Debate over The Generations of War.

[zenpundit]

It's aim is to get people to think - so just like Manoeuvre Warfare. The facts are irrelevant to the greater aim of getting people to think in a different way, and thus just like EBO.

All of these concepts are aimed at the altering of mindset, seemingly in preference to an approach that goes for empirically based education.

I can't really agree.

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise. I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.

Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists? We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

[Entropy]

Is the "generations of war" construct useful, and does it help us in defining and understanding conflict?

This is the biggest complaint I have against the XGW warfare concept. Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology:

* Complex and long term
* Terrorism
* A non-national or transnational base
* A direct attack on the enemy's culture
* Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
* All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
* Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
* Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

[wm]

This is the biggest complaint I have against the XGW warfare concept. Most of what is postulated as 4GW is not new, though certain aspects have been enabled and accelerated through technology beyond what was possible in the past. But these elements of 4GW do not, ISTM, require such technology:

* Complex and long term
* Terrorism
* A non-national or transnational base
* A direct attack on the enemy's culture
* Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media
* All available networks are used - political, economic, social and military
* Occurs in low-intensity conflict, involving actors from all networks
* Non-combatants become tactical dilemmas

Seems to me that both the 30 Years War and the 100 Years War meet all of the criteria above. anyone want to call them 4GW struggles?
Oh wait, I forgot, 4GW only became possible after the Peace of Westphalia introduced the conditions that made 3GW possible.

4GW reminds me of the Ptolemaic geocentric view of the universe. They both require wheels within wheels within wheels to explain the data. I also just love the claim that the 4GW construct is simply a "heuristic" to stimulate discussion. Being exposed to that kind of stimulus makes me want to shout, "Don't taz me bro!"

[TT]

..is interspersed amongst with discussion of Man Warfare, on the 'Boyd and Lind Rebuttal' thread located at

http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=4534

IIRC, many of the issues raised above are addressed in this in places in this thread.

[ericmwalters]

And I thought I was going to get my thread started on the OODA Loop, but this distracted me. Okay, here goes.

Most of the criticism about 4GW revolves around it's extremely shaky foundations as a theoretical construct, an analytical lens, or any number of uses as tool for understanding military history. Okay, ALL OF THESE CRITICISMS ARE VALID. But the 4GW characterization was never intended for the uses that so many appear to attribute to it.

Look, if this was a serious historical construct, it would not have been published in the Marine Corps Gazette. It would have shown up in a scholarly journal.

Okay, I was pretty much in thick with John Schmitt and Bill Lind at the time the original 4GW article was published and got to know G.I. Wilson and Keith Nightengale much later. So let me provide some context so you can understand the purposes of the original authors, at least from my perspective.

First of all, the "three generations of war" was pretty slick shorthand for charaterizing tactics and command and control. In other words, they were intended as labels. Extremely simplistic labels. But using them, one could describe what one saw on the battlefield. For example, The ROK Marines are a first generation ground force. Tactics of line and column, culture of control, extreme hierarchical command on the Frederickan mold. Discipline enforced by liberal doses of corporal punishment. I say "first generation" and everybody understands--I don't have to describe much more of the basics but can then dive into the details.

Regarding the so-called "linear progression" of the generations, it's true--it's doesn't work. Bruce Gudmudsson calls the development of 2nd and 3rd Generation warfare as "the fork in the road" in his book, On Infantry (Revised Edition). He was doing this pretty early on as I recall him saying this when Bill, Bruce, and I were doing the "Modern War" television show in the Spring of 1994. When "first generation" wasn't working due to the requirement for open order tactics, you saw this split--a focus on firepower at the expense of maneuver and still the rigid culture of order left from the first generation (this is 2nd Gen)...and then what we term as MW (3GW). Lord knows, it's a terrible labeling scheme. Just like the term "maneuver warfare." It was a bumper sticker, and it stuck, showing up in Marine Corps correspondence courses like MCI 7400 WARFIGHING SKILLS PROGRAM.

But I need to emphasize--these generational characterizations were labels applied to descriptions of tactics and C2. It took TX Hammes to flesh them out a great deal in The Sling and Stone and put the historical backdrop behind them and provide an air of historical/analytical basis where none existed before. Should he have done this? I'll let you debate it. We in the field Marine units could have given a rat's *ss. We liked the shorthand labels.

