We need less Chemo and Surgery and more "Voom."

[Bob's World]

So, what, pray tell, is a "terrorist" organization?

Terrorism is, after all, merely a tactic. Many insurgents use terrorist tactics. Many governments (to include our own) use terrorist tactics. Many non-state actors with broad political agendas, such as AQ, use terrorist tactics.

Frankly it is a label that bundles all manner of actors based upon a particular tactical approach. I don't find that very helpful, as it does not create a category that frames or suggests a particular family of solution to apply.

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.

AQ is actually more accurately a non-state political action group that operates outside the rule of law to conduct unconventional warfare to leverage the insurgent populaces of a wide range of primarily Muslim states, employing both guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, to force change upon the governments of those states and their foreign allies.

This cannot be well addressed by "counter-terrorism." Nor can this be well addressed by the slightly broader concept of "combating-terrorism." What I have long argued is that we we really need is a much broader, more holistic construct of "counter-unconventional warfare." This gets us past an excessive focus on the tactics employed, and instead forces us to think in the context of the actual operations being waged. Much of our jousting in the "3rd world" with the Soviets during the Cold War was essentially counter UW. We did not fly drones to Moscow and attempt to kill soviet leaders with missiles. But we fly drones in the sovereign airspace of many countries where AQ and nationalist insurgents operate and attempt to kill them. I find this odd at best.

But the energy source of any successful UW campaign is an insurgent populace. One cannot go to a stable, satisfied populace and create an insurgency. One can, however, go to place where such conditions are strong, but suppressed, and employ ideology, motivation, arms, leadership, funding, etc to move such a populace to action.

Che Guevara did not understand this fundamental truth of UW. He wanted to ignite a flame of insurgency that would spread and envelope all of South America. He looked at his map and picked a country in the middle of the continent and decided to light his fire there. So he went to Bolivia. But Bolivia had already had a revolution and much of the latent insurgent energy of the populace there was already released. He found few recruits and no sanctuary among the people. He was in short order hunted down and killed. He failed because he did not understand UW and the necessity for conditions of insurgency to fuel any such movement. AQ does not make that mistake, or perhaps they do not understand either, but the fact is there are so many populaces across so many countries in the Middle East with high conditions of insurgency that they cannot hardly help but finding fertile ground for their operations.

If not AQ, it would be someone else. They exploit the opportunity, they do not create the opportunity. I suspect this is why AQ has never resonated nearly as well among the Muslim populaces of the Asia-Pacific Region as they have in those areas that have not had the political revolutions yet such as have occurred there. As you well know, things are not perfect in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, or the Philippines - but these people and these nations have already thrown off the major aspects of external, illegitimate manipulation and are working toward their own destiny. Small groups and small numbers of individuals are open to help from groups such as AQ, but nearly so much as in the greater Middle East.

This is political. There are simple, fundamental aspects of human nature that provide a framework for understanding these problems. Each is unique in its details, but all are similar in their fundamentals.

[wm]

Terrorism is, after all, merely a tactic.

I'm not so sure that terrorism is always a tactic. Saying so is equivalent to saying that terror activities are being used as a means to some end. I suspect that some terrorist acts are conducted as ends in themselves. I am thinking primarily of some of the things done by so-called anarchists in the later 19th Century, but Timothy McVeigh's exploit in OKC might also fit in that category.

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.

The above categorization of counter terrrorism seems rather shallow. I see two aspects to counter terrorism. The first includes those actions one might take to prevent terrorist activity. These are what, for example, the Counter IED community calls actions to the left of the boom. Seeking to answer Bob's "why" question above, rightly belongs in this part of counterterrorism. I submit demotivating someone from the commission of terrorist acts is rather hard without knowing what is motivating him or her to engage in them in the first place.
The second aspect of counter terrorism is remediation--restoring order/cleaning up the mess after the terrorist action has occurred. How one does this may well fuel further terrorism. Knocking down the hovel next to the big hole left by the IED in the process of filling the hole, enforcing a curfew to "keep people safe" until we find the terrorists, or just leaving the restoration to the locals' own devices are probably not conducive to achieving the sort of results that the first aspect of counter terrorism is attempting to achieve.

