William S. Lind :collection (merged thread)

[former_0302]

Racist? Subtly racist? I don't know for that kind of thing. I'll leave it for others to judge.

But whatever, Mr. Johnson didn't comment upon racism. He commented upon what he saw as the ill effects of affirmative action and specifically upon how people can game the system to slant things their way. I asked if that was true. You said absolutely not. So as I said, your word cancels out his and his cancels out yours which leads to a need for others who would know to comment.

I was a part of a large group of officers last year which was assembled to listen to the musings of a three-star general who happened to be in town. One of the tidbits he decided to pass on to us was that by 2030, the US demographic breakdown is expected to be about 50% Caucasian, 25% Hispanic, and 25% other. He then went on to say that the demographic breakdown of the military's officer corps needed to reflect those percentages. Though it was not expressly stated, one wonders if the fact that the nation is about 50% female will play into that as well...

[davidbfpo]

Spotted yesterday a free link to read a Journal of Strategic Studies article 'The Morale Maze: the German Army in Late 1918' and Red Rat had time to read and comment:

..an interesting contrast to the current Lind debate.

Link:http://ht.ly/wmZI0

The Abstract:

The state of the German Army’s morale in 1918 is central to our understanding not only of the outcome of World War I, but also of the German Revolution and, indeed, through the pernicious ‘stab-in-the-back-myth’, on Weimar politics and the rise of the Nazis, too. This article presents new evidence from the German archives, blended with statistical analysis, to show that the morale of some units held up better than previously thought almost to the end, and thus to suggest three things. First, it proposes that some historians have placed too much reliance on English-language sources alone, such as British Army intelligence reports, which have various flaws as evidence. Second, it argues that, while historians have increasingly moved away from generalisations about German morale, this process has further to run. Third, it suggests that no single tipping point can be identified, and that morale alone does not provide a sufficient explanation for battlefield defeat. Indeed, much of the data can only be explained if the tactical realities of the war in late 1918 are clearly understood.

I am sure the saying "stabbed in the back" has appeared in one of teh Lind-related threads recently.

[JMA]

I often wonder if they ever have this type of conversation at NASA.

I was a part of a large group of officers last year which was assembled to listen to the musings of a three-star general who happened to be in town. One of the tidbits he decided to pass on to us was that by 2030, the US demographic breakdown is expected to be about 50% Caucasian, 25% Hispanic, and 25% other. He then went on to say that the demographic breakdown of the military's officer corps needed to reflect those percentages. Though it was not expressly stated, one wonders if the fact that the nation is about 50% female will play into that as well...

[carl]

I was a part of a large group of officers last year which was assembled to listen to the musings of a three-star general who happened to be in town. One of the tidbits he decided to pass on to us was that by 2030, the US demographic breakdown is expected to be about 50% Caucasian, 25% Hispanic, and 25% other. He then went on to say that the demographic breakdown of the military's officer corps needed to reflect those percentages. Though it was not expressly stated, one wonders if the fact that the nation is about 50% female will play into that as well...

former_0302:

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

Out of curiosity, what was the setup like when he spoke? Did he wander about talking to small groups? Was it a big auditorium? Were questions taken? Were honest questions taken or was it understood that certain things won't be asked? That kind of thing.

[AmericanPride]

This is the stuff of nightmares. It is third world army meets PC monster and they spawn something that will always be beaten. He just said that fighting proficiency is not as important as whatever characteristic is fashionable this week.

But that isn't the worst thing, at least for right now. The worst thing is the window into the mind of a 3 star this comment provides, a three star, supposedly one of the best the Army has. So the best the Army has doesn't acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting, subordinates it to political fashion and can't see what the result would be, or doesn't care.

Lind commented about the moral collapse of the officer corps. Well that 3-star's words validates fully Lind's view at least as far as the multi-stars go. The problem is officers lower down whose morals haven't collapsed yet won't be able to counteract the disastrous effects the multi-stars will have on the military.

What the heck are you talking about? That a general believes the demographics of the officer corps should reflect the demographics of the nation from which it is drawn is "the stuff of nightmares...[subordinated] to political fashion" and will be the bringer of "moral collapse" and "disasterous effects"? It's exactly your kind of reactionary fear-mongering that obstructs the development of sound, rational policy and it creates the very problems you claim you want addressed!

You don't know the context of that 3-star general's conversation. Does everything he speak about at every turn must "acknowledge the importance of being good at fighting"? It goes without saying that in the profession of arms, the ability fight and win wars, is essential. That this forms the basis of your criticism reveals your superficial understanding of the real problems at hand.

