Time for a FM 3-24: Counterinsurgency Update

[Bill Moore]

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010..._r=1&ref=world

The bloodletting peaked in 2007 when Shiites drove Sunnis out of Parachinar, the regional government headquarters. Sunni Muslims retaliated by denying Shiite Muslims access to road. In some instances, Sunni militants have stopped buses on the road, taken out Shiite passengers and executed them.

The Shiite militias had to turn to the Haqqanis to strike a deal "because they are so strong. No one else is as strong," Bangash said.

This is one recent example of hundreds available. Warfare is about power, not good governance. No about CMO, IO, economic development in a situation like this will distract from those who hold coercive power. The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.

Some argue we're doing the same old thing, but I would argue we forfeited the use of effective military force starting in 2002, and then in 2004 in Iraq. We became overly focused on winning hearts, not convincing the populace that we held the most coercive power and intended to win.

[slapout9]

The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.

Why no go back to good old basic SF theory where we raise and train a guerrilla force instead using conventional forces. We need the equivalent of an Islamic Los Pepe's like they used to Kill Pabelo.

[Ken White]

What three people are doing is suggesting that Bob's Way is not the only way to achieve some needed changes, that Bob's Way may be in fact a good idea that is simply incorrectly aimed, that Bob's Way would have a better chance of success if it posed fewer contrapositions. One cannot mind one's own business and not impose one's will on another and at the same times try to cajole him into doing it one's way...

Either we stay out of other government's business or we intrude or interfere in some way. Since the latter is the more likely course, I believe you and I would agree that militarily interfering is the last resort and generally not a good choice. Where we seem to disagree is how the Armed Forces should go about getting that point across to the policy makers. You appear to want the FlagOs to be pro-active and bulldoze the civilians into doing it the 'right way.' I contend that they should not try that (it will backfire, it always has every time we've tried it) and that the personnel turnover among said policy makers means your ideas will get little traction unless you produce a coherent, realistic, non contradictory approach that provides them political cover. IMO, you have not yet done that, in fact seem to refuse to even consider it.

Second; I don't pick on the Saudis, I pick on the US-Saudi relationship. The difference is a substantial one. Our entire Middle Eastern policy is long overdue for a major overhaul. But a many say, this is all policy stuff and not the domain of the military to worry about. The problem is that the policy types see insurgency and counterinsurgency as warfare and not the domain of policy types to worry about. We are at a stalemate, and something has to break that stalemate

True on the first point, for brevity I shortchanged that point which I did and do understand. I agree on the second point. On the third point, I disagree -- it is NOT the place of DoD or the Armed Forces to dictate to the civilian heirarchy what policies should be.

You'll likely respond you do not intend to dictate. So you might say but your words written here do not convey anything less. Think about that.

What I propose is that the military stepping up clarifying the roles of host nation, intervening nations, and what violence is warfare and what violence really isn't warfare is a critical initial step in breaking this cycle. To simply salute and say "we got it" is not helpful.

"Stepping up" equals dictation? Suggesting? Suggesting more strongly? Hinting? What? Precisely what do you propose the military do to get those points accepted?

Your "not helpful" comment, like the 'absurd' earlier is not going to help your sale pitch...

Further, FWIW, the US Army has not simply saluted and started off on its own in my lifetime. They have generally resisted almost to the point of insubordination. If you can give me an instance where they have done what you say, I'd appreciate it.

Here's the crux of the seeming pile on (I can't help you with the Fussball games...)

What I find interesting is that people can see regime change as ok; but employing a little firm, backroom influence between state leaders as inappropriate. I aways thought that warfare was supposed to be the "final argument of kings." We've gotten way too used to making it our opening statement.

No one here has said that or anything close to it -- what we are saying is that YOU contend we should not dictate to others and then consistently proceed to spell out the dictation that should be given. IOW, you appear to be talking out of both side of your mouth. Be nice in public, we must let them do it their way -- and if we don't like their way lambaste the hell out of 'em in private??? You contradict yourself on that issue.

