Mechanization hurts COIN forces

[Norfolk]

I really can't help but wonder if COIN wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been a little easier to wage if the bulk of the (combat) force structures in both countries were not made up mainly (not entirely) of good old-fashioned Infantry Divisions, the type that the Army got rid of several years ago favour of Light Infantry Divisions and now Stryker Brigades.

The old Infantry Divisions of course had the standard three brigades, nine battalions, da-da-da of Infantry, Div Arty, an Engineer Bn, et al, and a ready-made heavy-armour mechanized force for dealing with the more intense situations based upon a Tank Battalion and a unit of APCs sufficient to mechanize an entire Infantry Battalion. Not to mention, the regular infantry battalions had their own full scales of organic wheeled transport to get them where they needed to go (useful in areas where MBTs and APCs might provoke the locals or the terrain isn't really right for heavy stuff) and they can get around fairly fast. Moreover, the old Infantry Divisions only required about half of the logistical base of an Armoured or Mech Div.

It just seems that, looking back over the arguments on this thread, that the best Formation for most of the needs in Iraq could best be handled by regular Infantry Divisions. The old standard Infantry Divisions gave you a full complement of infantry, organic wheeled transport, and equipment, plus a modest but organic heavy armour and mech infantry capability that didn't have to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from another Brigade or Division and whose guys might not be familiar with your way of fighting (like when Armor units are attached to Airborne or Light Infantry formations), but already know how you operate.

It's probably too late now to re-organize Light Infantry Divisions and Stryker Brigades into regular Infantry Formations for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. But given that Light units as far back as Mogadishu (15 years ago now) needed what a regular Infantry Brigade (with organic tank company and mech infantry company) could provide that a Light Infantry Brigade couldn't, and that much the same sort of thing is needed right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe the Army would be rather better served in the future by regular Infantry Divisions in anything that didn't require mainly either Armoured Divisions or Airborne/Air Assault Divisions. Infantry Brigades and Divisions are a lot easier to switch back-and-forth between low-intensity and medium- or even high-intensity (purely defensive/holding ground role in the latter case) roles. Just a thought or two.

[RTK]

I really can't help but wonder if COIN wars such as Afghanistan and Iraq would not have been a little easier to wage if the bulk of the (combat) force structures in both countries were not made up mainly (not entirely) of good old-fashioned Infantry Divisions, the type that the Army got rid of several years ago favour of Light Infantry Divisions and now Stryker Brigades.

The old Infantry Divisions of course had the standard three brigades, nine battalions, da-da-da of Infantry, Div Arty, an Engineer Bn, et al, and a ready-made heavy-armour mechanized force for dealing with the more intense situations based upon a Tank Battalion and a unit of APCs sufficient to mechanize an entire Infantry Battalion. Not to mention, the regular infantry battalions had their own full scales of organic wheeled transport to get them where they needed to go (useful in areas where MBTs and APCs might provoke the locals or the terrain isn't really right for heavy stuff) and they can get around fairly fast. Moreover, the old Infantry Divisions only required about half of the logistical base of an Armoured or Mech Div.

It just seems that, looking back over the arguments on this thread, that the best Formation for most of the needs in Iraq could best be handled by regular Infantry Divisions. The old standard Infantry Divisions gave you a full complement of infantry, organic wheeled transport, and equipment, plus a modest but organic heavy armour and mech infantry capability that didn't have to be begged, borrowed, or stolen from another Brigade or Division and whose guys might not be familiar with your way of fighting (like when Armor units are attached to Airborne or Light Infantry formations), but already know how you operate.

It's probably too late now to re-organize Light Infantry Divisions and Stryker Brigades into regular Infantry Formations for use in Iraq and Afghanistan. But given that Light units as far back as Mogadishu (15 years ago now) needed what a regular Infantry Brigade (with organic tank company and mech infantry company) could provide that a Light Infantry Brigade couldn't, and that much the same sort of thing is needed right now in Afghanistan and Iraq, maybe the Army would be rather better served in the future by regular Infantry Divisions in anything that didn't require mainly either Armoured Divisions or Airborne/Air Assault Divisions. Infantry Brigades and Divisions are a lot easier to switch back-and-forth between low-intensity and medium- or even high-intensity (purely defensive/holding ground role in the latter case) roles. Just a thought or two.

