Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success

[Eden]

...I like that. When I was a battalion commander, my best company commanders ended up getting out, while the drudges remained. There were a lot of reasons for that, but the virtual impossibility of getting ahead of the pack during a typical career was certainly one of them. Two examples can illustrate:

I had several lieutenants who would have made better commanders than some of the captains I was forced to give command of companies. On at least one occasion I was forced to give a company to a man I knew, and my boss knew, was incompetent. Why? It was his turn. He commanded for 365 days and left with a bad OER, but he still ran the company into the ground. I assigned one of the best lieutenants as his XO in an attempt to alleviate some of the damage; this worked, but that lieutenant left the Army a year or two later, partly as a result of that experience.

In Afghanistan, I met several majors in the planning cell who were far more talented, innovative, and energetic than the lieutenant colonel who ran the cell. He was a drone and a negative influence: he quashed good ideas because he was afraid to run them by the boss, offered nothing in the way of inspiration, and couldn't even effectively manage the workload. Yet he stayed on, because the slot called for a lieutenant colonel. Everyone, including the commander and chief of staff simply worked around him, which was dysfunctional and wasted energy.

Until you reach general officer level, it is simply impossible to rise significantly faster than your peers. Even double-below-the-zone selectees only gain two years, and usually by getting [I][B]less[B][I] time in 'good' jobs as they are rushed through the BQ hoops. No budding Napoleon, Marshall, or Alexander gets any more time leading troops than someone who barely makes the command-cut.

Until you have some mechanism for accelerating promotion and less concern for 'fairness' or 'equity' in your officer personnel system, you will have a great deal of difficulty in either discerning, retaining, or managing talent.

[William F. Owen]

Until you have some mechanism for accelerating promotion and less concern for 'fairness' or 'equity' in your officer personnel system, you will have a great deal of difficulty in either discerning, retaining, or managing talent.

I think a lot of this comes down to how you recruit your officers, and what criteria you use to select them. Armies that require all officers to have succeeded as NCOs first or rather to have risen well above the ranks historically produce highly motivated men.

A lot also depends on how do you detect talent. The bad officers getting promoted or staying in slots have all proved adept at working the system. There are ways for measuring who is generally smart, professional and adaptable, but very few armies seem to use them.

[Ken White]

Initial selection is key -- I've long contended that I'd rather have two motivated dummies than all unmotivated smart guys you can give me. I can train the dummies; I cannot motivate the unmotivated (and the 'good leadership is required' crock is just that, a crock).

I would also in a Company or on a big staff rather be ten people short than two people over strength. Over strength breeds complacency and goofing off...

I will also echo Eden, who very correctly said:

"Until you have some mechanism for accelerating promotion and less concern for 'fairness' or 'equity' in your officer personnel system, you will have a great deal of difficulty in either discerning, retaining, or managing talent."

Note he rightly leads with "discerning" or identifying. You cannot get there if that step is omitted on the basis that 'anyone with the right credentials' can do it. They can't.

Some in Congress will fight that contention -- that battle needs to be fought; we do not have the luxury of a Draft to compensate for the terrible and glaring shortfall in that 'logic.'

[Old Eagle]

This piece is nothing short of excellent as far as the analysis goes. OEMA has an excellent reputation for high quality work. In contrast to other think pieces based on anecdotal evidence, this monograph presents facts and figures that are pretty amazing and deserve our attention. They also dispel, or attempt to, the HQ saw that what we are experiencing in the form of officer personnel challenges is primarily a result of the wars.

Having said that, I’m not sure all the conclusions follow directly from the evidence presented. Maybe we can discuss details in later posts.

More importantly however, how specifically, not generally or theoretically, do we proceed?

Is the current OER system a reflection of talent? If not, what is? What can be?

Is there a statistically sound qualitative breakout of what talent is leaving the Army?

Has anyone developed a mechanism to assess talent, especially among adolescents we want to recruit?

There are many ancillary issues raised by this study. Let the discussions begin.

[Schmedlap]

Has anyone developed a mechanism to assess talent, especially among adolescents we want to recruit?

When I was a Lieutenant, we LT's generally knew who among us were the top performers and who were the bottom of the barrel. Ditto when I was a Captain. The Soldiers also had a pretty good idea of who they were comfortable following into combat.

As for those whom we want to recruit, I would have to say that the same was true in ROTC. We knew who the top performers were and those individuals went on to be very good officers. The guys whom we knew were sub-par went on to be sub-par officers.

Regarding the assessment of talent prior to ROTC/USMA/OCS - not sure. Anyone can get someone to write them a good letter of recommendation. And grades/APFT scores are certainly not a reliable indicator from what I've seen.

[Old Eagle]

Go back to pg 15

"Talent goes beyond attitude or desire, beyond will and skill, beyond tolerance, compassion, values and character...Talent, however, adds the critical dimensions of intelligence, of aptitudes for rapid learning and adaptation..."

How do we measure that for either the assession or retention phase?

Most of us have survived several, if not numerous, permutations of the OER system. As I recall, even those forms that made attempts to address varied attributes soon morphed into "bricks". If any officer was less than 100% in any of the specified areas, s/he was a dirtbag. All -- or nothing.

[Ken White]

How do we measure that for either the assession or retention phase?

But I will defer to others for a while...

[Ken White]

All are, IMO, totally correct. The first one bears some thought -- some will dismiss it. I suggest that would be a mistake because that's really what it's all about -- or is supposed to be...

Shek provided this quote from the Paper:

Accordingly, many of these OCS-IS officers will be eligible for retirement before reaching the rank of major, which does little to help fill the Army’s shortages at the rank of major and lieutenant colonel.

