Roadside Bombs & IEDs (catch all)

[redbullets]

It seems to me that the challenge here is the limited options that civilian populations have, especially when those IEDs are deliberately targeted against locations where civilians must necessarily be as part of the fabric of their daily lives (markets, mosques, busy roads, etc). In contrast to mine casualties--where a significant proportion of casualties may come from ignoring warning signs, children failing to recognize mines and UXO, use of ad hoc, inadequate clearance methods, etc.--there is much less that civilians can do to reduce IED risks. Moreover, the IED risk is neither fixed in time or space, whereas the mine and UXO challenge may be much more so (leaving aside displacement due to weather or construction/clearance, or fresh mine laying due to continued hostilities).

What kinds and components of IED awareness education were you thinking might be effective, that aren't included in current mine awareness programmes (which typically include trip-wire type IEds and any suspicious ordnance)?

Thanks. The purpose of the study is to actually examine this and figure out what, if anything can be added to/extracted from MRE and other types of awareness campaigns to reduce exposure, in addition to pushing the increased public health impacts of victimization. I'm not aware of anyone in the humanitarian community who's done a serious study of the targeting around civilians in high-threat countries to illuminate trends such as target locations, time(s) of day, groups being singled out, etc. We do that in our own way in the Humanitarian Mine Action arena, but tools such as IMSMA do not support this in an IED context for reasons that include what you said above - landmines/UXO are static, and IEDs are active. That's a major theme and discussion I've included in the proposal I'm finishing.

Based on experience in Afghanistan and Iraq during the past six years, we've developed an analysis tool for the humanitarian community that does trend analysis of safety and security incidents, among a host of other things, and we're going to use this in our study to try and gel some targeting trends, and from those extract behavior modification that is doable.

I guess the whole point is that the humanitarian community is leaving this issue alone because its perceived as too hard. That conclusion appears to me to be drawn from anecdotal as opposed to empirical evidence. If you can advise housewives in Baghdad to do their shopping in little shops on side streets instead of high-traffic common markets, or advise fathers that they're better off praying at home this month due to trend X, there may be a victim reduction outcome. However, no one knows because to date this is all based on assumptions, or data that's been looked at from a primarily tactical/military perspective. We realize that any successful future risk education effort around IEDs would need to be very nimble and fluid as trends shift, and bad guys start monitoring campaign efforts.

Besides, why does more money go into Humanitarian Mine Action efforts in some places than into preventable disease? Few would argue that landmines/UXO claim more lives than a range of preventable maladies. Never been able to quite figure that out myself, but I suspect one reason is that its a lot simpler and easier to quantify landmines removed/destroyed than it is to quantify people who didn't get sick.

Cheers,

[Tom Odom]

Stan

what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

best

Tom

[redbullets]

Stan

what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

best

Tom

The major US office that funds this sort of thing, the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs at State has been taking a comprehensive approach to this for some years. They fund landmine/UXO mitigation efforts based upon reality on the ground, instead of focusing on landmines. They also have added Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) and MANPADS to their portfolio, and from the most recent donor workshop I attended with them a month and a half ago, are really taking this holistic approach seriously.

Here's the link to their site - http://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/

[Stan]

Tom, Joe was much faster on the keyboard

Stan

what is the pull today between demining and UXO disposal? I know that when setting up the demining op in Rwanda, I could get US monies for demining. I could not get them for UXOs--which were in fact the greater problem. has that tug of war changed?

seems to me it would play in this idea as well. the lines between an IED, a UXO, and a "mine" are very semantic, distinguished by targeting or lack or targeting to a large degree.

best

Tom

Basically, and just about the time you left Rwanda, State figured out Mines weren't the only problems, especially in the former east bloc.

We, for example, just got in on the waterborne issue along with Vietnam (prior to that, rarely could we get funding for clearance of lakes and rivers). Sitting on Estonia's eastern border with one of (then) HDO's kingpins, DH was taking happy snaps when our divers surfaced with AT mines The Gods were watching over me that day !

I ended up with funding for boats, motors, diving gear...you name it.

WRA

The Office develops, implements and monitors policy, programs and public engagement efforts that contribute to the prevention and mitigation of conflict, as well as post-conflict social and economic recovery. The focus is three-fold: to curb the illicit trafficking, availability and indiscriminate use of conventional weapons of war that fuel regional and internal instability; to pursue and help manage post-conflict cleanup of such weapons in areas needed for civilian use; and to engage civil society to broaden support for our efforts and enhance U.S. influence.