Since the Army decided a few years back that the cornerstone entity is the BCT, the title of the Division means very little. You're either and HBCT, SBCT, or IBCT. Whether you're in an Armored Division or a Mech Infantry Division, you look the same now. Strykers all look the same in terms of task org.

You could accomplish the same thing by returning all three cavalry regiments to corps control, making them all look like 3 ACR, giving the cav back their Kiowas, and bolstering their dismount capablility with either additional scouts within the scout platoons or 1x additional light infantry company in each squadron.

[Rob Thornton]

I'm not sure, but I'll put my bias up front having spent my Infantry time as a Rifle PL/AT PL/HHC XO in the 101st and staff and CMD time in a SBCT. When I was in 1-24th as a staff guy we were of the light variety and about a year from when I got there we "transformed" and became an SBCT as I was transitioning from staff to command. As a commander I had a 170 man combined arms team with far better mobility, better firepower, better communications, better protection then I would have had under the the old MTO&E. It cost quite a bit, but it in terms of capability - we had allot of flexibility. The IOT&E process was very enlightening- the test and evaluation that OTC came up with put us through the ringer - constant distributed ops over a period of a couple of months (I think it was three iterations) at FT Knox - which is every bit as much Infantry country as anything else - very restrictive, and over very complex. After that I turned over the rifle company and took the HHC for our trips to NTC and JRTC as part of 1/25th's train up for OIF - they were to relieve 3/2 (the Army's first SBCT) in Mosul. At this time the CTCs were transitioning toward a COIN look - the Lancer's did well at both - able to use the ability to move allot of Infantry with reasonable mobility, good comms for reachback, enough firepower in the Armsroom concept to outgun most enemy - and with additional comms and mobility to bring in more Infantry quickly if needed.

When later I went to Mosul as an advisor I got to see the 172nd SBCT on its first deployment and 3/2 on its second rotation in Mosul (and a large chunk of Ninewa). The 172nd after its RIP with 3/2 went to Baghdad for a few months, and 3/2 RIP/TOA'd early to go to Diyala. I was not surprised to see them able to use the same TTP to good effect - CO CDRs had no problem employing big combined arms 170 man companies in COIN to great effect. The AVN component was mostly KWs and those guys are great to work with.

I've not seen a more versatile formation for Infantry then the SBCT- the closest I've read about was the big Armored CAV platoons in Vietnam - I've met a couple of guys who fought those there.

SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.

What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.

I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch)

Out of the 43 AC (Active Component) BCTs we are going to require balanced capabilities that allow for roughly half of that force to be deployed while the other half is being refit, or ramped up for future deployments. The question of what types of modular BCTs provide the greatest flexibility across the spectrum of operations is also tied to what types of BCTs go into the RC (Reserve Component) forces. An AC breakout of the 43 BCTs might be structured around 15 HBCTs, 12 SBCTs and 16 IBCTs, this would allow for a commitment of up to 8 HBCTs, 6 SBCTs and 8 IBCTs at one time, provided the supporting elements are available to sustain them.

The AC BCTs would be backed up by RC BCTs. However the breakout between the USAR and ARNG correlate to what their primary missions are. The USAR would provide the additional combat power of 10 HBCTs, while the ARNG could provide 34 IBCTs which would provide their dual state mission with the manpower needed to better fulfill their Title 32 requirements. This would make for a total force of 25 HBCTs, 12 SBCTs and 50 IBCTs.

The overall rational for where capabilities are located at within the total Army (AC/RC) is based on balancing flexibility and sustainability with the types of missions those components are more likely to be tasked with. The Army must achieve consistent balance because the missions it will be assigned may call for formations to operate within the full spectrum over short periods of time and in some cases simultaneously. While many have called for greater specialization, I believe the key to our Army’s success lies within well trained, well led, adaptable GPFs (general purpose forces) that can be combined where needed based on the parameters of the mission. If the Army had an unconstrained force structure – meaning it had the resources and authorization to allow it to create and sustain an infinite number of specialized formations; we might consider alternatives to GPFs. However if we over specialize within the constraints of meeting our commitment to deploy and sustain 20 BCTs at a time, we might sacrifice our flexibility to staff HQs and afford leaders new education and experience; as well as man the institutions which allow us to evolve and provide strategic depth.

