What war are you planning to fight with this organisation?Originally Posted by Fuchs
Mortars and Training
Tuk:
My 6-gun 60mm platoon is only 1 tube larger then the total envisioned in you company. Totally agree with you regarding ammo for this weapon. The issue is does someone in the platoon/company actually carry these rounds or are they transported by/on a vehicle. I choose 6 guns because of the greater flexibiity in sub-dividing the platoon, 2 sections of 3, 3 sections of 2, a section of 4 and a section of 2, etc.
DO NOT agree with the idea/concept of "Snap Training". Soldiers/units will only be good at those tasks/skills they train on/practice regularly. Otherwise , they will probably never progress beyond a "novice" level of ability.
What war are you planning to fight with this organisation?
Given our training 'philosophy' today,
that's generally true. The Task, Condition, Standard system is specifically designed to train tasks by rote and repetition. Add to that the facts that we attempt to train people only for their next job -- both enlisted and officer initial entry training produce only a poorly trained, entry level person instead of a competent soldier or leader -- and that the system is structured to produce promotion levels for personnel management and advancement purposes, NOT for effective operations and you're right.
However, discard the terribly flawed BTMS and its allied stifling idiocy for Outcome Based Training and Education, structure ranks and promotion based on effective operating capability requirements and most importantly, properly and thoroughly train people in the basics then snap or swing training is not only possible but desirable. In fact, one need not do all three of those things, change in any one would allow quick switch in units.
The Troops are capable of doing far more than they are allowed to do. However, if that were proven true (as it has been in other times...), then what we're now doing would be exposed as terribly wasteful (which it is), over-ranking a lot of people (which is certainly true...) and underpaying Joe -- as well as exposing a lack of selectivity in who gets to be Joe...
The terrible crime of risk aversion does not just stifle actions in the combat theaters...
It's no organisation, but a text with food for thought.
My focus is on classical Western alliance defence, though.
Fuchs,
what are the parameters (geographic, constaints, etc.) to the "classical Western alliance defence" as you see it ?
Regards
Mike
Sir,
you are quite right. Struggled with that issue myself and almost settled for three tubes at coy as per the old US rifle coy of the 1960s. But I decided that there were pretty good reasons for the plt ldr to have access to an immediately avaliable 60mm tube to lay down obscurants or HE hence, as per the UK plt, assigned a commando mortar to each plt and two larger baseplated mortars at Coy for some measure of SF. Plt ammunition was envisaged as an immediate UBL of perhaps two rounds per man in the infantry sections with coy mortars having some kind of coy level mobile platform (a la ATMP). I don't envision the troops carry huge ALICE packs or whatever as per Afghanistan. Instead they'd be left in a coy assembly area or on long patrols/infiltrations a couple of ATMP per section (about four per plt) would be assigned for carrying water, ammo and packs and, once TiC, casualties. Personally, I think logistics is the much neglected achilles heel of "transformation" with the exploitation of newer technologies for air transport (via UAV), guided parachute packages etc. being overlooked for the sexier "things that go boom"/easier to sell to Congress/Parliament. But not really thought that through as yet. As per original post MULE-T looks interesting but the relity may be a bigger headache than the problem they're meant to solve (along the lines of Custer's last stand, though, they might come in handy for cover and concealment).
Well, the Southern flank of Europe can only be seriously threatened by a United Arabs Nation which doesn't exist yet. The only ground warfare necessary in a hot conflict against this super hypothetical opponent would be in Morocco, to secure the Strait of Gibraltar against land-based missiles (air and sea power could be defeated without invasions).
The Eastern flank of Europe can only be seriously threatened by the Russians with Allies. The terrain would be remarkably similar to WW2 Eastern Front except for more settlements and much, much better road network.
The Southeastern Flank (Turkey) is still allied, but it would offer the potential for a extremely high force density ground campaign (plus some Island warfare) if that changed drastically.
Overall, Europe is well secured today (and should reorient its forces to long-term instead of spending on the now and next five years). We should review, invent, innovate, experiment and reorganise. This is the time, we can afford it.