The Office furthers U.S. foreign policy goals through the development and implementation of comprehensive solutions to the security challenges and harmful humanitarian effects caused by the illicit proliferation of conventional weapons of war, and the existence of public hazards from such weapons following cessation of armed conflict. Conventional weapons and munitions addressed by the Office include but are not limited to landmines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned ordnance (AO), man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and other small arms and light weapons (SA/LW). The office strives to limit the access of terrorist or criminal groups to such weapons and munitions. At the same time, by addressing acute humanitarian needs, this office demonstrates the United States commitment to a set of values that respects human life. The Office works closely with other U.S. Government agencies as well as non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private enterprises. Innovation, strategic vision, responsible stewardship and cooperative team effort are all qualities that are encouraged by this office.

The Office incorporates the functions and responsibilities of the Bureau's former Office of Humanitarian Demining Programs (PM/HDP), to include management of the multi-agency U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program, the former Office of Mine Action Initiatives and Partnerships (PM/MAIP), to include encouraging public-private partnerships to reinforce the gamut of threats addressed by the Office, and the small arms/light weapons and MANPADS duties of the Bureau's Office of Plans, Policy, and Analysis (PM/PPA).

Regards, Stan

[Stan]

Hey Joe !

Thanks. The purpose of the study is to actually examine this and figure out what, if anything can be added to/extracted from MRE and other types of awareness campaigns to reduce exposure, in addition to pushing the increased public health impacts of victimization. I'm not aware of anyone in the humanitarian community who's done a serious study of the targeting around civilians in high-threat countries to illuminate trends such as target locations, time(s) of day, groups being singled out, etc. We do that in our own way in the Humanitarian Mine Action arena, but tools such as IMSMA do not support this in an IED context for reasons that include what you said above - landmines/UXO are static, and IEDs are active. That's a major theme and discussion I've included in the proposal I'm finishing.

Glad you brought up IMSMA’s applications and inherent shortcomings when dealing with what Estonia considers ‘other aspects of Demining and UXO clearance’. More often than not, UXO are the lifeblood of our IED builders (our criminals scoop out the HE and sell the metal – a bit more refined and business savvy than their Iraqi brethren).

Because Estonia’s structure here includes typical law enforcement duties (sweeps and post blast to name a few), we deal with both UXO and IED threats. We decided long ago to tailor the IMSMA platform to meet our needs in both arenas. That is, the trends you mention above. We have yet to ‘master’ the system, but what we do have in our DB helped us catch our last mad bomber. Granted, Estonia is far smaller than Iraq and Afghanistan, and the criminals far fewer.

Regards, Stan

[redbullets]

Hey Joe !



Glad you brought up IMSMA’s applications and inherent shortcomings when dealing with what Estonia considers ‘other aspects of Demining and UXO clearance’. More often than not, UXO are the lifeblood of our IED builders (our criminals scoop out the HE and sell the metal – a bit more refined and business savvy than their Iraqi brethren).

Because Estonia’s structure here includes typical law enforcement duties (sweeps and post blast to name a few), we deal with both UXO and IED threats. We decided long ago to tailor the IMSMA platform to meet our needs in both arenas. That is, the trends you mention above. We have yet to ‘master’ the system, but what we do have in our DB helped us catch our last mad bomber. Granted, Estonia is far smaller than Iraq and Afghanistan, and the criminals far fewer.

Regards, Stan

Stan:

Its funny, its been so many years since I've thought of landmines and UXO seperately in the macro sense that I forget that was how it used to be.

I think we should show you the toy our uber-geeks came up with. We can do it over Skype, with a bolt-on application that allows live demonstrations kind of like WebX or Oracle.

The Operational Activity Security Information System (OASIS) that we developed does a whole lot of things, but one of the most important is that it takes the geeks out of the loop - all of the analyses and queries are doable by the average operator. That was a direct result of our many years working with IMSMA and hearing the concerns of field operators.

Cheers,

[Stan]

Stan:

Its funny, its been so many years since I've thought of landmines and UXO seperately in the macro sense that I forget that was how it used to be.

I think we should show you the toy our uber-geeks came up with. We can do it over Skype, with a bolt-on application that allows live demonstrations kind of like WebX or Oracle.

The Operational Activity Security Information System (OASIS) that we developed does a whole lot of things, but one of the most important is that it takes the geeks out of the loop - all of the analyses and queries are doable by the average operator. That was a direct result of our many years working with IMSMA and hearing the concerns of field operators.

Cheers,

Careful Joe, people could figure out just how old you really are

Although we're supposed to be the heart of Skype here, most steer clear of using it (and the MOI server tends to block it).

