Motivation vs. causation

[marct]

I think the point was that it can be difficult or impossible to establish a social contract in an arbitrarily delineated "nation" that includes traditional enemies within its borders. An example might be the former Yugoslavia.

That's basically it yes.

One of the rather odd things I've picked up over the years is a slightly different view of the concept of a social contract. The fact that X and Y are traditional enemies means that they have a specific, defined and accepted relationship already, which is part of a contract. This has some interesting implications since, I would argue, every nation state (barring possibly Andorra, Monaco and few others) are arbitrarily delineated "nations" that only bear a passing resemblance to an ethnoi.

As to whether or not such a contract can be established, sure it can and has been in a number of places: Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland all spring to mind as classic examples. The question, IMHO, should be more in line with how did such a multi-ethnoi social contract come into existence and why and how has it been maintained?

Cheers,

Marc

[Dayuhan]

One of the rather odd things I've picked up over the years is a slightly different view of the concept of a social contract. The fact that X and Y are traditional enemies means that they have a specific, defined and accepted relationship already, which is part of a contract. This has some interesting implications since, I would argue, every nation state (barring possibly Andorra, Monaco and few others) are arbitrarily delineated "nations" that only bear a passing resemblance to an ethnoi.

I suppose two groups agreeing to kill as many of one another as possible at every available opportunity could be said to constitute a social contract of sorts. Whether that contract would be a viable basis for nationhood is another question.

As to whether or not such a contract can be established, sure it can and has been in a number of places: Canada, Belgium, and Switzerland all spring to mind as classic examples. The question, IMHO, should be more in line with how did such a multi-ethnoi social contract come into existence and why and how has it been maintained?

It might be more accurate to say that these contracts evolved, rather than speaking of establishment. The process of evolution varies widely from case to case; sometimes it's peaceful, sometimes it's not, sometimes the groups involved end up separating and establishing different nations. I don't think it's something something that can be effectively imposed on a deus ex machina basis.

[Beelzebubalicious]

I'd like to throw in a little wrinkle on the social contract discussion that's evolving here as it's a term that's come up a lot for me recently in the international development business (when I'm not winning no bid contracts and fleecing american taxpayers...).

International Review of Administrative Sciences 75(4), "Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq" by Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, the authors use the word "covenant" in this sense:

The good governance agenda assumes a form of state—society relations that results from a covenant between citizens and their government, yet historically most states arose through conquest.

Page 5.

I though the use of word "covenant" curious since it seems such a religiously and racially charged term - a bit heavy-handed for what seems to be a kind of social contract or partnership.

The first time I saw the term used was in the USAID report titled, “Democratic Decentralization Strategic Assessment: Indonesia Final Report". In this report, the term is used in this context:

An innovative concept emerging from this assessment is that a feasible approach for future local governance programming in the near term may be the introduction of a more efficient approach to the accountability challenge that works through multi-party relationships (accountability covenants) that bind a large number of actors together in support of shared aims. Local politicians and CSOs in Indonesia might organize a participatory planning process that first yields a shared vision then leads to formulation of an action plan. By assigning specific tasks to multiple actors, a dense network of mutual accountability is created

. p. 28

Social contract theory (Putnam) has driven a lot of development programming, most explicitly the World Bank's Community Driven Development approach applied broadly (over 30,000 villages and $1 billion distributed) in Indonesia. For a good overview of that, see a paper by Scott Guggenheim.

Donors, especially USAID, have consistently focused on supporting civil society and building the social contract (largely in the absence of a strong or even functional government) and I've been wondering if the use of "covenant" is an attempt to strengthen and expand the concept/approach. I find the concept and approach appealing, but it does have a lot of issues when it comes to international development.

[marct]

I suppose two groups agreeing to kill as many of one another as possible at every available opportunity could be said to constitute a social contract of sorts. Whether that contract would be a viable basis for nationhood is another question.