Aside from the basic fact that privately urging can be publicly ignored, thus forcing a public action -- like regime change -- your proposals all seem to be overly idealistic, not reality based and as noted, contradictory. In one sense, it's the walk softly and carry a big stick bit, ala T.R (who was a hypocrtical little dickens almost as devious as his cousin...) and that's a good catch line -- it does not work well with people who do not bluff if they sense the nominal stick wielder is a bluffer. Our problem in the US is that the electorate sometimes goes for bluffers. Our History of evil doing as you see it is also a history of poor bluffs and follow through. Those things have arguably done us more damage than any of or all the evil. A series of no or poor use of the Armed Forces and poor bluffs and follow through by four prior Administrations from both parties almost certainly led to the latest two cases of regime change. You may not agree with regime change, I disagreed strongly with the previous sluffing. Regime change works. Sloppy but it does work. The backroom stuff has a fairly poor track record unless it is backed up with credible regime change capability - and will to use it.

On the final point; we lead with force too often -- I totally agree and further agree with many of your proposals to change that.

However, I respectfully suggest that your methodology in getting your approach to change adopted by the Armed Forces or the US Government will not sell in Peoria -- or Washington. IOW, yet again, I'm suggesting you have some good thoughts but some rather jarring contradictions and a sales approach that is unlikely to succeed. So this isn't so much a pile-on as a fourth or fifth suggestion to consider that. Consider it my semi annual contribution.

[slapout9]

This is an old article on the Moral imperative of 4th generation warfare. Before we update the manual maybe we should take a look at other concepts that may have seemed strange at the time, but seem to be very relevant in understanding the enemy we are fighting.


http://www.dnipogo.org/fcs/pdf/4gw_a...imperative.pdf

[Bob's World]

http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010..._r=1&ref=world



This is one recent example of hundreds available. Warfare is about power, not good governance. No about CMO, IO, economic development in a situation like this will distract from those who hold coercive power. The military has a very valid role to play in COIN, and they a need a FM that tells provides guidance on how to be good at applying military force against these insurgent groups.

Some argue we're doing the same old thing, but I would argue we forfeited the use of effective military force starting in 2002, and then in 2004 in Iraq. We became overly focused on winning hearts, not convincing the populace that we held the most coercive power and intended to win.

Bill,

I don't say the military has no role in helping to resolve insurgency; my point is simply that I believe much of the GWOT violence aimed at the US is due to perceptions of populaces in primarily Muslim countries where such insurgent movements are active or growing is that the blame for much of their current grievances with their governments lies with the US. Be that a co-option of natural legitimacy processes; be it the concerns that media-delivered US "culture" is eroding Islam in dangerous ways, etc.

For the US to go from insurgent spot fire to insurgent spot fire and assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies primarily serves to make these GWOT-feeding perceptions WORSE.

We're chopping up starfish and throwing them back into the sea with our current military-led approach.

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies? If the military is the cure, then one should turn the military on the government (which sadly, too often happens). But no, the military is part of the government. The military is often as much part of the problem as it is part of the solution as the military too often becomes the lead face of the government with the populace as insurgency worsens. This will always be true due to the security concerns. The key then, is the military merely reinforcing and enforcing the same domestic/foreign policies that are the causal root of this problem, or is the military reinforcing and enforcing the new policies crafted to address the real and (material to insurgency) concerns of the populace??

Next time you sit down to do planning for an OEF-P way ahead, have one group do a COA that:
1. Adopts the planning assumption that insurgency causation comes primarily from the government of the Philippines and their domestic policies toward the south; and that the risk of those groups supporting acts of terrorism against the US and our interests derives its causation from US foreign policy in general, but more specifically toward Muslim governments/populaces globally, and to the governments/populaces of SEA.

2. Assume the current insurgent groups are largely symptoms of this causation and that ideology is merely an essential component of any such movement.

3. Include honest best effort assessments of how we think the populaces these groups emerge from feel about the role of US foreign policy on Philippine, Indonesian and Malaysian domestic policies.

4. Also assess popular perceptions of the legitimacy of their government at all levels, any institutionalized biases or discrimination, any disrespect of those who deserve respect, and finally how much voice the people feel they have to effectively address any of these concerns short of insurgency.

5. Consider fully if the most critical issues are best addressed through military-led approaches in the south, or if they are best addressed through diplomatic approaches in Manila? (not saying one does not exist currently or that one needs to go away entirely, just if they are properly understood, balanced, prioritized and resourced).

Does that change the proposed approaches? (And OEF-P is the one OEF where we the least abusive of the rights, authorities and legitimacy of the local government; and the most respectful of lives and property of the populace.)