A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.

The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.

Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.

Best, Rob

[Ski]

A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

SBCTs and modular BCTs are not the same thing - but both have something in common - they are full spectrum. That I think is the bigger issue - although the focus of the thread is mech with regard to COIN. While the predominance of our deployments and war over the next couple of decades might be on the lower end of the spectrum, - to do things like deter other conventional forces, or to fight and win those punctuations that show up on the higher end we'll need more conventional capability and I believe mechanized land power into combined arms, air-ground teams. The thing about modularity (and DR. John Bonin at Carlisle is probably the most well versed person on modularity I've ever met) is how it addresses the deployabilty issue of getting BCTs forward quickly, and perhaps when in a high universal OPTEMPO - how it might be more sustainable then what we had.

What I think could still be influenced is how the increase in force structure translates to how much of this and how much of that type of BCT goes where. What might make sense (although not entirely political) would be to make the ARNG' combat formations over into mostly Infantry BCTs with lots of trucks (motorized) and the required support to meet both its important mission at home, while also being able to field important BCTs in support of the wars we fight abroad. We could then put the HBCTs in the RC into the USAR where they have a closer connection with the AC.

I pulled this bit out of a paper I did recently here for ILE when asked to think about force structure with regard to how the Army might use the increase - its easier to cut and paste what I've already written then to rewrite it over when I'm thinking about chow (yea - I know its a crutch)



A couple of notes - I did allot of thinking here on the SWC about alternative uses such as an Advisory Corps - but I still came back to the constraints of force structure and the need to be able to field a more sustainable full spectrum force. There are no easy answers with this only tough choices.

The last thing I'd mention is FCS. I think FCS would come into play in replacing 1:1 the AC HBCTs. This is probably not a real "replacement", but one where each HCBT would come off line, receive its new equipment (whatever that will be), train and then go back on line. This is essentially what is happening with the SBCTs - 1/25th remained 1/25th as a flag, but received all of its new capabilities and personnel. This will take years.

Some hard choices ahead - in good part due to not being able to predict the future, and the further forward you go from right now, the less certain it is, and potentially higher the consequences for being unprepared to meet it.

Best, Rob

[Norfolk]

A number of things to discuss here:

1. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

7. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Excellent points Ski. I would not want to send an SBCT, let alone 2-Battalion + 1-Cav Sqn IBCT into an area where it may have to fight heavy armour formations, and that's even if such "Rapid-Deployment" formations really can be moved that quickly with all the logistics they'll need plus all the airpower and logistics that they'll need. I don't remember which Army officer wrote this in his CGSC monograph a few years ago, but his own summary of the changes over recent years was that "the current empahisis on getting lighter forces to the battlefield quickly is the Transformational equivalent of getting Custer to the Little Big Horn Faster". I think that it is supremely important to formally recognize the capabilities and limitations of each type of Formation and not try to shoe-horn Formations into a Doctrine or Concept that perhaps isn't really viable.

I worked with the original LAV-1 and loathed it, and with the LAV-25 (which was a definite improvement in terms of comfort); but despite a lot of what people in the Canadian Army were saying at the time about what new capabilities the LAV-25 (our recce versions back then had a good deal of the kit now in the LAV-III Strykers, which we also have too) gave us, it was just as clear that the LAV was in no way able to keep out even an errant 3" shell from a Sherman parked at a museum, let alone from the T-55s and T-72s that folks in the Balkans liked to use to intimidate our guys. We were forced to bring back the old Leopard I tank (and subsequently cancel the LAV-MGS) after a Platoon of 1RCR was ambushed in an village in Afghanistan, with one Section being pinned down and practically wiped out because the Strykers the Platoon had couldn't get to them for all the AT stuff the Taliban were throwing at them. Also, the wheeled suspension of the Strykers couldn't take the off-road conditions there and the hulls were cracking. Not good.