Here are the fundamental problems facing the armed forces:
- people and equipment are becoming more expensive on a per unit basis because of long procurement times, increased healthcare costs, inefficient budgeting and expenditures, and technological transformation
- this cost growth exceeds both the rate of inflation and rate of defense budget growth
- the cost growth disportionately reduces the size of the force, meaning that as individual units are more capable, the size in reduction results in an overall decline in combat power
- increased automation and systems means more overhead and administration
- combined, this means less available forward combat power
- less available combat power means greater demands on available combat power
- greater demands means higher operations tempo on both people and equipment, driving maintenance costs, refit/replinishment requirements, and exhaustion in the force
- that in turn means more money devoted to operations and less towards personnel (and more to defense and less towards social services)
- and that means a less fit, less educated, less qualified population to actually design, man, operate, and/or maintain those systems

What does this mean for the officer corps? It means it actually becomes increasingly difficult to formulate an effective strategy - the structural constraints imposed on leaders leaves very few options in implementing a dynamic, flexible strategy capable of matching the threats faced by the country. Instead, the "strategy" is driven by the availability of resources, including the Congressionally-constrained billeting of officers, which is limited because of the structural contradictions of the country's defense political economy.

We have one of the largest military budgets in American history combined with one of the smallest militaries by manpower in history. We are in a high tempo operations environment because of the political obligations of the government - meaning that far more is done today by far fewer people. And that's without the additional burdens of the campaigns in Afghanistan and formerly Iraq. So, in this environment, junior and mid-career officers are incredibly busy, even in the Reserves, with constant training cycles and mobilizations. There's really not time to implement change in the organization - and in any case, that's the job of the general officers, the number of which is tied by law to the size of the force. I don't fault the generals entirely; maybe they're just bad politicians having been imbued with strict conditions on the appropriate boundaries of civil-military relations. That Lind is both wrong (there are officers seeking to learn and transform the Army) and right (that this change is not occuring) should speak volumes about the conditions of our nation's defenses. Blaming black hairstyles or homosexuals is not only wildly off the mark but fuels the kind of obstructionism and division that makes it difficult to seek effective change in the first place.

[AmericanPride]

And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem:

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.

[former_0302]

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

In response to (1), the reason for this, IMO, is that there is a certain part of society which has a tradition of military service, and this sector continues to feed the beast. Is that happening at the expense of another sector of society which is clamoring to get in? If that is so, I haven't heard about it.

(2), okay, but that is a societal problem, not a military problem, and the military is not capable of fixing societal problems, either here or abroad...

(3), I sincerely hope that the values of the military are different than the society from which they're drawn. If I'm not mistaken, that's part of the whole "...special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities..." thing. If the values aren't different, we have a problem.

[AmericanPride]

In response to (1), the reason for this, IMO, is that there is a certain part of society which has a tradition of military service, and this sector continues to feed the beast. Is that happening at the expense of another sector of society which is clamoring to get in? If that is so, I haven't heard about it.

Access to enlistment is not the issue. Willingness to enlist is the issue. As the country becomes increasingly Hispanic (and to some extent, Asian) while the Army remains white and black, the disproportions will only increase. This logic is also at work in the growth of metropolitan areas and the depopulation of rural areas - and the relatively fast growth of the West (driven by Hispanics and Asians) compared to the rest of the country. Is it "bad" in of itself that the Army is disproportionately white and black? No. But it becomes "bad" when, for example, senior leaders fail to recognize the demographic makeup of their institution and attempt to implement policies that are actually destructive of good order and discipline. And this will become an issue in the future as Congress, especially the House, begans to reflect the changing demographic patterns of the country, and it starts focusing its attention on dated military policies and culture.

(2), okay, but that is a societal problem, not a military problem, and the military is not capable of fixing societal problems, either here or abroad...

It is absolutely a military problem if 1 of 4 potential recruits are ineligible to enlist on the basis of their education or health. It was the military at the start of the Cold War that pushed for the national school lunch program, and it should continue to support policies that are conducive to maintaining an able-bodied and -minded population. This also applies to the country's technological policies. Policy-makers should rid themselves of the false dichtonomy between military and non-military spending and, through the painful process of Congressional appropriations, seek out a rational budget that recognizes the linkages between public policy and military capabilities.

