. It is an AT-gunner's field of dreams.

This part of Lebanon is after all part of the Great Rift Valley as it reaches for the European land mass. In fact the Litani River Valley is the migratory route for African raptors; that little tidbit came to me from a 55 year old Norweigian reservist who had volunteered for OGL because bird--and especially hawk and falcon--watching was his passion.

Best

Tom

To give you an idea of how close things are I posted a pic of the IDF brigade Hqs in 1987 I took from the observation deck of OP Hin. The IDF Hqs straddled the border. Op Hin is just inside Lebanon oriented south and we had a hilltop IDF position just behind us which overlooked Bint Jbeil, which in 1987 was most definitely "Indian Country".

[Tom Odom]

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

To a certain degree, yes, with Hezbollah as irregulars in prepared defenses. It would be a much closer match had their been a regular force afeild or at least poised to take the field. The Syrians are not that stupid.

Best

Tom

[William F. Owen]

Also Tom Odom don't you think this was a good example of Fortified Compound Warfare? (from Hezbollah's point of view)

Fortified Compound Warfare? Please explain. Is this another name for "hedgehog" or "Stellunghund" defensive systems?

[Tom Odom]

Here is an anthology on the subject

Compound Warfare: An Anthology, Thomas M. Huber, editor. Final Version. (PDF)

In the long history of warfare, a recurring theme is the combined use of regular and irregular forces to pursue victory. The American colonists relied upon regular Continental Army troops and local militia in their war for independence. British troops commanded by Wellington fought alongside Spanish peasant guerrillas against Napoleon in Spain. The Chinese Communists under Mao Zedong organized local militia units, regional forces, and a regular army for use in their struggle to topple the Nationalist government. In these and many other cases, the practice of employing regular and irregular forces together was not only applied, but also instrumental in bringing victory to the side that at the beginning of the conflict seemed clearly inferior to its opponent.

In 1996, in an article entitled “Napoleon in Spain,” Dr. Thomas M. Huber of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) coined the term “compound warfare” to describe this phenomenon of regular and irregular forces fighting in concert, as he examined the reasons for Napoleon’s failure to pacify the Iberian Peninsula. The article, written to support CSI’s course in modern warfare at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, received high praise from student officers, from the CSI faculty, and from the Institute’s director at the time, Colonel Jerry Morelock. Impressed by Dr. Huber’s analysis of the synergistic effects achieved by Wellington’s British Army and Spanish guerrillas as they worked together against Napoleon’s forces, Col. Morelock suggested that other members of CSI examine examples of this pattern of warfare in other times and places. This book is a compilation of their studies.

[William F. Owen]

Here is an anthology on the subject

Aha! Many thanks.

[Jedburgh]

SSI, 25 Sep 08:
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

Hezbollah’s conduct of its 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has become an increasingly important case for the U.S. defense debate. Some see the future of warfare as one of nonstate opponents employing irregular methods, and advocate a sweeping transformation of the U.S. military to meet such threats. Others point to the 2006 campaign as an example of a nonstate actor nevertheless waging a state-like conventional war, and argue that a more traditional U.S. military posture is needed to deal with such enemies in the future.

This monograph, by Dr. Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations and Mr. Jeffrey Friedman, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, seeks to inform this debate by examining in detail Hezbollah’s conduct of the 2006 campaign. The authors use evidence collected from a series of 36 primary source interviews with Israeli participants in the fighting who were in a position to observe Hezbollah’s actual behavior in the field in 2006, coupled with deductive inference from observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their larger strategic intent for the campaign.

Complete 110-page paper at the link.

[William F. Owen]

Read the 2nd Paragraph.
So,

Israel's brief, violent, and ultimately inconclusive war against Hezbollah in 2006 is the new prototype guiding the Pentagon's war-planning process. "Hybrid warfare" -- a non-state actor's sophisticated employment of terrorism, conventional military action, propaganda, cyberwarfare, and high-technology weapons -- is now the focus of attention inside the Pentagon's policy office.

So the Hezbollah are the prototype?
This is a guerilla group, that;

• Can't use guided missiles
• Lost most of its long range SSMs in air strikes
• Can't use MANPADS
• Could only launch two of it's anti-ship missiles.
• Tried to hold ground - and failed
• Can't conduct counter attacks
• Can't fight in built up areas
• Can't patrol
• Abandons most of its equipment without destroying it
• Can't use mortars properly
• Can only get 25% of it's SR SSMs to hit built up areas
• Has given up conducting military action against Israel for the 3 years since the war.