100% of responders to this thread think the current COIN manual needs a re-write. One has offered substantive changes for consideration. I'll even come out and work as a consultant with this group to help them work through the nuances of these issues and to face the full range of challenges to developing such a perspective. Happy to work with the Leavenworth team as well, even if as a red cell to a main effort that is looking at much more moderate adjustments to the manual.

[slapout9]

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies?

This is where I disagree with you somewhat, many times what you say is true but not always. Warden was right all along the Enemy is a System....not a country. Some Insurgencies/movements don't believe in governments at all and that is a really big problem that is not going to be solved with negotiations or building them a new country or a good government for that matter. How do you deal with a movement or group that dosen't even believe in Government....alll they believe in is force to get what they want.

[Bob's World]

This is where I disagree with you somewhat, many times what you say is true but not always. Warden was right all along the Enemy is a System....not a country. Some Insurgencies/movements don't believe in governments at all and that is a really big problem that is not going to be solved with negotiations or building them a new country or a good government for that matter. How do you deal with a movement or group that dosen't even believe in Government....alll they believe in is force to get what they want.

Slap,

But that is implicit in this position of insurgency as govenance rather than warfare. The entire dynamic is internal to the relationship between a populace and its governance, and manipulated and shaped by external parties seeking to maintain, enhance or create inroads with some element of that internal dynamic for their own interests.

There is a lot of wisdom in Warden's work, but not all of what was derived for warfare applies to insurgency. Warfare is temporary and is between separately governed bodies. Insurgency is continuous and is within a single governed body and only rarely rises to a state where it appears much like warfare.

Does your heart become your enemy when your poor lifestyle choices and genetics combine to enable the development of disease within that segment of your body? No, it is part of you. It is not the problem, it is merely the part of you where this combination of factors has resulted in a problem. Just as evil men will exploit a populace weakend by conditions of insurgency, so too will disease exploit a heart weakened by conditions of poor health. This is not a problem that can be resolved through surgery or medicine alone, but requires taking respsonsibility for ones own role in causation and adopting a comprehensive program of treatment that is heavy in lifestyle changes. Ironically, when the patient refuses to accept such responsibility or adopt such changes in his own behavior and the heart stops functioning it is a disaster for the entire body and we call it "heart failure." It is not the heart the failed the patient, it is the patient that failed the heart.

[slapout9]

There is a lot of wisdom in Warden's work, but not all of what was derived for warfare applies to insurgency. Warfare is temporary and is between separately governed bodies. Insurgency is continuous and is within a single governed body and only rarely rises to a state where it appears much like warfare.

I don't agree, in fact that is the main problem, there are know boundaries,it is a movement (a philosophy of life) and the only boundaries are the ones inside the guerrilla fighters head (and they don't have many boundries) not a country or government.

PS: all good cops smoke and drink large amounts of coffee, it is not poor lifestyle choices it is Genetics

[Bill Moore]

I'm pretty sure I recall FM 3-24 stating that "every" situation is different. The communist insurgency and the Muslim separatist movement in the Philippines have little to do with the war on terrorism and in this almost everything to do with poor governance. The CPP and NPA have remained isolated from external due to choice and geography, and while the Muslim separatist movement has some degree of international support, it is mostly moral and financial in character.

On the other hand, the threat we responded to were the terrorist groups in the Southern Philippines (JI and ASG), and at the time we responded they were relatively strong and their strength was growing. They were suppressed by a combination of aggressive security force operations and civil-military operations (CMO wouldn't have worked without the aggressive security measures), and equally important a great effort was made to separate the Muslim separatist movement from its illegimate brother the terrorist groups (ASG and JI), so we didn't artificially conflate the issues. Of course, like most things dealing with politics, social movements and conflicts (or more simply, people) there are gray areas, so you can point to exceptions where there were links.

Like every prolonged conflict, the character of it changes over time. For the most part the threat of Islamic radicalism in the Southern Philippines has been suppressed (not defeated), but the issues of separatism and communism remain and will remain until the government reforms "itself". IT isn't our role to reform their government, but as allies we can provide a helping hand if asked. It is important to note that the Southern Philippines could easily slip back into the dark days if "security forces" can't effectively apply pressure.

IMO the greatest threat of terrorism in the Philippines (outside of insurgents using terrorism as a tactic) is the growing Balik movement that can potentially be radicalized. The threat of Islamist based terrorism is not restricted to the Southern Philippines.