What is fascinating about it is, really, the structures negotiated to contain conflict to specific times, places, styles and forms. "Nationhood", like the concept of nation state, is, IMO, quite tricky and a very recent invention. Honestly, as far as establishing a model of social contracting between either different ethnoi or sub-groups of the same ethnoi, nation states are pretty irrelevant except as a special case.

Where it does become relevant is when we start examining how multi-ethnoi, multi-group polities can function. Again, the nation state is a special, and quite recent, case, so it can't serve as the basis for a general theory.

It might be more accurate to say that these contracts evolved, rather than speaking of establishment. The process of evolution varies widely from case to case; sometimes it's peaceful, sometimes it's not, sometimes the groups involved end up separating and establishing different nations. I don't think it's something something that can be effectively imposed on a deus ex machina basis.

It's a very interesting question - evolution vs. contract ex machina. In most cases, I suspect that initial contract conditions are imposed and, from that imposition, evolve over time; that was certainly the case in Canada.

I'd like to throw in a little wrinkle on the social contract discussion that's evolving here as it's a term that's come up a lot for me recently in the international development business (when I'm not winning no bid contracts and fleecing american taxpayers...).

International Review of Administrative Sciences 75(4), "Decentralized local governance in fragile states: learning from Iraq" by Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Ronald W. Johnson, the authors use the word "covenant"....

Donors, especially USAID, have consistently focused on supporting civil society and building the social contract (largely in the absence of a strong or even functional government) and I've been wondering if the use of "covenant" is an attempt to strengthen and expand the concept/approach. I find the concept and approach appealing, but it does have a lot of issues when it comes to international development.

It's an interesting term, especially since they are using it in the 19th century sense. Technically, using "covenant" as a "coming together" it is correct, although you're right that it now carries religious connotations. How do you see it as being useful for development work?

[Entropy]

I think state formation is an important element and is a primary factor in a lot of the problems we see today with "failed states." That's one reason I keep bringing up the issue of borders because, in many cases, borders were imposed and are a continuing source of conflict. There wasn't a natural evolution that developed into a social contract and nationhood - instead a bunch of different peoples were conglomerated and given a name. I'm not sure there is much that additional outside interference (ie. "Development") can do to create or improve a social contract in that case. It might make problems worse.

There's also the question of institutions and I think they are some of the stickiest glue that enables a "social contract" that keeps peoples together in a big tent. For example, in Pakistan there is the Army. What is there in Afghanistan? Somalia? Yemen? Nothing except Islam which brings up another set of issues. Can outsiders develop such institutions? It seems to me the track record on that isn't very good.

[Bob's World]

From my current perch in the middle of things here in Southern Afghanistan, I get a chance weigh these theories against the facts I deal with daily, and the various programs that higher develops.

One area drawing a lot of focus is that of Reconciliation and Reintegration (or "forgive and forget" as I think of it.) Personally, I think we are worrying too much about this, and that to over formalize or overly shape this from our outsider perspective would be as likely to be harmful as helpful, but that is not what I wanted to address.

In reviewing some R & R documents, it struck me that we are really dealing with two distinct types of insurgency with the Taliban, and it divides on hierarchical lines.

For the Taliban senior leadership, I believe it is primarily a "Revolutionary Insurgency” (In BW, there are three broad categories of Insurgency: Revolutionary, Separatist, and Resistance). For revolutionary insurgency Causation and Motivation are more distinct than for a resistance insurgency. I believe that the key to R & R with the Taliban leadership must address the Causal factor of the illegitimacy of the Karzai government; that there must be some place for their ideological concerns in the new government; and that lastly, the presence of the foreigners must be reduced.

For the rank and file, I believe it is primarily a resistance insurgency. 50-80% fight simply because we are here, or because we are here and they can draw an honest wage as well to attack that foreign presence. I think they don't spend much time thinking about the government in Kabul, or its legitimacy. I think they don't much think about the TB ideology. For them the key factors that must be addressed are virtually the inverse of those for the senior leadership. BL, is that I don't believe we need to really worry about the majority of the populace to address the causal factors for the insurgency writ large, and that the COIN / R & R effort must focus on addressing the issues of the leadership.

