Recognizing Distinct Types of Insurgency - "Know the type of conflict you are in."

[Bob's World]

When I say "political entities" or "political systems" I am not comfortable myself that those are the best terms, but to be clear, I do not mean this is limited to "states" or that the political system is run by some formal government, but that it is under a single system of governance.

Harry Summers derived a simple social trinity from Clausewitz in his "On Strategy" of "Government-Army-People." And yes, I realize this is related to, but is not, Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity," yet I think it does provide a simple model for what I mean by a single political system or political entity.

This can certainly describe a state, but it can also describe a tribe, and in fact, probably describes both the Hatfield clan and the McCoy Clan. So, violent conflict between any two or more such systems shares a common nature that we describe generally as "war."

But what if the conflict is within any one of those systems? Illegal competition (as defined by the rules and laws of that system) to coerce change upon, or overthrow of, the leadership (or "government") of that system. This is a thing of a very different nature than conflict between two separate and distinct systems.

As an internal insurgency (revolution) gains success, at some point the political system may well divide as any living cell does, into two or more distinct systems, each with their own complete systems of governance, population and security forces. At this point, if the contest continues, what was once revolutionary non-war becomes war. Defeat the governance of an emerging system, as we propose with our counter-ISIL strategy, and one does not "win" the war, all one does is convert the conflict from war back into revolutionary non-war once again.

When we don't identify this critical distinction, we do not plan for, recognize, or respond appropriately to these critical transitions in the nature of a conflict.

[TheCurmudgeon]

When I say "political entities" or "political systems" I am not comfortable myself that those are the best terms, but to be clear, I do not mean this is limited to "states" or that the political system is run by some formal government, but that it is under a single system of governance..

Sir,

I assumed as much. I can tell from you trouble defining revolutions.

Harry Summers derived a simple social trinity from Clausewitz in his "On Strategy" of "Government-Army-People." And yes, I realize this is related to, but is not, Clausewitz's "Remarkable Trinity," yet I think it does provide a simple model for what I mean by a single political system or political entity..

I still don't like the over-reliance on the Saint Clausewitz' trinity, so I will propose something different. Imagine a venn diagram with one large circle that represents the entire population of people, regardless of who they are. Marke that circle "all people." Inside of that place a smaller circle that represents the "people." What seperates this group of people from the larger domain of "all people" is some internally derived identity. It can be ethnic, religous, or political, but it is how these people seperate themselves from the larger domain of "all people." Inside of our circle marked "people" is a smaller circle marked "Army." The Army is that subset of the people who have been morally sanctioned to commit violance in the name of the people. I think this does a better job than a trinity, and it does not lock us into the Clausewitzian dogmatic defintion of war as an extension of policy.

As an internal insurgency (revolution) gains success, at some point the political system may well divide as any living cell does, into two or more distinct systems, each with their own complete systems of governance, population and security forces. At this point, if the contest continues, what was once revolutionary non-war becomes war. Defeat the governance of an emerging system, as we propose with our counter-ISIL strategy, and one does not "win" the war, all one does is convert the conflict from war back into revolutionary non-war once again.

When we don't identify this critical distinction, we do not plan for, recognize, or respond appropriately to these critical transitions in the nature of a conflict.

I agree, and that is one of the reasons we cannot find a good defintion of "winning." We have definitionally backed ourselves into a neverending war.

[Bob's World]

One thing I do believe strongly when it comes to defining things is that if one is creating something one can define that thing to whatever it is we want it to be; but, if instead we are seeking to understand some natural thing existing in nature, it is what it is, and will not conform itself to our cultural or institutional bias, or become what the senior man in the room declares it to be.

Popes and Generals are often made fools in this regard.

[TheCurmudgeon]

One thing I do believe strongly when it comes to defining things is that if one is creating something one can define that thing to whatever it is we want it to be; but, if instead we are seeking to understand some natural thing existing in nature, it is what it is, and will not conform itself to our cultural or institutional bias, or become what the senior man in the room declares it to be.

Popes and Generals are often made fools in this regard.

Truer words ...

... the reason I largely no longer bother with this stuff. My head is too bloodied from smaking it against tables and walls.

[omarali50]

On the question of Islam and ISIS etc

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd...the-dream.html

[slapout9]

On the question of Islam and ISIS etc

http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd...the-dream.html

omarali,
Great post.

[Bob's World]

The weakest part of Galula is his perspective on the role of his own nation in the insurgencies he dealt with through his life. He could see the people and the domestic government with great clarity and insight, but was blind to causal role of France. He brought that blindness with him to the US and shared it with us, so that we too could be blind to the causal role of the US in the insurgencies we intervened within.


COIN should be limited to domestic operations only. Anytime one thinks they are doing "COIN" abroad they are likely acting in ways that will make the underlying problem worse for their efforts. This is true regardless of how inept the host governance is, or how non-existent it is. If you don't plan to stay and force the place and the people who live their to submit to your governance, then you are not the COIN force. Making that one small fix in US COIN doctrine would save us Trillions of dollars, thousands of lives, and tons of influence around the globe.