New Rules of War

[Ken White]

Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not. Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

What most miss is the human dimension. Too many leaders are not up to the theoretical level of performance. A good example is the above mentioned Viet Nam experience that Tukhachevskii posted:

"This was the case during the Vietnam War, too, when the prevailing military organizational structure of the 1960s -- not much different from today's -- drove decision-makers to pursue a big-unit war against a large number of very small insurgent units..."

The good Perfesser fails to note -- or notice -- that the Organization was totally capable of morphing into small units and Checkerboarding and many units did just that and did it successfully but USARV / MACV did not do so in toto because the leadership and the too powerful Staffs at high echelons were comprised of people whose experience was predominately in northwestern Europe and thus they tried to force the fight in the paddies to be conducted the same way they would have on the north German plain.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:

(ask Arminius !)

[marct]

Hi Ken,

Swarming and Checkerboards. They crop up every few years, are touted as the Holy Grail and fail miserably in application far more often than not.

I remember reading some years back, that a science becomes a science when it drops static typologies and looks at change over time. Swarming, checkerboards, etc - any tactic really - can work if the factors limiting the situation are right. No tactic, however, is a Holy Grail; they will all fail if the situational limits are against them.

Those who tout the techniques -- and the net centric stuff-- invariably are theorists who will have no responsibility for executing but cite a success or two and rarely mention the many failures of their recommended techniques.

Hey, I resemble that remark !

More seriously, cherry picking historical examples of the success of a tactic (or strategy) is fine as long as it is designed to highlight the limiting factors. Unfortunately, the author in this article appears to be doing it for another reason. Swarming, as a tactic, seems to work best when there is limited capability for opponent identification and when immediately available defensive technologies can be breached quickly. It also seems to work really nicely when you have both of those conditions and the aim is actually to attack in some other area, usually moral via logistics (i.e. force the non-swarming group to invest heavily in infrastructure and logistical support). Probably the classic campaign along these lines, which, BTW, Arquilla does not mention, was Crassus' expedition against the Parthians.

The theories espoused in the article are not totally wrong but most will fail in combat application due to personnel quality. People are the problem

Actually, training people is the problem. Well trained people and units will be able to shift gears and fight as required.

Yup! That is the lesson he should have drawn from the legions.

The sharp and well trained will do what MarcT said, send out Cohorts for independent operations as required. His summary of the good and bad in the article is on target, not least in this:

[Outlaw 7]

Anyone here on this blog ask the 1st Cav what they thought about "swarming".

Ask about the high losses at two of their COPS in 2007/2008 and then deduce that there is nothing to swarming---it was the primary battle tactic of the IAI and AAS starting in 2007.

Ask US forces about their losses in recent COP attacks in Afghanistan.

Jesus guys do some reading and asking--- actually the article was the first sign that someone is starting to understand "open source warfare" (OSW).

I cannot believe the number of comments here that seems to wipe the concept of swarming off the table and to a degree want to negate a DoD study by RAND off the table.

[Steve Blair]

Jesus guys do some reading and asking--- actually the article was the first sign that someone is starting to understand "open source warfare" (OSW).

Many of us have, and continue to do so, and that's why some folks here are pointing out that there is nothing especially new or unique about "swarming." You might be better served asking why the professional force as a whole seems to have been so surprised by what is essentially a basic form of tribal-based warfare.

Simply creating a new acronym for a technique does not automatically make it either new or unique. Within our own military history framework, any veteran of the Indian Wars could have told you about swarming, and any helicopter pilot from Vietnam could have told you that RPGs are, in fact, a great anti-helicopter weapon. Yet we seem to have to constantly relearn lessons.

[Outlaw 7]

To all---and where you all when the discussion around "swarming" and "open source warfare" (OSW) broke in of all times 2004 WHEN it was how many months after we entered Iraq? Here is a portion of that article.

Tuesday, 18 May 2004
GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING
Swarming tactics have been used successfully in wars throughout history by a variety of organizations from the tribal Parthians (horse archers) to 20th century Germans (U-boats). Global guerrillas (next generation terrorists) will likely use swarming tactics as part of their doctrine. This technique, in combination with new market-based financing techniques is what's called a killer combo.

Definition.
A good place to start an analysis of swarming is Sean Edwards' "Swarming on the Battlefield (PDF downloads). Here's his excellent definition of swarming: a primary maneuver that results in an attack from multiple directions (all points on the compass) by 5 or more (semi) autonomous units on a single target/unit.