My advice is basically to develop a triad of infantry:
* mechanised infantry (more than we're used to thanks to simple HAPCs & APCs with many seats instead of gold-plated IFV with few seats)
* expert infantry (close to the best regular infantry outfits today, replacing also "door kicker" special forces)
* huge reserve infantry organisation with regionally-based regiments, composed of volunteers most of whom serve only during infantry training and refreshing training exercises. This could provide the quantity for a great continental war at low cost and would help as intro for the regular forces' recruiting.
This framework doesn't dictate any "tactics, tasks, weapons and organisation" below battalion level.
edit: 1,111 posts. Gotta get some sparkling wine.
Last edited by Fuchs; 08-16-2010 at 10:15 PM.
Less special-this and special-that and more good, solid, "jager-type" light infantry? I'll drink to that.
Have a hefeweizen.edit: 1,111 posts. Gotta get some sparkling wine.
Last edited by Rifleman; 08-16-2010 at 10:34 PM.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
Here are some excerpts from my file with notes about the expert infantry idea:
The missions don't look like copies of the special skills because I emphasize the maintenance and development of competencies in modern armies. We don't need huge forces right now to secure Europe, but we need to be very competent when that changes.special skills:
(especially honed in certain companies whose personnel disperses into all other companies as advisers & trainers in the event of related formation exercises)
parachuting (HALO, HAHO, LA automatic)
arctic warfare (northern Norway training, skiing – res inf and mech inf train with snowshoes only)
alpine warfare (high altitude, climbing)
riverine warfare (boats)
swamp warfare
river crossing (?)
amphibious landing
employment of pack animals
foreign armies doctrine and TO&E knowledge
idea: special skills are available without intensively training all personnel in all skills. This specialisation shall create true experts with basic all-round skills.
To be employed in especially demanding infantry missions, such as
river crossing
mountain warfare (capturing & securing mountain tops/ridges, passes)
air assault (QRF, Raid, coup de main – primarily by parachute because ResInf can be used for helo insertion)
raiding (non-air assault), surprise attacks with limited objectives
+ red team players (OPFOR in exercises)
slow infiltration (Sicker) attacks
My great problem with my 'expert infantry' idea is that I've got no good ideas on new infantry tactics. My research and creativity is much more fruitful in regard to the area of armoured reconnaissance/cavalry. I derived some original and unorthodox operational ideas from that one, while my thinking on infantry seems to be obsessed with survivability (which may be right or wrong. I cannot tell that any more - cognitive dissonance and such - you know?).
That's part of the reason why I created a thread about modern infantry theory sources a while ago. I need to absorb more info, for fresh info usually creates new ideas of mine. Historical tactics, infantry FMs from five nations, other 'by the book' tactics and all that 'Infantry 101' stuff were already absorbed.
Fuchs,
Your last post described something akin to the U.S. 75th Ranger Regiment or the French 2d Foreign Parachute Regiment. Both are light infantry units with some degree of specialization and skills that not every infantry unit has; yet, neither unit is the type of unit one usually thinks when SOF is mentioned.
"Pick up a rifle and you change instantly from a subject to a citizen." - Jeff Cooper
...or Royal Marines.
The level of originality is rather disappointing in comparison to some of my other works in progress.
After sleeping on it...
...the following thoughts occured to me. Yes flexibility is always a bonus but at a cost. Dispersing the plt into two or three sub-units adds to the command, control, communication problem especially at Coy level where HQ wouldn’t have the resources that a BN HQ would. Given that currently existing command nets are already pushing the boundaries of available bandwidth (etc.) and dispersing the units entails a greater need for coordination and, of course, more radio nets keyed into coy FDC you might actually be trading availability and immediacy for survivability/flexibility. I have read of numerous occasions in Afghanistan when British units have been able to get the “ball rolling” with their plt mortars while waiting for the JTAC/FIST to call in fire thereby developing and “shaping” (ugh!) the situation or fixing the enemy. Having six tubes dispersed or not merely add to the FDC’s calculations (etc.) during the coy fire support planning process and reduces the responsiveness that a smaller number of tubes, grouped together, may afford. It would also, come to think of it, be easier to displace a two tube section to a supplementary or alternate firing site when needed than it would two or three mortar squads at the company level.
