Are snipers and recon still valid in infantry battalions?

[Ken White]

Correct, and that would be the point. Just like with your battalion level scouts regarding recon.

Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right?

They would be referring to (apart from ‘sharp shooting’) field craft, as taught to all infantry, but to much higher standards (again, similar to your scouts).

Snipers are capable of operating unseen, behind enemy lines, in small teams (typically of two) to engage the enemy. This in contrast to scouts who avoid any contact.

I see a DM (what’s with the ‘D’ anyway, why not just M?) as integral to the unit, be that squad, platoon or company. As such his rifle can essentially be seen as a support weapon. I don’t see a DM as someone who is likely to move far from said unit.

A sniper works directly for battalion (or whatever) and can operate independently, behind enemy lines at great distances from anyone else. His rifle, which may be the exact same, would be an IW (for him).

In stability operations and in mobile warfare, there are no enemy lines to speak of -- that's always subject to modification based on the METT-TC of the war or a particular period in a war. If there is a degree of stasis, is this sniper team restricted to the Battalion zone and if so, how far out in front of the BN FLOT / FEBA / MLR or whatever we call it today can they be expected to go?

To take out high value targets
To take out targets of opportunity
To lay forward- or flanking screens *
Ambush – or cut off to ambush *
Area denial /covering terrain *
Blocking positions *
Harass the enemy
Counter sniping and counter recon.
And, if necessary, recon or assistance to recon.(asterisks added /kw)

No sniper team or collection of sniper teams is going to do those things I placed an asterisk by. They can try but they will not be able to do any significant damage in such missions. You may not agree and if it's important, perhaps you could give me some examples of such actions. Taking just one example, in the area denial mission or the screening mission against marginal opponent, I believe that if one were to try that against a mediocre or even a poor Rifle Co they'd eat your lunch in about 30 minutes. You might get a few but your survival expectation would be quite low...

While I see some counter recon value, a DM ( LDM, Lowly DM ??? ) can do that job and I do not agree on using shooters for recon or scouting -- wrong mentality.

So what you're left with is HVTs (perhaps if the fates smile), targets of opportunity, harassment, counter sniping and some counter recon. Is the cost and effort to train compensated by that?

(I pulled some of these points straight out of Mark Spicer’s book) And again, potentially all behind enemy lines and in very small teams (stealth and economy of force). And there, I think, lies the difference between a sniper and a DM.

Presuming there is an enemy line, what precisely is the sniper to do behind them? He can get off a good shot or two but then he's going to have to move thus decreasing his 'unseen' quotient. He may kill an opposing Brigade Commander -- but that is unlikely to even slow the Brigade, much less stop it. I think I see far more myth than reality here -- but I have not read the book, so I'll get hold of a copy and see what Brother Spicer has to say. Then I'll return to this sub thread.

[Kiwigrunt]

I have not read the book, so I'll get hold of a copy and see what Brother Spicer has to say. Then I'll return to this sub thread.

Do prepare yourself for a bit of sniper-myth chest-beating

[Pete]

Then we could call them EDM -- Exceptional Designated Marksmen -- right?

The DoD R & D guys have a prior claim on that acronym, meaning Engineering Design Model.

We used to have thousands of guys called RTOs, for radio-telephone operators, but the acronym had to be given up because Railway Transport Officers (all 12 or so) had an earlier claim to the abbreviation dating back to the First World War.

[Pete]

The Tom Ricks blog has the following quote from Gunner Keith, USMC:

Technology. Used appropriately, can be a force multiplier. Unfortunately, Marines look at our technology as short cut tools. If I got my trusty G-Boss aimed down that road, I don't need to patrol it or if there is a boom in the area, no reason to go and investigate as I will just track it on my handy G-Boss. No doubt these things are impressive tools and can help considerably but nothing compares to a Marine being there or seeing it with his own eyes.

To read the rest click on the link below. This is the 12th in a series of tutorials by Gunner Keith on small unit tactics in the Ricks blog--they can be found by scrolling backwards through the blog.

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...ce_being_there

[RJ]

Wilf posted

Based on your figures Patton was doing 80 miles a day on the march. Correct?
Harold Godwinson marched his Army 185 miles in about four days, in 1066, so 46 miles a day on foot!

Food for thought?

1066 - Hmmm. That date is floating around the back part of my brain.