Now the Strykers are being replaced in A-Stan with rebuilt M-113A3s with the full armour kit and the old Leopard 1s have been replaced by Leopard 2s. Even an Infantry Battalion now has a Tank Squadron (Company) permanently attached for COIN in Afghanistan, and all the Rifle Companies have tracks to get them to where they need to go.

Another excellent point ski about the Army Reserve. Ever since the last handful or so of AR Separate Brigades were disbanded in the 90's, the AR has little capacity to reform said without a major effort taking several years at least. And given that Reserve recruiting isn't the hottest in recent years, and the IRR has been combed out to bring AC units up to strength, the AR is probably in little condition to attempt an expansion.

Or even the Active Army, for that matter.

[J Wolfsberger]

Where we got in trouble in OIF was having a SecDef who was addicted to glitzy techno fixes. (His addiction goes all the way back to the 1970s.) The structure, equipment, TTPs, etc. may have created problems for us, but nothing as severe as the insistence that the services would somehow pull a quick fix out of the hat if their advice was ignored.

What should have come first is the mission to be accomplished, in context. I don't recall any discussion of the fact that the state of Iraq was created from the remains of the Ottoman Empire, for the convenience of the British and French negotiators, and represented no underlying nation. But that has been one of the major drivers of subsequent events. Instead, we had "regime change" followed by "nation building," none of which, at the time, was defined in the context of who we would be dealing with. What we did not have was any sort of accurate picture of who would emerge as the significant power wielders, what their relationships were, who the significant groups were, how they differed, what they agreed on, etc. In fact, I don't think the decision makers even realized it was necessary.

Given that the mission is correctly defined, the second step is determining what is required to accomplish it. In OIF it was boots on the ground, which didn't accord with the SecDefs desire for a techno fix, and was ignored. (And if I recall correctly, the messenger, Shinseki, was "shot.") Part of this step is also looking at what equipment is available or can be developed, and how it contributes to accomplishing the mission.

I think the proper approach to answering the thread topic, and the larger questions behind it, is to ask the right questions. Do my missions in Iraq require the troops to have mobility, some protection and occasionally a base of fire? If the answer is yes, then at a minimum you need Stryker, Bradley, LAV, M113, Warrior, or some other APC/ICV. Does my enemy have the potential to bring in heavy ATGM on occasion? If the answer is yes, then you need Abrams, Leopard, Challenger, etc.

Mechanization, per se, neither contributes nor detracts from performing the mission. Fixing on it as a solution in and of itself leads to the same sort of problem our Air Force counterparts face - flying around with 2000 pound bombs and no one to drop them on.

[Rob Thornton]

. Full spectrum means what? BCTs are not deploying off their MTOE's, they are deploying off MEEL's and DMD's. I've always doubted the "speed of deployment/mobilization" argument - what good is it to get forces to point X that are not equipped, trained and manned properly?

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.

2. The ARNG has already shifted its focus to IBCT's from Armored or Mechanized Brigades. 21 out of the 28 BCT's are Light Infantry with 1 SBCT and 6 Heavy.

I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.

3. The USAR does not have a "closer connection" - please explain this throwaway sentence if you have the time or desire- with the AC. I don't understand where this line of thinking comes from to be honest. The ARNG has been in the Heavy BCT/formation business along with the AC since 1993. That's 15 years now. You've know just significantly increased the costs of reestablishing the USAR as a heavy Force provider. The USAR does not have the people, the facilties,the equipment, the schools, the leaders or most importantly, the desire to re-acquire combat structure.

What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.

5.Title 32 is a strawman argument - the ARNG is dual missioned and trains towards its MTOE METL. You train on very few "title 32" tasks in the ARNG. The whole "Homeland Security" mission is a bit of strawman as well - if you don't think active component units from all branches will not be involved...

My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.

6. FCS is an unaffordable pipe dream. I think this formation is going to end up in the same boat as the F22 - the service will ask for "we need 25 of these BCT's" and will settle for six because the services are about to price themselves out of business. Ask yourself this question - how would FCS help us win the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? Now see if you can really come up with a rational answer.

Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

. As someone who's spent way too much of his career in force management, I don't think trying to predict for the future is a good or stable way to build an Army when it comes to structure. Brigade structures have been relatively stable throughout history. Just stick with something, and incrementally modernize the equipment, instead of looking at an end state and saying "this BCT can do X, Y and Z" and then change the force. There is little difference in the BCT structure from that of the 1940's, except they are now supposedly independent...