This throws a wrench in the POP COIN machine to a degree. Yes, we must treat the populace with respect, no, we can't kill our way out of this (merely killing senior leaders drives the Pez effect. New ones keep popping up). We must enable a legitimate process that includes the leadership of this large, disenfranchised segment of the populace. In so doing, we will be able to bring them into the system and bring legitimacy to the system at the same time. This stands leadership down. Then we can reduce our presence. This stands the rank and file down.

But you must address the leadership first.

[Beelzebubalicious]

It's an interesting term, especially since they are using it in the 19th century sense. Technically, using "covenant" as a "coming together" it is correct, although you're right that it now carries religious connotations. How do you see it as being useful for development work?

Well, USAID is using it in terms of "accountability covenants" between civil society and government, the key definition being binding relationships where each side holds the other accountable. This starts with both sides understanding each others role and responsibility in a democratic society, something which takes years to develop. In many countries I've worked in, there's a huge level of distrust on both sides, a sense of entitlement on the citizen side (high expectations and frustration) and on the government side, the perspective that citizens don't know best, should not be involved and that government should make decisions themselves.

I think USAID wants to take the whole idea of social contract a step further and to make it almost a sacred trust, a stronger bond. Unfortunately, citizens holding government accountable often means taking the "watch dog" role and it is inherently antagonistic, which further deteriorates the relationship and bond. On the other side, civil society working closely with government can also mean co-option and lack of objectivity.

This kind of approach often fails to take account of or approach the issues of power and political economy. So, coming around to answer your question, I'm not sure it has much validity, or at least I think I need a lot more convincing. The World Bank has claimed success in using this kind of a method in Indonesia on the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach at the village level and CDD has been adopted by USAID and now the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in other places. The WB has done a lot of impact evaluation and they have some compelling arguments that it works.

[marct]

Hi Beelzebubalicious,

Well, USAID is using it in terms of "accountability covenants" between civil society and government, the key definition being binding relationships where each side holds the other accountable. This starts with both sides understanding each others role and responsibility in a democratic society, something which takes years to develop. In many countries I've worked in, there's a huge level of distrust on both sides, a sense of entitlement on the citizen side (high expectations and frustration) and on the government side, the perspective that citizens don't know best, should not be involved and that government should make decisions themselves.

I suspect that a largish part of the problem lies in the concept of "democratic society" . It was certainly part of the mythography of the 20th and early 21st centuries, but has been too much of a failure in too many parts of the world to be appealing. Federal Republican versions of it usually flop when the people running it realize how much they can skim, while parliamentary types flop without a long held crown as a counterpoise. I suspect many of the countries in, say, Africa, would do better with a canton-esque confederate system a la 18th cenrtury Switzerland.

I think USAID wants to take the whole idea of social contract a step further and to make it almost a sacred trust, a stronger bond. Unfortunately, citizens holding government accountable often means taking the "watch dog" role and it is inherently antagonistic, which further deteriorates the relationship and bond. On the other side, civil society working closely with government can also mean co-option and lack of objectivity.

Typical, unfortunately. At a cultural level, it would be analogous to the Commonwealth stepping into US politics and saying "Nice try, guys, but we've decided you need some stability, so we are re-establishing the monarchy". There are other alternatives to that watchdog, antagonistic role - you might want to glance at the preface to the 2nd edition of Durkheim's The Division of Labor in Society where he talks about "intermediate systems" in a large society. People are, as a general rule, more likely to trust people they actually know.

This kind of approach often fails to take account of or approach the issues of power and political economy. So, coming around to answer your question, I'm not sure it has much validity, or at least I think I need a lot more convincing. The World Bank has claimed success in using this kind of a method in Indonesia on the Community-Driven Development (CDD) approach at the village level and CDD has been adopted by USAID and now the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in other places. The WB has done a lot of impact evaluation and they have some compelling arguments that it works.

Hmmmm, yeah, I can see that. Covenants that aren't enforceable in this world or the next tends to be not worth the paper they are written on .

Cheers,

Marc