All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

[Condor]

Moderator's Note: thread created to help JMA and gain hopefully responses (ends)

I would appreciate to hear what aspects of the Rhodesian Bush War are of interest to (principally the) US reading public (as represented here).

Responses will be much appreciated.

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

[JMA]

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

Thank you for the comment. Taken onboard.

One of a very books written from the airforce side (all aviators were airforce) is:

DINGO FIRESTORM: The Greatest Battle of the Rhodesian Bush War

Also available on Kindle.

Ian Pringle has done that operation justice with this book and sat the same time providing an unique airforce / aviator perspective.

Prior to the war army officers were sent on FAC courses which involved the use of ground panels etc. During the war this fell away. Effectively all jet FAC (except for small teams operating externally in Zambia and/or Mozambique) was done by the ubiquitous piston engined Lynx (Cessna 337) either by 'talk-on' or target marking with rocket smoke or what ever.

We the ground troops, used a simplified form of FAC - called GAC (Ground Air Control). Simply put this was to mark FLOT (forward line of own troops) with smoke then indicate target with a flare (normally a pencil flare as distances were close - hence the term close air support). When the pilot announced he was 'turning in live' the ground troops gave covering fire to distract the enemy sufficient to minimise the ground fire.

The only time we pulled back was when there was to be a jet strike. There was no safety distance for a gun run (twin 30 Brownings), while SNEB rockets were used at any range if there was a need. The 15 gallon Frantan (Napalm) was used as a pinpoint weapon on rocky areas and small caves and the fireball at close range was spectacular (and troopies needed to warned to keep a tight a..hole

Being a small military we got to know all the pilots - helos and fixed wing - personally and by name as we (the RLI) based with them at the airfields and had beers together if we recovered back to base at night. So, importantly, we knew them, they knew us as we worked together all the time. This allowed for a great degree of flexibility on the ground.

GAC training was given down to stick commander level - lance corporal but clearly not all were capable of that. On fire force ops when there was a gunship (with senior pilot and army commander onboard) overhead it (they) would talk on the fixed wing and instruct the troops on the found to mark their positions etc. Dust from 20mm HE from the gunship would usefully generate dust to mark the target as well.

[carl]

I am interested in I guess the human factor. In the US we seem to be all about machines. Back then Rhodesian didn't have recourse to machines so much so it seems to me that they had to make up for that with imagination.

Another thing is how bush skills came into it, tracking and things like that, though that may have been covered elsewhere.

Also what David said, about retention of loyalty of the black population and turning people.

And, it seems to me the Rhodesian gov lost the public relations fight for world opinion. That was of vital importance. Was that seen as important as it turned out to be? Did it influence the war at the sharp end? Was there much thought given to how to fight that particular fight?

[Biggus]

I am another who is interested in the human factors.

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

It's a pretty good case study for fighting a war on a miniscule budget with very little external support. It's also an excellent case study on how easily world opinion can be manipulated.

[JMA]

I am another who is interested in the human factors.

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

It's a pretty good case study for fighting a war on a miniscule budget with very little external support. It's also an excellent case study on how easily world opinion can be manipulated.

If you haven't already read this, here is a start point:

The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier - by Dr J.R.T. Wood

The key was this: "The net result was that ZANLA would stop laying landmines on roads regularly swept by the Pookie and lay them elsewhere in the hope that they would not be found before they could achieve their objective."

[davidbfpo]

Cited in part:

The level of technical and tactical innovation and inventiveness also fascinates me. Much of the modern MRAP's history seems to stem from developments in Rhodesia (and South Africa too, possibly to an even greater extent).

There are a couple of books on vehicle development. Rhodesian contacts were proud of their record and as part of the relationship with South Africa gave the SADF full access, even one example of each vehicle. After 1980 IIRC they were amazed to see how much the SADF had developed the concepts further, usually putting them into service in SW Africa (Namibia now) and annoyed they had not been updated.

[Biggus]

If you haven't already read this, here is a start point:

The Pookie - A History of the World's first successful Landmine Detector Carrier - by Dr J.R.T. Wood

The key was this: "The net result was that ZANLA would stop laying landmines on roads regularly swept by the Pookie and lay them elsewhere in the hope that they would not be found before they could achieve their objective."

That's a thoroughly interesting link.

I'd previously only read Dr Wood's Helicopter Warfare: 1962-1980 article and found it very informative. I found it an excellent bit of further reading after Chris Cocks' Fireforce.

There are a couple of books on vehicle development. Rhodesian contacts were proud of their record and as part of the relationship with South Africa gave the SADF full access, even one example of each vehicle. After 1980 IIRC they were amazed to see how much the SADF had developed the concepts further, usually putting them into service in SW Africa (Namibia now) and annoyed they had not been updated.

