The future with Karzai: a debate (merged thread with new title)

[davidbfpo]

There are those here in the UK who state - quietly - that Karzai is the only option and a far larger group who'd prefer the question was not even asked. It is sometimes bewildering to see how the fundamental issues of our role in Afghanistan are pushed aside for the tactics.

I would expect the 'establishment' would swiftly change its "tune" if the USA announced, or quietly undermined him, that Karzai was an obstacle.

From my "armchair" Karzai is not the only option, especially when you realise the power of a nation-state based in Kabul is actually very limited.

IMHO we should not overlook the domestic impact of Karzai's recent apparent statements, his attitude will harden the majority here who oppose the UK involvement and could swing others.

[GreenIdeal]

Bing's article was refreshing, and a good perspective on how Marjah may provide examples for a "bottom up" approach. I do feel it's worth taking a step back from the "ditch Karzai now" argument and try understand why he made his comments earlier in the week. Was it part of a hidden agenda for reconciliation? What was the context of those statements? Was he being intentionally inflammatory to evoke a western response? What was said to him prior to those statements? I believe it was in a closed door meeting, and he was quoted by the Nangahar provincial representative, which also may be laden with rhetoric. Despite Karzai's clear toleration for corruption (hello! his brother is a major narco/terrorist facilitator), he is no fool. He's survived because he's a politically motivated opportunist. He knows how to build alliances and utilize coercion. Is he worth our continued support? Probably not. Is he worth addressing and negotiating with? Sure.

The point in asking these questions is to try and understand Karzai's actions over the last week without making the typical over-reactive assertions. Karzai is playing a dangerous game, and the NATO nations should react accordingly, which is to say they should call his bluff. However, before acting, they should attempt to reach out and understand the logic behind his statements from his perspective before moving on and cutting him out of the picture entirely.

[Steve the Planner]

Green:

From what I read lately, Karzai's primary focus is to prepare for the time after the US backs off in 2011. Playing to his popular base, plus against the threats to his power base (anti-corruption).

We may be the strongest tribe at the moment, but we offer him no future.

The funny part was his comment about joining the Taliban. Immediately, the Taliban's well-oiled press machine responded that they could accept him, but only after judging him for bringing foreign troops into Afghanistan.

That sounds like Salem Witch Trials. Wrap him in rocks, drop him into a lake. If he is innocent, he will float upward.

His back is up against a lot of walls. What to do?

If I was him, maybe I would be taking drugs, too.

PS: As much as anything, West's flyer (coming after his trip to Marjah with all the big boys) might, in the end, prove to have been a trial balloon to get his undivided attention. It really is a big game.

PPS: As Saddam was swinging, Quadafi reminded his Arab brethren that this fate often awaits those leaders who dance with us. Was he right? Is that what Karzai is focusing on?

[Firn]

Green:

From what I read lately, Karzai's primary focus is to prepare for the time after the US backs off in 2011. Playing to his popular base, plus against the threats to his power base (anti-corruption).

We may be the strongest tribe at the moment, but we offer him no future.

The funny part was his comment about joining the Taliban. Immediately, the Taliban's well-oiled press machine responded that they could accept him, but only after judging him for bringing foreign troops into Afghanistan.

That sounds like Salem Witch Trials. Wrap him in rocks, drop him into a lake. If he is innocent, he will float upward.

His back is up against a lot of walls. What to do?

If I was him, maybe I would be taking drugs, too.

He seems to gain political capital by biting into the hand which fed him, feeds him and which won't hang him from the spring board of a swimming pool.

Said thought might well cross the minds of his potential "allies", the Taliban who would gladly give him a fair trial and hang him for crimes against Islam, the Afghan people and the cooperation with the infidels.


Firn

[slapout9]

From my "armchair" Karzai is not the only option, especially when you realise the power of a nation-state based in Kabul is actually very limited.

I agree, we could do better.

[slapout9]

Link to Washington Post article (from SWJ Blog) by Peter Galbraith (worlds greatest living expert on Good Government and Brother of the worlds greatest living Economist James Galbraith) comments on what to do in A'stan since we don't have a legitimate ally with Karzai.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...d=opinionsbox1

[Sylvan]

Link to Washington Post article (from SWJ Blog) by Peter Galbraith (worlds greatest living expert on Good Government and Brother of the worlds greatest living Economist James Galbraith) comments on what to do in A'stan since we don't have a legitimate ally with Karzai.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...d=opinionsbox1

Concur with the jist.
My ultimatum is simple. Karzai goes or we do. And I mean rapidly. Who ever wins the blood bath either deals with us or we break skulls again and start over.
ANSF can handle the taliban right now.
Militarily we have met all our objectives. Supporting an illigitimate dictatorship that we installed is not helping our long term objectives.
We backed the wrong horse, as State Department always does, and the military is paying the price. Karzai wasn't even popular in Kandahar. His base was Tarin Kowt, a non-entity in the larger picture.
Wish that 2000 pounder took him out in 2001. Would have been easier.

[Steve the Planner]

Sylvan:

One version I read of "would have been easier" was if the US had not pressured the Afghans to accept our constitution, and not simply re-appoint the old king. Alternative is a new Loya Jirga to address constitutional issues (do what they would have done back in 2002).

Having said that, Tough Love sounds like the remaining course. The Afghans still have many unresolved political/civil issues better left to themselves; every effort we make in that sphere forestalls their resolution.

PS: If the Taliban (under Omar/ISI, not Baradar) "judges" first, there won't be any "second thing" to address.

[Sylvan]

"OUR" Constitution it wasn't.
It is a Western Europe constitution that our State Department was so enamored of and shoved down their throat.
As you can see in other threads, my admiration for the capabilities of our State Department is literally immeasurable.
We gave them a disfunctional frame work, and then installed a disfunctional ruler.
And we are now befuddled that Afghanistan is disfunctional.

[Bob's World]

"OUR" Constitution it wasn't.
It is a Western Europe constitution that our State Department was so enamored of and shoved down their throat.
As you can see in other threads, my admiration for the capabilities of our State Department is literally immeasurable.
We gave them a disfunctional frame work, and then installed a disfunctional ruler.
And we are now befuddled that Afghanistan is disfunctional.

GIROA can never be any anything but corrupt, with fixed elections under the current constitution. Bad systems lead to bad results.

In the US we forget how blessed we are by our good systems.

As to Mr. Karzai, that is a matter between him and the people of Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to get out of the mindset of thinking that if we don't like a particular leader of another nation that we have some right to change that leader.

We need to make our focus the people of Afghanistan. The Afghan Army is never going to threaten the US; but if we take positions that are counter to the well being of the populace of Afghanistan the people certainly can.

Mr. Karzai is doing the US a favor by creating separation and working to create legitimacy for his presidency that if not borne of the popular will of Afghanistan, at least is not perceived as borne of the popular will of the US.

We need to step back and reassess where certain "lines" are. There are things that are within our "area of concern"; those that are within our "area of influence"; and those that are within our "area of control." We traveled down a slippery slope throughout the Cold war, and the subsequent War on Terrorism, to where we seem to think that every corner of the globe not within the sovereign borders of a nuclear state is within our area of control. I doubt that there are many others who agree with that assessment; and it is a position that is wearing thin with friends and foes alike.

Once we realize that not everything that concerns us can or should be influenced by us, and certainly even less should be controlled by us, we will begin to find the security from terrorist attacks that we seek, and a reemergence of the influence with others that has waned of late.

Perhaps Mr. Karzai will help us to figure that out.