All matters MRAP JLTV (merged thread)

[Geronimo53]

Future of the Army MRAP Force

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

But its not as easy as saying "MRAPs are good, the Army should have them."

How they should be incorporated into the operational Army structure is the question. Should every unit be issued MRAPs to replace 5-Ton trucks and Humvees - resulting in scores of them cruising around Ft Bragg and Ft Drum? Should they all be mothballed until we need them again? Maybe we should donate them to "friendly countries"? Obviously if I am taking the time to write this I must be advocating a different COA. In fact, I have done the COA analysis (not included in this entry!) and determined a balanced way that ensures proper training, availability, and utilization, while also reducing logistical costs. Surprisingly, as you’ll see, that means not integrating them directly into Army tactical units.

I propose that the future Army MRAP allocations be limited to:
1. CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
2. Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
3. National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
4. Combat Training Centers


There is no need to distribute MRAPs down to every Army BCT or even form specialized MRAP units within those BCTs. The MRAP after all is only a troop carrier - a very well armored truck. Yes, it sometimes used for route clearance missions but its main utility is transporting combat troops safely around the area of operations. Tactically speaking, riding in the back of a MRAP is not much different than riding in an old army Deuce and Half, unless of course that ride takes you over an IED. But it doesn’t require extensive day to day training for the passengers, just driver licensing/familiarization training.

That said, the Army must complete a performance review of the six existing MRAP variants in an effort to reduce the number of variants in the force to two, or at the most three. This will reduce both the overall logistical costs and field maintenance nightmares, and increase vehicle uniformity within the force. Criteria that should be considered are durability, soldier survivability, adaptability to different environments/terrain, and the costs of contractor supported logistical support.

CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
Given our current military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the distinct possibility that this will not be our last visit to the Middle East/SouthWest Asia, the Army should maintain eight BCT-sized allocations of MRAPs for combat and stability operations in the CENTCOM Theater to rotate among deployed BCTs. As US operations wind down and the MRAPs are no longer required on the ground they can be transitioned to CENTCOM APS locations.

Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
At the Army installation level, a battalion-sized allocation of MRAPs should be contractor maintained for use by divisional units in specific training areas on the base. This would allow for the development of specialized home station lane training (ex. MOUT, route clearance, etc) utilizing these troop transport vehicles, prior to deployment to a CTC or to combat/contingency operations. In this way they are a shared division level training asset that is used by BCTs when needed, not sitting unused in BCT motorpools for extended periods of time. Due to contractor maintenance costs, having the MRAPs available for units to train with as needed is preferable to completely incorporating them into the division force structure.

National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
As the current wars have shown, the National Guard and Reserves makes up a large part of this nation’s contingency force. Therefore they must not be left out of the MRAP training cycle. Prepositioned stocks of MRAPs, with all required logistical support included, should be available at National Guard Mobilization Training sites and Annual Training locations. Depending on location, this will coincide with the existing stocks used by the active duty units as stated above. This will provide the National Guard the same advantages that it provides the active duty forces – equipment that is there when they need it, without the persistent logistical maintenance costs.

Combat Training Centers
The MRAPs should be part of the prepositioned stock that rotational units draw for their training at the Combat Training Centers. NTC, JRTC, and JMRC are the primary pre-deployment training locations for deploying units. Deploying units could train on MRAPs, similar to the ones they’d soon be issued in theater, in realistic and immersive training environments. These training centers already issue rotational vehicles out of their preposition yards, so adding MRAPs and the contractor supported maintenance would not be something unmanageable.

Conclusion
The MRAPs have proven to be an excellent mission specific mobility asset in the CENTCOM Theater that will undoubtedly be utilized by the US in future combat and contingency operations around the world. Incorporating the MRAPs into the operational Army structure in the ways I described above maximizes this asset’s availability while reducing the high logistical cost burden that would prove untenable in the future.

[jcustis]

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

I have to play devil's advocate before this discussion gets too deep, when in fact a specific layer needs to be addressed.

MRAPs have become an integral part of operations, but can we truly say they have proven their worth?

