Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change?

**slapout9** · 07-11-2008

What does SWORD stand for? Can the model be posted? Interested from the Gang aspected mentioned above.

**Steve Blair** · 07-11-2008

Originally Posted by slapout9

What does SWORD stand for? Can the model be posted? Interested from the Gang aspected mentioned above.

From John's post:

Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD)

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No worries, Slap. I missed it the first time through, too....

**Rank amateur** · 07-11-2008

I thought Brown made two good points: in spite of her obvious bias.

She refereed to research that says political disputes aren't driven by grievance as much as greed. In more practical terms, the people who have the oil in Iraq are never going to share the money with the people who don't: regardless of how much capacity building or hearts and minds work the boots on the ground do. Big problem, if true.

Two: the manual is binary; the political situation in Iraq is multifactional. My pet bugaboo and another huge problem. Arguably, clearing and holding Sadr City gives Maliki less reason to compromise with his opponents: many have wondered if Maliki is actually more interested in using military power to weakening his political opponents than stability. An issue Biddle refers to as "Interest alignment with the host government." (I may or may not have something intelligent to say on this issue later.) But if our objective is political reconciliation, these are the issues that could lead to strategic failure in spite of tactical success.

**Bill Moore** · 07-11-2008

John I'm familiar with the SWORD model, but have yet found a concise description of it, or a graphic representation. My on-line searches led to numerous articles that talk about SWORD, but never really address the bottom line. Can you send a link, or links, to white papers or articles that accurately address the SWORD model?

The one diagram I did see was basically a triangle, and very simliar to Dr. McCormack's Diamond Model (Naval Post Graduate School), which you may be familiar with. I believe the SWORD model was the genesis of Diamond Model after researching the SWORD, but that is speculation on my part. The Diamond Model is relatively easy to interpret and apply at all levels from the tactical to the strategic level (in my opinion), and would probably be a good addition to the new 3-24.

Thanks for your help, Bill

**Gian P Gentile** · 07-11-2008

I thought all four reviews were excellent in their own ways and brought out needed criticism of a manual that needs to be debated; heavily and deeply.

I agree with Marc T's notion of grounding the manual in reality on the ground; I would add that the manual's narrow selection of history and theory (population-centric, that is) causes it to be a narrowly applicable doctrine for the many realities of insurgencies that the United States might face. Hence the point I have made previously about the American Army becoming dogmatic in its approach to coin.

John T; what is it about Biddle's review that you thought was "outdated?"

And I believe, contrary to your stark dismissal of Kalyvas's review, that he is actually and absolutely spot-on correct in his assessment of FM 3-24. It is, depending on how you want to look at it, Galula Heavy or Trinquier Light. Go back and read the thing; its premise demands a response of protraction, heavy amounts of American combat boots on the ground to secure the population in order to separate the insurgents from the people and ultimately establish the host government as legitimate. How is this not the protracted people's war approach of the 1960s aka Thompson, Galula, Trinquier, etc?? Point to anwhere in the manual where there are other options for an american counterinsurgent force to pursue other than population-centric? There is one 5 line paragraph in Chapter 5 on "limited options" for coin. But that is it.

The entire FM needs to be deconstructed and rebuilt the same way active defense doctrine was heavily debated between 76 and 82 and in the process fundamentally changed. Unfortunately, most folks in the Army see FM 3-24 at its end point as was FM 3-0 in 1986. Or, in other words, most folks think it just needs some polishing around the edges, I on the other hand, thinks it needs to be rebuilt.

gg

**Ken White** · 07-11-2008

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

I thought all four reviews were excellent in their own ways and brought out needed criticism of a manual that needs to be debated; heavily and deeply.
...

Or, in other words, most folks think it just needs some polishing around the edges, I on the other hand, thinks it needs to be rebuilt.

I also agree that it is overly formulaic and emphasizes numbers (mass) as opposed to tactical agility.

**Steve Blair** · 07-11-2008

I would almost prefer to see it go in the direction of the USMC warfighting stuff (MCDP 1 series)...something that is grounded in the history and theory with practical examples from a wide spectrum of COIN. It shouldn't (IMO) focus on Iraq to the exclusion of all else (since there's a fair chance it will be needed elsewhere...and maybe not in a traditional COIN context). I don't think such a deep rewrite is being considered, but it certainly needs better sourcing, better historical examples of techniques working and (equally important) not working. I'd like to see an example of an approach working in one situation and failing in another because the people on the ground failed to look at the entire context of their situation and instead pulled out a "book solution" and suffered for it.

And of course the American Army's getting dogmatic in its approach to COIN...it's done that with just about every warfare type it's encountered during its history. This doesn't surprise me.