The Army Capstone Concept: the Army wants your comments

[slapout9]

If they say "consider the impact of the media," they are totally wrong, because the "effect" depends on the action, and you cannot predict 2nd and 3rd order effects reliably or even how the media will see them. - you cannot tell the future.

Wilf, if it dosen't matter then how come our enemies are so good at using the media to affect the audience to achieve a desired effect?

[MikeF]

Wilf, if it dosen't matter then how come our enemies are so good at using the media to affect the audience to achieve a desired effect?

Slap, there is much contention amoungst AQ central over UBL's media exploits. He is accused of being a showboat, and his actions caused much division in the ranks.

Captured Email from Abu Khalid al-Suri (aka Muhammad Bahayah) and Abu
Mus’ab al-Suri to Bin Ladin

The strangest thing I have heard so far is Abu Abdullah’s saying that he wouldn't listen to the Leader of the Faithful when he asked him to stop giving interviews….I think our brother [Bin Ladin] has caught the disease of screens, flashes, fans, and applause…. Abu Abdullah should go to the Leader of the Faithful with some of his brothers and tell them that … the Leader of the Faithful was right when he asked you to refrain from interviews, announcements, and media encounters, and that you will help the Taliban as much as you can in their battle, until they achieve control over Afghanistan.… You should apologize for any inconvenience or pressure you have caused … and commit to the wishes and orders of the Leader of the Faithful on matters that concern his circumstances here

v/r

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Wilf, if it dosen't matter then how come our enemies are so good at using the media to affect the audience to achieve a desired effect?

Cos folks do stupid things? Dunno. Al Quieda thing 4GW is insightful. That they do, does not give it any credence. - in fact, as I suggested to TX Hammes, the opposite may be true.

Any AQ broadcast ever weakened US will to fight?
Can the Taliban force the US to withdraw using any operation, not related to military effect?

So called "Media" is used as part of effecting the Political dimension. As concerns "Enemy" use of media, all you see and read is essentially a "party political broadcast." Political will is far more fragile than military.
Yes, military action must not undermine the political will to use force. That is both obvious and enduring.
Given that we all understand that, how does "media operations" take any form of primacy over traditional Political-military dynamics, in any way we have not seen before?

[marct]

Okay, here are my comments on it. There are a couple of general comments I want to make as well that I thought I'd toss out for discussion rather than leave hidden in the pdf (which I know you will all read ).

1. Personally, I think that the perception of cyberspace in the document is paranoid and, at the same time, schizophrenic. More importantly, i think that it does not capture the current uses of cyberspace as a "realm of conflict" well at all. IMO, cyberspace needs to be treated as if it were any other type of terrain in which and through which conflict and co-operation may take place.

2. In a fair number of comments, I make some pretty disparaging remarks about the underlying epistemology and, specifically, about the implications of word choice. In many cases, I haven't bothered to make comments because I happen to agree with most of what Ken wrote in the area. There are, however, a few areas where I believe the wording is artificially restrictive at the conceptual level and, since this is a concept piece, I find that disturbing. In almost all cases, the comments and suggestions revolve around shifting the language from a static "X is" to a dynamic form.

Final comment: I am really glad to see that the ACC has been put put for discussion and comments before it is officially released. I believe that this shows a real understanding of one of the positive aspects of cyberspace which, BTW, is not listed in the ACC .

Cheers,

Marc

[Ken White]

There's a joke in there somewhere about Baroque typeface but it's too early on a balmy Sunday...

[Backwards Observer]

LN349-352 Currently reads: “ Consequently, the U.S. Army must develop the capability to think in terms of friendly (partners and allies), the enemy, and the people, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking or defending to defeat and destroy enemy forces and organizations.”

Suggested change: “ Consequently, the U.S. Army must develop the capability to think in terms of supportive (partners and allies), oppositional (the enemy) and neutral (the “population”, NGOs, etc.) groups, and possess the flexibility to secure populations while simultaneously attacking or defending to defeat and destroy or neutralize (convert) oppositional forces, organizations and ideologies.”