[MAJ Chris Isgrig]

We will need something like the MRAP again, in fact we will need a better MRAP in the future. Giving the MRAP to "friendly nations" will only ensure that our future adversaries have a training set. The point is however moot since we will continue to need the MRAP and we will soon need a better MRAP.

There is an assumption that the MRAP is a COIN only vehicle. I believe that assumption is not true. The MRAP is a servicable vehicle for anywhere the opposition does not have tanks or APCs. It is a good vehicle for where ever the main threat are mines and artillery. As such its a pretty good vehicle for route control and so would be a good asset for MP units and some engineer units, the people who are tasked with mobility tasks and who would not be in direct contact with the forward edge of the battle area.

As for the Strykers and the other vehicles in the forward areas where they might engage enemy armor or mechanized units those too need to evolve into something more MRAP like.

The trend in Soviet armored vehicle design toward the end of the cold war was for low silhouette vehicles, but those vehicle have not faired well against our taller vehicles. So there is room to imagine that some future replacement for the Bradley or the Stryker might be taller and have a "V" shapped hull.

One think can be assumed to be a sure bet, the opposition TTPs in the COIN fight will evolve their own TTPs to counter the MRAP and so there will have to be an MRAP evolution. As such the current set of vehicles may not be as valuble in 10 years as we might wish.

[SJPONeill]

It's interesting how similar problems have similar solutions in the resemblance between MRAP and some of the vehicles developed by South Africa and Rhodesia in their counter-insurgencies in the 70s and 80s...

If current predictions run true and this form of warfare is going to be the new 'regular' warfare for the next 2-3 decades, then I think you are correct. The risk may lie in going too far down the COIN vehicle path at the expense of the those optimised for traditional force-on-force conflict - much we we did in the 80s and 90s across NATO and ABCA...

The other risk with vehicles such as MRAP is that they will continue to be perceived in some quarters and 'anti-IED' vehicles which they are not...any vehicle designed to be anti-IED is only a reaction and not the response that CIED really needs...

[TAH]

Future of the Army MRAP Force

I propose that the future Army MRAP allocations be limited to:
1. CENTCOM Theater then into Army Preposition Stock (APS) locations
2. Specified active army installations (shared training asset)
3. National Guard/Reserve Mobilization Training sites
4. Combat Training Centers [/B]


There is no need to distribute MRAPs down to every Army BCT or even form specialized MRAP units within those BCTs.

I would suggest expanding your unit profile beyond just BCTs. Route Clearance Engineer Companies and Combat Support MP Companies who patrol MSRs are two obvious canidates for MRAPs as organic systems as opposed to for deployment only.

Each of the National Guard Maneuver Enhancement Brigades will inlcude a combat arms bn (Infantry, CAB or Cav/Recon) as a rear area combat force. I think that should be another canidate.

There is also a need/requirement to train the system mantainers/mechanics.

[Ken White]

An Infantryman in Afghanistan just recently wrote me in an e-mail that "...the MRAP is an invention of the devil..." He contends it is destroying tactical skills and is leading to more not fewer IED hits.

I strongly concurred. If I understand those who favor it, you're saying that an overlarge, unwieldy vehicle that is an armored cocoon which discourages patrolling and fosters inaction by soldiers is desirable.

Further, you're doing that in spite of the fact that one cannot add enough armor to protect against all fire or explosive effects. Favoring doing the expected thing in a monster vehicle that actually impedes tactical flexibility, fosters a desire to not leave that protective womb, that is excessively expensive in all aspects for benefit derived and which has no place in mid or higher intensity warfare and that is inimical to proper conduct of low intensity warfare is fascinating. Still scary...

One achieves tactical dominance by simply being competent, doing the unexpected and being agile, not by being protected.

[Tom Odom]

An Infantryman in Afghanistan just recently wrote me in an e-mail that "...the MRAP is an invention of the devil..." He contends it is destroying tactical skills and is leading to more not fewer IED hits.

I strongly concurred. If I understand those who favor it, you're saying that an overlarge, unwieldy vehicle that is an armored cocoon which discourages patrolling and fosters inaction by soldiers is desirable.

