What we support and defend

[Bob's World]

Ok, so you remember in about 1950 when we extended containment to include the entire Sino-Soviet alliance once Nationalist China fell? Also Communist, the domino theory in SEA, etc.

All those mechanisms put in place, our support to S. Korea and that ensuing alliance, with Taiwan, S. Vietnam, all to contain China. Any of this ringing a bell? Much of that is still in place, even though our relationship with China should be evolving.

No we waged containment every bit as hard in Asia and perceived China's communist influence to be every bit as expansive as that of the Soviets. Now we fear their economic expansive influence every bit as much, if not more and seek to contain still. But yes, our message does not match our actions. We have a bad habit of that and it costs us influence. We act in one way and say we are acting in other ways. Seems we only fool ourselves when we do that, as we buy into our self-image as a benign force for good and rule of law. Others see us differently.

[Dayuhan]

Ok, so you remember in about 1950 when we extended containment to include the entire Sino-Soviet alliance once Nationalist China fell? Also Communist, the domino theory in SEA, etc.

Of course by 1960 the Sino-Soviet alliance was history and they were at each other's throats, though many Americans clung to the fiction that Communism was a united force.

Containment was as much about the perceived need to contain an ideology perceived as expansionist as it was about a perceived need to contain any given power. In practice of course that meant the Soviets, as the Chinese were not nearly so aggressive about supporting Communism in faraway places.

I don't see current moves as containment per se, more an announcement that expansionism can be met with containment if that's deemed necessary. The Chinese are doing something very similar on their side, it's not at all a one-sided picture. All the dogs, big and small, are out growling and pissing on trees, none seem very interested in a serious confrontation. Hopefully the US will not feel obligated to disrupt that status quo. That's not to say the Chinese (or someone else) might not disrupt it; no status quo lasts forever, but the US has little to gain by rocking the boat.

[Entropy]

All those mechanisms put in place, our support to S. Korea and that ensuing alliance, with Taiwan, S. Vietnam, all to contain China. Any of this ringing a bell? Much of that is still in place, even though our relationship with China should be evolving.

So as long as have alliances with all those nations we are containing China? Does that correctly describe your view? Well, then what would a policy of non-containment look like?

Look, as I've said before here many times I think we really need to reexamine our alliances and try to reduce our overseas commitments. But, like Dayuhan, I don't think the status quo in East Asia is at all equivalent to the Cold War containment policy where we went to war to try to stem the spread of communism in Asia. Nor is it anything close to what we did to Russia with NATO expansion. My reading of the NSG indicates concern over China's long-term goals, nothing more, along with a desire to ensure we have access to our allies. I do not see it as a strategy to roll-back China's influence, nor stem the non-existent expansion of Chinese communism. Again, a strategy of containment is predicated on preventing an adversary from accomplishing some goal - what is it WRT China?

[Bob's World]

Dayuhan,

I agree that neither side is aggressively pushing the other right now, but these things tend to happen in degrees, and both sides have increased the degree of chest bumping against each other, without increasing the degree of interaction with each other.

In no way should we "abandon" our allies in the region. Equally, in now way should we continue to define those relationships by perspectives overly shaped by a world that no longer exists. Is this pivot or shift the right flavor of change for the emerging world, or is it simply a move to put more energy into old concepts based on old perspectives?

Entropy asks what would an alternative to containment look like. A good friend of mine co-wrote a paper as "Mr. Y" that suggests a grand strategy of "sustainment," and it has some good ideas in it. I published a paper that took a slightly different tact and branded it "empowerment."

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j...6jEINkzKIoQfuw

(If that link does not work, google "A Grand Strategy of Empowerment") Not intended to be the definitive answer, but merely to note that we need to make a major course change in terms of our strategic approach and to offer one new (old) concept to help shape that dialog.

[Dayuhan]

I agree that neither side is aggressively pushing the other right now, but these things tend to happen in degrees, and both sides have increased the degree of chest bumping against each other, without increasing the degree of interaction with each other.

I'd say interaction with China has increased quite a bit in the last few decades, particularly economic interaction.

Entropy asks what would an alternative to containment look like. A good friend of mine co-wrote a paper as "Mr. Y" that suggests a grand strategy of "sustainment," and it has some good ideas in it. I published a paper that took a slightly different tact and branded it "empowerment."