I'm a bit foggy about England's history back beyond the War of the Roses

How did old Harold make out when he met the enemy with a tired, footsore and strung out bunch of Axe, Swordsmen and Carls or Jarls?

We have shifted from Recon and Infantry Battalions to Mech Road March statistics and the occasional historical reference.

I suspect Recon in Afgahanistan is going to be much different than Recon has been in Iraq.

I just finished Zinni's book with T. Clancy and am looking at 5 different wars fought in Vietnam, controled by the terrain.

I had a brother in I Corps, and an other in the Central Highlands and a cousin married a Seal who did duty in the Mekong Delta. Sitting around a fire having a taste with these men and you realize they all fought in a different war tactically. I never put it togther until I read Zinni's book.

[reed11b]

Update. Just returned from RSLC at Benning and have some infantry recon observations. One, the infantry recon community is tiny. Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission. Three, there is a huge disconnect between the larger Cav scout community and the infantry scout community. There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts. I say that the latter idea is a really bad one. This would transfer many of the missions that we do over to SF, not Cav, and our SF community is already A) over tasked (often a self created problem) and B) using less experienced and trained soldiers to a meet this over tasking. Much of the Urban and long range recce missions can be performed by infantry given time and training, freeing up SF to do other missions.
Reed

[Ken White]

As one who has been all three -- SF, Inf Recon and Cav -- I wholeheartedly agree with what you say. The SF intrusion into the reconnaissance and surveillance business was all about funding and mission turf expansion (and it hit at a low point in the fortunes of the US Army when McNamara's project 100,000 was in full bloom and training was being dumbed down). Spaces and budget slices.

The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element and due to bad equipping decisions (and the aforementioned poor training system), Armor heavy and 'Hi diddle diddle right down' the middle oriented.

Much of our problem with recon is impatience -- some staff squirrel is afraid his Boss will ask a question he cannot answer so they drive their Recon elements into dumb situations and thus the perception that Recon is (a) too slow and (b) too dangerous to employ properly is thoroughly embedded in the heads of too many.

There are some exceptions to all the above but they are far too few.

[Fuchs]

The Inf problem is partly that too many Inf Cdrs do not have a clue how to use their Recon capability and our 1980-2005 poor, dumbed-down training didn't help-- Armor branch is taking advantage of that to garner spaces...

The Cav problem is that they lost the bubble on Reconnaissance and became an 'economy of force' element (...)

Question:
Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??


Remark:
Cav Scouting should include some readiness for combat, even for the initiation of combat. It should just be restricted to OPFOR recce and unready targets of opportunity.
It's possible to go too far in either direction.
Armored 4wd cars with 40mm AGL and sensor mast such as Fennek are too passive, a Cav force of Abrams and Bradley is too much on the combat side.

[reed11b]

Remark:
Cav Scouting should include some readiness for combat, even for the initiation of combat. It should just be restricted to OPFOR recce and unready targets of opportunity.
It's possible to go too far in either direction.
Armored 4wd cars with 40mm AGL and sensor mast such as Fennek are too passive, a Cav force of Abrams and Bradley is too much on the combat side.

Cavalry mission and R&S teams missions are not the same either. There is overlap in route recon and some area and zone recon but surveillance and urban recce are a pure infantry R&S team mission.
Reed

[Ken White]

Wasn't 1980-1992 supposed to be the great period of the U.S. Army resurrection after Vietnam and pot, before the bad, bad peace dividend a.k.a. Clinton??

personnel intake was concerned. Some very sharp enlisted and officer acquisitions as opposed to the 1970s dreg problem; thus my mention of McNamara's Project 100,00 (LINK), (LINK).

Aside from the problems that fiasco caused directly in the 70s and early 80s, many of those folks stuck around for 20 or 30 years and thus screwed things up far longer than they should have, they were also the real reason for the Army electing to adopt that dumbed-down Task, Condition and Standard training system. The 20 to 30 year dwell time of the 100K (actually, the total number recruited was greater) was the main reason that flawed system was allowed to stay -- it was all many could handle and in later years, they were senior NCOs...

By the late 90s, that problem was gone, the training system was flawed and everyone knew it but too much was invested to change it even though it was not only an inadequate training process, it was virtually insulting to the really sharp and well educated enlisted and officer accessions from the mid 90s on.