Further, you're doing that in spite of the fact that one cannot add enough armor to protect against all fire or explosive effects. Favoring doing the expected thing in a monster vehicle that actually impedes tactical flexibility, fosters a desire to not leave that protective womb, that is excessively expensive in all aspects for benefit derived and which has no place in mid or higher intensity warfare and that is inimical to proper conduct of low intensity warfare is fascinating. Still scary...

One achieves tactical dominance by simply being competent, doing the unexpected and being agile, not by being protected.

Agreed

MRAPS were made to make me appreciate Blackhawks.

Tom

[IntelTrooper]

100% agree with Ken and his friend.

[William F. Owen]

100% agree with Ken and his friend.

Me to, and I think Tom Odom nailed it pretty well when he said,

MRAPS were made to make me appreciate Blackhawks.

[Eden]

Let me add my voice to the chorus.

MRAPs do have some utility as specialized niche vehicles. As troop carriers, they represent the bankruptcy of our tactical thinking and the spinelessness of our senior leaders.

Hopefully most of them will end up as targets on our training ranges.

[Fuchs]

The MRAP story sounds a lot like the hard body armour plate story on steroids, doesn't it?

[Geronimo53]

Let me add my voice to the chorus.

MRAPs do have some utility as specialized niche vehicles. As troop carriers, they represent the bankruptcy of our tactical thinking and the spinelessness of our senior leaders.

Hopefully most of them will end up as targets on our training ranges.

So then how should we transport soldiers to their AO without them getting blown up on the way there? Blackhawks are great for that...when available.


I'm sure its true that some units use them to conduct presence patrols instead of walking, but that falls on unit TTPs and the small unit leaders on the ground. How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?

Obviously MRAPs aren't indestructible. They are being destroyed by IEDs with more ferequency in Afghanistan now. But what's the alternative?

[Geronimo53]

An Infantryman in Afghanistan just recently wrote me in an e-mail that "...the MRAP is an invention of the devil..." He contends it is destroying tactical skills and is leading to more not fewer IED hits.

I strongly concurred. If I understand those who favor it, you're saying that an overlarge, unwieldy vehicle that is an armored cocoon which discourages patrolling and fosters inaction by soldiers is desirable.

Further, you're doing that in spite of the fact that one cannot add enough armor to protect against all fire or explosive effects. Favoring doing the expected thing in a monster vehicle that actually impedes tactical flexibility, fosters a desire to not leave that protective womb, that is excessively expensive in all aspects for benefit derived and which has no place in mid or higher intensity warfare and that is inimical to proper conduct of low intensity warfare is fascinating. Still scary...

One achieves tactical dominance by simply being competent, doing the unexpected and being agile, not by being protected.

You left out "killing the enemy."

[Ken White]

You left out "killing the enemy."

One might just capture them or wound them -- or deny them an objective or goal they aimed toward. In any event tactical dominance implies whatever it takes, kill, maim, pillage, block, divert, whatever...

Eden can answer this...

ADDENDUM: He did and his answer is far better than mine; shorter, too...END

...Until he does, you might consider a point or two:

So then how should we transport soldiers to their AO without them getting blown up on the way there? Blackhawks are great for that...when available.

If one tries to fight in short increments measured in hours or days, that will be a problem -- if one fights as one should, often off base and in the field for weeks at a time, it is far less a problem...

I'm sure its true that some units use them to conduct presence patrols instead of walking, but that falls on unit TTPs and the small unit leaders on the ground.

Not totally on small unit leaders and TTP -- those things are expensive, are provided and the system expects them to be used so they will be. Whether they're used inappropriately or by people that shouldn't have them at all will not be a major issue -- it should be but it will not be.

How are MRAPs representative of our spineless senior leaders? What would you have those senior leaders do instead? Should they not utilize the MRAP technology...

Soldiers are dying from small arms fires, grenades and IEDs because they're in combat. That's a fact of life. In this combat, they are fighting an enemy that does not have Artillery and uses the IEDs as a substitute; if he had Arty, almost certainly a far greater number would be dying from that.

