Peru & Sendero Luminoso (merged thread)

[John T. Fishel]

Mike--

The fall of SL is complex. The capture of Guzman was not just his capture but that of the entire Politburo in one fell swoop due to good police work and SL carelessness. It was also due to SL expanding too rapidly and taking in new members who had not been recruited and indoctrinated as children - their previous pattern. While important, cutting off the head was hardly the sole reason for defeating SL. SL was a master of centralized direction and decentralized execution. In fact. the Politburo only put out the party line and all the regional commands were given free reign to conduct operations in their own area so long as they conformed to the party line. Hardly a pure spider org.

The other critical factor in the defeat of SL was its brutality which cost it nearly all its legitimacy in the Sierra and in Lima. That brutality turned the local people - districts and their dependencies - to arming themselves and forming the rondas. That the army, after some resistance, accepted the rondas and helped arm them and provided some communication capability was decisive in the Sierra. Cooperation with the police and govt worked in Lima for the people.

In the UHV, GEN Arciniega's efforts blunted SL until he was releived due to DEA's slander campaign.

Wilf--

I never heard the charge that DEA was a cover for other intel activity in the UHV and I'm inclined to discount that charge. CIA ran a very small operation in Peru, focused largely on Lima - at least when I was in Southcom (86 - 91) - while DEA had been operating in the UHV since, at least, 1979. Interestingly, the one SL regional command that was not shut down or significantly degraded by the capture of Guzman and the Politburo was the Huallaga Regional Command.

Cheers

JohnT

[William F. Owen]

I never heard the charge that DEA was a cover for other intel activity in the UHV and I'm inclined to discount that charge. CIA ran a very small operation in Peru, focused largely on Lima - at least when I was in Southcom (86 - 91) - while DEA had been operating in the UHV since, at least, 1979. Interestingly, the one SL regional command that was not shut down or significantly degraded by the capture of Guzman and the Politburo was the Huallaga Regional Command.

I'm inclined to discount it as well. Sounded like rubbish when I heard it, but from what you said previously, I can see how the myth got developed to reframe the events on the ground.

[George Raihala]

The other critical factor in the defeat of SL was its brutality which cost it nearly all its legitimacy in the Sierra and in Lima. That brutality turned the local people - districts and their dependencies - to arming themselves and forming the rondas. That the army, after some resistance, accepted the rondas and helped arm them and provided some communication capability was decisive in the Sierra. Cooperation with the police and govt worked in Lima for the people.

While working on my Masters In International Relations, I wrote a paper on SL, and what jumped out at me was that they essentially turned what appeared to be victory into defeat by relying almost solely on violence. There were several reports that predicted the success of SL, yet in the end, they lost the war. While they proclaimed to be a "Maoist" type insurgency, they never really adopted that philosophy, and instead of forming a relationship with the local people, their extreme brutality forced the locals into cooperation with the army, no small matter since the army was also implicated in many human rights abuses at the time. They also showed very little acumen when dealing with Perus indigenous people, and ignored their customs and culture in favor of communist doctrine. At one point, an SL leader said that he expected a million deaths during the "struggle." They killed community service workers to make the plight of poor Peruvians even worse, and widening the gap between rich and poor, ostensibly to cause the poor to rise against the rich. This however, backfired on them in a big way.

George

[John T. Fishel]

I saw those reports at the time and thought they were pure BS!

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike Burgoyne]

Mike--

The fall of SL is complex.

John,

Thanks, that is a great perspective. I’m working my way through David Palmer’s compilation on Shining Path now and you are right like most conflicts it is complex and multi-layered. I’m going to make a more nuanced argument and see where that takes me.

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

goes by Scot He was the first, and perhaps the only, American victim of SL (Guzman's) machinations when Prof Guzman had his tenure at the U of Huamanga (as a PCV) cancelled.

Got your PM and am back to you.

Cheers

JohnT