[Steve Blair]

I remain unconvinced that terrorism is "merely" a tactic. As WM points out, there are far too many cases where terrorism is clearly an end and not a mean. Also, there are too many examples of groups that have over time spun into a cycle of violence where the attack is the end in and of itself and the why of the attack no longer has any real meaning.

[Dayuhan]

Which leads to "counter-terrorism," which equally is a little more than a commitment to seek to disrupt, defeat, deny, etc those individuals and organizations that employ terrorist tactics. It is very symptomatic in nature, and as such does not much consider WHY some organization or individual is acting out, or why they have come to a position where they believe terrorist tactics are their best hope for achieving their goals.

Disrupt, defeat, and deny is essential. It may not be the only the only thing that's essential, but it's certainly essential. That doesn't mean you don't have to look at and address the "why", it just means that when someone is actively trying to kill you or your people you stop them first and then worry about why.

One of the problems with efforts to identify and address causes is that they are very much open to erroneous interpretations of causes. One trend we often notice in the US is the tendency to assume that everything happens because of us, and that everyone else simply reacts... thus if AQ wants to kill us that must be a "backlash" against something we did to them, and we can make them stop by not doing whatever that was. I think we underestimate the extent to which AQ is proactive, acting not in response to situations but in an attempt to initiate conditions they believe will be conducive to their growth.

AQ is actually more accurately a non-state political action group that operates outside the rule of law to conduct unconventional warfare to leverage the insurgent populaces of a wide range of primarily Muslim states, employing both guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics, to force change upon the governments of those states and their foreign allies.

Again we have the contention that AQ primarily exploits an "insurgency" dynamic (built around relationships between Muslim governments and the populaces they govern) rather than a wider perception of direct occupation of Muslim land and direct oppression of Muslims by the West. This contention could use less repetition and more supporting evidence, as it is anything but self-evident.

We did not fly drones to Moscow and attempt to kill soviet leaders with missiles. But we fly drones in the sovereign airspace of many countries where AQ and nationalist insurgents operate and attempt to kill them. I find this odd at best.

Not odd at all. By the time we had effective drones the Soviet Union no longer existed... and there was always that MAD thing going on.

But the energy source of any successful UW campaign is an insurgent populace. One cannot go to a stable, satisfied populace and create an insurgency. One can, however, go to place where such conditions are strong, but suppressed, and employ ideology, motivation, arms, leadership, funding, etc to move such a populace to action.

I don't see the relevance of this, since AQ is not creating an insurgency or moving a populace to action.

I suspect this is why AQ has never resonated nearly as well among the Muslim populaces of the Asia-Pacific Region as they have in those areas that have not had the political revolutions yet such as have occurred there. As you well know, things are not perfect in Malaysia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, or the Philippines - but these people and these nations have already thrown off the major aspects of external, illegitimate manipulation and are working toward their own destiny. Small groups and small numbers of individuals are open to help from groups such as AQ, but nearly so much as in the greater Middle East.

That's certainly not true in, say, The Philippines or Thailand, where "external, illegitimate manipulation" by national governments that Muslim minorities do not accept is alive and well. The limited appeal of AQ in these ideological markets stems more from AQ's preoccupation with pan-Islamic issues and foreign occupations that seem very remote in these parts: Southeast Asian Muslims are for the most part more concerned with their own domestic issues than with what's going in the Middle East or South Asia.

The assumption that those who support AQ do so because they want to change their own governments is inherently suspect and needs to be supported by evidence and reasoning. It's not credible simply because it's said to be so.

[jmm99]

I've said elsewhere that I have a "tortoise mind".

Here is where I got in considering your turtle story (before asking the question you answered).

