William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[former_0302]

Came across this piece by Lind going back to february 2009.

On War #293: The Price of Bad Tactics



Then this issue will overlap with the issue of the type of aircraft used for CAS (close air support) which has been the subject of another debate.

Interested to hear from those who served as infantry in close combat as to this multi-faceted issue.

To address his three points:

1) "Hubris and intellectual sloth" is, I think, a bit harsh, though not entirely unjustified. I think most of the guys I've known as infantry officers are reasonably well-read for 20 to 30-something year old people. The particular problem with our tactics in Iraq and Afghanistan, IMO, is that the tools we have and have been taught to use from the beginning of our service, are analogous to using sledgehammers to kill flies against the enemies we face there. You don't build Javelin, TOW and Hellfire missiles, 2000-lb JDAMs, 155mm howitzers, and the like to go fight 5-10 man teams of insurgents carrying AKs and RPGs... but that's what we have, so that's what we take to the fight. As it happens, I think we need them, for the reasons I'll address below.

To me, the point of "tactics" is to find a way to exploit whatever advantage you have over your enemy. IMO, our only overwhelming advantages in a fight in Iraq or Afghanistan were/are firepower and armor. The Afghan/Iraqi is much lighter and faster than we are, whether dismounted or mounted, because of all the armor we are obliged to wear/drive around in. He almost invariably has the advantage of starting a fight, because he is almost always indistinguishable from any noncombatant in the area. This allows him to engage us at his leisure, on his terms, at a time and in circumstances when it is most advantageous for him. Our position in daytime is almost never unknown to any enemy within a 5 km radius. We have a marked advantage at night, but the enemy chooses not to fight at night, nullifying that advantage. Additionally, it's their turf; even if a unit's been in a given location for a year, it's still likely that the enemy knows it better. Oh, and every next step we take, or next meter you drive, might be onto a pressure plate.

So our main tactical advantages are the ability to bring bombs, artillery, missiles, etc., to bear against people with AKs, RPGs and IEDs who aren't playing by the same rules we are, and enough armor to withstand a fair portion of what they bring to bear. Frankly, it's a pretty stupid way to fight, but how do you change it? The only thing I can think of is changing the rules... but company grades don't make that decision.

2) There is a some free play training done in the Marine Corps. Not enough in my opinion, but it does happen. Frankly, I don't think we train enough, period, but a lack of training isn't really the issue in Iraq and Afghanistan. To use the catchphrase, it's all about how their asymmetrical advantages stack up against ours, and it's basically a stalemate. You only break the stalemate by changing the rules...

3) Absolutely no argument from me on this one. Our personnel system does leave a lot to be desired, and the reasons he brings up are valid, among others.

Don't know if that's what you were looking for, but there it is.

[JMA]

Thank you for that and hopefully others will also comment.

When you say 'change the rules' what exactly would that entail?

To address his three points:

....

[former_0302]

Thank you for that and hopefully others will also comment.

When you say 'change the rules' what exactly would that entail?

I guess the simplest way to say it is that only certain tactics are possible within the set of policies we fight under, and with the tools we're using. I think it's possible that if some policies were changed, or if a few different tools were used, a different outcome might come out of it...

But also maybe not. Pretty sure John Paul Vann thought something similar in Vietnam.