Rationale: (I) The current wording maintains current military taxonomies (“the enemy”, “the people”) that have
caused significant problems in current conflicts. A much more flexible version of this taxonomy is based on situational motivational attitudes of groups as “oppositional”, “neutral” and/or “supportive”, a taxonomy that not only allows for but, also, is conducive of thinking that would encourage groups to shift their stance in ongoing conflicts (e.g. The Anbar Councils).

(II) Simplistic taxonomies of enemy, friendly and neutral encourage thinking by US Army forces that is contrary to the lived reality of the actual populations, sometimes producing associated “perceptions” that are completely erroneous (e.g. Of the “if they are friendly, then they will do X, Y and Z. If the don't, they must be the enemy.”).

This was the first change I was gonna suggest, but didn't have the cojones. Also Marc puts it more elegantly than I could've done.

[Schmedlap]

I'm a tactical level guy, so I only have some nitpicky comments about a few of the assumptions. The rest of it reads like a statute for which there is no jurisprudence on point to clarify what the words mean. Maybe that is unavoidable for such big-picture, broad stuff that is written by committee, but it seems that you could read whatever you want into this thing.

My observations, fwiw...

Line 607: Military tactical-level networks could remain shielded from an electromagnetic pulse, however, operational-level, interagency and intergovernmental networks could still be at risk.

But aren’t the tactical-level networks in large part dependent upon the larger networks? Okay, so the BN TOC/JOC can all share files. So? They can communicate face-to-face, making network communication irrelevant. The value of the network is the ability of Bn staff to interact directly with BDE & higher staff.

Line 612: Improved sensors, sensor fusion, communications, and knowledge networking will allow higher levels of information sharing, enabling more effective application of combat power, decentralization, and noncontiguous operations under certain conditions

Decentralization? I hope so. But my experience is that the more information that you are capable of sharing, the more higher headquarters demands it and the more confident higher headquarters becomes that it is able to make decisions that should otherwise be made at lower levels. See slide number 12. If technological improvements are to truly change the way that we make decisions, then they need to be made in step with changes in the organizational culture.

Line 615: Improved system durability and reliability, fuel efficiency, and precision munitions will reduce sustainment demands and sustainment infrastructure, and will extend the duration of operations prior to required replenishment.

Reduce sustainment demands? I’m skeptical. It seems that with every new gadget or innovation – even procedural innovations – we need another office on a giant FOB to maintain and/or oversee it. On second thought, I would just summarize my skepticism with one acronym: FOB.

Line 620: Improvements in immersive technologies will enable development of virtual training areas inside a finite training space…

I hope that they’re not talking about stuff like the EST or whatever that trailer is called that has the pneumatic weapons and the giant computer screen. It’s a neat video game. It is not training – not even close. Or maybe they're talking about that computer simulator that mimics the layout of the Brads/Tanks and allows an entire platoon (or more) to engage in a simulation at one time. That has some value, but it is very limited. The value that I saw in it was just the initial orientation to crew communication and communication between vehicles. New crewmembers were able to gain a quick appreciation for information they needed to more clearly convey and to recognize the complications that arise when multiple people are monitoring multiple nets (internal, platoon, company). Drivers learn to shut up when they hear PLT or CO traffic, learn to ignore fire commands and focus on other traffic, gunners learn to do likewise when the BC is giving directions to the driver, etc. But as for any complex situational training, such as that mentioned in this document, I see absolutely no value in those systems. For brevity, I'll omit an explanation unless someone is just dying to know. For most of us, I suspect it is self-evident.

Line 630: Improvements in neuroscience will mitigate stress and improve mental, moral, and physical capacity

Improve moral capacity through neuroscience? I guess I'm not clear on what moral capacity is. If it has something to do with ethical decision making, then I am a bit skeptical. I suspect that moral capacity is just about set in stone by age 6, unless there is some life-altering event such as a religious conversion (other than COIN) or a traumatic emotional experience.

