Ukraine: military (Aug '14 to mid-June '15) closed

[AmericanPride]

If you then look at the definition and one notices that word WMD is used as one of the three reasons I would and have argued the shooting down of a civilian airliner and killing 298 with a SAM is in fact the usage of WMD---just as the random shelling of civilian targets by the Russian irregulars via the BM21 and 27s are also in fact the reflect the use of WMD.

And... I addressed this by raising questions about the implications of classifying conventional weapon systems as "weapons of mass destruction". So - the next time a U.S. drone kills dozens of people in a wedding party, or a U.S. warship downs a civilian airliner, will you argue that the U.S. is a 'rogue' country recklessly using weapons of mass destruction?

On this I agree... the question is what can be done to adjust his calculations of cost and benefit I've already pointed out one possibility: for the Ukrainians to offer a cease-fire, amnesty, and a degree of autonomy as a way of pulling the rug out from any claim that peacekeeping forces are necessary. I don't think that's an ideal solution by any means, but if the Ukrainialn forces move into urban areas to root out the separatists it's going to be an engraved invitation to Putin for an invasion under the guise of peacekeeping. Better to not hand them the invitation.

At this point, this is probably the most realistic outcome with the highest possibility of restoring stability in the region. Kiev needs to find a way to reintegrate the opposition into the political process - that will isolate the radicals and undermine Russian justifications for intervention. What does Ukraine's political landscape look like if it exterminates the armed opposition?

See AP a rouge country having and threatening the use of nuclear weapons and yes in the early stages of the Crimea nuclear threats were in fact issued by members of the Duma

Is that like U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo calling for the nuclear destruction of Mecca and Medina during the GWoT? There are reckless blowhards in every country. So - if we accept your argument that Russia is a rogue, reckless, criminal, irrational country carelessly throwing around threats of nuclear weapons, why is your proposed response to further provoke it? If there's no connection between the country's interests and its behavior, how can you be certain that escalated sanctions or increased U.S. military presence in eastern Europe won't be met with a nuclear first strike? The very ideas of deterrence and sanctions are premised on the assumption that the targeted state is a rational actor and will respond in a way desired by the other state(s).

[AmericanPride]

I don't think it's likely that the status quo ante will be restored in any exact way. Whether or not the new status quo favors Russia remains to be seen. If they gain Crimea but see the rest of the Ukraine end up in firmly pro-Western hands that is hardly a win.

I agree with this assessment. There's a couple of outstanding questions:

o What will Ukraine's post-war political landscape look like? Will it be inclusive of ethnic Russian interests (and what are those interests)?

o What will be Ukraine's relationship with EU and NATO? What kind of security and economic guarantees will be extended to Ukraine from those organizations?

o Assuming a Ukrainian victory over the insurgents, where will the defeated fighters go? This region has a history of roaming armed brigades so if defeat seems imminient, will they withdraw to Russia (or Crimea) and establish a base in exile? Will Russia disarm them or keep them on a low burn for future political leverage?

o What will Russia's political landscape look like? The conflict thus far seems to have strengthened the nationalists and realists in his administration - there seems to be a very distant hope that any liberal (read: Western) influence on policy will ever return. If defeated in Ukraine and sanctions continue, will this trigger a political crisis in Moscow (I doubt it)? Who could come to power afterwards?

o What relationship does the U.S. and Europe want with Russia post-conflict? And how will the outcome affect Russia's perspective on other international security issues (i.e. Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Central Asia, etc)?

I classify the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as two different conflicts even though the belligerents are the same. The reason is that IMO Russia's intention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are very different: it just so happens that Russia executed two wars (one direct, one proxy) simultaneously against the same adversary. Crimea is materially important for strategic and political reasons, and Russia's political claims are least nominally valid in comparison to the ones made regarding eastern Ukraine (why didn't Russia annex Donetsk after the region's independence referendum?). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, however, I think is aimed at keeping Russian interests at the bargaining table when Ukraine's political crisis is finally resolved and, failing that, weakening Ukraine to the extent that it cannot seriously impede Russian security interests in Europe.

[Dayuhan]

I agree with this assessment. There's a couple of outstanding questions:

Most of these questions are of course unanswerable. For one thing the government of the Ukraine will play a major role in determining the post-conflict landscape, and their positions are not yet clear. The US and the EU will have very substantial influence over the post-war Ukraine, which will be an economic dependency for years to come, but I personally think it would be a bad idea for the US/EU to degrade Ukrainian sovereignty by dictating policy. It will be a fairly delicate bit of balancing.

o What will Ukraine's post-war political landscape look like? Will it be inclusive of ethnic Russian interests (and what are those interests)?