How would a grand strategy of empowerment be applied to today's Asia-Pacific region? Whom do you propose to empower? Certainly an empowered populace is less liable to embark on a Communist led revolution (I'd question the degree to which the US is actually capable of empowering anyone else's populace, but that's for another thread), but the Chinese aren't promoting revolution or subversion. Empowering the Chinese populace would be wonderful but it's not the most practical of objectives.

What exactly do you propose that we do in Asia?

I find the whole Asian pivot concept less than convincing, just because I don't see what assigning more ships to the Pacific is actually meant to accomplish, other than posing an assertive and Presidential-looking alternative to the withdrawal (some will say retreat) from Afghanistan. I don't necessarily see that as containment, but if you're going to propose an alternative, I'd be curious about what the alternative would look like in actual application.

[Ken White]

I find the whole Asian pivot concept less than convincing, just because I don't see what assigning more ships to the Pacific is actually meant to accomplish, other than posing an assertive and Presidential-looking alternative to the withdrawal (some will say retreat) from Afghanistan. I don't necessarily see that as containment, but if you're going to propose an alternative, I'd be curious about what the alternative would look like in actual application. (emphasis added / kw)

We've had up to 70% of the Fleet in the Pacific several times over the last 100 years. The preponderence of the ships go where they can best be used. This Admin wants to edge Europe into doing more for itself than most of the last few. Nothing wrong with that.

Nothing earth shaking, either...

Not to mention an upcoming election and a need to look busy with some justification -- but with little to no probability of major malfunctions.

[Bob's World]

We can empower Japan and South Korea to take on greater responsibility for their own defense, rather than primarily expecting them to serve as bases for our own containment.

We can empower China to work with us to ensure the safe sailing of the commercial fleets of the region.

We can empower the Philippines to actually work to resolve the disconnect between their government and their many diverse, but equally dissatisfied, populaces.

There is no logical rationale for greater call to US military action in the Pacific, and to do so merely enables bad behavior by allies and competitors alike, rather than empowering positive actions.

Ken infers that our shift works to empower Europe to stand up more for their own interests, but we can do that by bringing capacity home and standing down excesses; it does not require we shift it to the Pacific to keep it at work where no extra work need be done. But Fuchs raises a good point earlier as well, that the Europeans may not field the force we wish the did so as to better be able to join us on our exaggerated adventures around the globe, but they are fielding the force they need for the actual threats they face to their own interests as they define them.

As America looks to the future, it needs to build that foundation on our pre-Cold War past. To build it upon the crumbled and irrelevant foundation of the remains of our Cold War posture is illogical at best, and sets the stage for the further decline of our national influence at worst.

[Dayuhan]

We can empower Japan and South Korea to take on greater responsibility for their own defense, rather than primarily expecting them to serve as bases for our own containment.

We can empower China to work with us to ensure the safe sailing of the commercial fleets of the region.

We can empower the Philippines to actually work to resolve the disconnect between their government and their many diverse, but equally dissatisfied, populaces.

How exactly do you propose to empower any of the above? Beyond generalities, what do you propose that we actually do.

All the nations you mention above are independent sovereign states, and they make their own decisions. They are going to do what they want to do, not what we want them to do; they will not ask our permission and they do not need us to empower them to do anything. If they aren't doing any given thing, it's because they don't want to do it, not because we haven't empowered them. The notion that we are in a position to "empower" the Chinese or Koreans or Japanese or Filipinos seems, in all honesty, a bit pretentious to me, and I don't see how exactly we're supposed to do it.

There is no logical rationale for greater call to US military action in the Pacific, and to do so merely enables bad behavior by allies and competitors alike, rather than empowering positive actions.

Agreed, but I haven't seen any proposal for military action, just for a military presence... and even there I'd say the program is more politically motivated talk than anything else.

[Ken White]

Ken infers that our shift works to empower Europe to stand up more for their own interests, but we can do that by bringing capacity home and standing down excesses; it does not require we shift it to the Pacific to keep it at work where no extra work need be done. But Fuchs raises a good point earlier as well, that the Europeans may not field the force we wish the did so as to better be able to join us on our exaggerated adventures around the globe, but they are fielding the force they need for the actual threats they face to their own interests as they define them.

Ken didn't mean to infer that, Ken meant to say that's what the Admin would like. Not the same thing...

Like you I don't believe that will happen and for the same general reasons.

You are correct that no extra work needs to be done in the Pacific area -- but I think incorrect on the "require" aspect -- our system requires it; Congress, the National Security and Foreign Policy establishments Require it for self justification...

Dumbbb -- with three 'bs.' We have indeed lost the bubble.