The JI has also been under a lot of pressure in the Indonesia by its security forces, so right now it appears the organization is having a hard time finding its balance; however, if that pressure if removed they'll reconstitute because the underlying driver has nothing to do with "good governance" and everything to do with radical ideology, and the desire to establish a caliphate. What most of us would call "good governance" they hate with a passion and it is the reason they're fighting. They don't have popular support and probably never will, but they have a cause they believe in, and the only way for those who oppose that cause to have an acceptable level of security is to conduct aggressive security operations to suppress the radicals. The basic rule applies here, the side that most effectively (means skillful application of force, not brute force) applies coercive force wins. There isn't a happy middle ground with these organizations that their opponents can negotiate, because their views are extreme, which is why we label them as extremists.

While there may be some similiarities or even parallels to Afghanistan, there are many more differences, which is why I cringe when I hear we should apply the Philippine model in Afghanistan. The Philippine model (if indeed it is effective) is only effective in the Philippines. The ideal Afghanistan model hasn't been developed yet, and when it is it will be based on the real dynamics in that region (not our politically correct view of the way it should be), not in the Philippines.

Long way of getting to your question, but in short the terrorists in the Southern Philippines were suppressed by effective security operations that were enabled through CMO. What we're talking about is warfare, and warfare has never been restricted to simply the application of violence, but the application of violence always plays a role.

[Dayuhan]

I believe much of the GWOT violence aimed at the US is due to perceptions of populaces in primarily Muslim countries where such insurgent movements are active or growing is that the blame for much of their current grievances with their governments lies with the US.

AQ has very little to do with populaces or nationalist insurgency. It is not a populace based movement and has only very tenuous connection to nationalist insurgency. It's good to remember that AQ's initial prominence and much of its residual legitimacy emerged from a struggle against the Soviet Union, not the US, and that it has only achieved meaningful popular support for struggles against direct foreign intervention. To declare a linear causative relationship among US policy, nationalist insurgency, and AQ terrorism is to assume what has yet to be demonstrated, and to excessively simplify a very complex causative environment.

For the US to go from insurgent spot fire to insurgent spot fire and assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies primarily serves to make these GWOT-feeding perceptions WORSE.

Are we doing this? If so, where? Certainly not in Iraq or Afghansitan... we didn't go to those places to assist governments threatened by insurgency, we went there to replace governments we dislike, and the insurgencies we now face grew from that process. We didn't go there because of insurgency, the insurgency is there because we went there.

Where exactly do we "assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies"? Is there any government out there that we support that would talk to its own people and address issues if we ceased to support it? I can't think of any, offhand. In most cases a withdrawal of US support and associated conditionalities would simply generate more vigorous suppression.

I think you're vastly overestimating our assistance, and the degree to which we enable anything.

Bringing this back to my two points: The conventional wisdom (of governments, btw) is that insurgency is "caused" by insurgents, ideology, or some external actor drives our current approaches. I simply suggest considering, just for a moment, what if that planning assumption is wrong, and in fact that causation is something that comes from governmental domestic policy for nationalist insurgencies; and for the US/GWOT, from governmental foreign policies?

Largely true, but of questionable relevance to GWOT, which is not fundamentally a fight against insurgents. Our COIN fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are collateral burdens, products of fundamentally flawed (IMO) GWOT policy decisions, not an integral part of the supposed GWOT.

Part of our problem in imposing COIN models, whether FM 3-24 or the Jones model, on GWOT is that it's not essentially a COIN fight: it's not a fight against insurgents. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan there is no insurgency that requires US intervention in more than a limited FID role, and Iraq and Afghanistan are less the traditional insurgencies that these models are designed to confront (intervention to support an allied government threatened by insurgency) than a natural and inevitable part of the regime change process. The issue is not entirely governance,it's also about foreign intervention.

We may be looking less at a case of flawed models than at a case of models being applied to situations they were not designed to cover.

Next time you sit down to do planning for an OEF-P way ahead, have one group do a COA that:

1. Adopts the planning assumption that insurgency causation comes primarily from the government of the Philippines and their domestic policies toward the south; and that the risk of those groups supporting acts of terrorism against the US and our interests derives its causation from US foreign policy in general, but more specifically toward Muslim governments/populaces globally, and to the governments/populaces of SEA.