We don't know. Part of the problem will be differentiating between ethnic Russian interests and Russian national interests... for example, the Russian demand for autonomy with a veto over foreign policy decisions is clearly intended as a Russian level over possible NATO membership and other links tot he West, and is incompatible with Ukrainian sovereignty. At the least the ethnic Russia community could be offered recognition of their language as official, as the Quebecois got in Canada. It would help a great deal if the ethnic Russians can develop a moderate leadership that can articulate expectations and desires of the community without being controlled by Putin. Whether or not that is possible we do not yet know.

o What will be Ukraine's relationship with EU and NATO? What kind of security and economic guarantees will be extended to Ukraine from those organizations?

Ukraine will be effectively dependent in economic terms. The extent of the assistance they receive, and the conditions attached to that assistance, will have to be carefully worked out.

o Assuming a Ukrainian victory over the insurgents, where will the defeated fighters go? This region has a history of roaming armed brigades so if defeat seems imminient, will they withdraw to Russia (or Crimea) and establish a base in exile? Will Russia disarm them or keep them on a low burn for future political leverage?

Ideally you'd send the Russians back to Russia and let Putin deal with them, and allow at least the rank and file of the local insurgents to stay without penalty. Of course that is hypothetical and the governments in question will have a lot to say about it. There may be some agitation among ethnic Russians for full scale relocation to Russia. There is some precedent for this: much of the ethnic Russian population of Kazakhstan has returned to Russia. Whether the Russians would be amenable, or how it could be done in a way that doesn't look like ethnic cleansing, is anyone's guess. My guess is that it will be handled badly and make a mess.

o What will Russia's political landscape look like? The conflict thus far seems to have strengthened the nationalists and realists in his administration - there seems to be a very distant hope that any liberal (read: Western) influence on policy will ever return. If defeated in Ukraine and sanctions continue, will this trigger a political crisis in Moscow (I doubt it)? Who could come to power afterwards?

Not possible to know or control.

o What relationship does the U.S. and Europe want with Russia post-conflict? And how will the outcome affect Russia's perspective on other international security issues (i.e. Syria, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Central Asia, etc)?

I think the risks to "the relationship" are in many ways overrated. The commercial interests on both sides are too strong to repress out of enduring pique, and I'd expect trade relations to be renewed pretty quickly if the conflict is resolved. If the resolution of the conflict is handled in a way intended to inflict outright defeat (or emasculation) of Russia, we can expect them to disrupt our strategic interests to the greatest extent of their ability. Of course that doesn't have to happen.

I classify the conflict in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as two different conflicts even though the belligerents are the same. The reason is that IMO Russia's intention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine are very different: it just so happens that Russia executed two wars (one direct, one proxy) simultaneously against the same adversary. Crimea is materially important for strategic and political reasons, and Russia's political claims are least nominally valid in comparison to the ones made regarding eastern Ukraine (why didn't Russia annex Donetsk after the region's independence referendum?). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, however, I think is aimed at keeping Russian interests at the bargaining table when Ukraine's political crisis is finally resolved and, failing that, weakening Ukraine to the extent that it cannot seriously impede Russian security interests in Europe.

The problem here is that "Russian security interests in Europe" seem to require an allied or at least neutral Ukraine, and short of outright conquest that no longer appears to be achievable. How that sorts out is anybody's guess. The west cannot promise a neutral Ukraine, because that would intrude on the sovereign right of the Ukraine to choose its own alliances. If the Ukraine goes firmly pro-west, even without Crimea, the only ally the Russians have on their western border is Belarus, and that's a shaky ally at best. If Russia can't control the eventual transition out of Lukashenko's rule, they may be left with exactly the situation they want to avoid: the West on their doorstep with no buffer. What Russia will try to do about that is, of course, up to them.

[JMA]

... and allow at least the rank and file of the local insurgents to stay without penalty.

This stuff is straight out of cloud cuckoo land. I give up.

[Dayuhan]

This stuff is straight out of cloud cuckoo land. I give up.

You need to resolve the conflict without giving the Russians a gold-plated pretext to come openly across the border in the guise of a "peacekeeping force". How do you propose to do it?

The point of offering a settlement that appears at least superficially magnanimous is to undercut the Russian narrative and underscore the weakness of Russian claims that intervention is needed to protect ethnic Russians. Of course they will try some counter-propaganda, but the quality of Russian propaganda is very low and effectiveness will be limited.