OK, Yertle ends up in the mud; so, that's OK with Mack who got all the turtles off his back. But, what about all them other turtles - who also ended up in the mud ? Some of them undoubtedly would blame Mack for their now wet and muddy existence - he (that is, his burp) being the proximate physical cause of their condition. Some others of them, looking at the moral aspect, would blame Yertle, the prime mover of the turtle pile for his benefit. My conclusion: both Mack and Yertle ended up as turtle soup after the respective groups of muddy turtles got done with them. Sort of the Louis XVI and Louis St.-Just of their little turtle world.

You know from our other conversations that I don't have a philosophical mind. Now, you know that I don't have a metaphorical mind, either.

Regards

Mike

PS: Not being a complete Luddite, I did order Philosophical Investigations (this is the 2009 Hacker-Schulte German-English version of 592 pp.) - and, to fill out my collection of Works by Whackos, The Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics: Collected Works 1955-1980 with Commentary ("Many Worlds" etc.).

[Bob's World]

I think the discussion on getting to a more sensible perspective on terrorism and counterterroism is an important one.

Just as it is important to understand what is insurgency, role of the energy source of the nature of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, as well as the role of those external to those dynamics (such as AQ today) who seek to leverage that energy to their own ends.

Dayuhan mentions that there are many Muslim populaces who still have high levels of this "energy," or what I call conditions of insurgency across the Pacific. That is very true and I am very encouraged by recent actions by the government of the Philippines to change their approach in their Bangsamoro program to better address those conditions. But AQ's agents have not had much success with their UW campaign in the Pacific. Indonesia and Malaysia are primarily Muslim, and both of those countries have, since addressing the colonial problem, been largely stable. Are these works in progress? Absolutely, revolution brings change, but typically also brings ineffective and chaotic government. These things take time. I don't think they are very vulnerable to AQ exploitation, nor do I think they need much US help in dealing with the few agents of AQ that do show up, or those small internal movements who still act out within their current systems. Less is more. We need to focus, as we have in the Philippines, on respecting host nation sovereignty and helping to build partner professionalism, rather than capacity.

And while I appreciate that there are some few individuals over the course of history who have created terror for terror's sake, that certainly does not apply to what governments called the "Anarchist" movement of the last century. That was not much different than what is going on now. A movement intended to force government and society to evolve to change with the tremendous changes that were occurring with the rise of the industrial age and electronic communications. Old systems of entitlement were being challenged to make room for rising classes. Did a few wingnuts join the cause? Certainly. I am sure there are a few wingnuts sitting around AQ campfires as well.

But by and large, in the middle of the bell curve, terror is a tactic. Which leads us to CT. We keep trying to expand CT to make it encompass every aspect of the current terrorist problem. In some ways its just a name, so why worry if so many activities that have very little to do with the tactic being countered are bundled together.

For me this is one of those important nuance issues. CT is threat centric. So inevitably when one bundles activities under a CT banner they all have an ultimate purpose of making some particular threat go away. I think that is far too symptomatic, and results in an endless series of short-sighted tactical approaches, driven by intel and led by the threat. I believe we are better served by keeping CT narrowly defined, and then coming up with a better name for a more holistic approach that CT would be a mere sub-set of.

Not only is CT far too symptomatic and threat focused, it also leads us too easily down the slippery slope of getting into actions of questionable legitimacy that are very abusive of the sovereignty of the nations where these CT activities take place. When one appreciates that in most of these places what we are calling "terrorists" is typically 8 parts nationalist insurgent movements and perhaps 2 parts external non-state UW actor one gets to why a different framework is so important. CT approaches tend to conflate those all as one "terrorist" problem, as that facilitates easier targeting. Far better if we take approaches that force is to break these organizations down by the nature of their relationships and by their primary purposes for action, rather than conflate them by their shared tactics, associations and ideology. Once we do that we can begin to out compete AQ for influence with the populace groups these insurgents emerge from, and also get to approaches with the governments involved that support, rather than degrade, perceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy. The lead should be policy and diplomatic approaches designed to help convince key partners they are better served by engaging their populaces more professionally, and by creating vehicles to give the people more effective ways to legally address their grievances within the context of their own cultures. This may mean that some in power will be legally replaced with new leaders, and it will certainly mean that many in power will need to evolve to stay in power.