Then came 4GW. It was Bill's label. And the paradox of it was that it didn't describe a tactical or command and control method at all. It described social conditions leading to the value systems of the warriors and explained how traditional operational art and military strategy wasn't going to be sufficient against these people. So why did Bill label it this way? I can only guess--because as soon as you describe 4GW in response to a question, the next question is what are the other three generations. And then you get the short course in the development of MW.

I'm not defending this. It's just how I perceived it at the time.

Now, the caveat. I'm a believer in the concept, although I agree with Echevarria that the term has become too synonymous with the idea of insurgency in general (blame TX Hammes in The Sling and the Stone which changed the original meaning of 4GW) and Iraq in particular (and Lind's "On War' columns in Military.com may have had something to do with that). I still adhere to the original conceptions as outlined in the earlier articles. Hammes' 5GW is more akin to what the original authors envisioned, although they didn't see the potential for "super-empowerment" as we now conceive of it.

But 4GW was still a label to describe a condition. It wasn't intended for the historians. It wasn't created for the defense analysts. It wasn't meant for the academics. It was for the field Marines who needed a shorthand term to describe the Cartels, the Somalia clans, the warring tribes and families, etc. To basically mean that pure military force wasn't going work against these characters. In that sense this bumper sticker label still works, even though the numbering system is misleading and the idea of "generations" just doesn't hold throughout under any serious historical investigation or analysis. Remember, this is the Marine Corps. "It's easy to be hard, and hard to be smart." And the corollary: "I'm not smart, and you can't make me." I'll just leave it at that. I'm not defending it, but I'm explaining it.

So, the bottom line up front for you non-jarhead types: This was never intended for you. Not really. Not originally.

Of course, the proponents--Bill Lind among them--were only too happy to see this particular genie escape the lamp and cause all kinds of debate and rhetorical havoc. And I think it's been a good thing for all the reasons we've seen in other threads about MW. People have to ask questions and defend their points of view...and constantly rethink their assumptions.

This is no doubt a gross summary/oversimplification of nearly twenty years of serious thought and discussion, but I thought I'd open up this particular Pandora's Box since CavGuy started this thread.

[zenpundit]

I'd like to add a few comments to those of Col. Walters.

There's a difference between using correct historical methodology - something I was trained to do - where you seek to explain causation of events and engaging in strategic sudies or some other social science. In history, you do not begin with a conclusion and use that as a prism with which to interpret events or attempt to justify it by gathering evidence that suits the model. Or rather you are not supposed to do that.

Strategic theories, like 4GW or IR theories in Poli Sci or economic models are useful only to the extent that they are explanatory and almost always that means that successful theories will fit a few scenarios very well, fit many adequately or partially and others not at all. Expressing the theory in quantitative terms instead of qualitative terms does not change that limitation, it just tells you with greater specifity how well your theory is matching or missing reality.

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

[Cavguy]

I'd like to add a few comments to those of Col. Walters.


There's a difference between using correct historical methodology - something I was trained to do - where you seek to explain causation of events and engaging in strategic sudies or some other social science. In history, you do not begin with a conclusion and use that as a prism with which to interpret events or attempt to justify it by gathering evidence that suits the model. Or rather you are not supposed to do that.

Strategic theories, like 4GW or IR theories in Poli Sci or economic models are useful only to the extent that they are explanatory and almost always that means that successful theories will fit a few scenarios very well, fit many adequately or partially and others not at all. Expressing the theory in quantitative terms instead of qualitative terms does not change that limitation, it just tells you with greater specifity how well your theory is matching or missing reality.

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

Zen, I don't see how it's a "challenge", because you can't use 4GW to predict anything, only describe and environment. I'm confused. How is 4GW or whatever construct I use "predictive"? It's a descriptor of a condition, not a theory.