I'd agree with you for the most part.

8. The Army decided to build more BCT's instead of growing the existing BCT's by a third infantry battalion. I don't agree with that line of thinking, especially for the short term as we are in fights than are at the company and below. All BCT's were supposed to have 3 IN BN/CAB's and a RSTA/ARS SQDN, but it was unaffordable when the AC Force Structure allowance was 482K. Now it's going up to 547K (whether or not the Army can man that number is yet to be seen - all signs are pointing downward) and the Army wants to grow BCT formations instead of bulking up the force to where it should be doctrinally.

Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.

Anyway, force structure is the base of the pyramid in any army, and we've built an army that's probably very effective and deadly for conventional/3GW/maneuver warfare, but it's seriously out of whack for the fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. The problem is that people are cautious on changing the base of the pyramid (and pyramids cost lots of money) based off the current conflicts (and their reality based force structure in theater).

And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.

We live in interesting times. There has been close to a decade's worth of force structure change...both codified and mission specific...where do you think we are at?

Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Ski]

Rob

Sorry if I wrote my response in a snotty tone - didn't realize it until I posted it...

My point about how units are deploying is exactly the problem. The force structure we've built is not what is being used in theater, and since we've had to buy Billions worth of HWMMV's (and possibly MRAP's), and we've been forced to change how we fight and train for the current wars, I think we've created a force for an enemy we aren't fighting now (and who knows if the structure we've created will be used any time in the future). We've borrowed hundreds of billions of dollars to sustain military operations that is going to have to be paid back - at some time. We may not have the fiscal flexibility in the future...

Yeah - 21 IBCT's now...lots of good reasons why the force changed...

It'll cost more to move the Heavies into the USAR than its worth, and all the issues that surround the HBCT's in the ARNG will migrate over there...but you'll have all the individual augmentees you want from the USAR.

All military forces should be integrated into a consolidated and logical "homeland defense" force. That's why it's called the Defense Department, not the War Department or the Offense Department. Semantics matter...

FCS is what it is. At some point, the Army has to field these forces. We cannot afford another Comanche or Crusader. We also have to understand that the expense of creating these forces has a limit - if it sounds like I'm banging the drum on spending, it's because we are the largest debtor nation in the world. Cuts are going to come at some point.

As I said, we live in interesting times.

"Ours not to wonder why, ours but to do or die"

Full spectrum means that we are talking across Enabling Civil Authorities thru conventional offensive operations - best example is 3-0 - its a big broad brush, but it helps define the range. WHile they may not be deploying off their MTO&E, thy are built around them - once we get back to a sustained OPTEMPO - beyond OIF (it will end sometime) that is what they will be manned and resourced off of - they may change based off of recent experiences - but that is still how we will do it. Right now we do what we do beause we need to based off the conditions.



I did not know that - I did know they had a SBCT in PA - I was just up there.



What I mean is who pays the bills, and only that - I have several friends at the NGB. Ref. the latter - conditions should decide what component we use for what and how we man, equip and train it. Fiscal decisions will ultimately decide if its worth it. We rearranged things before for different reasons. COnsider how much BRAC is actually going to cost vs. how much was briefed - depends on what you want - which probably depends on why you want it.



My point is given the emphasis on Homeland Defense - maybe we need to enable the ARNG to focus more on its Title 32 responsibilites. It doesn't mean AC units won't be doing HD tasks - no more then it means RC will not be doing deployments - just a question of capabilities - who were the real heroes during Katrina? The preponderance of forces belonged to the ARNG - the 1st Army CDR may have go the press, but the Guard folks were there to do the heavy lifting.