Certainly causation in this case comes from the Philippine government; I think that's universally recognized. Despite our long-term relationship with the Philippine government, though, these groups have not generally acted against US interests, and have acted against US citizens only in opportunistic situations that are less terrorism than criminality. To the limited extent to which anti-US rhetoric is embraced, it's little more than a nod to groups who occasionally send a little money. It's very difficult to draw any causative line between US policy and terrorist or insurgent activity in the Philippines. Both insurgent groups and their popular base in the Philippines generally approve of us; they see us as a moderating influence on their enemies.

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

Our interagency and military planning is frequently done poorly, and our nation and especially our troops have to live with the results of this poor planning all too often. Sometimes the poor results are due to arrogance and ineffective personalties leading the planning effort, but just as often I think the root of the problem is the planning process itself and the associated expectations.

I think we plan poorly because (at least in the military) we're focused on the process instead of correctly defining the problem. We almost casually give our planners a mission to plan, which often means we told them the problem to solve, and probably without putting much intellectual rigor in it. Then the planners take the mission given to them and with religious zeal adhere to the MDMP steps believing they'll come up with the right answer. Usually the over worked majors will quickly identify some bogus centers of gravity again without intellectual rigor, because the expectations are you'll have to give a brief on your plan development according to the timeline. So now we have most likely have the wrong mission and wrong centers of gravity. Obviously if we define the problem incorrectly, our plan won't be helpful, and most likely it will just make the situation worse.

IMO one of the changes we need to address in FM 3-24 is the importance of slowing the train down during planning. We need to invest the time required to research the situation and truly talk (and more importantly listen) to the experts who understand the dynamics in that nation. Once we identify the right problems to solve (or help the HN solve), then maybe we can use something along the lines of MDMP that is modified for interagency purposes. Perhaps in the end we know how to plan, but we don't how to identify the right problem to address? Regardless, I still think the process is too restrictive and consequently stifles the development of creative solutions.

Insurgencies are relatively slow processes, we have the time to really think this through before we commit to a course of action. After we commit we need to constantly reassess to monitor when the character of the conflict changes and adjust our plan accordingly. Seems we have trend of starting to get things right after 7 or 8 years of involvement in these types of conflicts. Maybe we can do better?

[Dayuhan]

Our interagency and military planning is frequently done poorly, and our nation and especially our troops have to live with the results of this poor planning all too often. Sometimes the poor results are due to arrogance and ineffective personalties leading the planning effort, but just as often I think the root of the problem is the planning process itself and the associated expectations.

True, but I think a great deal of the trouble is at the policy level. Screw up there and it's very difficult to fix things at the strategic or tactical levels.

[Bob's World]

I recommend that John M. Collins' (Colonel, US Army, Retired) on "Military Strategy - Principles, Practices and Historical Perspectives" be included as a reference in the next version of this manual.

John's text is clear, complete, and logical. A great desk reference for anyone who deals with military or policy issues much. His section on "Specialized Military Strategies" that drills into a wide range of subtopics material to this discussion is of particular note.

[slapout9]

I think we plan poorly because (at least in the military) we're focused on the process instead of correctly defining the problem. We almost casually give our planners a mission to plan, which often means we told them the problem to solve, and probably without putting much intellectual rigor in it. Then the planners take the mission given to them and with religious zeal adhere to the MDMP steps believing they'll come up with the right answer. Usually the over worked majors will quickly identify some bogus centers of gravity again without intellectual rigor, because the expectations are you'll have to give a brief on your plan development according to the timeline. So now we have most likely have the wrong mission and wrong centers of gravity. Obviously if we define the problem incorrectly, our plan won't be helpful, and most likely it will just make the situation worse.

IMO one of the changes we need to address in FM 3-24 is the importance of slowing the train down during planning. We need to invest the time required to research the situation and truly talk (and more importantly listen) to the experts who understand the dynamics in that nation. Once we identify the right problems to solve (or help the HN solve), then maybe we can use something along the lines of MDMP that is modified for interagency purposes. Perhaps in the end we know how to plan, but we don't how to identify the right problem to address? Regardless, I still think the process is too restrictive and consequently stifles the development of creative solutions.

As the ultimate Field manual and Mapping freak I would say you hit it on the head. And if I was the Field Manual Czar for a day I would create a field manual that had 50 pages of the best known analysis techniques and 50 BLANK pages for the solution. On another thread we were talking about the Galula manual which has Insurgency analysis methods that are as valid today as they were back then........but he has only one solution, not a good ideal against a dedicated and creative enemy.