Or we can just do CT to keep those pesky people in check and sustain governments we think will best support our interests. I don't recommend this. Conditions of insurgency grow for a reason. Insurgent organizations form and act out for a reason. Organizations with regional agendas form and wage UW for a reason. We need to focus more on understanding what those reasons are and how to best encourage or assist as necessary those governments in addressing those reasons. Currently we apply CT, and we attack the symptoms.

[Dayuhan]

I think the discussion on getting to a more sensible perspective on terrorism and counterterroism is an important one.

I think the discussion is going around in a rather unproductive circle.

Just as it is important to understand what is insurgency, role of the energy source of the nature of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed, as well as the role of those external to those dynamics (such as AQ today) who seek to leverage that energy to their own ends.

The problem with this formulation is that AQ is not leveraging "insurgency" at all, if we define insurgency as conflict between governments and the populaces they govern. They've tried, but they've failed. What AQ does leverage effectively is a widespread (but not universal) perception of Western oppression among Muslims, particularly resentment toward direct "infidel" occupation of Muslim countries. When deprived of this stimulus - such as after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan - AQ's relevance and support decline rapidly. Paradoxically, this is when they are most dangerous: because they need foreign intervention to survive, they will lash out and attack in hopes of provoking that intervention and restoring their relevance. That's no reason to give them what they want.

Dayuhan mentions that there are many Muslim populaces who still have high levels of this "energy," or what I call conditions of insurgency across the Pacific. That is very true and I am very encouraged by recent actions by the government of the Philippines to change their approach in their Bangsamoro program to better address those conditions. But AQ's agents have not had much success with their UW campaign in the Pacific. Indonesia and Malaysia are primarily Muslim, and both of those countries have, since addressing the colonial problem, been largely stable. Are these works in progress? Absolutely, revolution brings change, but typically also brings ineffective and chaotic government. These things take time. I don't think they are very vulnerable to AQ exploitation, nor do I think they need much US help in dealing with the few agents of AQ that do show up, or those small internal movements who still act out within their current systems. Less is more. We need to focus, as we have in the Philippines, on respecting host nation sovereignty and helping to build partner professionalism, rather than capacity.

SE Asian Islamic insurgent/separatist movements are generally not that susceptible to AQ manipulation mainly because they and their popular support base are focused on local issues and not really concerned with the pan-Islamic narrative or the perception of general oppression of the ummah that AQ has to sell. There are of course a few exceptions to that rule, and local organizations will cooperate with jihadi groups to the extent they deem convenient, but in any broad scale sense SE Asian Muslims are concerned with local issues and don't particularly care about foreign occupations in Iraq or Afghanistan, about Palestine, etc.

For me this is one of those important nuance issues. CT is threat centric. So inevitably when one bundles activities under a CT banner they all have an ultimate purpose of making some particular threat go away. I think that is far too symptomatic, and results in an endless series of short-sighted tactical approaches, driven by intel and led by the threat. I believe we are better served by keeping CT narrowly defined, and then coming up with a better name for a more holistic approach that CT would be a mere sub-set of.

I agree that "CT" as we know it now should only be one part of any effort to address terrorism and its underlying issues. It remains an important part, and it's natural that it's the part that will dominate military discourse because it's the part of the program that the military, along with the intel and LE communities, is responsible for implementing. Whatever we think of causes and whatever we can do to alleviate causes, it has to be clear beyond doubt that people who attack us or our allies, plot to attack us, or shelter those who attack us will be subject to direct action, wherever they are. No nation can condone or accept attacks on its territory or citizens, whatever the cause.

