Two books I recently read that I think were very good.
The Great Rifle Controversy: Search for the Ultimate Infantry Weapon from World War II Through Vietnam and Beyond, by E.C Ezell.
This book was written in 1982 and is probably known by most around here but I liked it and learned a lot about technical detail and bureaucratic dynamics. Two things, of many, stood out for me. First the author said American military rifle development was not a story of innovation, but mostly a story of incremental product improvement. He hoped that future decades would change that and see some real innovation. That was written in 1982 and the ensuing 30 years have seen...incremental product improvement.
The second thing was that I think the Senate committee that investigated the M-16 rifle introduction debacle concluded that there had been negligence rising to a criminal level but the program was structured so diffusely that no individual or small group of individuals could be held responsible. When I read that I realized how little things had changed in 50 years.
The other book is:
Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq by James R. Arnold.
The book is a study of 4 small wars, Philippine Insurrection, Algeria, Malaya and Vietnam. Mr. Arnold is an excellent writer and can use a sentence to convey an idea where others (like me) need paragraphs; so he has quite a lot of valuable things to say about these conflicts in not so many pages.
For example, he said that one of the primary reasons for the success of the much debated "Surge" in Iraq was that AQI overplayed its hand by its homicidal fanaticism. I haven't read that in too many other places and it is interesting to contemplate what would have happened if their political platform had extended much beyond maniacal killing.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
This isn't all that new - it is closely connected to the "Iraqi agency" argument that has picked up steam recently, but it really started at least as far back as Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who said the Anbar Awakening was the result of the Sunnis having to be the ones to make the decision that they had finally had enough.
This isn't wrong, but the problem with focusing specifically on this point, is that it is used to argue that an increase in US troops (called "the surge") was not responsible. The problem is that it considers each element of what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008 in isolation, trying to figure out which one was the cause of the reduction in violence. In reality, all of these things were connected, and without one you probably wouldn't have the other. Yes, the Iraqis had to make this decision for themselves, but it is not a coincidence that it also came at a time when the US finally was able to provide a viable alternative to AQI. Likewise, an increase in US forces was important, but more important was how those forces were used, and demonstrating to Iraqis that they had an alternative to al Qaeda that would keep them alive. "The Surge" was not just dumping additional bodies into Iraq and calling it a day. It was an ongoing, interconnected process in which the actions of the US, Iraqis, and al Qaeda all had an effect in reducing the violence at the time and weakening AQI.
To get back to the topic of the thread though, I just finished Execute Against Japan: The US Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. I am reading Gunther Rothenberg's The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon. After that will be John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic: Motivations and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France.
Blitzkrieg legend
The best book I have read on the operation. BTW: Found an intersting interview of the author regarding a German wandernden Kessel/wandering kettle/moving pocket
Truppenführung
There has been written so much about the second book, especially the timeless chapters that I don't want to repeat them. However Appendix E, a German analysis of FM 100-5 (the 1944 issue, I guess) done in 1952 was a bit of a surprise
Hat tip to Mark @ Zenpundit for a reminder this classic book is now in paperback and cheaper to buy:http://www.amazon.com/Human-Face-War...9259943&sr=8-1
With two highly rated reviews and one by Fuchs here:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Human-Face-W...9392849&sr=1-1
Taken from Fuchs:Mark's short review:..I still rate it as one of the most impressive military books of the last decades..Link to Zenpundit's reviews:http://zenpundit.com/?p=5397I am intruding on Scott’s post to add my strong endorsement. If you are serious about strategy, particularly if you are a member of the armed forces with responsibility for operational planning or unit leadership, The Human Face of War by Colonel Storr is on the short list of must-read books. It no longer costs a zillion dollars, so go buy it.
I too baulked at buying the hardback and borrowed a library copy. In places it is a hard read, generally it flows and abounds with examples to satisfy. So I'll get a paperback copy one day soon and read again, plus add markers so I can ask Jim what he meant.
davidbfpo
I just picked up An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, by Adam Smith and The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money by John Maynard Keynes on Nook. I have been meaning to read both for some time. I probably need to read Friedman as well.
“Build a man a fire, and he'll be warm for a day. Set a man on fire, and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.”
Terry Pratchett
Have you seen the Keynes vs. Hayek videos put together by the Mercatus Center at George Mason? I can’t guarantee they’ll be up your alley but I really enjoy them. [LINK 1] [LINK 2]
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Reading Adam Smith and Keynes as well. I have to confess that Keynes is slow reading even with an background in economics. Reading Smith is a bit like reading Clausewitz in the sense that both are more quoted then read and that you get away with a different feeling then the one you started with. Loved many aspects of it, seen from a "modern" micro and macro view with current affairs in mind.
BTW the NYTimes has a recent article about the shortages of basic goods in Venezuela and ElPais run articles about YPF and the economic policies of Kirchner and the Argentine government. Such price controls certainly seem to result in the textbook predictions.