True -- and a function of NOT identifying enlisted talent early on but letting it self select. That's a function of many things, not least the that system we call the Army is stifling to an extent and it takes some guys a few years to develop the self confidence to give a commission a try. One cannot say the Army discourages OCS but it certainly does little in peace time to encourage it. Nor is the Army very good about offering direct commissions to outstanding NCOs (other than when forced by war time crunches), insisting that they go through the hassle that is OCS. It also says something about the way those folks know their background is looked upon by the senior officer selection boards...

Short comment: the processes can be significantly improved IF the Army wishes to do so...

Cav Guy once made the statement that he saw very little difference at the Captain level with regard to source of commission. I agree and would add that pretty well holds true up to LTC in my experience. Since everyone cannot be a General in any event...

Old Eagle as always raises some great questions:

Is the current OER system a reflection of talent? If not, what is? What can be?

As an only infrequent and long departed participant in the process, I can only say that in 1995 it absolutely did not -- it identified occasional water walkers and tons of excellent Officers plus an occasional miscreant. "What is?" Far more difficult. I'm inclined to trust the subjective judgment of seniors (I trust), peers (I trust) and even subordinates (I trust). Hmmm. I seem to have a problem...

As to what can be, the OER isn't that bad, the process has just gotten corrupted. Some years ago the Chief of OPD proposed a new OER -- just like the old OER except that the name and signatures of the Rater and Senior Rater were moved to the back page and the intent was that would not be shown Promotion Boards. The Board would see the rating but would not know who the Raters were. That idea got rave reviews as it was staffed -- until it hit the first General Officer in DCSPER. It was immediately killed. Still a good idea, though...

Is there a statistically sound qualitative breakout of what talent is leaving the Army?

Not to be Clintonian but 'define talent.' My suspicion is that to get an agreement on what constitutes 'talent' will be exceedingly difficult. I'd want a guy or gal who wasn't afraid to take chances, think odd thoughts or to speak out -- others would want academic prowess, still others social conformity and risk avoidance...

Has anyone developed a mechanism to assess talent, especially among adolescents we want to recruit?

That's the crux of it. The Paper has some good points -- but they need to better define 'talent' and then determine a mechanism to identify it.

Shek also said:

...However, given the All-Volunteer Army in the United States, your ability to grow the enlisted pool large enough to support an officer corps with the attributes the authors describe is simply not sustainable (additionally, in terms of cost, OCS-IS is the most expensive form of commissioning in the US).

The Officer corps the authors describe is an ideal state in their view -- others may have differing ideas. For example, they seem to imply that all should be capable of obtaining advanced degrees. While I do not question the need for some -- even many such -- I do strongly question whether all should have them. I also suggest that a look at Command tracks and Staff tracks has merit, that 'up or out' unnecessarily discards a lot of competence and ask if a Company Commander is really in need of an advanced degree. Long way of saying I do not agree with the statement that the enlisted pool will not have enough talent but acknowledge that the definition of talent is key.

I'd also ask on what basis OCS becomes the most expensive commissioning process?

You can train dummies to function only up to a certain level of responsibility. At some point, training is not enough and it requires education, education that may be beyond the capability of the dummies...

Easily solved -- don't pick dummies that cannot be educated to the necessary degree (note I did not state the currently preferred degrees. Pun intentional). I'll also apologize for using the word 'dummies' -- gave a connotation that begged to be exploited. Perhaps I should've said 'untertiarily educated,' 'unwashed' or something along that line.

Nonetheless, I would hope that our pre-commissioning sources are able to cull out the unmotivated with the rare exception.

Can't speak for today, I'm not around the system that often -- but I can speak for the period 1949-1995 and can assure you that IMO the success rate was never more than about 60-70%. Some of those had other motivations aside from just being good soldiers and officers -- and every officer is first and foremost a soldier (or should be), add those to the 30+% who weren't motivated along that line at all but had other, usually personal situation improvement related, motivations and you get about a 50+% net success rate.

In defense of my position I offer, Shek again:

I think that on average, your more talented officers will have risen by the time they hit the 7/8 year point in commissioned service and so the masking now incentivizes less talented individuals to stick around while those who did shine above their peers may now decide to get out.

Does that statement, if true, not raise the questions of "How motivated were they?" or "What were their real motivations in seeking a commission?"

It also highlights the Author's real issue -- talent as opposed to numbers; talent as opposed to better assignments. Thus my comments about selecting truly motivated folks and shortfalls being preferable to overages.

Further, that last quote from Shek illustrates what I (and lots of others) have long contended -- the system is entirely too competitive. It should not be based on competitiveness but rather on competence. It is not

[Shek]

In defense of my position I offer, Shek againoes that statement, if true, not raise the questions of "How motivated were they?" or "What were their real motivations in seeking a commission?"

It also highlights the Author's real issue -- talent as opposed to numbers; talent as opposed to better assignments. Thus my comments about selecting truly motivated folks and shortfalls being preferable to overages.

Further, that last quote from Shek illustrates what I (and lots of others) have long contended -- the system is entirely too competitive. It should not be based on competitiveness but rather on competence. It is not

Ken,

I think that Schmedlap hit the nail on the head with his comments about the reality of the Army experience for many, and those who were excited about the Army are often turned off. In terms of my comments about masking, this is also a product of the way the Army has defined itself - command is everything, and staff is the penance you pay for the opportunity. If this is the culture your propagate, when you have those who are told that you must pass a gate (ACOMs in command) and then the reward is taken away (the knowledge that you remain competitive for battalion command) through masking, then we shouldn't be surprised when people get upset and lose faith when the rules of the game are changed.

I think we need to change the definition of a successful career such that command isn't the only thing celebrated, which I think is the same thing you're getting at. However, I'm not sure how you mean exactly between competitiveness and competence.