[marct]

Hi Schmedlap,

Line 630: Improvements in neuroscience will mitigate stress and improve mental, moral, and physical capacity

Improve moral capacity through neuroscience? I guess I'm not clear on what moral capacity is. If it has something to do with ethical decision making, then I am a bit skeptical. I suspect that moral capacity is just about set in stone by age 6, unless there is some life-altering event such as a religious conversion (other than COIN) or a traumatic emotional experience.

Yeah, I'm pretty sceptical about that one as well. I'm not an expert in neuroscience, but I read a fair bit in the area and, while it is possible, the current techniques we have for it are either "unacceptable" (intensive meditation anyone?) or pharmacological ("just take this nice bright, red pill, Johnny!" - shades of "Prince Valium to the Rescue!").

The actual field tested and proven techniques - and yes, meditation is one of them - require a lot of work and certainly won't be achieved in a 3 day training special. The pharmacological ones act much faster, but have some very serious side effects - remember the CIA sponsored acid tests in the 1960's and 70's?

[William F. Owen]

....but does anyone else feel uneasy about a document of this nature, never using the word "kill," and only ever mentions suppression once. - so essentially it ignores the two primary methods of applying force, or choose to describe them in other ways. Hmmmm...

[William F. Owen]

It is not my intention to be needless rude of provocative here, but having been asked my opinion, here it is.

1. This document serves no useful purpose, as it stands. Doing what it intended should have taken no more 2,500 words and/or 5 pages. Having claimed not to be telling the reader what to think, it then sets out to be telling the reader that the enemy “will do X,” as opposed to “might do X, given Y or Z circumstance, and context, A, B or C.” - and where is the dividing line between Doctrine and Concept?
2. The document lacks clear and precise descriptions, and uses un-clear and highly convoluted language, none of which is helpful. - why use "new terms?"
3. Implicitly this document progresses a vision of conflict that the US Army wishes to fund, and not one based on history. It seems to serve a human and organisational need, rather than a foundation for teaching (Doctrine?).
4. The idea that the US was proficient as “old Warfare” and “new Warfare” is somehow “more complex” and more challenging is untrue, and evidence free.
5. The description is the 2006 Lebanon conflict is highly simplistic, inaccurate, selective and substantially un-true. It is what the US Army wants to believe instead of looking at the facts.

Given the above, the rest begins to fall apart pretty quickly.

As concerns capability you have to wonder about a document that never says “tank,” , and only says “Armor” twice. It says artillery and infantry each only once.
Yet in contrast it mentions :

• the V-22?
• Mentions un-manned 5 times?
• Cyber and network over 30 times?

I can only assume that this is to progress a belief in new technologies and “networks” to serve a budgetary need.
There are some very odd statements such as:
• “The future force requires the support of Joint Synergy (redundancy versus interdependencies) in certain capability areas such as fires and surveillance platforms. – I have no idea what that means.
• The future force requires the capability to conduct combined arms offensive operations and to overcome complex web defenses in complex/urban terrain. – so the US Army does not have this capability? Same capability as 1918 perhaps?

I could go on for another >5 pages, but I hope the largely negative comments so far may serve some useful purpose. There is some good stuff, but that is largely obvious to all, and there is too little of it to bother.

[Dr. C]

In lines 427 through 436, the authors present three components to the framework analysis they used, which make up the military “problem” to be solved.

In lines 454 through 482 “Iraq from 2003-2009” is used to illustrate a hybrid threat, one of the challenges guiding the framework analysis toward solutions. This section focuses more on what the insurgency “got right” then what the U.S. forces got right. It seems a valuable exercise to look at how the insurgency was successful. On the other hand, it’s even more valuable to look at examples of what the U.S. forces did right and how to appreciate in value the efforts that worked well. Where are the positive examples of what the Army did right, which we want to see more of in the future, to appreciate in value that which worked well?


The authors present the “solutions” to the military “problem,” and I’d like to read more of how they arrived at these solutions based on what worked well in the past, instead of just based on the identification of problems from the past and the probability of future challenges.