To quote an IDF friend of mine, "There must be two Hezbollahs. The one I fought and the other one the US studied."

Personally, I believe the best information operations coup Hezbollah pulled off, was getting the Pentagon to believe they are better than the facts and the evidence show. It's either that or some folks just want to see the things that promote their personal agendas.

[Jedburgh]

CSI, May 09: Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

.....The IDF Operation CAST LEAD against Hamas in 2008-09 was a small scale affair in comparison to the multi-division attack into Lebanon in 2006. The former operation, however, restored confidence in both the government and armed forces in the eyes of the Israeli populace. The reforms of the year and a half between conflicts paid great dividends to Israeli soldiers and aircrews. It also demonstrated Israeli resolve, created a schism in the Muslim Middle East and is only one of a series of escalations in what is becoming a very dangerous conflict in the region......

[William F. Owen]

CSI, May 09: Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD

Only read the First Chapter. I'd treat it with extreme caution. Quite a lot is plain wrong, not understood, or is based on opinion. Critical detail has also been omitted.
If anyone wants blow by blow details I'm happy to pitch in. The list is long!
Footnotes indicate that research was done on the internet or some e-mails with guys I know well. Basically little or no original research.

[Ken White]

several things stood out.

From the Introduction:

"American professional military personnel are well-acquainted with “the arrogant show of strength” that was Task Force Smith in Korea in the summer of 1950 and of its fate."

Any American professional military person who looks at Task Force Smith as an arrogant show of strength is badly -- really badly -- deluded. It was not any such thing, it was a rapidly thrown together and poorly designed effort to send a message and its likelihood of success was known to be poor.

These items from the final chapter:

"The US in contrast develops campaigns that have an enduring endstate. The concepts of campaigns and strategies that involve unified action are part of a comprehensive campaign that brings with it allies, coalitions, and regional partners."

How has that worked out for us...

Then there's this exercise in wishful thinking:

"The lack of a National Strategy related to strategic influence impedes the Department of Defense and military services."

One must recall that we have elections every two years; each of these has had and will have some effect, possibly quite subtle, on all our attempts at a coherent national strategy. While such an object would be beneficial, the likelihood of having one is slim. Thus, DoD and the service had better be prepared to adapt -- and to give sensible, competent advice on probabilities to the politicians.

Lastly, this is scary. Do we really want a Gestapo?

"Establish dedicated OPSEC planning and assessment specialists to manage the process and programs for the commander."

[Hacksaw]

Ken,

I was with you all the way up to the last comment (which of course you concluded with ) so I'll take it with a grain of salt.

The first and one of the best lessons I learned as a planner, was always always avoid hyperbole and emotion filled language if it is your intent to communicate effectively....

All the places where you found fault were examples of just that... either over stating the case or unwarranted chest thumping... then,...

You threw in the Gestapo comment ...

Not sure having a dedicated person to implement and enforce a command program like OPSEC equates to the Gestapo

Melting in a Kansas heat wave

[Ken White]

Sort of. It was semi serious...

I was with you all the way up to the last comment (which of course you concluded with ) so I'll take it with a grain of salt.
...
All the places where you found fault were examples of just that... either over stating the case or unwarranted chest thumping...

True and me too; it's taken me 20 years to get to the point where I'll underline or otherwise highlight a word. With that document there were several more excellent targets but I figured only a couple would do...

then...You threw in the Gestapo comment...
Not sure having a dedicated person to implement and enforce a command program like OPSEC equates to the Gestapo

OpSec is EVERYONE'S business (he hyperbolized and highlighted) and IMO should be, it strikes me that an OpSec person has the same flaw as the Master Gunner program -- create an expert and suddenly many say "I don't have to know or do this, he/she'll take care of it."

That would lead, I believe, to a rapidly worsening OpSec picture in most units which would cause the Master OpSecker to crack down, probably with only marginal success -- and probably too late. The Gestapo bit was mostly tongue in cheek but they after all had one mission of insuring secrets stayed secret...

Basically, I think it's a really bad and quite unnecessary idea on several levels...

Melting in a Kansas heat wave

No sympathy. Heat Index here 109, humididitity is 88 (feels like 99.9). Though it is supposed to cool off for the next few days...