Its still the Army's #1 aquisition program - neither your opinion or mine changes that. FCS probably will not look like its O&O - but the tech that comes out of it will go forward - not as a revolutionary type impact - but as an evolutionary one. Good tech is the type that enables guys on the ground - read General Petraeus's comments from the Wired magazine article. All the robots that do Counter IED, all the comms that help push info fwd on detainees and help locate units, the GLMRS that hit targets with lighter payloads, all the UAVs, all that stuff is FCS like tech that has co-evolved. You have to get past the manned ground vehicle platform - that ain't it - that is the bumper sticker - and its constrained thinking. There are other new tech that is coming out of FCS - google FCS spiral - and you'll see how this really plays out. With regards to the larger stuff - like platform - also evolutionary and we've been doing that type stuff for a long time - developing and building better stuff that keeps us ahead - good tech helps us offset some of the advantages of the home teams for all the away games we play.

7

I'd agree with you for the most part.



Again not decsisions we get to make, but I'll give them credit that Senior leadership weighed the options and decided upon a COA for reasons that are consistent with positioning the force where it needs to be - lots more to consider when you weigh in how you sustain the Institutional side, etc.



And why besides the idea that the larger Army must not understand might we stick with the Golden Mean? When the policy folks agree to limiting our missions, or agree not to do the unexpected, or convince others not to do the unexpected - we can probably afford to focus exclusively on the next Iraq and Afghanistan. Until they do though - we have to be prepared to do the full range. I don't think we can afford to count anything out - some of it has to do with credible deterrence, some with having the flexibility to adapt - nobody else seems to want to "get our back" that kind of leaves it up to us.



Its been longer then that - we're always evolving (always have been - just did not put a "transformation" bumper sticker on it) - new stuff and ideas come in and then comes back in later, etc. I suspect that is the nature of things.


Best Regards, Rob

[Ski]

Interesting points about Canadian Strykers/LAV III's - did not know they were having stress issues on the frames due to combat operations.

The Army Reserve was also formed as a medical reserve in WWI for docs and nurses. As the country went to a total war capability in WWII, the USAR was expanded to become a fully structured component of the Army with combat, combat support and combat service support functions. In 1993, the USAR gave up all of its combat structure in order to get more CS/CSS from the ARNG and everyone has been happy-ish since.

Excellent points Ski. I would not want to send an SBCT, let alone 2-Battalion + 1-Cav Sqn IBCT into an area where it may have to fight heavy armour formations, and that's even if such "Rapid-Deployment" formations really can be moved that quickly with all the logistics they'll need plus all the airpower and logistics that they'll need. I don't remember which Army officer wrote this in his CGSC monograph a few years ago, but his own summary of the changes over recent years was that "the current empahisis on getting lighter forces to the battlefield quickly is the Transformational equivalent of getting Custer to the Little Big Horn Faster". I think that it is supremely important to formally recognize the capabilities and limitations of each type of Formation and not try to shoe-horn Formations into a Doctrine or Concept that perhaps isn't really viable.

I worked with the original LAV-1 and loathed it, and with the LAV-25 (which was a definite improvement in terms of comfort); but despite a lot of what people in the Canadian Army were saying at the time about what new capabilities the LAV-25 (our recce versions back then had a good deal of the kit now in the LAV-III Strykers, which we also have too) gave us, it was just as clear that the LAV was in no way able to keep out even an errant 3" shell from a Sherman parked at a museum, let alone from the T-55s and T-72s that folks in the Balkans liked to use to intimidate our guys. We were forced to bring back the old Leopard I tank (and subsequently cancel the LAV-MGS) after a Platoon of 1RCR was ambushed in an village in Afghanistan, with one Section being pinned down and practically wiped out because the Strykers the Platoon had couldn't get to them for all the AT stuff the Taliban were throwing at them. Also, the wheeled suspension of the Strykers couldn't take the off-road conditions there and the hulls were cracking. Not good.

Now the Strykers are being replaced in A-Stan with rebuilt M-113A3s with the full armour kit and the old Leopard 1s have been replaced by Leopard 2s. Even an Infantry Battalion now has a Tank Squadron (Company) permanently attached for COIN in Afghanistan, and all the Rifle Companies have tracks to get them to where they need to go.

Another excellent point ski about the Army Reserve. Ever since the last handful or so of AR Separate Brigades were disbanded in the 90's, the AR has little capacity to reform said without a major effort taking several years at least. And given that Reserve recruiting isn't the hottest in recent years, and the IRR has been combed out to bring AC units up to strength, the AR is probably in little condition to attempt an expansion.

Or even the Active Army, for that matter.