There are ways to negate enemy artillery, there are ways to negate enemy use of IEDs but both require extra effort, some privations, tactical finesse and an appetite for taking risk. Not ever strong points of the US Army in my observation. Do some units do the right things some of the time? Absolutely. Do most units fail to do that most of the time? Regrettably, yes.

They should not use MRAP 'technology' because its a fallacious techno-fix for a training and employment shortfall. It feeds the "I'm safe in here" syndrome and a reluctance to dismount (or to order dismounting, a different but allied problem). It becomes a crutch -- and a reason no risks are taken...

Most units are only marginally trained and they use their MRAPs to achieve a measure of protection while doing dumb things like 'presence patrolling' in a large, unwieldy vehicle with no tactical saving grace aside from its protective ability. That and commuting to work are not beneficial. Combat is not a commuting sort of job, it's an outdoor sport.

The fascinating thing is that MRAPS are a symptom of the risk avoiding culture that has overtaken the Army and that many people who decry that effect support the MRAP, the epitome of risk avoidance.

I can't speak for Eden but IMO the senior leaders were not so much spineless as they were intent on protecting the institution that is the Army. We had not purchased armor protection for GP and utility vehicles because its expensive and because it has limited utility in mid to high intensity combat. As US policy was, before 2001, to avoid nation building, FID and COIN -- with good cause and good sense -- that procurement decision was quite sensible. Still is, IMO.

However, upon entering Iraq, political opponents of the war and the ignorant media -- but I repeat myself -- hopped on the so-called vulnerability of unarmored vehicles and the rest is history, The senior leaders resisted the idea of such vehicles on a number of sensible grounds but the political and media pressure grew so they finally acceded to the purchase as the lesser of two evils. Either purchase an unneeded and poor vehicle or face a lengthened trainup time and concomitant increase in casualties. Given the Congressional pressure to spend money on equipment instead of on training, they had little choice and thus bought vehicles of marginal utility that breed bad habits...

Spineless or pragmatic? Dunno. That's life in a democracy...

...and explain to the American public why soldiers are dying from IEDs?

The bulk of the American public understand the why. The fact that other parts of the public did not or chose not to understand as fanned by the ignorance of the news media is sad but a factor of life today. Why anyone would expect no casualties in a war is mind boggling but some said they did expect just that or close to it...

Senior leaders failure to level with the public -- indeed, with the Army -- on that score is spineless or remaining above the fray, not sure which. Either way it was and is dumb and merely leads to future acquiescence to later ignorant or ill informed demands.

[JMA]

Future of the Army MRAP Force

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles have proven their worth in theater where they have obviously become an integral part of combat operations. And regardless of where US troops deploy in the future, the persistent threat of IEDs dictates the continued need for this type of vehicle.

But its not as easy as saying "MRAPs are good, the Army should have them."

[snip]

Conclusion
The MRAPs have proven to be an excellent mission specific mobility asset in the CENTCOM Theater that will undoubtedly be utilized by the US in future combat and contingency operations around the world. Incorporating the MRAPs into the operational Army structure in the ways I described above maximizes this asset’s availability while reducing the high logistical cost burden that would prove untenable in the future.

May I offer that the first difference is whether these vehicles are for the use of motorised or mechanised infantry.

To motorised infantry (I suggest) for the purpose of getting from A to B and not fighting from.

I recommend that one attempts to sidestep the procurement system associated with such equipment development. (How many soldiers must die before the clowns involved with the process get their act together?)

As I mentioned in another thread the modifications to existing vehicle configurations can be carried out in theatre (or in a friendly neighbouring state - not Pakistan) on an as and when required basis. In fact as these vehicles will probably not have any application outside the current theatre all the work can be carried out in this factory on commercially available chassis. After the war they can be handed to the ANA or scrapped.

In Rhodesia a total of some 2,500 landmines were detonated. (No figures for which were military/police or civilian vehicles.) 650 deaths and 4,500 injured. Had a number of drivers who had detonated 3 mines with only some hearing damage.

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

[JMA]

May I offer that the first difference is whether these vehicles are for the use of motorised or mechanised infantry.

To motorised infantry (I suggest) for the purpose of getting from A to B and not fighting from.

