As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.
Heck, from what I hear, some of the designs first fielded to Iraq didn't even tow points. Go figure.
As far as evolution and all-round utility, we got to where we are because of the mother's of America syndrome, plain and simple, IMO.
Heck, from what I hear, some of the designs first fielded to Iraq didn't even tow points. Go figure.
So it's an over reaction to casulty sensitivity? So does FMTV strike the right balance between utility and protection?Originally Posted by jcustis
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
I think so, for its purpose. And thanks for the clarification.
John Wolfsberger, Jr.
An unruffled person with some useful skills.
I have not yet worked with the MRAP so I do not have first hand knowledge of them. What I do know is that the biggest killer among IEDs in Iraq is the underbody explosion. EFPs get a lot of attention because they are relatively sophisticated and are difficult to defend against because of their ability to penetrate a lot of armor. Underbody attacks, on the other hand, are very unsophisticated, basically a whole lot of boom buried under the road. The thing is an EFP is a linear weapon. The spall that it generates when it penetrates can seriously injure or kill but often it takes a direct hit to kill, meaning that it can kill one or more people in the vehicle depending on seating and the angle of the strike. Even a direct hit can be survivable depending on where it hits and who is seated nearby. Underbody attacks are not at all sophisticated, relying on pure brute force to pulverize the vehicle and its contents. Underbody attacks are often not survivable and will generally kill everyone on the vehicle rather than just the unlucky ones seated in the way. As far as I can see the MRAP was designed to answer that problem and mostly that problem alone. I am simply not sure that they were really considering all the other variables that have been discussed on this board so far. I don't think that they were really thinking about how these would fare in a head to head conventional fight. I suspect that they were concerned with how these will fare in this fight, right here, right now. As far as I can tell, these things are just about perfect for that role.
SFC W
Exactly! People miss that when getting wrapped around the axle over the MRAP's shortcomings as a multi-purpose tactical vehicle. It exists to protect soldiers in the unique environments of Iraq and (lesser case) Afghanistan.
That was actually the delay in getting more fielded - the military procurement/force integration staffs didn't see it as having lots of general-purpose utility in the future. Gates shut that argument down hard, to his credit.
Last edited by Cavguy; 07-08-2008 at 09:49 PM.
Maybe it would be interesting to look for its limitations. The general purpose usefulness depends on how much it's specialized or not.
My list of possible shortcomings (in comparison to modern APC project wish lists) that don't hurt in Iraq:
- side slope capability / usefulness in mountaineous terrain
- usefulness in snowy terrain
- no heater (?), possibly not prepared for sub-zero temperatures
- very large/visible
- very limited off-road mobility
- no bomblet protection
- some MRAP have less seating capacity than necessary to fit in a full squad
- no standardization; spare part logistical nightmare
And the vehicles will of course be (almost) worn out after the war.
Concur. My take, is that it may well be useful to look at these vehicles as having wider utility, and especially for transporting infantry over operational distances. I am not suggesting they follow the tanks across the start line, when confronting a combined arms armour enemy.
Arty 8
Exactly. The MRAP designs that have appeared in the last 5 years have made me really question the design and requirements criteria behind things like Stryker and the UK FRES.Frankly, for the US this conversation should have been taking place twenty years ago. The US army failed to learn the lessons of the Rhodesian/South African and Northern Ireland conflict and adopt mine protected vehicles. Just another example of a cold war army adapting to a 'modern' counterinsurgency.
From what I saw in Paris last month, even the Russians are now selling/proposing MRAP/JLTV type designs.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Given the cost of their procurement, I'm not sure what MRAPs have to offer, outside of countering the IED and mine threats. Now, if the designs could be such that ground pressure per axle is reduced, profile/height is lowered, and there was a decent weight to power ratio, they may indeed have wider utility. I do not know what a troop's combat effectiveness would be after a 12 he ride in a current design, across moderately broken ground, because the ride can be very rough due to seat design.
As for not following tanks past the start line, where would they be? I don't have stats on how many troops were motorized vs. Mech'd up in March 2003, but I don't think we could have afforded single-role troop transport vehs. That is the beauty of things like the MTVR. Need to carry troops? Pop the seats up. Got a cargo mission? Drop them. Have you seen any current designs with that sort of modularity?
As for matters of Stryker design, 8-wheelers have been around for a ton of time. Is it something about the Army's use of Stryker that seems off, or simply the platform in general, as it relates to protection and lift?
Unless my stats are off, MRAPs don't have any dash speed comparable to Strykers or LAVs, and they certainly cannot traverse anywhere similar terrain. Outside of the COIN scenario we face now, can anyone help me see a wider utility?
They may be perfect for this role, but we cannot afford to stock MPF or gray-bottom amphibs with them...or can we? Do we need to have a COIN MRAP ability staged for introduction around the beginning of phase IV?
At the end of the day, nothing beats patrolling the beat on foot. Commuting to work, call the MRAP taxi I suppose.
Last edited by jcustis; 07-09-2008 at 01:51 PM.
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