Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
I guess you follow the ROE and then the restrictions on air support. But here's a group that good work on flat dessert like terrain.

Koevoet Tactics

Koevoet operations were devoted to tracking groups of SWAPO fighters who were on foot. Their tracks were picked up in various ways, but most often from:
Patrols of areas favoured for crossing by SWAPO fighters.
Information from local inhabitants.
From areas surrounding a recent attack.
Once a suspicious track was found, a vehicle would leap-frog ahead a few kilometres to check for the same tracks, and once found, the other vehicles would race up to join them. Using this technique they could make quickly catch up with the guerillas who were travelling on foot. The technique borrows strongly from experience gained during the Rhodesian Bush War.
The trackers were so skilled at their art that they could provide very accurate estimates on the distance to the enemy, the speed at which they were travelling and their states of mind. They were able to do this by "reading" factors such as abandoned equipment, changes from walking to running speed, reduced attempts at anti-tracking or splintering into smaller groups taking different directions ("bomb shelling").
Once the trackers sensed that the SWAPO fighters were close, they would often retreat to the safety of the Casspir armoured personnel carriers to face an enemy typically armed with RPG-7 rocket launchers, rifle grenades, AK-47s, SKS carbines and RPK and PKM machine guns.
Koevoet members were financially rewarded through bounty system, which paid them for kills, prisoners and equipment they captured. This practice allowed many of the members to earn significantly more than their normal salary, and resulted in competition between units.[6]
Whilst Koevoet were a SAP unit, the trackers, and a lot of the troops, were not White South African. They were either indigenous SW Africans recruited directly, or captured and turned terrorists / insurgents. For this 'idea' to ahve any utility for AFG one needs to explain :

1. What 'police force' ISAF are to use; and'
2. How and why indigenous people will join and be effective in this initiative, given ISAF is having enough difficulties getting them to participate effectively as 'normal' police.

I am reminded of Sir Michael Howard's description of the use of military history without context as being akin to pornography... I believe that selective cherry picking of 'examples' is just as gratuitous and possibly even less useful.