(3), I sincerely hope that the values of the military are different than the society from which they're drawn. If I'm not mistaken, that's part of the whole "...special trust and confidence in the patriotism, valor, fidelity and abilities..." thing. If the values aren't different, we have a problem.

If the values are different, don't be surprised when Congress decreases defense spending, cuts back troop and procurement numbers, and limits pay and benefits. American veterans receive a special place in the politics of the public, and this is unique to the United States; with the country's changing demographics and diverging makeup of the military and general population, that's not guaranteed to last.

[AmericanPride]

The point being all this social normalization/justice stuff has no business in the military IMO and it is probably even illegal per the Supreme court.

So where do you draw the line on "social normalization/justice stuff"? Was integration a viable social experiment for the military pursue? If so, why?

[former_0302]

Access to enlistment is not the issue. Willingness to enlist is the issue. As the country becomes increasingly Hispanic (and to some extent, Asian) while the Army remains white and black, the disproportions will only increase. This logic is also at work in the growth of metropolitan areas and the depopulation of rural areas - and the relatively fast growth of the West (driven by Hispanics and Asians) compared to the rest of the country. Is it "bad" in of itself that the Army is disproportionately white and black? No. But it becomes "bad" when, for example, senior leaders fail to recognize the demographic makeup of their institution and attempt to implement policies that are actually destructive of good order and discipline. And this will become an issue in the future as Congress, especially the House, begans to reflect the changing demographic patterns of the country, and it starts focusing its attention on dated military policies and culture.

Hmmm... well, I can't speak for the entirety of the USMC, but my service has acquainted me with vastly more Hispanic Marines than AA Marines. Perhaps it's a service thing.

Can you give an example of the sort of policy which is "...actually destructive of good order and discipline?" Not entirely sure of what you're driving at.

It is absolutely a military problem if 1 of 4 potential recruits are ineligible to enlist on the basis of their education or health. It was the military at the start of the Cold War that pushed for the national school lunch program, and it should continue to support policies that are conducive to maintaining an able-bodied and -minded population. This also applies to the country's technological policies. Policy-makers should rid themselves of the false dichtonomy between military and non-military spending and, through the painful process of Congressional appropriations, seek out a rational budget that recognizes the linkages between public policy and military capabilities.

Is it military problem? Only if the military requires significantly more people than it does now. You're saying 75% of the potential recruits are eligible? According to the figures on the census.gov site, there's about 29 million 17-29 year old males in the US. If 75% of that is fit for military service, I'd say our problem isn't too severe, unless we plan to occupy China.

If the values are different, don't be surprised when Congress decreases defense spending, cuts back troop and procurement numbers, and limits pay and benefits. American veterans receive a special place in the politics of the public, and this is unique to the United States; with the country's changing demographics and diverging makeup of the military and general population, that's not guaranteed to last.

We must be thinking of "values" in different contexts. Your response doesn't make any sense to me in relation to the point I was trying to make, so I'll assume I just didn't state what I meant very clearly...

[carl]

American Pride:

You said this

Willingness to enlist is the issue.

and this

Alienating elements of the ranks on one basis or on another is detrimental to the higher purpose of winning America's wars.

.

Now forgive me for putting together my interpretation of all your arguments but I have to to make my point and it's too confusing to go back and copy and paste. These two quotes along with all your other posts lead me to what I believe your position is.

From what I gather you believe that in order for the military to fill its ranks it must get recruits from all the census groups at least in rough proportion to their numbers in the population. It order to do that it must establish race and sex goals or quotas for these groups otherwise they won't sign up in sufficient numbers. In other words it must bribe these groups by dangling guarantees of position to entice them into joining. There is a problem with that position.

First and most importantly it denigrates the patriotism and willingness to serve of the groups targeted. The people in those groups are all grown up and if they decide not to join up they have good reasons. As former_0302 says a lot of that is cultural. Some groups are just more inclined than others to go in. Different groups going into different professions or fields is quite normal in society. Thomas Sowell has written about that a lot.

Another problem with your position is that you are saying that they can be bribed. You are saying in effect that we can overcome their unwillingness to serve by bribing them. Them they will sign up. That is insulting.

An additional problem is your position doesn't treat the people in your target groups as individuals. They are just members of a herd and will respond if the right stimulus is applied.

I don't find such a position very respectful of the people it purports to care for.

As far as the three star goes, the context provided by former_0302 was quite clear as was the three stars position. You can't fancy it up much. He believes the demographic of the officer corps needs to reflect the demographic of society at large.