I’ve been reading, studying, practicing, and learning more about the Appreciative Inquiry method of organizational development. Instead of framing concepts as problems and solutions by looking backward at what went wrong or what didn’t work and trying to “fix it,” the idea of Appreciative Inquiry is to discover and move towards what is going right. The idea is to encourage and embrace what works.


“In problem solving it is assumed that something is broken, fragmented, not whole, and that it needs to be fixed. Thus the function of problem solving is to integrate, stabilize, and help raise to its full potential the workings of the status quo. By definition, a problem implies that one already has knowledge of what "should be"; thus one's research is guided by an instrumental purpose tied to what is already known. In this sense, problem solving tends to be inherently conservative; as a form of research it tends to produce and reproduce a universe of knowledge that remains sealed” (Cooperrider & Srivastva, 1987, http://www.stipes.com/aichap3.htm).

I don’t mean to take issue with the whole problem-solution framework of the capstone. It’s probably not something that can really be changed at this point. I just wanted to point out that possibly adding to the document more positive examples of what worked well in the past could guide the future concepts and provide more support for the “solutions” presented (this is my main idea, so I put in boldface type).

[jmm99]

by COL Ridderhof - you should post more. Especially this:

While I laud the focus on uncertainty and complexity, I was somewhat troubled by the phrasing, once again in Gen Dempsey’s cover, that spoke of “imposing order on chaos.” I’d recommend focusing that we take actions to achieve the mission or to impose our will on the enemy. However, chaos and uncertainly are just a natural part of the environment. Rather than focus on how we can’t change this, we must emphasize how we are going to use it to our advantage—leveraging chaos.

Perhaps our own version of Naji's "The Management of Savagery" ?

Since the Capstone Concept does not deal with law, it lies outside of my expertise. My general impression of the document is that it presents more of a plan for a large part of the US Government. I realize that it has its ancestry in DOD Directive 3000.05; but I guess I am enough of a dinosaur to find more comfort in capstones such as MCDP 1 Warfighting.

And, a PS to Dr C - positive examples are good. An extension of that is that we should pay a bit more attention to the writings of those who won, as well as to those who lost.

And another one - Michele, little font size is hell on old eyes - seriously.

[William F. Owen]

I don’t mean to take issue with the whole problem-solution framework of the capstone. It’s probably not something that can really be changed at this point. I just wanted to point out that possibly adding to the document more positive examples of what worked well in the past could guide the future concepts and provide more support for the “solutions” presented (this is my main idea, so I put in boldface type).

...but that's the whole problem! - Most Armies do not use "examples of what worked well in the past could guide the future concepts and provide more support for the “solutions” presented." because they are generally oblivious of what worked well in the past or even how it worked.

Using military history to find out what worked and what did is extremely problematic - It's what I do - and the current "COIN debate" is writ large with folks ignoring uncomfortable historical facts.

Additionally folks make fraudulent use of "positive examples" to prove what they want to prove. The Manoeuvre Warfare crowd tried to cite the German Spring 1918 Offensive as an example of Manoeuvre Warfare. In fact MW was built on an entirely fraudulent set of examples.

Finally the Army Capstone Concept, is expressly attempting to guide folks to do the one thing we know that does not work, and that is to predict the future! = "The Enemy will X and Y"

[Bob's World]

Ok, I am going to take a serious look at this, but must confess, I couldn't get past the title.

Operating under Conditions of Uncertainty and Complexity in an Era of Persistent Conflict

Or, said another way:

Employment of Military Power to Force Compliance with an Obsolete Foregin Policy in a Era of Strategic Uncertainty and Social Change

We can keep trying to build the perfect hammer at Defense, or we can draft a better blueprint at State. I look forward to reading this, and hope it strongly suggests the importance of the latter.

[William F. Owen]

We can keep trying to build the perfect hammer at Defense, or we can draft a better blueprint at State. I look forward to reading this, and hope it strongly suggests the importance of the latter.