That theory, at its root, exists to support the notion that "maneuver warfare" (3GW) is automatically superior to "attritional warfare" (2GW) in most every situation. Note I used quotes. And 4GW exists to make people think this is something "new" rather than old. In other words - the whole construct simply exists to reinforce a dogmatic notion that (as the creators define it) 2GW<3GW<4GW. Which means you have to accept that there even is a "attrition" school and a "maneuver" school - which is also a fraud. This is as dogmatic as the "2GW" construct the authors were trying to get the USMC out of. Having had some success in the USMC, their followers are now applying it beyond where it should be, IMO.

My beef with 4GW is that I don't think it's in all forms superior to 3GW and 2GW, and I don't necessarily think in all cases 3GW is "superior". I feel even bankrupt making these arguments because I don't agree with the premise of the construct in the first place.

I've seen Eric argue in every thread that it was a strawman to shake off complacency. Well that strawman is still around, and wreaking some bad history and knowledge among the less-thinking. What bothers me, at its core the GW construct exists only to advance the theories and ego of its authors, which they view as "necessary" even while acknowledging its bankruptcy. What happens when their bankrupt construct is carried too far? That is my concern.

Why the need to break down warfare in such a way against time?

[William F. Owen]

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

Very happy to participate, except I agree with a lot of the 4GW positions, and CAVGUY has got it right, with his reservations about the idea. My "beef" with 4GW is the overall concept, not the detail of its parts. I have the same beef with MW.

4GW is a bag of ideas, some of which are useful, but that to assume relationships between them, is not. WM's list is instructive

One of my "Rules" for modern operations is DO NOT KILL CIVILIANS. If you simply aim for that, then a lot/some of the 4GW constructs evaporate as a concern. Why doesn't 4GW just say that?

BUT - if you are fighting for your national survival, who cares how many of the other guys civilians die and your people are always more important that the enemies people.

[wm]

Is 4GW a useful theory? The best test of that would be how predictive it proves to be in "the real world".

The Small Wars Council could run an informal test pretty easily. At the next outbreak of serious conflict - the next Georgia or Somalia or whatever scenario we find agreeable we could have CavGuy, Wilf Owen, WM or whomever offer their analytical predictions of the outcome based upon whatever yardstick they think serves best and then a 4GW "Red Team" offering their set of predictions - say myself, Ski, Selil, Eric Walters. Then we can see where the chips fall and evaluate accordingly. Dave Dilegge can be our referee.

Any interest gentlemen ?

I'd be more than happy to play but I suspect that the predictive power of 4GW theory (if it has any, which I doubt for the same kinds of reasons given by CavGuy and Bill Moore) is not where Zenpundit proposes the contest. I submit that it may lie in assessing where and how the next outbreak of violence will occur, not in deciding how it will end up.
Do the 4GW advocates want to take on this challenge instead?

BTW, I note that Zen proposed a one against many effort--the "traditionalists" nominate a prognosticator "champion" to be subjected to a riposte from a 4GW "Red Team"--certainly sounds like a traditional (dare I say attrition-based warfare) approach--use mass to ensure you trounce your opponent.

[William F. Owen]

My reading of Lind would be that, among other points, he's making an argument regarding the political and moral effect of using military force in the context of the late nation-state period. I'm not sure if Lind being Lind is engaging in a pure critical thinking exercise.

Bill Lind makes so many points it's hard to keep track, but I submit that he is always trying to alter peoples ideas and opinions.

I think he's wrong regarding the absolutist nature of the position he takes ( "everywhere the state is in decline") but he's making a substantive argument, not offering up hypotheticals or red herrings.

Concur. We now have more nation states, not fewer, and the vast majority of conflict is concerned about who lives where and with what systems of government.

Secondly, what evidence is there that there is much of a culture of empiricism operating on the "other side" of the non-theoretical, operational, pragmatists?

There is no evidence of what you suggest. My position is, that this is the area that holds the most promise for progressing military thought - and the one that most (not all) the "new concepts of war" folks seem to ignore.

We all watched an American military and political leadership proceed for years with an occupation in Iraq that was clearly not working until a political crisis at home forced a change of strategy. Absent 2006 election results, would anything have changed ?

The American ppl may have been empiricists but their leaders sure weren't.

Above my pay grade. I don't get or even pretend to understand US Foreign Policy. - what is more, none of my business so I can't comment.