I'm not surprised at how amazed the Rhodesians would have been at seeing what the South Africans had accomplished. When you consider how quickly things seemed to progress from looking at Pookie prototypes to developing the Bosvark, the Buffel and then the Casspir, it's an incredible achievement. Then to consider how successful both the Buffel and the Casspir have been over the last three decades or more, it's really quite remarkable. They've been quite long-lived vehicles.

[JMA]

I'm not surprised at how amazed the Rhodesians would have been at seeing what the South Africans had accomplished. When you consider how quickly things seemed to progress from looking at Pookie prototypes to developing the Bosvark, the Buffel and then the Casspir, it's an incredible achievement. Then to consider how successful both the Buffel and the Casspir have been over the last three decades or more, it's really quite remarkable. They've been quite long-lived vehicles.

Development in South Africa was parallel where the SAP (police) and the military worked separately with the military retaining the conventional chassis with its suspension system (the Buffel) while the SAP developed the monocoque design used by Konchel in Rhodesia on the Leopard further (into the Casspir).

It should be noted that while Rhodesian vehicles were designed to travel on roads and tracks the South Africans developed vehicles with cross country capability to avoid roads and tracks that could be mined.

Book to read:

Taming the Landmine - by Peter Stiff

[Biggus]

Taming the Landmine - by Peter Stiff

Thank you for the tip.

[JMA]

Moderator's Note: thread created to help JMA and gain hopefully responses (ends)

Aviation operations in general with an emphasis on rotary wing operations in support of the ground forces. Also did the Rhodesian ground forces use some version of a Forward Air Controller (FAC) to help coordinate aviation assets with the guys on the ground?

Condor, further to my first response here is a further comment from elsewhere from Peter Petter-Bowyer:

-----------------------------

Background to FAC and GAC
By Peter Petter Bowyer

Then Rhodesian forces of Federal days had an obligation to Britain to support her Baghdad Treaty obligation in any conflict in the Middle East. In addition British interests in Africa were to be supported, when needed, by Rhodesia.

Therefore the Federal Army and the RRAF (Royal Rhodesian Air Force) trained for conventional operations based on British military systems which were themselves based on WW ll principles. In this regard the RRAF trained Army battalion and sub unit commanders in the methods necessary to effectively direct air strike pilots against enemy targets visible to their own forces. This was essentially an RAF systems known as Forward Air (Strike) Control or FAC.

After some cock-ups experienced during Operation Cauldron (1968) it was necessary to adopt totally different techniques for counter insurgency operations in bushveld conditions. So a home-grown method of FAC was developed by the Rhodesian Air Force in co-operation with RLI Commando Commanders and SAS. We called this method of Ground to Air Control of air strikes, GAC. Once developed and proven, most army units were trained for GAC.

---------------------------

Group Captain Petter-Bowyer has published an extremely interesting autobiography - "Winds of Destruction"

Only possible in a very small airforce 'PB' was involved in most of the developments in the Rhodesian Air force and the war - importantly the home grown weapons development.

[BayonetBrant]

Personally, I think the Rhodesians got screwed, and the rest of the world is loath to admit it, because of the inevitable screams of 'racism' that will inevitably accompany anyone attempting to voice support for a post-colonial nation that had a white-skinned head of state resisting an "opposition" of black-skinned terrorists.


I'm interested in the lessons of Rhodesia at least in part to help avoid future catastrophes where superficial narratives obscure much deeper ethnic problems (paging Dr Kosovo!) and that the "public" solution often ends up being far worse than even status quo. Is Zimbabwe/Rhodesia really better off after 30 years of "self-determination" (read: "mugabe"-determination) than they would've been under the government that existing in 1974?


Additionally, the individual tales are, quite frankly, a riot to read.

[Condor]

JMA,

I appreciate the suggestions and I will try to pick up a copy of each. I believe it was member jcustis who made a statement something along the lines of "I don't think we [the US] are utilizing our rotary wing assets as efficiently or effectively as we could be". As a former US Marine helicopter pilot with a couple of tours in OIF, it struck me like a sledgehammer to the forehead that a fellow Marine (and ground pounder to boot if I am reading between the lines correctly) would say such a thing about his fellow brothers in the air. We have always prided ourselves (within the Marines) as providing our brothers on the ground with the best possible air support one could expect when the going gets rough. With that being said, after much self-reflection I believe there was some elements of truth to his claim. While I am no longer serving, I do think there is much to be gleaned from other air forces around the world and how they have operated and been successful (or failed). Some of what I have read recently on this topic piqued my interest so I have been trying to spend what little free time I have reading about the subject. While no doubt the size, uniqueness and intimacy that the Rhodesian Air Force enjoyed probably helped contribute to its successes (and the fact it was fighting for its very existence) one must wonder why there seems to be so little study on this subject? Politics aside, I do think there is a lot to learn from this period and with budget realities starting to hit the US Military maybe there will be some movement to start thinking creatively while retaining capable, effective and reliable aviation assets without breaking the bank. Unfortunately, I feel us Americans always want to buy the Ferrari rather than the Ford when it comes to military aircraft. Maybe that day is soon coming to an end. I've always argued we need more A-10 and CH-53E type aircraft and less F-35 and MV-22 type aircraft.