CT approaches tend to conflate those all as one "terrorist" problem, as that facilitates easier targeting. Far better if we take approaches that force is to break these organizations down by the nature of their relationships and by their primary purposes for action, rather than conflate them by their shared tactics, associations and ideology.

To a large extent I agree, but I think your assessment of the "primary purposes for action" is flawed in a way that leads to some very dangerous conclusions. If we assume that AQ draws its sustenance from the relationships between Muslim governments and the populaces they govern, there's a tendency to try to affect causation by trying to influence those relationships. That's both wrong and dangerous: AQ draws its sustenance not from relationships between Muslim Governments and those they govern but from the perceived relationships between the Muslim ummah and the non-Muslim world around it. Trying to interfere in relations between Muslim governments and those they govern will be ineffective and probably disastrous: we have little influence in most of these relationships and we have no credibility as a mediator. Neither populaces nor governments want us involved and trying to push our way into the picture uninvited just reinforces AQ's narrative of Western interference. That doesn't mean engagement is never a good idea, but it should be multilateral whenever possible and it should be as requested by local groups with a credible claim to speak for the people, not initiated by us.

We can effectively deprive AQ of much of their impetus simply by not invading or occupying Muslim territory, and my minimizing our overt interference and military footprint. We have to understand that if we do this we will be attacked: AQ will try to provoke a response that they can manipulate. That doesn't make it any less important. Trying to change the patterns of governance in the Muslim world is both futile and dangerous. We shouldn't obstruct change, and we should work with it as it occurs (as we've been doing) but trying to compete for influence over Muslim populaces or trying to appoint ourselves as a mediator or champion of the populace is going to snap back in our faces in a major way.

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan

We disagree about the nature of AQ, so we will disagree with how to best deal with AQ and the the problems of governance and instability in the places they operate.

Worth considering is that you subscribe to a position that fits fairly closely with the thinking that has driven US reactions since 9/11. How is that working for us?

I am reminded of a favorite question that Ranger Instructors would pose to Ranger Students who were in the midst of hopelessly mucking up some particular task or mission: "Ranger, are you as F'd up as you want to be"?

Its kind of like "when did you stop beating your wife." There is no good answer. "Yes, Sergeant, I want to be this F'd up"? or "No, sergeant, I want to be even more F'd up"?

I think our current position buys too heavily into the sizzle. I try to focus on the steak. Governments are much more comfortable when they can lay responsibility for these types of problems at the feet of some malign actor, some ideology, or some set of environmental or economic conditions beyond their control - and then simply apply the energy of the state to defeat, deny or disrupt those who act out illegally to operationalize such popular discontent.

But without insurgent populaces who are both very dissatisfied with their own systems of governance, and who equally perceive that external Western influence, money and manipulation is a major factor in why their governance is so out of step - there would be no AQ. Getting rid of AQ without addressing that base of energy will only open the way for the emergence of "AQ 2.0." With this much demand, there will be someone to step up and provide supply. We attack supply, and ignore demand; much as we do with the largely illegal drug-related criminal problems that are also growing beyond our capacity to suppress. Our current approaches are simplistic and will break us.

We need simple approaches that are much more honest about what really fuels these powerful illegal challengers. You don't have to agree with me, but that does not make me wrong. All I know for certain is that the current assessment/approach does not work.

You tend to share the assessment/understanding that has brought us to this place, but argue for different tactics. I don't think new tactics will get us there. We need a new assessment. We need a new understanding. Once we have that, new approaches will present themselves, and they will be far less costly and far less intrusive than the ones of the past decade. I suspect they will be far more productive and much more in line norms of what most humans see as acceptable government action as well.

[Fuchs]

But without insurgent populaces who are both very dissatisfied with their own systems of governance,

...or maybe rather just with the other guys' leaders being in power and handing the spoils down to their followers.