Lines of Operation

[The Pap]

Your points are very thoughtful. I agree that there are objective aspects of "logical" lines of operation and your argument is very strong.

My point was more ontological in that we have taken a more concrete (objective dominance) view of the military concept of LOO and extended it to include existential or metaphysical aspects (more dominated by a subjective view of reality).

This is likely why we are having this conversation -- because LOOs are now more subjectively produced (based on judgment calls rather than a scheme of physical maneuver). In other words, why there is ambiguity in the extended meaning of LOO in joint doctrine. This requires "interpretive" skills, and much less "concrete" skills.

This also calls into question the use of the word "line" that is explicitly creates an implicit "false concreteness" as we borrowed from linear, Jominian-rational theories of warfare.

Metaphoric extension of the idea of LOOs from more physical to the more metaphysical should cause us to be critically mindful of the shortfalls of analogically-based abstract reasoning.

For example, the physical linearity of maneuver-to-objective may confuse us to believe (through uncritical use of analogy) that this cause-and-effect relationship applies to attempts to change social-psychological conditions, say, in counterinsurgency operations.

I would prefer to highlight the DIFFERENCE (not the analogical overlap) Social-psychological manipulations are so inherently complex as to defy one-way causality (the prospect of mutual causality borrowed from complexity science) may better help us frame the situation. Perhaps we'll be less surprised by dynamic side effects (unintended consequences) of those manipulations. Recognizing these sorts of LOOs as an "unknowable science" may be a source of wisdom (and not a source of prescription indicated by borrowing meaning mindlessly from physical LOOs),

Thanks!

[slapout9]

This also calls into question the use of the word "line" that is explicitly creates an implicit "false concreteness" as we borrowed from linear, Jominian-rational theories of warfare.

Perhaps if it was taught as a "line of questioning" or "line of reasoning" as it is in the LE/Legal profession. In that manner you are taught not to forget that you are dealing with a live opponent who is going to try and outwit you and you learn to expect and be prepared for surprises. Instead of expecting it to be some type of a straight trajectory.

[Navy Dave]

As I follow this thread, it seems to me the term “logical lines of operation” is a misleading metaphor and directs us toward a relatively narrow mode of linear thought. General Chiarelli’s article in Military Review suggests that the term “logical lines of operation” is useful because it moves us away from the phased approach to warfare, allowing for simultaneous action toward a final goal rather than discreet, albeit blurred transitional phases of action. However both concepts harken us back to traditional “lines of communication and maneuver”, and are still distinctly linear in nature. Indeed the term itself, “lines of operation” borrows from “lines of communication” and (as The Pap likes to remind us) originates from a time when communication relied on linear physical infrastructure, delivered via roads, rail, or telegraph lines.

General Chiarelli reminds us in his article that “Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight... We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought.”

But doesn’t thinking in terms of “Logical lines of Operations” simply borrow a linear metaphor from classic military modes of thought? Speaking from my perspective as a Navy officer with admittedly limited experiences operating with the Army, I have often thought and remarked on what occurs to me as a distinctly linear approach that the Army takes toward problem solving. And though I admit this tendency of linear thought undoubtedly pervades all of our military services (a fact which perhaps lends even more credence to these suggestions), it is perhaps more so with the Army.

In an earlier post Shane Sims makes a great point that “Logical lines of operations are existential in part, but there are very real, physical elements, which will have an impact on overall objectives.” I suggest that those physical elements are indeed lines of operation, but that what we think of in a broader sense as “logical lines of operation” should be thought of as something quite different. A design approach might help us break from this classic military linear thinking.

As The Pap notes in his article Design and the Prospects of a US Military Renaissance, “With a more open search strategy, we may collaborate with others with varying views, call upon the unfamiliar arts and sciences, merge heuristics, and, extend and displace concepts until we discover new meaning in the situation.”

I suggest we search for our own “Eureka” moment in our effort to make sense of what “winning the peace” means today. Defining logical lines of operation with a new design way of thinking might help us to break out of our linear mental mold. Though NDD points out that none of this is really new, and “We know what has to be done, we need to quit re-wrapping the package and get on with it.” I propose that words and concepts really do matter, that there is a time and place for critical thinking, and that thinking should shape our action.

V/r
LCDR Dave Purkiss
Student, Command and General Staff College
Satellite Location: Fort Lee, Virginia

The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

[ChrisPaparone]

Slapout. Good comments -- reinforces insight!

Dave--good comments. I plan a follow on to that article for SWJ to discuss how our construct of leadership has to change as we bring design into fruition.

Step one is to differentiate leadership from management and command per the writings of Keith Grint (an educator at the one-star development program at UK's Defence Academy). His nontraditional ideas about leadership are spot on. But will the US military change its arguably patriarchical view of leadership (that some like Grint argue may lead to inappropriate dependencies)?