[JMA]

Condor,

From the book Africa's Commandos comes this quote:

“Fire Force was the end product of a philosophy, a philosophy that ignored the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, convention, rank, petty rule books and personal agendas so prevalent in the behaviour of the modern military. Fire Force was a manifestation of an ethos that like-minded commanders of all ranks and of all arms needed to combine their considerable talents in a collective effort to constantly evaluate the battlefield, to be self-critical in all analyses, and to strive to work for the greater good.” - NIGEL HENSON

Henson's article on fire force with superb diagrams in the book is a must read for those wishing to explore this aspect more.

I have been told by Brits and many from different US forces that this philosophy is not achievable in their systems due to interservice rivalry and other internal BS.

Would you agree?

JMA,

I appreciate the suggestions and I will try to pick up a copy of each. I believe it was member jcustis who made a statement something along the lines of "I don't think we [the US] are utilizing our rotary wing assets as efficiently or effectively as we could be". As a former US Marine helicopter pilot with a couple of tours in OIF, it struck me like a sledgehammer to the forehead that a fellow Marine (and ground pounder to boot if I am reading between the lines correctly) would say such a thing about his fellow brothers in the air. We have always prided ourselves (within the Marines) as providing our brothers on the ground with the best possible air support one could expect when the going gets rough. With that being said, after much self-reflection I believe there was some elements of truth to his claim. While I am no longer serving, I do think there is much to be gleaned from other air forces around the world and how they have operated and been successful (or failed). Some of what I have read recently on this topic piqued my interest so I have been trying to spend what little free time I have reading about the subject. While no doubt the size, uniqueness and intimacy that the Rhodesian Air Force enjoyed probably helped contribute to its successes (and the fact it was fighting for its very existence) one must wonder why there seems to be so little study on this subject? Politics aside, I do think there is a lot to learn from this period and with budget realities starting to hit the US Military maybe there will be some movement to start thinking creatively while retaining capable, effective and reliable aviation assets without breaking the bank. Unfortunately, I feel us Americans always want to buy the Ferrari rather than the Ford when it comes to military aircraft. Maybe that day is soon coming to an end. I've always argued we need more A-10 and CH-53E type aircraft and less F-35 and MV-22 type aircraft.

[JMA]

Personally, I think the Rhodesians got screwed, and the rest of the world is loath to admit it, because of the inevitable screams of 'racism' that will inevitably accompany anyone attempting to voice support for a post-colonial nation that had a white-skinned head of state resisting an "opposition" of black-skinned terrorists.

I'm interested in the lessons of Rhodesia at least in part to help avoid future catastrophes where superficial narratives obscure much deeper ethnic problems (paging Dr Kosovo!) and that the "public" solution often ends up being far worse than even status quo. Is Zimbabwe/Rhodesia really better off after 30 years of "self-determination" (read: "mugabe"-determination) than they would've been under the government that existing in 1974?

Additionally, the individual tales are, quite frankly, a riot to read.

The world is not yet ready or mature enough to discuss such matters rationally - as evidenced by the recent thread in the Journal. And that was arrogant yet totally ignorant Americans.

Better one looks to the current CAR and South Sudan for - once again - graphic proof of how thin the veneer of civiliazation really is. Have just spent a year in West Africa you can pull more examples from there. Not to mention Rwanda.

Disclaimer - before some luntic clown points a finger and screams racism at me I need to place on record that the Bosnia example proves (as did the Germans 70 years ago) how thin that veneer of civiliazation is universally.

But here we talk of Africa.

Xenophobia to the extent where people from different tribes/religions will be killed at a drop of a hat - if they stray into the wrong area - still exists as evidenced in many examples from across Africa on an almost daily basis (as it does in gang areas in LA and elsewhere).

The problem is that many Africans deny the existence of tribalism on the basis that it makes Africans look uncivilised and undeveloped ... and sadly there are idiots out there who believe this.

I had an experience in Mozambique about 20 years ago where at a program meeting which was attended a senior (female) USAID person (the donor) we all were told by her that there was no tribalism in Mozambique. I dared to ask her how she had arrived at this position and she responded - I kid you not - that her driver had assured her of this. (she was shagging her driver).

I realised at that moment that if relatively senior US decision makers on the loose in Africa were that gullible/ignorant then all was lost.

Twenty years on it has - in my humble opinion - got worse.