With regards ammunition I think two coy level tubes equipped with PGMM would be of greater benefit than 6 (especially given the phenomenal RoF a single mortar can produce- 20 rds/min IIRC)in all but FPF missions requiring copious (why does that word always sound rude to me?) amounts of ammunition and where more tubes would definitely be a plus in terms of frontage as well as volume though I often think frontages and areas are merely ways of ensuring destruction (suppression is a different issue) in the absence of precision capabilities hence the emphasis on PGMM ( just look at Excalibur or GMLRS, but OTOH in a major war with diminished/degraded GPS they may be redundant, in fact, come to think of it, I’m sure I read that a man-portable RF jamming kit was in development somewhere). Don’t think DPICM munitions for 60mm would be feasible. But then again the eight 120mm and six 155mm tubes at Bn should pick up the slack. One also might need greater volume of fire in the defence or the assault which is why I added HE projectors and MPMS (essentially advanced RPGs) which can be better co-ordinated at section/plt level. But I think those with actual experience would be best placed to answer that issue (I don’t know what I’m talking about at the best of times and, thanks to my health, never got the opportunity to get any... experience that is... militarily speaking...oh dear)
As an aside I wasn’t advocating “snap training” per se merely suggesting that there may be arguments in favour of it which, as always, Ken White has explained as no else can. In fact, WILF’s platoon groups idea tacitly presupposes such an arrangement anyway from what I can surmise.
Got a feeling I’m rambling now so I’ll end it there.
Mortar ranges have improved a lot during the last decades. Especially long-barrelled mortars can fire very far.
Dedicated 60mm LR models reach out to 4.8 km (TDA) to 6 km (Vector) (with a Norinco model in between).
The dispersion and accuracy may be a problem, but it's nevertheless food for thought.
A pet topic of mine is horizontal fire support; identical (small) units supporting each other, even their neighbour's neighbour. This has important effects on logistics and requires effective (radio) communication, but it's quite interesting as long as you don't assume that all of them get into firefights at once.
Even then it's still an analogy to the artillery's concentration of many artillery batteries on one very short and concentrated strike after another (WW2).
Horizontal fire support has furthermore the advantage that not all mortar bombs come from "the rear". Dispersion is greater in length than in dispersion, so a neighbour unit might be able to shoot at more close hostiles than organic mortars can.
An army that gets horizontal fire support right could save tubes (not necessarily significant quantities of ammunition) in its combat units.
In other words: One 60mm LR mortar per company with established horizontal fire support could offer more fire support than three normal 60mm mortars per company without.
Only on the Weekneds
From a quick net search 60mm rounds weigh between 3 and 4 pounds (1.4 to 2 Kg) each.
combat_load.pdf
From a study done in A-stan back in 2003 the average load for a rifleman is a 63 pound (28.5 Kg) fighting load. His assault load was 96 pounds (43.5 Kg) and had a load of 127 pounds (57.6 Kg) when conducting approach marches.
So. adding a couple of rounds per Solider makes an alreadt bad situation worse.
Who controls the fires of the mortars is up to the Company Commander. He may retain control of all of them, task organize them all down to the platoons for their direct control of a combination.
Agree totally with your comment regarding log/CSS/Sustainment. Our LOCs and our Log Bases are and probably will remain our soft spot.
MULE-Ts looked like a good idea on the surface. But, they were going to be VERY expensive, did not come with an on-board self-protection system to defeat RPGs, would have been vunlerable to mines, IEDs, and Direct-fire. Don't care about lossing the 'Bot. Do care about lossing what it was carrying.
A "Gator" like vehicle is a better idea.
[QUOTE=Tukhachevskii;105104]...