OK, but Armed force serves policy. The Army has to provide what the Policy maker requires - NOT provide what would work if the policy was easier to fulfil by military means. Armies are contractors, not clients.

[J Wolfsberger]

...More importantly, i think that it does not capture the current uses of cyberspace as a "realm of conflict" well at all. IMO, cyberspace needs to be treated as if it were any other type of terrain in which and through which conflict and co-operation may take place.

Absolutely, 100%, dead nuts on correct.

And adding to it, the entire media is part of the military landscape.

[slapout9]

Absolutely, 100%, dead nuts on correct.

And adding to it, the entire media is part of the military landscape.

Double no, triple dead on it. Warden was of the first people to mention that in the future whole wars could be won or lost in the Cyber-Phere as he called it.

[William F. Owen]

And adding to it, the entire media is part of the military landscape.

So we need to think about "Media" like Logistics, and Intelligence?
If military operations are being conducted in line with legal guidance, why consider the media?

Where does media have it's greatest effect? On the political dimension or the military dimension?
Military action sets forth policy. I submit that media is part of the political landscape. - more over, how is media different from "public opinion?"

It would be a very great mistake to assume all our "enemies" are "Skilled media operators" or that it matters as much as some think, because the Russian and Chinese have very different ideas.

[zenpundit]

Hi Wilf,

Will try to respond in reverse order, more or less, since my last comment:

If military operations are being conducted in line with legal guidance, why consider the media?

Good and fair question. Because if you do not deign to consider the media's impact of how they are likely to be framing military operations, by embracing an artificial mental compartmentalization between military and political domains, the civilian policy makers over time are going to have the lawyers find technical reasons to increasingly circumscribe how you carry out military operations beyond what is required by the laws of war ( in the very long run, this creates agitation to change the laws of war themselves by diplomatic means to the further disadvantage of conventional militaries facing insurgents). Some of their media driven ROE that they will want for political reasons are not going to make much sense or enhance the likelihood that an operation will be successful.

There's reasons that the political ratchet has gone in only one direction -greater restrictions on the use of military force - since WWII. Not wanting to be bothered with contemplating the implications of the "political landscape" is in itself, not a winning strategy for militaries retaining their legal ability to carry out their core function effectively.

I submit that media is part of the political landscape. - more over, how is media different from "public opinion?"

Having sat, in my time, at editorial meetings, it's the difference from being the playwright or the director and sitting in the audience watching the play unfold on stage. Any idea that the media reports rather than intentionally shapes is completely daft.

I submit that Steam and Telegraph has at least as substantial social and cultural effect, as the Internet, Computers and so-called modern media

.

I agree. Not everyone adapted immediately or neatly though. It's a couple of generations between the experience of the Union using railroads and telegraphs in the Civil War or von Roon's mobilization reforms and the elaborate, universal scale seen in 1914. Moreover, von Roon faced heavy opposition from that pesky political landscape.

Yet read the military discussions of late 19th Century and you see how military men have got their heads around steam power, new weapons, railways, telegraph and most of everything else. They are applying what they know for certain and not attempting to hypothesise or guess at what they do not.

Across what Wilf, sixty years?

The flaw here is you are looking at the discussions of the military figures over a long stretch of time who understood the implications of change and got things right. Everyone knows who George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower were. No one recalls the name of the superior officer who told them to stop writing articles about tanks if they wanted to stay in the Army. DeGaulle was not the voice of the French officer corps on tanks either, for that matter.

Speculation and hypothesis are not bad things. Provided they lead to something empirical, they're a gateway to progress.

If they say "consider the impact of the media," they are totally wrong, because the "effect" depends on the action, and you cannot predict 2nd and 3rd order effects reliably or even how the media will see them. - you cannot tell the future.

True, you cannot predict second or third order effects in a social environment in a mathematical or precise sense but you can forecast. We intuitively game out probabilities whenever we make decisions in situations where there are many variables in play - and when a decision is important we tend to give the more critical and likely variables greater consideration before deciding on a course of action.

