This is what happens when targeting individuals becomes the strategy versus an action that supports the strategy. I think they were close to a strategic victory, but based on what you said, victory is no where in sight now.
This is what happens when targeting individuals becomes the strategy versus an action that supports the strategy. I think they were close to a strategic victory, but based on what you said, victory is no where in sight now.
All good, effective, durable COIN begins with civil leaders creating and good laws and policies that offer a viable political alternative to the aggrieved population that insurgent groups emerge from or exploit. The US Civil Rights laws that allowed the US to turn the corner on the growing instability and violence of the Civil Rights movement is a great example. The British decision to give up colonial political control over Malaya and to pass laws granting suffrage and equal opportunity to the entire population as the military created time and space is another great example. The government of the Philippines has a chance to follow in those footsteps with Bangsamoro. I hope they do not blink and miss this opportunity.
Some of the darkest illegal violence of the civil rights movement occurred after the laws were passed. These types of human drama can not be turned on (by ideology) or off (by law) like a switch. They build over time as trust is violated, and must wane over time as well as trust is restored.
Maybe if the US took the bounty off the heads of these men it would help give peace a chance.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
I agree on the issue of targeting individuals. In this case the individual concerned may have been of less value than some believe, as argued by Sidney Jones, one of the more credible analysts coverings SE Asian Jihadis:Originally Posted by Bill Moore
http://file.understandingconflict.or...n_Mindanao.pdf
How close victory was is open to question. The agreement may or may not have brought peace (there were formidable obstacles to come in the implementation) but was at least a step in that direction. Even if it had passed the legislature, though, there were already strong indications that the Supreme Court would shoot it down, partly because the Court is dominated by Manila-centric individuals determined to preserve the prerogatives of "imperial Manila", partly because the Court has an adversarial relationship with Aquino and would be only too happy to torpedo one of his signature initiatives. Politics are always with us.
Aquino might have been able to get an agreement through earlier in his tenure, when he still had more pull with the legislature and the Court. As it is, with coalitions fracturing and individuals lining up their alliances for the 2016 election, there is little chance of getting an inherently unpopular piece of legislation through even the legislature, let alone the Court. Aquino has made powerful enemies among the traditional politicians and the Catholic Church, and they are lining up to chop him down now that he's vulnerable. His own manner has at times made their job easier.
If the peace can be held up that long, it is arguably possible that the process could be revived under a new administration, but that seems a slim hope, as 2016 looks likely to be a step backward on multiple fronts. It is hard to be optimistic, and it looks likely, if not desirable, that we will become interesting again.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
On the other side of the equation, I can't help but wondering if the younger MILF leaders emerging will be willing to abide by the draft agreement. Seems ISIS has already regenerated a new wave of radicalism far beyond Syria and Iraq. As Colin Gray titled one of his more recent books, it will be another bloody century.If the peace can be held up that long, it is arguably possible that the process could be revived under a new administration, but that seems a slim hope, as 2016 looks likely to be a step backward on multiple fronts. It is hard to be optimistic, and it looks likely, if not desirable, that we will become interesting again.
I don't see ISIS as a major factor... certainly the more radical factions (not all of them young) identify with ISIS, but if ISIS wasn't there they'd identify with something else. If this agreement falls apart, as seems likely, I do expect some significant changes in the MILF and in the separatist movement in general, with the radicals and those who see negotiation as pointless gaining traction and the negotiation-minded factions losing traction. This will be the second time that the negotiators have signed an agreement only to have the Philippine government reject it; if negotiation does not bring results it's hard to see why they would continue on that course.
The problem at root is that while some Philippine leaders are willing to negotiate, the majority of the populace remains heavily Islamophobic and regards any concession as a betrayal. It's an easy soapbox to get up on, it wins broad approval, and it's supported by a heavily Manila-centric judiciary.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
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