With regards ammunition I think two coy level tubes equipped with PGMM would be of greater benefit than 6 (especially given the phenomenal RoF a single mortar can produce- 20 rds/min IIRC)in all but FPF missions requiring copious (why does that word always sound rude to me?) amounts of ammunition and where more tubes would definitely be a plus in terms of frontage as well as volume though I often think frontages and areas are merely ways of ensuring destruction (suppression is a different issue) in the absence of precision capabilities hence the emphasis on PGMM
See my earlier comments regarding control of fires. As these are Company-level weapons, control should NEVER go above that level.
Not sure anyone makes or is thinking of making a 60mm PGM. 81mm yes, 120mm yes.
An advantage of a 3-gun section/platoon/unit is that two tubes can be firing HE while the other fires smoke. Or the reverse. With just two guns the effect is too weak.
So, having said all of that, maybe a single platoon of four tubes normally kept as a single unit is a better/alternate solution.
1. I don't think you'd need a tube just for Smoke, all you'd need is to fire three HH, a smoke round and then three more HE (for instance) per tube AFAIK its possible and is done routinely.
2. You might well be right but I'm still concerned about responsiveness. Much easier for plt cdr to turn to his mortarman and order five HE and one smoke than it is to call them in over the net. Beside if coy cdr decides to employ the mrotar section/plt on a HVT the plts may be shorn of valubale fire support at critical moments. Also, say during an assault of a strongpoint, the four/six tubes at coy would be as reponsive to shifting fires as would the plt mortar which eases fire support planning at coy level IMO.
1. Agree , but a third tube gives the option/flexibility of firing both types of rounds at the same time. Angles.. head of a pin.. dancing... how many
2. Don't forget that EVERYTHING in the platoon belongs to the Company Comander. If he needs to, he can/will take: mortars, MGs, fire teams or even whole squads. Same issue applies to the Company from Bn.
Surely you must supply context? What do you do with mortars in the jungle with a closed tree canopy or anti-tank weapons in forests where there are no fields of fire?
Mortars are a prime indirect fire weapon for combat in forests because they can use even small gaps of the foliage thanks to their near-90° maximum elevation.
A look at mortar ranges and actual satellite imagery of European forests furthermore shows that there are always opportunities to set up a mortar in range.
About tanks and forests; flat forests - especially the cultivated kind often seen in Central Europe - are no good obstacle against tanks. The tanks can often either crush the (small) tree or avoid the (large) tree (large trees require much area, thus large gaps between the stems). Woods were a common marshalling area for armoured forces in WW2.
Even if they were a reliable obstacle; every obstacle needs to be defended. Short range anti-tank weapons are very much necessary in forests (not the least to defeat cover).
Besides; to leave some tools in the trucks is the least challenge for infantry.
You’re talking about two different things here though. A commando mortar at platoon level is for direct fire and does indeed offer great response capability at that level. The tubes at company and battalion level are for stand-off indirect fire. One advantage of having greater numbers of tubes/sections in a battalion mortar platoon is the ability to leapfrog behind a moving battalion, while always keeping one foot on the ground. Increased numbers of 60 mm at company level would offer the same potential, but does the advantage at this level outweigh the weight and manpower penalties?
I think 60 mm mortars at coy level are a half way between, with compromises and capabilities in both directions. Many can be used as ‘commando’ mortars, which is great, but it does go to the immediate detriment of the company level indirect fire support. If you want both all the time, you gotta have both, but you pay.
IMO having some 60s at company is cool; it gives some measure of organic indirect support. But don’t get too exited by trying to make in ‘enough’, coz it never will be. You can’t equip sub units at all levels as if they have to fight the war by themselves. And if they do have to fight their part of the war by themselves (distributed ops), well, battalion might lend them a section of 81s.
Urggggh. All this talk about mortars. Our infantry have no mortars at all!
Nothing that results in human progress is achieved with unanimous consent. (Christopher Columbus)
All great truth passes through three stages: first it is ridiculed, second it is violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident.
(Arthur Schopenhauer)
ONWARD
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