[slapout9]

Ideal, why dosen't the Army have a contest and put up some cash to see who could write the best new update for the manual.

[Fuchs]

Ideal, why dosen't the Army have a contest and put up some cash to see who could write the best new update for the manual.

Because this kind of tender exists primarily (almost exclusively) for hardware ... for unknown reasons.

[JMA]

On another thread we were talking about the Galula manual which has Insurgency analysis methods that are as valid today as they were back then........but he has only one solution, not a good ideal against a dedicated and creative enemy.

That has been my point.

No one person can provide a solution (or set of solutions) to cater for all eventualities. Use Galula to help hone analysis skills and if having studied as many sources to assist with such an analysis one can't come up with a custom solution then it should be left to those more able.

The level of this process should start at Command and Staff Course level and extend beyond. All those below should act under instructions and do the job their level demands/requires. It starts to get ridiculous when junior officers and NCOs start second guessing the COIN strategy for a particular campaign.

If faced with a dedicated and creative enemy you beat him by outdoing him in both aspects... or if you can't, better you just pack up and go home.

[Bob's World]

AQ has very little to do with populaces or nationalist insurgency. It is not a populace based movement and has only very tenuous connection to nationalist insurgency.

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.

It's good to remember that AQ's initial prominence and much of its residual legitimacy emerged from a struggle against the Soviet Union, not the US, and that it has only achieved meaningful popular support for struggles against direct foreign intervention.

Also not the case. Certainly the Saudis have always encouraged the dissident members of their populace to take their issues elsewhere, and taking them to the AFPAK region during the Soviet invasion was a popular cause and destination. It is good to remember that the Cold War was still in full effect at this time, and that if the Soviets could invade Afghanistan, they could certainly expand into Iran and down into the Arabian Pen. as well. At that point in time the presence of the US in the Middle East was welcome to the degree that it was far superior to the alternative.

AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed. Tolerence for Western presence that deterred the Soviets waned just as quickly (if not more so) in the Middle East than it did in Europe. We vastly downsized our presence in Europe in response to this pressure, but actually increased it in the Middle East. This shifted the bullseye of AQ squarely onto the US; and also made the US the easy scapegoat for poor governance in the region.

To declare a linear causative relationship among US policy, nationalist insurgency, and AQ terrorism is to assume what has yet to be demonstrated, and to excessively simplify a very complex causative environment.

US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact. Some dynamics are indeed simple, though the facts of how they materialize are always going to be diverse and complex.

[Bob's World]

Are we doing this? If so, where? Certainly not in Iraq or Afghansitan... we didn't go to those places to assist governments threatened by insurgency, we went there to replace governments we dislike, and the insurgencies we now face grew from that process. We didn't go there because of insurgency, the insurgency is there because we went there.

Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ. But every insurgent always becomes immediately a counter insurgent upon "winning." Does the US have a hand in facilitating the current insurgency of the Taliban against the Northern Alliance? Absolutely. There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.

Where exactly do we "assist the government there suppress the insurgent element of their populace through military force, while at the same time enabling those same governments to avoid engaging in meaningful talks with their own people and addressing the very real issues fueling these insurgencies"? Is there any government out there that we support that would talk to its own people and address issues if we ceased to support it? I can't think of any, offhand. In most cases a withdrawal of US support and associated conditionalities would simply generate more vigorous suppression.

I think you're vastly overestimating our assistance, and the degree to which we enable anything."

Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years. This is a model that worked well during the Cold War while that Soviet threat hung over the region, and in an age where information technology was such that these governments could control their people through force and the control of information.

Times have changed, and the U.S. must change our policies in the region to match the times, and also to bring them more in line with our founding principles as a nation.

As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily. This brings us back to the example of man with the failing heart. If that man was your business partner, you also would have no right to make him change his lifestyle. But you definitely have an interest in him making those changes. He too has an interest in making those changes that he may not fully appreciate. Sometimes your partner needs some tough love to recognize the need for such change. Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.

Largely true, but of questionable relevance to GWOT, which is not fundamentally a fight against insurgents. Our COIN fights in Iraq and Afghanistan are collateral burdens, products of fundamentally flawed (IMO) GWOT policy decisions, not an integral part of the supposed GWOT.