So why not point this out and stop panicking about complexity and media? Do we really think that the political dynamic of today is more complex than that in Europe at the time of Luther?

The critical relationship is between military force and politics. Media only bears on the latter - as CvC explained. Surely the aim here is to explain something simply and usefully, not compound the problem

Who is panicking? The simple explanation is that in combat situations where the political dynamic retains supremacy over military necessity or "best practice", the media is likely to have a lot of influence over the outcome by eroding the political will you mentioned. Ignoring that reality and proceeding full steam ahead will contribute to that erosion.

Whose media and effect on who? You cannot please everybody. Military forces, use violence to gain political outcomes. "The Media" is not a cohesive coherent body. What play well with Fox, will be called a "war crime" with the BBC, and no one in Texas cares what anyone in Cairo things

.

There are always multiple audiences to consider and choices to be made among them. There always was but today they are more likely to view events in something closer to real time, with greater simultaneous reactions. Or at least less lag.

So show me successful armies that failed to adapt? 1914-18 and 1936-45 saw far more radical changes in Warfare than anything seen today. Why do we now think it "requires adaptation." Kind of silly to even say it, in an historical context

.

It's the unsuccessful who failed to adapt. by definition, the successful eventually came around.

Media influence is ENTIRELY political. The impact of the media is only relevant to the the policy being sought by force. If it is not, then commanders are asking Media permission or approval to do stuff - which is like asking an 8 years old for advice on marriage.

I share your low opinion of the media - but in this instance, the media is more like an 8 year old who exerts a degree of control over the adults in the house. Ignoring media influence or calling it political doesn't help change the fact that it influences events or reactions of political leaders.

[William F. Owen]

Some of their media driven ROE that they will want for political reasons are not going to make much sense or enhance the likelihood that an operation will be successful.

So are the ROE driven by Politics/Policy or media?

There's reasons that the political ratchet has gone in only one direction -greater restrictions on the use of military force - since WWII. Not wanting to be bothered with contemplating the implications of the "political landscape" is in itself, not a winning strategy for militaries retaining their legal ability to carry out their core function effectively.

I am all for the military gaining "political goals" via force or threat of force. What leave me confused is the inability of many to understand military force as an instrument of policy. Media speaks to an effect on Policy, - and only then in "policy" an ameliorating agent to violence. The military should only listen to Politicians, not Editors.

Any idea that the media reports rather than intentionally shapes is completely daft.

Sorry, but I don't understand what you mean. Some media are actors in the conflict and do manufacture or adapt messages to suit a policy agenda.

The flaw here is you are looking at the discussions of the military figures over a long stretch of time who understood the implications of change and got things right. Everyone knows who George Patton and Dwight Eisenhower were. No one recalls the name of the superior officer who told them to stop writing articles about tanks if they wanted to stay in the Army. DeGaulle was not the voice of the French officer corps on tanks either, for that matter.

Tanks or Mechanisation in general? Point being, a lot said about Tanks, in the 1920's turned out to be dead wrong. - and yet the UK and US both went to war with no horse drawn equipment, unlike the Germans. The general trend since the 19th century is for armies to over-hype technology, not the opposite.

Who is panicking? The simple explanation is that in combat situations where the political dynamic retains supremacy over military necessity or "best practice", the media is likely to have a lot of influence over the outcome by eroding the political will you mentioned. Ignoring that reality and proceeding full steam ahead will contribute to that erosion.

Panic may be too stronger word. Needless waffling perhaps? The reality of the "media" eroding political will has been a major factor in war since Ancient Rome, and before. Media passes information to the Public and the "people" are part of the "trinity." This stuff is not new. My point being precisely that. How Lincoln and Grant viewed the "newspapers" is directly relevant to today.

The infinitely possible and unknowable effects of things we cannot predict, are pointless to consider. For example: NATO kills civilians in Afghanistan = "Sadly unavoidable." The IDF kill civilians in Gaza = "War Crime!"

The primary purpose of modern media is to make money by providing "News entertainment." Personally I do not think Military Operations should be effected by such drivers.