Aside from the denigration of talent for fighting and leading that reflects, I suspect he has no idea of the administrative mess it would create. Who is black? What is white? What is mixed race and how should we count it? Is Sikh a race or a religion? Is religion race? Depending on the answers to those questions and what the % of this or that is projected to be when the next promotion cycle comes there would be a mad scramble to document that indeed this person is whatever would help get him promoted. The military being what it is there would have to be published procedures and policies relating to all of this. They would have to determine what was black, white, brown and variations thereof. And you know what that would mean? It would mean the US military, the great leveler, would have to create a race code, something not seen since the 30s in Europe and a long time ago in the South.

A note about school spending and eduction. NYC spends about $19,000 per student per year. Boy what Father Gallagher and Sister Mary Loretta could have done with $19,000 per year per student. Anyway, the people the NYC schools turn out aren't very well educated I've read. So perhaps it isn't about the amount of money spent, but how it's spent.

I am glad to see that today I am only a superficial reactionary fear monger. Yesterday I was a racist so I am coming up in the world.

[AmericanPride]

And carl, since we're on the topic of the demographic of American officers, let's talk about where they come from. The trend for both officers and enlisted is overrepresentation of whites and blacks, and enlistees from the South. A single college in the South can easily commission more officers than the whole of New York City. Recruits are overwhelmingly middle class in origin. But of the top ten states by percentage of quality recruits, only 2 are in the South (South Carolina and Louisana). Then there's this gem:

According to a report released in December 2010 by The Education Trust entitled “Shut Out of the Military: Today's High School Education Doesn't Mean You're Ready for Today's Army,” 1 in 5 high school students failed to qualify for enlistment in the Army based on their Armed Forces Qualification Test score.3 Students of color were more likely to fail the test. For future recruit pools, DoD may need to reconsider the value placed on a high school diploma if educational standards do not produce enough recruits able to pass the Armed Forces Qualification Test.

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

The readiness of the armed forces to fight and win the nation's wars begins at home. By the time the soldier reaches the battlefield to close with and destroy the enemy, most of his odds have already been decided by the thousands of micro-decisions leading to that event - and not only in the officer corps, but across the country. By then it's too late to figure out if the soldier has the right weapon or equipment or values or education or training. That's the part of our strategy that's missing.

[Steve Blair]

What does this mean? (1) The military does not accurately reflect the demographics of the American population from which it is drawn. If projections of ethnic group growth are accurate, and enlistment patterns remain the same, this difference will only increase. (2) Non-defense investments (i.e. education) is important in establishing the quality of recruits prior to them ever stepping into a recruiter's office. Today, only 1 in 4 candidates 17-29 are estimated to be eligible for enlistment. (3) This is the origin of the divergence thesis between the armed forces and the population - if the people are different, so are the values, and what are the consequences for the country and democratic governance if its military is not drawn from the same population as society at large?

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

[AmericanPride]

Considering that this is the way the military was recruited prior to World War II, I'd wager that the country will survive. As soon as you look at the pre-wartime draft military you see this sort of thing. And as for small manpower? Simply not true. The cost per solider is obviously much higher, but in terms of numbers the army has indeed been much smaller than it is currently, and for most of its organizational history.

If you study the history of the military in the United States, you'd realize that what we're seeing now is a return to normal as it existed prior to the Cold War.

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

[Steve Blair]

The issue here is that the pre-WW2 and post WW2 Americas are worlds apart. So in some ways we may be returning to historical norms in the long view of American history regarding the size of the force, but at the same time we are not returning to the pre-WW2 limited international engagements. Before World War II, there was no NATO, the US did not have combatant commands or bases in 100+ countries, or material interests in nearly every country around the world. Nor did the United States have a self-ascribed global police function as the centerpiece of the international political order. I don't think it's useful with these two different periods to use the pre-WW2 military as a baseline for measuring the current one.

EDIT: Also, let's talk about what 'normal' really is. It's been 237 years since 1776. It was 214 years between 1776 and 1991, 51 years of which included World War II and the Cold War (1940 - 1991). That's 23.8% of American history. Adding the 23 years between 1991 and 2014, the proportion increases to 31.2% of American history. So almost a third of American history has had a relatively large, permanent standing army. How long will it take for that to be considered the new normal?