Last edited by Firn; 04-21-2012 at 09:25 AM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Daniel Kahneman's latest on why it's so hard to reach correct conclusions. Spoiler alert -- we're hard-wired to fail.
This isn't a military book in the classical sense, but it provides important lessons on decision-making. Kahneman explains that the brain has two systems for processing thought: the fast, very basic system one, and the more deliberate, critical, analytical system two. Forcing system two to kick in and work appears to be a challenge. He also ties together other contributors in the field: Gilbert, Taleb, Tetlock, etc.
I plan to use the book in one of my analysis classes. So far, I continue to be amazed at how students who acknowledge the requirement for better analytical thought revert to the comfort zone in their own analyses. I am therefore open to suggestions.
I admit to being a fan of Storr's writings. I paid a right leg to get a copy when it first came out and have piqued the author's brain on a few things.
Right now, I am reading Fukuyama's The Rise of Political Order. It should be required reading for anyone who puts a uniform on.
Never got round to this Carl. Perhaps better that way as I doubt this is the place for such a discussion.
Another book worthy of study is (not necessarily in the way the author want):
Company Commander - Major Russell Lewis (Author)
I've been looking back on the early years of the war in Afghanistan lately with a few good books:
I just finished reading The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA's Clandestine Service. It covers a variety of issues from the CIA's CTC in the buildup to September 11 to lessons learned from the first few years of war, but what I found most interesting was the author's description of his experience serving in Africa. Based on current events in Libya, I found this information to be timely and informative.
I've moved on to a book the previous author recommends, First In: How Seven CIA Officers Opened the War on Terror in Afghanistan . This covers the JAWBREAKER team's entry into Afghanistan and their challenges in the opening days of the war. Very interesting so far.
In the last couple of months:
Thinking, Fast and Slow - Brilliant book. It is not surprising that it already has been discussed here. Regression to the mean and the law of small numbers surprised even me, despite having studied statistics at the uni. But then again, if we consider the base rate of those who failed, it is not surprising at all that I was among them.
Ironically the Marshmallow Study which is cited in the book has a clear shortcoming, which can at least partly be explained by other chapters of the book.
The Checklist Manifesto: It doesn't has the grand span of Thinking, Fast and slow but it made its manifesto very well. It shows how hard but important it is to do consistently the right things in the right way and order. Discipline forced by something like a good checklist can empower initiative and thinking, making a big difference in performance.For the past four decades, the "marshmallow test" has served as a classic experimental measure of children's self-control: will a preschooler eat one of the fluffy white confections now or hold out for two later?
Now a new study demonstrates that being able to delay gratification is influenced as much by the environment as by innate ability. Children who experienced reliable interactions immediately before the marshmallow task waited on average four times longer—12 versus three minutes—than youngsters in similar but unreliable situations.
Wages of Destruction: The best economic book I have read about the WWII, from an author which actually studied macroeconomics. This often basic economic knowledge was sometimes obviously missing in Why the Allies won and even more so in Freedoms Forge.
It always amazed me that such basic and thus key elements like ressources, capital, labour, productivity, monetary policy were not yet investigated with similar scientific rigour before, at least not in a widely available (and cheap) book. Even more so if we consider the amount of ink spent on this period.
Freedoms Forge: A nice book with good stories but it suffers greatly compared to Wages of Destruction. It is written by somebody who has no professional education in economics and it really tells. If it just had sticked to the stories, maybe with a bit less drama about heroic men and American exceptionalism it would sill be a great book. But the black-and-white description of business and labour and the fact- and senseless attacks on the New Deal of New Dealers often broke the flow. Critic is important but it should be based on facts and those were just not there. This narrow ideological approach does weaken the whole book. And this comes from a convinced capitalist.
The Halo Effect: It is in its scope similar to the Checklist Manifesto. It limits itself, in this case to a strong attack on the way we often think and write about business, managers and success. This simple, fact-based approach makes the book powerful.
Last edited by Firn; 10-11-2012 at 11:01 AM.
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
Have you tried this one, Firn?
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
... "We need officers capable of following systematically the path of logical argument to its conclusion, with disciplined intellect, strong in character and nerve to execute what the intellect dictates"
General Ludwig Beck (1880-1944);
Speech at the Kriegsakademie, 1935
but I have no exposure whatsoever to that world so I have no idea whether the ethnography rings true. I find the author dorkily loveable so I want to give her the benefit of the doubt.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Re: Bill Moore's response to my question on momentum:
Bill,
I'd say your comment on momentum only taking us so far, as when an enemy is free to regroup in a cross border sanctuary, is spot on...
And I greatly appreciate your taking the time to research von Clausewitz in response to my question.
Cheers,
Mike
Bookmarks