Clinton wasn't responsible for the 'peace dividend' problem, George H.W. Bush did that. Clinton didn't know anything about the Armed Forces so he left them pretty much alone other than to misuse them in places like Somalia (which GHWB started but Clinton screwed up) and Bosnia.

Agree with you on the vehicles, problem is that to develop and field the ideal Recon vehicle would be an extremely expensive proposition and the fear that Recon assets are 'high risk' permeates the acquisition community. Their solution to low quantities with high risk is to not buy them.

Thus we have the M3 Bradley purchased as part of a deal between the then Chief of Armor and then Chief of Infantry, so we ended up with the Bradley and the Abrams because that deal killed off the M8 armored Gun system (just as well, that was poor vehicle also...)...

There are lots of options but Recon is not considered a vital skill in the US Army today so we likely will not pursue any of them. We were sort of going to but backed off (LINK). That will be regretted as soon as we have mid size or larger war.

[Rifleman]

One, the infantry recon community is tiny.

What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.

Two, we are endangered by SF expansion into the traditional LRS mission.

Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?

There is a push to better train infantry scouts on TA/TI and Urban recce and an opposing push to eliminate infantry scouts all together and replace them with cav scouts.

The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.

[reed11b]

What is tiny these days? When I was active every battalion had a scout platoon. There was no LRS at divison or brigade level. LRS started to appear during my time in service.

LRS was nearly killed after Desert Storm and again after 9/11. We were down to 82nd's, and maybe 10th Mountains on the active duty side (101st was killed 2005ish I think) and maybe 3-4 LRSD/LRSC units in the Guard. They have just started to form new LRS units in the BsFBs and there is a push to expand them into higher echelons (of course there is still a push to kill them outright as well). As far as Battalion scouts, some IBCTs seem to still have them and some only have a Plt at Brigade level. Some SBCTs and HBCTs seem to only have Cav scouts. Mixed bag, but everyone at RSLC seemed to know the same people. Even the Marine Force Recon guys knew a lot of the same people.

Meaning they are doing tactical recon and not strategic?

Bingo, got it in one.

The battalion scout platoons didn't have any formal training program in my day; OJT was it. XVIII Airborne Corps did run a Recondo School that had some application but it was really more like a mini-Ranger School than a recon specific course. In fact, the All American Airplane Gang considered the XVIII Recondo School as a pre-Ranger course.

They still don't, though there is a push that all Scout NCO's need to go to RSLC.

[82redleg]

LRS was nearly killed after Desert Storm and again after 9/11. We were down to 82nd's, and maybe 10th Mountains on the active duty side (101st was killed 2005ish I think) and maybe 3-4 LRSD/LRSC units in the Guard. They have just started to form new LRS units in the BsFBs and there is a push to expand them into higher echelons (of course there is still a push to kill them outright as well). As far as Battalion scouts, some IBCTs seem to still have them and some only have a Plt at Brigade level. Some SBCTs and HBCTs seem to only have Cav scouts. Mixed bag, but everyone at RSLC seemed to know the same people. Even the Marine Force Recon guys knew a lot of the same people.

Each IBCT rifle battalion has a scout platoon, authorized 22 pax, 3 x 6-man "squads" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTO. Additionally, there is a 10-man sniper squad, which is administratively a separate squad in the HHC, but usually attached to the scout platoon.

Each IBCT recon squadron has a dismounted recon company, authorized 2 x platoons of 28, 3 x 8-man "sections" plus PL, PSG and 2 x RTOs. In addition, the company has a 7-man sniper squad, a 6-man 60mm mortar section and a company HQ, but they aren't really involved in scouting, except for the maybe the snipers.

Each SBCT rifle battalion has a scout platoon, authorized 24 pax, 3 x 5-man "squads", 4 x 2-man vehicle crews (including the PSG) and a PL. Additionally, there is a 7-man sniper squad, administratively separate in the HHC. I've never been Stryker, so I'm not sure if they are lumped in with the scouts or not. I'm also not sure how often 11Bs fill these 11B slots, vs how often 19Ds are used.

Regarding the LRS units, on the active side, the division LRSDs are no more, AFAIK. I know that 82nd LRSD went to the CAB and became a Pathfinder Company, although they still call themselves LRS. The Corps LRS-C still exists, but has been rolled into the 1-38 CAV in 525 BfSB. I've heard that they have stood up a new LRS-C in the BfSB at FT Hood, but I don't know for sure.