My point is simply that we've been here before. Comparing the current reality with the artificial construct that was the Cold War isn't helpful, either. You need to consider that the military's current position of privilege is very much an outgrowth of the first Gulf War and lingering elite guilt about the way the Vietnam military was treated (in the aftermath of the Gulf War, at least...such feelings were noticeably absent during the 1980s and before). It's not a historical norm in the United States.

Popular sentiment has never really favored long-term external engagement. It could be swayed and to an extent justified by the Cold War, but once that ended popular enthusiasm faded (and I suspect a strong case could be made that it was fading during Vietnam). How much of your external engagement is really remnants of the Cold War? It's also interesting to note that the draft-era army was always considered something of an emergency force, and that its strength fell drastically in the 1950s. It was built back up for Vietnam, and then moved back to the more traditional (for the United States) volunteer force.

If you're going to talk about normal, you need some understanding of where that normal came from and if what you consider is normal is in fact something else. In the wider scope of American history (that two-thirds you mentioned), a large military (and especially one based on conscription) has never been considered normal by a fair chunk of the population. And for the bulk of its non-draft history (and even its draft history after the mid-1950s when deferments became more common) the army has never been especially representative of the population (either in the officer corps or the enlisted ranks). Very, very few of the issues you bring up are new, although the scale might be (although a compelling case can be made that the army that served on the Frontier between 1848 and 1892 faced many similar challenges in terms of distance, support structure, and very low strength).

[AmericanPride]

Carl,

Also, about New York City schools. I can't speak to their quality, but I can tell you that New York is ranked 18th out of quality enlistees as a state. In fact, the mid-west and northeast tends to score higher than the south in terms of quality. The lowest state is Mississippi which also ranks 44th in education spending per student. That's not a coincidence. Education matters. And spending on education also matters.

[carl]

Carl,

Also, about New York City schools. I can't speak to their quality, but I can tell you that New York is ranked 18th out of quality enlistees as a state. In fact, the mid-west and northeast tends to score higher than the south in terms of quality. The lowest state is Mississippi which also ranks 44th in education spending per student. That's not a coincidence. Education matters. And spending on education also matters.

You spoke about education and spending. I commented about education and spending.

The 18th ranking would only be of use if you relate it to how New York ranks in state spending per student, which I have. New York in 2011 was no. 1 in spending per student at 19k per. Now if results were directly related to gross spending you would expect NY to score a bit higher that 18th. No. 18 in spending is North Dakota which spends per student 11.4k followed by Ohio and Nebraska.

[Fuchs]

We have one of the largest military budgets in American history combined with one of the smallest militaries by manpower in history.

I suppose these diagrams are a more accurate representation of reality:

PERSONNEL


http://www.comw.org/pda/1002BudgetSurge.html


http://www.marketsize.com/blog/index...duty-military/

[Fuchs]

SPENDING


http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/thread1002996/pg1

http://files.abovetopsecret.com/file...fa532776b1.png (image too large)
http://www.abovetopsecret.com/forum/...g1#pid17676345


http://www.heritage.org/research/rep...fense-spending

BOTH

(distorted by deployment-related extra compensations and reserve/active force balance)
http://www.heritage.org/research/rep...fense-spending


So the military (and army) aren't really small. Budget and manpower are merely somewhat below non-World War zenith. That's fine.

In fact, I think Americans are crazy for spending so much on the military because the public good of defence can be had with a fraction. Most of the effort goes into the additional bullying and 'messing in distant places' capabilities.

[AmericanPride]

Hi Fuchs,

Thanks for the graphs.

From one of your links:

The upward trend in the DoD budget partly reflects decreased efficiency and a failure to make disciplined choices in procurement. It also reflects the decision to put the military to work in wars of a type for which it was not designed. Finally, it reflects increased readiness, activity, and capability. In some important respects, today’s US military is more powerful than its Cold War predecessor, even though the number of full-time military personnel is 30% less. Among the enhancements are a vast increase in its capacity to attack targets with aircraft and missiles. Also, its capacity to rapidly deploy troops and equipment has improved. In these and other ways, the power of the Pentagon has been re-inflated.

You and I have discussed this subject at some length before. One thing your graph is missing the growth of the operations and maintenance proportion of the DoD budget from a low of ~24% in the early 1960s to today's high of 45%. At the same time, the proportion of spending for military personnel has decreased from approximately 50% to today's 25% (even as your heritage foundation graph illustrates the per unit cost of servicemembers increased by 200%). Nine of the last ten years have seen the lowest military personnel spending 3-year averages since FY48. In contrast nine of ten highest years of O&M expenditures were between FY02 and FY14.