Benefits.
It's easy to see the advantages of this type of maneuver:


•It cuts the enemy target off from supply and communications.

•It adversely impacts the moral of the target.

•It makes a coordinated defense extremely difficult (resource allocation is intensely difficult).

•It radically increases the potential of surprise.

Types.
Swarming is typically divided into two types:
Massed swarming -- Swarmers begin as a massed unit. They break apart and then swarm on target.
Dispersed swarming -- Units are dispersed (geographically) from the start. Once a target is identified, they converge to attack. This is the most difficult of the two types of swarming to defend against since the attacker never presents a massed target.

Effectiveness.
Historically, swarming is successful only when it scores high in the following areas:


•Elusiveness -- either through mobility or concealment.

•Long range firepower -- standoff capability.

•Superior situational awareness -- having more information about the enemy than they have about you.

Swarming contra infrastructure systems: guerre de course
Given this background, how will global guerrillas use swarming? First, the target for global guerrillas won't be isolated military units but rather urban infrastructure systems. The objective of these attacks will be damage that results in economic attrition. Let's examine how global guerrilla's will leverage swarming tactics to accomplish this objective.

The effectiveness of Global Guerrilla swarmers.
Global guerrilla swarmers will maintain their effectiveness across the vital swarming attributes in the following ways:


•Elusiveness. Global guerrillas attain concealment through anonymity in large urban environments. Reliance on the local population isn't necessary. High degrees of mobility are accomplished by leveraging public transportation networks.

•Superior situational awareness. Open source intelligence is easy to accomplish (via the Internet, the media, and other sources). Further, encrypted global communications, via the Internet, enables global intelligence sharing information sharing. The small size of operational cells limits the potential of discovery and counter-guerrilla intelligence development.

•Standoff attacks. Like many historical swarming attacks, global guerrillas will have significant standoff firepower potential -- the ability to attack from a distance. However, this firepower isn't a traditional weapon, rather, its the global guerrilla's ability to use attacks on infrastructure to impact downstream systems miles (perhaps hundreds of miles) distant. Attacks will be rotated among infrastructures in a modern variant of horse archer tactics.

How global guerrilla swarmers will surmount traditional limits to operations.
Historically, swarmers have been limited by terrain, logistics, and communications. Global guerrillas will not be constrained by these limits. This makes global guerrilla swarming unique to history as can be seen in the attached 2x2 matrix. The upshot is that global guerrillas will be able to conduct dispersed swarming maneuvers on the operational level. Here's how global guerrillas will surmount the traditional limits on swarming:


•Ubiquitous public transportation networks (roads to airlines) enable rapid, low-cost transportation for dispersed units.

•Logistics requirements can be met via open economic transactions and don't require population support. The requirements for operations are relatively limited (damage to infrastructure requires low-tech tools). Additionally, the small size of the cells (~5 people) requires little housing/food/etc and in most cases would fall well below the threshold of detection.

•Real-time, anonymous, wireless communications (both data and voice -- VoIP, e-mail, Web, cellphones, etc.) enable global guerrillas to coordinate dispersed operations on the operational level. Tactical operations will be of a conventional type, typically by a single unit or individual.

[Outlaw 7]

To all---a challenge to the readers here.

ASK any current BCT or BN or for that matter any Company Cmdr located currently in Iraq or Afghanistan for their definition of "swarming".

THEN wait for the blank stares and THEN listen to the comment "never heard anything about it".

AND why do we waste then massive amounts of money on CALL if we do not learn from the previous experiences of ie the 1st CAV in Diyala or the beatings we recently took on two Afghan COP attacks ALL of which were "swarming" attacks.

WHAT does it take to be recognized as a formal battle tactic with you all?

[Ken White]

'recognizing an old tactic being used currently as something that should not be a surprise...' with 'Failure to recognize a tactic.'

The two are not the same thing.

You might also search the Threads here before criticizing. John Robb and Arquila, swarming and open source warfare, generational warfare or not, have all been cussed and discussed here a good many times over the last few years. Nothing you have posted to date is particularly revelatory or new to most here. It's not that we aren't aware, it is simply that we don't agree. That should be acceptable.

[Outlaw 7]

Ken---being cussed and discussed and found of no interest is WHAT the great answer to members of Allied/US military killed or wounded by a tactic that a discussion group deems of no interest?

LOOK at any of the CTC's training scenarios since 2007---NOT a single "swarming" event--I would say that flys in the face of reality but it might seem to some here as "not deemed of interest".

