Wilf,
I'd offer that the repeated call for empirical evidence that supports the individual squad leader can be countered with the same call for empirical evidence that we need to change. Bottom line is that you'll never get the magic bullet of empirical evidence.
Wilf - 50 Bravo posted "Squad size:
Never felt the rifle squad was realistically designed to operate on it's own but as an administrative convenience to get enough infrastructure (Squad and fire team leaders) to let the platoon operate effectively. Maybe the all-volunteer thing has changed that equation but between rotation, casualties etc. there weren't many full to&e squads running around loose. When you start with nine and pare back from there for reality (rotation, illness etc), you got problems as a maneuver element.
If we were going out to ambush or interdict, we preferred to take 13 to 15 people. You need that many for a decent ambush if you are going to have any security at all and still have a decent KZ. Also some losses don't reduce your firepower in such a drastic fashion.
It looks like the US Army grew its 2 fire team squads to 13 or 15 in Vietnam to provide a realistic size force to meet the minimum size unit to conduct tactically effective ambushes.
50 Bravo, I'll bet that the ambush team included at least one M-60 in the party. We would include a Machine Gunner and assistant gunner in our ambush squads and every fire team leader and rifleman would hump extra MG ammo for the gun team.
jcustics - Empirical evidence seems to be the modern version of the Holy Grail! I'll bet todays Marine Corps still fills out 13 man squads that have battle casualties with Cooks, Bakers, Remington Raiders and the occasional Cannon Cocker until they can get some 0311 replacement parts. I suspect "Every man a Rifleman" is still practiced and the temporary interchangable parts get the job done.
M/3/5 0369 once a'pon a time, long, long ago and far, far away.
Absolutely agree. - but there are measures of effectiveness that good trials and research would reveal.Originally Posted by jcustis
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Why 12 man ODA?
Wonder why 12 men was the answer for a SF ODA? Why not 10? 9? or 15? I understand in respect to the quality, experience, and education of an infantryman vs a SF soldier and the differences in mission requirements. My point is that some one much smarter than me saw this as the magic number. With 12 men there is enough redundancy built in to handle casulties and enough firepower to handle many situations. As I stated in and earlier post I am personally a fan of a 9 man squad with a gun team which brings us to the magic number of 12 men. Would like the historical perspective of why SF went with 12 man teams and that may help in figuring out the ideal sized squad.
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
Two Honchos,
plus two each Ops/Intel, Weapons, Comm, Medics and Demo = 12.
Apples and oranges to rifle squads, I think.
May have left the question
lost somewhere in the other jibberish. I was wondering if anyone knew why 12 men or was it more of that is just the way it worked out after looking at leadership requirements and having 2 of everything? Didn't know if some one thought 12 was the right amount of personnel and then tailored the make up to this number or the other way around. Understand the comparison is apples to oranges in some aspects.
A question that arises is also mobility assets. Under the current composition a 9 man squad can move by two gun trucks or 1 UH-60(seats in of course). If the squad size increases then do our mobility platforms need to increase in size as well or do we simply increase the footprint (more vehicles). Might simply be to far into 9 man squads in the Army to change at this point. How do the other services handle this?
ODB
Exchange with an Iraqi soldier during FID:
Why did you not clear your corner?
Because we are on a base and it is secure.
ODB,
Add vehicles. I think trying to keep unit size matched to transport size is a loosing battle.
It doesn't matter what the unit or transport type is either. It's a nice idea, but in the end we just have to accept the fact that crossloading and breaking up elements for transport will have to happen and get on with the job without worrying about it too much.
Hasn't it usually had to be sorted out in the assembly area anyway? Even if it was a hot LZ in the Ashau Valley? I think a UH-1D usually carried six for a combat assault. How many times was a platoon able to divide by six and have it come out even?
Last edited by Rifleman; 10-20-2008 at 09:10 PM.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
All true
It's not desirable but it's often necessary and it doesn't really have too bad an effect. Unit integrity is great; just hard to attain...
The number was based on taking the needed
skills, generally doubling the number for redundancy (and insuring cross training to reinforce that) and was broadly based on the organization and experience of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma during WW II, by far the most successful large irregular warfare operation and way ahead of the success of the Jedburgh Teams.
The very different US Rifle squad, OTOH, is based primarily on Korean War experience and the two fire team leaders specifically date from there and a perceived need to have another NCO for both redundancy and for the training stream. The AR Man in each team (as opposed to a Machine Gun / Gunner) was due mostly to lack of an acceptable MG at the time plus the old "not invented here" syndrome which says that if another nation is doing 'A' we must do 'B.'The nine man squad is an abortion; it was introduced in the 80s simply to free up the other two men from the Squad to provide numbers to increase the number of Army divisions -- a process that sliced TOEs to the bone and really hurt the Divisions even as it created two more from the same manpower. Dumb idea then and a dumb idea now. Much more effective was the 11 man squad -- more staying power, also...A question that arises is also mobility assets. Under the current composition a 9 man squad can move by two gun trucks or 1 UH-60(seats in of course). If the squad size increases then do our mobility platforms need to increase in size as well or do we simply increase the footprint (more vehicles). Might simply be to far into 9 man squads in the Army to change at this point. How do the other services handle this?
Part, not all , of the size of our vehicles is based on justifying that nine man squad -- can't be like anyone else...
Other organizations handle larger sizes with (a) bigger vehicles; and (b) splitting their squads -- just like the US Army has to do all too often...
Whoa, whoa, there Ken, the process only sliced TOEs to the bone for Infantry (and Cavalry). Some other branches (most notably Military Intelligence) have seen their representation consistently increased with every reorg (for little or no corresponding increase in combat effectiveness).
I agree with the vehicle size comment, the USMC, to site the obvious example, does design tracks and helos to accommodate more men. However, I think that there is a limit to how big a heavy APC can be, in terms of volume under armor (such as the Israeli Namer). Perhaps not relevant in this war, but in others such a vehicle might prove very useful. I would submit that as perhaps the one actual limit to carrying capacity.
Personally, I think vehicle carry capacity matters for any ("permanently") mounted unit, as operations go on and entropy naturally increases, the unit will find itself de facto organized along those lines more often than not.
William F. & RJ
William F. & RJ can I interject & refer back to your back & forth on page 3.
I believe RJ's best support for his position comes half way thru his long article when refering to the separation of the Marine SqLdr allowing him to coordinate the manuevering while separate fr/ the actual activity of the manuever.
Which frees his mind fr/ controlling his squad & his individual team. It also allows him the freedom to command the scene & float freely amongst the teams for optimum control.
I think the 2 of you are having a hard time sync-ing on this 1 b/c you fundementally view the Operations of the squad & SqLdr thru the eyes of your Institutions.
W. F. Owens, fr/ the little I know about Brit formations the Squads are design to operate pretty tightly together, under the control of the PLT CO.
Marine Squads operate much differently, much looser, the control of a Sqd fr/a SqLdr a Plt Cdr less of a direct control & is designed to be more fluid, more independent over a much larger area.
So W.F.O, its my take that when you visualize RJ explain to you about a separated SqLdr your visualizing a Brit Manuever w/ the Plt Cmdr exhibiting tight control over the Squads in his Plt.
Your not visualizing a USMC style Manuever, w/more men & more dispersion, covering much more ground where the SqdLdr is acting more like a Plt Cmdr throughout the Manuever.
The answer to the Q? of Squads... the right #'s & formations etc, etc, all comes down how do you does the Individual ENVISION them being used. Everything else is plug n play.
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