Share of NCOs among deployed combat troops

[Fuchs]

I'll simply copy & paste a list of last weeks' U.S. KIA from Afghanistan as an example of what I've been observing for a long time:

US Army Sgt (...)
US Army SSG (...)
US Army Sgt (...)
US Army SPC (...)
US Army SPC (...)
US Army Sgt (...)
US Army Sgt (...)
US Marines Cpl (...)
US Army SPC (...)

That's five or six NCOs (not sure how to count corporal) and three or four enlisted. Earlier lists of this kind often included an officer or two.

I have made these observations with anecdotal value, not really counted all the reported KIA.

Nevertheless, I'm very confused by the very high share of NCOs among the dead Americans in Afghanistan.

The German military has had a horrible rank inflation for two decades, and these lists suggest that the U.S. had its rank inflation as well.

These KIA lists sound even more bottom-up than does the "Taliban leader" thing; reputedly, one third of captives were considered to be Taliban leaders.


I guess I'm not the only one uncomfortable with the thought of deployed forces having so many chieftains that being chieftain inevitably loses a lot of its meaning?

[Bill Moore]

A SPC is a Specialist, which not an NCO, but your point is still valid. I'm not sure what the promotion norm is now, but in the Army (the other services are different) it used to be:

E-1 (PVT) initial entry
E-2 (PVT) with a stripe, 6 months after entry
E-3 (PFC) after a year
E-4 (SPC or CPL) (2 years) A CPL is considered a NCO, largely dependent upon MOS and duty position whether an E-4 is made a CPL or not.
E-5 (SGT) (3 or more years)

A Marine E-3 is called a Lance Corporal, but he is not an NCO, so the verbiage can be confusing.

As we migrate more into an advisory role versus a direct combat role it will be the norm to see more NCOs and Officers killed and wounded than lower enlisted, because lower enlisted generally are not experienced enough to be advisors.

I'm not concerned about the ratio within U.S. forces so much only because I have become numb to it. The rapid promotions have been and remain a retention tool that has been abused and we have been living with it for years. Wish it would go away, but I have no hope that it will.

What really concerns me is your other comment:

These KIA lists sound even more bottom-up than does the "Taliban leader" thing; reputedly, one third of captives were considered to be Taliban leaders.

The term High Value Individual (HVI) become vogue over the last decade and now everyone we kill or capture is a HVI to include a 19 year old emplacing IEDs. It is all part of our growing dishonesty with ourselves and ever ending demand for metrics that don't mean anything that promotes these distortions.

A HVI should mean something. Exactly who is a HVI is situational dependent on the particular dynamics of the insurgency or terrorist organization. If you're dealing with an organization that is largely a personality cult, then that personality matters. If you're dealing with a growing movement that will continue despite the removal of its leadership then those funding it and the propaganda experts that give it legitimacy are of much higher value than a Taliban insurgent who emplace IEDs, or a local combat leader that leads a local militant group that is smaller than a platoon size.

What is see now is general purpose forces calling these fighters members of the shadow government. This is an attempt to give them more value, but in reality indicates how little they understand about the insurgency. The real shadow government does consist of HVIs, but not every Taliban member leading fighters in combat is a member of the shadow government.

All the above should be targeted if we're pursuing a military solution, but not all these individuals are HVIs.

The first casualty of war is the truth, that is a given, but now I think we been blowing smoke for so long we believe our own spin.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

That's five or six NCOs (not sure how to count corporal) and three or four enlisted. Earlier lists of this kind often included an officer or two.

Six NCOs (the Corporal counts) and three Specialists (a super Private).

Nevertheless, I'm very confused by the very high share of NCOs among the dead Americans in Afghanistan.

Without context and job, it's difficult to decipher. However, part of the explanation lies in the opponent's use of IEDs against vehicles and the number of vehicles that are not involved in direct combat but are merely transporting supply and service people from one location to another. Hauling a Contact Repair team to the site of a disabled vehicle and the HMMWV that's doing that may have three NCO specialists in it -- if it gets hit, that could a SSG and two SGTs at one whack. Same deal with the Officers, could be two Judge Advocate, legal officers, on their way to a FOB. The possibilities are endless.

The German military has had a horrible rank inflation for two decades, and these lists suggest that the U.S. had its rank inflation as well.

We have. That's an understatement.

These KIA lists sound even more bottom-up than does the "Taliban leader" thing; reputedly, one third of captives were considered to be Taliban leaders.

I agree with Bill but would add that's also because they're the ones targeted in the raids on their houses and meeting places, the minions get killed in minor engagements. Most minions avoid capture by fleeing as it looks advisable; the targeted 'leaders' are mostly caught by night raids -- again, not the result of direct combat.

I guess I'm not the only one uncomfortable with the thought of deployed forces having so many chieftains that being chieftain inevitably loses a lot of its meaning?

Probably not...