[crisselvin]

Israel accepted that the earlier attacks on the threat to its security, even that against Lebanon in 1982. However, its assault on Gaza was not justified and there are international calls for an investigation. But is there the political will to make Israel account for its war crimes

[William F. Owen]

Israel accepted that the earlier attacks on the threat to its security, even that against Lebanon in 1982. However, its assault on Gaza was not justified and there are international calls for an investigation. But is there the political will to make Israel account for its war crimes

a.) Who says Operation Cast Lead was not justified? Ever had rockets shot at your home?

b.) How come only Israel should be held answerable for war crimes, given the level of civilian deaths in both Iraq and Afghanistan?

c.) Why reference an extremist website as being typical of the views of Israelis.

You might want to tell us all, who you are where you are coming from on this.

[Zack]

Hello, not sure if this was the correct section for this, but if not I will move it.

I am just beginning research for my MA thesis, which (I think) will be about the use of air power against irregular foes, and how effective that is. I had initially planned on doing at least 2 case studies, but time constraints on both myself and my Professors (thesis is capped at around 60pgs, otherwise professors get cranky) it will just focus on the 2006 war between Hezbollah and Israel. I am looking for additions to what I have collected so far to read, and the general structure I plan on using (still up in the air to a degree though).

Books:
Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists by James Corum and Wray Johnson
Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War by Anthony Cordesman (from CSIS)
The War in Lebanon: A Reader edited by Nubar Hovsepian
34 Days by Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff
Bombing to Win by Robert Pape
The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare by Stephen Biddle and Jeffery Friedman
How Democracies Lose Small Wars by Gil Merom
Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation "Cast Lead" by LTC Scott Farquhar
Asymmetric Warfare: Threat and Response in the 21st Century
Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife by John Nagl
Tradgedy in South Lebanon: The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006 by Cathy Sultan
The 33 Day War: Israel's War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its Consequences
Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Infidatas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army by Sergi Catignani
Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers by TV Paul

Articles:
On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law by Thomas Franck (American Journal of International Law)
Lebanon: Securing a Permanent Cease-Fire (Hearing before the Senate CFR)
Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict (Congressional Research Service)
Lessons and Implications of the Israel-Hizballah War (Washington Institute for Near East Policy)
Who Really Won the Second Lebanon War by Michael Totten (Commentary Magazine)
Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment by Andrew Exum (Washington Institute..)
Israel's Uncertain Strategic Future by Louis Rene Beres (Parameters)
When Close Doesn't Count: An Analysis of Israel's Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the 2006 Israel-Lebanon War by Major Bottoms (The Army Lawyer)
Crisis in the Levant: Lebanon at Risk by William Harris (Mediterranean Quarterly)
Between Victory and Defeat: Israel after the War with Hezbollah by Dov Waxman (CSIS)
Surprise and Terrorism: A Conceptual Framework by Daniel Morris (Journal of Strategic Studies)
Thoughts on "Hybrid" Conflict (SWJ)
The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned by Sarah Kreps (Parameters)
How Israel Bungled the Second Lebanon War by Efraim Inbar (Middle East Quarterly)
Hezbollah's Strategic Threat to Israel by Patrick Devenny (Middle East Quarterly)
Has Hezbollah's Rise Come at Syria's Expense? by Robert Rabil (Middle East Quarterly)
The End of Israeli Military Restraint by Or Honig (ME Quarterly)
The Psychological Asymmetry of Islamist Warfare by Irwin Mansdorf and Mordechai Kedar (MEQ)
Nasrallah's Defeat in the 2006 War by Eyal Zisser (MEQ)
Missile War is a new Challenge to Israel's Long Rule in the Sky by Scott Wilson (Washington Post)
Short '06 War Stokes Pentagon Debate by Greg Jaffe (WP)
Look Not to the Skies: The IAF vs. Surface to Surface Rocket Launchers by Noam Ophir (Institute for National Security Studies)
Back to Ground Rules: Some Limitations of Airpower in the Lebanon War by Noam Ophir (INSS)
The Limits of Coercive Airpower by Daniel Lake (International Security)
From Conflict Management to Conflict Resolution by Edward Djerejian (Foreign Affairs)
The Future of Lebanon by Paul Salem (Foreign Affairs)
Israel's War with Iran by Ze'ev Schiff (Foreign Affairs)
The End of Proportionality by Jonathan Keiler (Parameters)


The way I plan on breaking it down is:
Chapter 1: Intro to conflict, casus belli
Chapter 2: Theories of airpower & insurgency/counterinsurgency
Chapter 3: Capabilities of Hezbollah and IDF/IAF
Chapter 4: Decision making before/during/after war

If anybody has any additions to my reading list (or things I should remove), or any suggestions about my chapter breakdown, I would be grateful.