Part of our problem in imposing COIN models, whether FM 3-24 or the Jones model, on GWOT is that it's not essentially a COIN fight: it's not a fight against insurgents. Aside from Iraq and Afghanistan there is no insurgency that requires US intervention in more than a limited FID role, and Iraq and Afghanistan are less the traditional insurgencies that these models are designed to confront (intervention to support an allied government threatened by insurgency) than a natural and inevitable part of the regime change process. The issue is not entirely governance,it's also about foreign intervention.

We may be looking less at a case of flawed models than at a case of models being applied to situations they were not designed to cover.



Certainly causation in this case comes from the Philippine government; I think that's universally recognized. Despite our long-term relationship with the Philippine government, though, these groups have not generally acted against US interests, and have acted against US citizens only in opportunistic situations that are less terrorism than criminality. To the limited extent to which anti-US rhetoric is embraced, it's little more than a nod to groups who occasionally send a little money. It's very difficult to draw any causative line between US policy and terrorist or insurgent activity in the Philippines. Both insurgent groups and their popular base in the Philippines generally approve of us; they see us as a moderating influence on their enemies.

US planners in the Philippines actually did go through a process much like that which you describe. Unfortunately it was very badly done, and considered very few of the factors and influences involved. The outcome was American support for an ill considered "peace process" that was doomed from the start and managed to make things a good deal worse.

One problem with the approach you suggest is that "diplomatic approaches in Manila" are not going to produce any meaningful change. No matter how diplomatic we are (generally not very) we can't make policy for the Philippine government, nor can we persuade or compel the Philippine government to follow our policy recommendations. It's another country, and our influence is not that great.

I will not argue against the fact that we have over-engaged, over-reacted in our GWOT response. We did not understand the problem then, and we still do not today. In a recent interview with President Bush he made the comment to the effect that "on 9/11 we were ruthlessly attacked when we had never done anything to anybody." Americans need to look in the mirror a bit more carefully. Ike once said the best thing about Containment was that we in effect contained ourselves. Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller. But this goes to the causal effect of foreign policy on international terrorism. Its complicated true, but we are not blameless and we must evolve. Harder-Faster will not win this contest.

(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

[Dayuhan]

This oft stated position is simply not the case. AQ has no populace, true. AQ also has no power without its ability to leverage the populaces of others. AQ takes sanctuary in it's non-state status and employs an Islamist ideology to leverage and incite both individuals and organizations experiencing conditions of insurgency to support actions that advance the AQ cause, while advancing their own causes at the same time. Without the existance of significant conditions of insurgency in the many distinct states that AQ leverages their influence, this movement would be little more effective than that of Tim McVeigh and his little group of buddies.

AQ has been singularly ineffective at leveraging insurgency. What AQ has managed to leverage effectively is widespread resentment in the Islamic world toward foreign military intervention in Muslim lands. This is a very different thing. AQ’s efforts to muster insurgency against Muslim leaders they dislike have fallen flat on their faces: they have never drawn anything near the popular support needed to generate insurgency. The narrative that works for them is “expel the infidel from the land of the faithful”… they’ve tried others, but generally without much success. That’s why they have to keep provoking the infidel to make sure they keep intervening: without an intervening infidel to challenge, they have nothing.

AQ really got going in the first Gulf War. The KSA rejected Bin Laden's offer to protect them and brought in a very overt Western, US-led presence for that mission. A significant presence remained following the defeat of Saddam's push south; and not insignificant in this is that the Soviet threat no longer existed.

AQ really got going against us during the first Gulf War. They actually enjoyed far broader and deeper support during the anti-Soviet jihad, but we didn’t so much notice, because they were on our side.

The US presence in Saudi Arabia in the 1990s was only half of what AQ exploited. The other half, at least as important, was the global oil glut, the extremely low oil price, and the consequent extremely poor economic environment in Saudi Arabia. That created the perception, inaccurate but widespread, thet US troops were somehow forcibly keeping the price of oil low and impoverishing them. That was, of course, something AQ could and did exploit.

We do not, of course, have to change current policies to address this perception, because the conditions that generated it no longer exist. The US troops are no longer there, the oil glut is ancient history, oil prices are sky high, the Saudi economy is booming. The 1990s are gone, we no longer have to concern ourselves with that environment because it's already gone.