We also needed to take the geek factor out of using our DB, especially in the field. Unfortunately, I can't share or even access our server outside the intranet...we're working on that firewall issue though. We simplified IMSMA's system using our existing data base and then added Google Earth. We had to deal with Estonian laws and try to remain transparent too. 5 years later, I think we have a good product, but still can't share it with partners.

We're looking at a visit from WRA early next year and more funding Maybe, this time, DH will attempt to visit when it's warm

Regards, Stan

[Rex Brynen]

Besides, why does more money go into Humanitarian Mine Action efforts in some places than into preventable disease?

Oh, I have no presumptions about the macro-rationality of donor assistance!

It does seem to me there are some aspects in which demining may have a certain "strategic" significance. Given the frequency with which transport routes, abandoned housing, economic infrastructure, etc. is mined, demining becomes essential for a range of related imperatives (refugee return, agricultural production, economic growth). Moreover, mines and UXO can be a major source of explosives, and so there is a military/counterterrorism implication here too.

None of which invalidates looking at IEDs as posing different sorts of challenges, as you propose to do.

[redbullets]

Oh, I have no presumptions about the macro-rationality of donor assistance!

It does seem to me there are some aspects in which demining may have a certain "strategic" significance. Given the frequency with which transport routes, abandoned housing, economic infrastructure, etc. is mined, demining becomes essential for a range of related imperatives (refugee return, agricultural production, economic growth). Moreover, mines and UXO can be a major source of explosives, and so there is a military/counterterrorism implication here too.

None of which invalidates looking at IEDs as posing different sorts of challenges, as you propose to do.

My organization has conducted something called Landmine Impact Surveys for several years - these efforts werre actually the original reason our team was brought together in late-1998. Our last serious one was in 13 of Iraq's 18 governorates. For the most part, the major contaminated countries with real need for these expensive, time-consuming projects have been completed or are underway. I think there's a rathional tendency now to exampine the same kind of infratructure blockages/impacts that these surveys specifically look at, and that you mention above, but cull the data from a wider variety (read: cheaper) range of alternate sources, and there are more and more tools out there that allow this.

Here is the first of the four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs that I developed, and that I think addresses your point about explosives supply:

1. In most, if not all countries where IEDs are employed, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) on former or current battlefields are a foundational component of the IED assembly line. Humanitarian efforts to eliminate landmines, UXO and Abandoned and Hazardous Ordnance (AO/HO) should include the impacts of IEDs upon civilians when prioritizing ERW mitigation. IEDs that are “fed” by abandoned caches, depots and other ERW sources are NOT a threat distinct from currently accepted HMA parameters.

Cheers,

[Stan]

Hi Joe !

Here is the first of the four principles of humanitarian response to IEDs that I developed, and that I think addresses your point about explosives supply:

1. In most, if not all countries where IEDs are employed, Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) on former or current battlefields are a foundational component of the IED assembly line. Humanitarian efforts to eliminate landmines, UXO and Abandoned and Hazardous Ordnance (AO/HO) should include the impacts of IEDs upon civilians when prioritizing ERW mitigation. IEDs that are “fed” by abandoned caches, depots and other ERW sources are NOT a threat distinct from currently accepted HMA parameters.

Cheers,

Well put ! Oddly enough, we've known this for some time, but never seemed to get the HDO community to address and recognize the direct correlation between UXO and IEDs. Although our IED incidences have decreased over the last 10 years, I had hoped to address IEDs in my future country plans for funding considerations instead of finding injured or maimed children’s pictures

Hmmm, are you still working on the other 3 points or do you intend to feed those to us once per day

[redbullets]

Thanks, Stan. I'll e-mail the others to you - still a bit protective of them as I want to get in a good position with them to tweak the humanitarian community for having failed to address the issue.

I'm sure if we can cull the data around targets even partially, we can begin to make assessments concerning infrastructure impacts/damage in addition to the victimization trends, rates, and public health system impacts and needs. Anyway, if we can get the data in some viable form beyond the daily media hyperbole, maybe we can make something happen.

There's a very practical element to this that the Humanitarian Mine Action community should consider. Funding specifically aimed at demining/EOD is on the decline, and increasingly focus is being placed on mainstreaming (linking demining to overarching relief/development/infrasructure programs) and the holistic, all-conventional-weapons approach. That ordnance sources feed IED production, and subsequent IED use produces civlian casualties, should add some impetus toward keeping humanitarian demining/EOD capacities a bit more vibrant than might have been the future outcome.

Cheers,