I recommend that one attempts to sidestep the procurement system associated with such equipment development. (How many soldiers must die before the clowns involved with the process get their act together?)

As I mentioned in another thread the modifications to existing vehicle configurations can be carried out in theatre (or in a friendly neighbouring state - not Pakistan) on an as and when required basis. In fact as these vehicles will probably not have any application outside the current theatre all the work can be carried out in this factory on commercially available chassis. After the war they can be handed to the ANA or scrapped.

In Rhodesia a total of some 2,500 landmines were detonated. (No figures for which were military/police or civilian vehicles.) 650 deaths and 4,500 injured. Had a number of drivers who had detonated 3 mines with only some hearing damage.

The photos below represent some of the cheap but effective methods used to protect troops from landmines. The Pookie detected mines and was built on a VW Beetle chassis. The Puma and Crocodile were built on a Isuzu or Nissan 5 ton chassis. The Pig was built on the Unimog 2.5 chassis. All (except the Pookie which used low pressure tyres) had water in the tyres.

Note: correction to my above post, it was the drive train of the VW Combi that was used for the Pookie. And the tyres for the Pookie were worn out Formula 1 racing tyres sourced from the scrap heap at Kyalami Race Track in Johannesburg, South Africa.

There have been a number of instances where the issue of urgent on the fly modifications or at least bypassing the normal (long and labourious) procurement could have been (or at least should have been) carried out to provide protection for troops traveling on vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This problem is incapsulated in the 2008 Study: Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) Vehicle Case Study by Franz J Gayl

It chronicles the horror story of a procurement bureaucracy gone mad at an unacceptable cost of life and limb to those fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Worse still it highlights how virtually all serving officers and enlisted men have been numbed into accepting that there is no solution to the problem. See quote below:

It is noteworthy that during the conduct of his 2002-2003 thesis research Maj McGriff continuously encountered push-back from operators at all levels, both enlisted and officer, when presented with the MRAP idea. As if conditioned with a sense of futility, his audiences shared a common first response that 1) the MRAP idea was unrealistic because the Marine Corps would not nor could not afford it and 2) the acquisition system would certainly reject MRAPs because it was something new that differed from/was outside of established Programs of Record (PORs). This same sense of procurement and process futility persisted even while their warfighter audiences agreed that the MRAP made operational common sense.

My experience here in SWC and reinforced by two recent conversations with long serving US soldiers finds the same. That is that the US soldier has been conditioned to accept that his country will send him into harms way without taking the necessary action to provide them with the necessary (and deserved) protection.

I sense that the mindset in the US (and probably also the British) military leadership has developed the belief that the best way to protect soldiers is to not expose them to risk in the first place rather than provide them with the best equipment and support available while insisting that closing with and killing the enemy still remains the primary role of the infantry and continues to be their daily operational duty.

The conclusion should be of grave concern:

The MRAP case study has demonstrated that Marine Corps combat development organizations are not optimized to provide responsive, flexible, and relevant solutions to commanders in the field.

Anyone freak out over this when it was published? ... or with a shrug was it just treated as a normal day at the office?

The following article remains essential reading in relation to landmine detection systems:


The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier by Dr J.R.T. Wood

[82redleg]

...blah blah blah
"...during the conduct of his 2002-2003 thesis research..."
blah blah blah...

The listed information is invalidated by its date, and invalidates any conclusions drawn from it- there was little reason to worry about this in 2002-2003. I deployed in JAN 04, and given the choice between Up-Armored HMMVWs and soft skins, we chose softskins- they were more flexible, easier to mount/dismount, offered better visibility, etc, etc. My brigade suffered no casualties to IEDs during its previous deployment to Afghanistan (as best I can recall), and our only IED casualties in Iraq were to dismounted troops. I realize that this is an anecdote and not representative. It does show, however, that there was contrary information that inhibited the decisions that appear so obvious in hindsight.

[Fuchs]

I recall that South Africa sold some of those 70's/80's design MRAPs to IIRC India (Casspirs).

Quick google search told me they did indeed buy 165 refurbished Casspirs around '99-'01.