I look for the open and deep discussion of what is occurring and why we are failing and we are failing in Afghanistan to occur, but maybe this location is the wrong place for that--for to look at failure means one is willing to challenge and challenge hard current doctrine but maybe that is not in the DNA of this blog site.

WHY is it that much of the latest open discussions are in fact occuring outside of blogs like this and and are not occuring inside the military or defense contracting world?

EXAMPLE: Take the Pakistani LTC article released here on SWJ which really challenges current US reporting and in fact states the country is covered by 98% of a Taliban shadow government and is fighting a phase 2/3 Mao style guerrilla war AND a massive discussion breaks out on is swarming or is it not a valid "tactic."

I can see why a large number of military personnel no longer return to this site

[Steve Blair]

I look for the open and deep discussion of what is occurring and why we are failing and we are failing in Afghanistan to occur, but maybe this location is the wrong place for that--for to look at failure means one is willing to challenge and challenge hard current doctrine but maybe that is not in the DNA of this blog site.

WHY is it that much of the latest open discussions are in fact occuring outside of blogs like this and and are not occuring inside the military or defense contracting world?

I can see why a large number of military personnel no longer return to this site

I'd second Ken's challenge to review older threads on this site before you start accusing folks here of "not challenging current doctrine." I'd also repeat what I said earlier and what some others have said in different ways: this is nothing new. Swarming...horde tactics...flash mobs...it's nothing new and has been around for as long as there have been tribal-based groups that function in conflicts in that way. Maybe RAND has just 'discovered' it again, but that does not make it new.

What I would say, and have said before, is that the Army seems determined to relearn almost every small wars lesson the hard way...and has manifested this particular training defect since before Vietnam. It accelerated after VN to be sure, but the trend had been there before. As a student of history this particular blind spot concerns me a great deal, but it appears to be built into the institution's DNA...and has been since before the Civil War.

How do you deal with "swarms"? If our own military history is any guide, you focus on being VERY solid at the basic tactical levels and develop strong unit solidarity and integrity. Rotating units as units and not individual replacements is a good start for unit integrity, but training is a different matter.

Those are just starters.

[politicsbyothermeans]

I'm doing about ten things at once here but I'm just thinking about it (swarming) when it really isn't a tactic at all. Specifically, I'm thinking about Mogadishu.

The concept of "flash mobs" is not new to the cultural underground in many first world countries. Flash mobs have many of the same characteristics of the "new" concept of swarming, save they generally don't result in violence.

And the things they have in common is robust and redundant communication and a lack of centralized leadership. Localized leadership, yes, but no real centralized leadership and I'm wondering if that is a vulnerability or a strength.

[William F. Owen]

To all---and where you all when the discussion around "swarming" and "open source warfare" (OSW) broke in of all times 2004 WHEN it was how many months after we entered Iraq? Here is a portion of that article.

Tuesday, 18 May 2004
GLOBAL GUERRILLA SWARMING

...and? That article is mostly wrong.
Swarming is merely what multiple attacks looks like to an observer who has a very limited view point. Nothing new here.
The Mongols were described as "hordes" for the same reason, and they explicitly did not "swarm" or do anything like it.

[Rifleman]

Swarming is merely what multiple attacks looks like to an observer who has a very limited view point. Nothing new here.

So, does it boil down to this?:

"Find the bastards. Then pile on." - George S. Patton III - Commander, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

[davidbfpo]

From Firn's post (No.126)

Jan Breytenbach has a number of interesting reviews of many actions and operations of the border war. He gives some good insight why units like the 32. Batallion were so successful in the smaller, guerilla and larger, more conventional phases of the war.

Firn found a lengthy interview in German alas in the Austrian Defence Forces publication: http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/omz/oemz2009_01.pdf

Whilst the main website has the option for an English version finding the publication in English eluded me: http://www.bmlv.gv.at

Jan Breytenbach's book on 32 Batt. has appeared before on SWC in late 2009:

'They Live By The Sword: 32 'Buffalo' Battalion - South Africa's Foreign Legion' by Col. Jan Breytenbach (Pub. Lemur 1990). A unit formed in 1975 from black Angolans, with South African (white) officers and NCOs. Formidable reputation as mainly COIN fighters and suggested as a non-US / non-Western example. Note Eben Barlow (Executive Outcomes) was an officer in them.

Few copies about if Amazon is correct: http://www.amazon.com/They-live-swor...9129763&sr=1-1 . Republished in 2003 as The Buffalo Soldiers: The Story of South Africa's 32 Battalion 1975-1993.

The unit's website; http://www.32battalion.net/index.htm