We may not like the Saudi government, but they know their people better than we do, and they know that if they provide security, stability, and prosperity, the vast majority of their people will not oppose them. As long as times are good, there will be no functional insurgency. A bit of terrorism here and there, but nothing they can’t handle, and as long as the boat has a solid tail wind the bulk of the populace won’t object if they lock up those who rock it.

US policy is to GWOT as Domestic Policy is to insurgency. Just as each state shapes the degree of the conditions of insurgency within their populace through the domestic policies they adopt and enact; so too does the US shape the degree of the conditions of international terrorism directed against us through the foreign policies we adopt and enact.

I think you vastly overestimate the degree to which we shape anything. There are many other influences out there, and many effects for which we are not the sole cause… and for which we are not the cause at all.

Actually Afghanistan had a very active insurgency in the Northern Alliance vs. the Taliban. We picked side and helped them to prevail to suit our goals against AQ....There was little insurgency by the Taliban until we enabled the current Karzai regime to emerge. Once it became clear what type of government we had enabled the Taliban insurgency quickly grew in strength to oppose it and our support to it.

I didn’t say there wasn’t insurgency in Afghanistan, I said we didn’t go there because of insurgency, certainly not to defend an allied government from insurgency. Realistically, the Taliban would have opposed any government we installed.

As to Iraq, much like the Balkans under Tito, Iraq under Saddam was a powderkeg of suppressed insurgency. We took the lid off and lit the fuse when we took Saddam out, and then naively were surprised when the whole thing blew up.

Again, there may have been insurgency, but that’s not why we went there… and while we may have removed the lid, what ensued was less “insurgency” than the very predictable armed competition to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s removal. We may have backed one faction and called it “Government” and the others “insurgent”, but those distinctions existed in our minds, not in Iraq.

Most of these states call their insurgents "terrorists" and if you think the US is not a big supporter of counter-terrorism programs across our allied governments in the Middle East you are not paying attention. We know these are some of the most despotic regimes on the planet, and yet we support them as by and large they have been willing to work with us in the pursuit of our national interests in the region over the years.

They would say that you are calling their terrorists “insurgents”, and redefining the term “insurgency” to suit your arguments. How many of these states actually depend on US assistance to suppress their dissidents? Certainly not the Saudis.

As to the U.S. having the right or the influence to get these governments to address their domestic policies? Excellent point. We certainly have no right, and our influence is shrinking daily... Currently we are enabling destructive behavior. We need to change ourselves, and we need to then apply such tough love with our partners.

Tough love? Surely you jest… we’re not talking about cranky teens here, these are sovereign states, not our wards or dependents. We didn’t create their policies, we don’t meaningfully enable their policies, and we don’t have sufficient influence to force or persuade them to change their policies. Your proposition assumes that we hold a position of influence and authority that we simply do not have.

Since the fall of the Soviets we've been feeling a lot less contained, and the list of sovereign countries we have bombed, invaded, or economically attacked through sanctions is growing larger and larger, while the rationale for doing so is becoming smaller and smaller.

Is this really true? Add up our intervention rates pre and post cold war; it may be surprising.

(As to the Philippines, every GCC was looking for some place to get into the fight. PACOM picked the Philippines as the Government agreed to allow them in under strict constraints and the auspicies of the training exercise "BALIKATAN". If not for 9/11 we would not be there in the manner we are today. I believe that the Government of the Philippines and their security forces have evolved in very positive ways through our intervention, but you are right, this was and remains largely a family squabble between a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government. I fear that our presence enables the government to avoid making really hard decisions on substantive changes of domestic policies that could reduce the conditions of insurgency in a more enduring manner.)

Questionable. The conflict in the southern Philippines is at root not a fight between “a variety of distinct segments of the Philippine populace and their government”. It’s a fight between two distinct and fundamentally irreconcilable segments of the populace. The government has failed to act as referee, and has taken the side of the segment from which it is almost entirely drawn and to which it is effectively accountable. Can’t address that conflict until we face up to the reality that it is populace vs populace, not populace vs government. The proposed "solution" that we supported failed to address that reality, and crashed in flames before it left the runway. If we'd opened at least one eye we would still have had no solution, but we could have avoided association with a dysfunctional proposal.

I don’t think the Philippine government and security forces have evolved at all. They’ve learned to tell us what we want to hear and show us want to see (actually they learned this long ago), but the moment we’re out of sight they reset to default mode. If our presence was removed there would be no substantive change, just a return to the status quo ante.