If they refuse the settlement you express great concern for civilian life, urge all civilians to leave, offer refuge and safe passage, etc. Again, the point is to take away the "crimes against civilians" narrative that the Russians need to support intervention. They will attempt to use that narrative anyway, but the you can deprive it of traction and make it weaker.

If they accept, you send the non-indigenous Russians out, seize the equipment, re-establish the border, arrest the worst leaders... then you can renege on the agreement and do whatever you want, as long as you keep it below the threshold that would trigger intervention.

Insistence on complete military victory followed by rigorous punishment and/or ethnic cleansing for all separatists is just going to provoke direct intervention and a broader conflict. Who gains from that?

How would you propose to resolve the conflict in the eastern Ukraine without provoking direct intervention?

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---here is where both you and AP get amazingly off track---while you debate what should be done to give Putin an exit off the war road he is on he does not want to come off it--for that matter he cannot come off it if he wants to be reelected.

Here is why:

If in fact what the Ukrainian SBU released yesterday is true and it makes sense ----Russia wanted on 17 July to cross the border and the SBU is indicating they have the voice intercepts to prove Russia movements towards the border at a distance of 500m from the border---the Buk was as the SBU indicates driven and manned by a full Russian crew as they have the voice intercepts---and a Ukraine@war blogger has shown how the Buk was in fact tied into the Russian AD system---the SBU is indicating that the Buk was to have shot down a Russian Aeroflot flight that was on the same exact track but at 11.3kms in height ---it was right above and slightly to the rear of the MH17 which was at 10kms in height and twenty minutes in front of the Aeroflot flight.

The SBU is indicating that the Russian crew got the Ukrainian town names wrong and placed itself in the MH17 flight path not that town which was directly under the Aeroflot flight.

The Aeroflot flight was to have crashed then in Ukrainian controlled areas not as the MH17 did in irregular areas giving the Russia military the opportunity to secure the crash site--- blame the UA---- and conduct "peacekeeping" operations.

They were just as stunned as were the irregulars when it was MH17 that came down.

At the same time both you and AP need to go back and overlay the dates and times of the Russian MRL and artillery fires into the Ukraine---and watch the up tick in firing just before the 17th and through the first two days of the crash---really check the dates and times.

There was an attempted run by the Russian Army with tanks and APC physically into the Ukraine on the night of 12/13 July that was both fired at and blocked by the UA that has largely gone unnoticed.

Secondly, AP keeps talking about and talking about Russia being pushed around and pushed around and threatened---does this sound like the US is the one pushing, nudging, cornering, and agitating Russia?

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/...e-least-16-ti/

The last time I checked neither NATO or the US has been making airborne border runs and crossing into Russian airspace unless there is something I do not know about.

Take these actions and paste it to the reported very aggressive actions of Russian fighters against the RC135 in neutral waters this week and one has a pattern and it is not that of a "poor" pushed around and beat up on Russia but a very aggressive in your face Russia that is actually crossing boundaries that were never crossed even by the SU in the height of the Cold War days.

AP/Dayuhan---that is the key what is being done now by Putin was a red line never crossed by the SU even in the worst of the CW days. Both sides knew the game---Putin is not playing a game this time.

Again back to both you and AP---why does the world need Russia which only contributed two raw resources to the world economy and one is running out in 2020 and do not give me an answer that well the Russians are contributing their efforts in other hotspots the US needs assistance with---because actually when you look at their assistance it is almost always against anything we do in those hotspots to include now the latest agreements with Iran?

[Dayuhan]

Just to focus on the one clear issue in all that...

Again back to both you and AP---why does the world need Russia which only contributed two raw resources to the world economy and one is running out in 2020

First of all, whether or not anyone "needs" Russia is completely irrelevant. Russia exists, so they have to be dealt with. We cannot make them stop existing. Whether or not anyone needs them, they still have to be managed. I don't see why "need" is in the picture at all. We don't need Iran or North Korea either, but we still have to deal with them.

How exactly do you figure Russia is running out of anything in 2020? What's the source on that?

The US does, in reality, need Russia to keep selling oil, as does everyone else who buys oil. They export 7mbpd +, and if that comes off the market it's hard to imagine where the world oil price will go.

I really don't place much faith in the theory that the MH17 attack was actually a failed false flag attack on a Russian plane. That would need a lot more support to be taken seriously. The question also remains: if Putin wants so badly to intervene in the east, why didn't he do it a long time ago, like after the pseudo-referendum? The troops were in place, the pretext was there, why hold back? Either there's some mysterious force restraining him, or he doesn't want it as badly as you say he does.

Still waiting for your suggestions on what the US, EU and Ukraine should be doing.