Garden in September. —Associated Press
My fellow Think Tank contributor (and sometime co-author) Brian Katulis says that for “the Obama administration, 2015 brought ups and downs in foreign policy.” This is far too rosy an assessment, though it is sober compared with the State Department’s review of its 2015 accomplishments, which included “Winning Fight Against Violent Extremists” and “Bringing Peace, Security to Syria.” The last year has been one of serious strategic setbacks, falling roughly into three categories:
1. Failure to respond to assertive great-power challengers. In 2015, China intensified its campaign to build and militarize artificial islands in the South China Sea, with the likely goal of strengthening its territorial claim within the “nine-dash line” and limiting other states’ freedom of action in the area. Russia deployed military forces to the Middle East–in direct opposition to U.S.-supported groups–and consolidated its annexation of Crimea while maintaining or deepening support for separatists in Ukraine in defiance of the Minsk cease-fire agreement.
The U.S. has not mustered an effective response in either case. After years of hand-wringing, the White House authorized a Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South China Sea that may have inadvertently strengthened the rights China claims in the area. As for Ukraine, although the U.S. and its allies maintain their sanctions regime against Russia, they could not eliminate dependencies on Moscow, which might prove debilitating in future conflicts. Meanwhile in Syria, the U.S. concedes that Moscow is meeting its goals so far while insisting it is doomed to fail.
2. Lapsed focus on outcomes. The Obama administration frequently cites the Iran nuclear deal as a marquee accomplishment. Achieving U.S. objectives through diplomacy would have been laudable, but the nuclear deal was possible precisely because the U.S. laid aside its objectives. Iran made concessions but also largely achieved its strategic aims: retaining its nuclear weapons capability and resisting demands for a broader “strategic shift” in its support for terrorism and regional policies. Iran also received sanctions relief that is broader in practice than on paper, all in exchange for temporary limits on its nuclear fuel-cycle activities.
Secretary of State John Kerry has said that “diplomacy is the art of the possible.” Yet administration officials fail to comprehend how U.S. action, or inaction, can shape what is possible. This was clear in Afghanistan, where President Barack Obama was forced to face the consequences of prematurely announcing a U.S. withdrawal. It is increasingly clear in Syria, where the White House, despite foreseeing the dangers posed by the conflict, is shifting objectives in response to others’ actions rather than taking the initiative.
3. Weakened alliances. President Obama frequently contrasts what his administration calls the 19th-century behavior of some states to the rules-based order he prefers. Yet, as President Obama has noted, rules and norms do not enforce themselves; international order is threatened not only by overt challenges but also by others’ failure to defend it. The challenges described above should have been opportunities to cement alliances in the face of common threats: to deepen ties with Japan and India in the face of Chinese expansionism; to unite with Mideast allies against threats from Iran and Syria; and to unite Europe in defiance of Russian actions in Ukraine.
Instead, these opportunities have largely been missed. U.S. allies in Asia have been alarmed by what they perceive as Washington’s failure to follow through on a promised “pivot” to the region and its failure to back up “red lines” elsewhere. In the Middle East, the Iran deal and U.S. confusion in Syria have strained already weakened ties with Israel and Arab states. A White House effort to assuage the concerns of Gulf Cooperation Council states was both belated and off the mark, focused on expanding U.S. assistance rather than accommodating allies’ concerns over U.S. policy. Weakened alliances mean that U.S. power is diluted and our allies tend to act independently of the United States and of each other in ways that complicate our efforts.
The list could continue; for example, neglect of the domestic component of foreign policy could shift the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade agreement from a success into a failure thanks to opposition from the president’s own party.
The Obama record in 2015 suggests that our post-Cold War struggle to determine how best to shepherd and use U.S. power continues; for the overreach of the Iraq war, diffidence has been substituted. The primary challenge in 2016 and onward will be how to deploy the United States’ still-immense strength judiciously, proactively, and multilaterally to resolve conflicts to our advantage and to prevent new ones from emerging.
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