Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[marct]

Hi Bob,

My point is simply that insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.

This problem (technically a "breech" in our assumed reality), turns around and really highlights the problems with a lot of our doctrine and operational stance. For example, the entire concept of "poor governance" or "corruption" assumes particular socio-cultural standards of both, and the ascribes causality for an "insurgency" to them. Why? Probably because that is what caused a number of them in our own past political history. That, my friend, is the real definition of ethnocentrism - the ascription of a cultural assumption as a universal law.

So what happens if we through out the assumption that 'states" exist as anything other than socio-cultural constructs? Well, for one thing, it forces us to be a lot clearer on what our campaign intentions are. It also highlights the ways in which campaign planning would have to change, and that specifically includes what political institutions should be imposed / changed.

When tasked to help suppress an insurgency, the first thing the military commander should (who should be the resident expert on warfare in the room) say to that Civilian leader is along the lines of :

"Yes sir, we can help solve this problem; but understand that the fact that we are faced with an insurgency is a pretty damn good indicator that the government is failing a significant segment of the populace in a major way. So lets meet back here in two weeks. I'll have 2-3 solid COAs on how the military can assist in the operation and you should have a good idea as to how you plan to address the failures of governance that brought us to this sad point where you are prepared to employ our military against our own populace. I'll also have with me a letter of resignation that I hope I won't have to submit, but if your position is that you simply want the military to punish that segment of the populace that dares to act out, you will need to find another man for the job."

One of the "insurgencies" that we never seem to discuss is the Liberal Revolts of 1847. I think that it would really help clarify some of our thinking in this boundary zone (i.e. the interface zone between politics, warfare, insurgency, policing, etc.) to take a look at how they were handled in the Austrian case from 1847-50. Very little "fighting", and the entire "revolt" (and separation) of Hungary ended when their own minorities "rose up" against them.

Part of the reason why this is a useful case is that it is primarily "political" (i.e. non-kinetic conflict) and that it happened at a time of fairly rapid technological change, which makes it a useful analogic case. As an added bonus, it is one of the few really good European instances where a "state" and a "people" are not the same which, BTW, tends to be another one of those nice little ethnocentric assumptions about "states" that we have.

Anyway, I need more coffee .

Cheers,

Marc

[MikeF]

Who's perspective to we apply to figure out what sort of conflict we are in? The Afghan villages I've visited see their district as some sort of third-party and the province and national governments as some distant entity they hear about on Pashto BBC. For alot of these people, "the state" ends at the wadi dividing them with the next village or where the farthest field meets the desert. For them, I'd imagine going to settle a blood feud against the village down the way is the same as blowing up the passing infidels or soldiers from Jalalabad who may or may not speak the same language.

Is this an insurgency or just war?

This question is the crux of the debate isn't it? In the formal model that BW suggest

insurgency (violent political struggle within a state) and conventional warfare (violent political struggle between states) are different.

we're assuming a state versus a counter-state. This model can be an insurgency or a civil war. In reality, there are multiple actors vying for power and control on the micro or local level. When we interdict as an external actor, we become a third player into the two-person game. We have to define a role. In Bosnia, we played a role as an arbitrator splitting the competing factions. In Iraq, at times we became a competitor, fighting for control. It's a slippery slope, and it can get messy. On the batallion and below level, we often don't get to choose our roles or our friends. We simply execute operations in support of higher's stated goals.

Here's an interesting example- Kurdistan. To some in Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, Kurdistan is a terrorist safehaven that possesses a potential existential threat. To the US, the Kurds are our allies.

That drives back to BW's early point on conducting COIN versus being a counter-insurgent. On the ground level, it's a moot point. I'd submit that's an operational issue. When you're given a mission to clear a denied area, you gotta figure out how best to do it.

Best

Mike

[Bob's World]

My take is the that people who live within what is now called Afghanistan have an ancient and accepted system of local governance; a flegling and unproven attempt to apply centralized "state" governance; a Taliban led insurgent challenge to that central role; and a mix of competitors for regional influence in the midst of all.

At the local level I think the best you can hope to do is enforce the ancient local systems, and then work to help connect them effectively to the fledgling centralized systems to a degree and in a manner that is acceptable to that populace. There is nothing simple about that task; but I think the key is to see it as bringing the two together, vice imposing one upon the other. Some of those informal competitors, be they labled "warlord" or "taliban" etc may well be essential connectors in many areas.

[Ron Humphrey]

Hi Bob,



I suspect that you are falling into the fundamental ontological error of assuming that such a "thing" as a "state" exists in and of itself. "States", whether modern or ancient, are, like all social institutions, constructed by humans as a result of various and sundry activities which may (broadly) be called "politics".

Where the "difference" comes between "convention" and "insurgency" is in the perception of a) causality of conflict and b) the development of cultural and social conventions to contain that conflict. Indeed, "democracy" is another form of "violent" political struggle with (assumed) non-kinetic cultural conventions.

The more I think about this, the more convinced I am that the assumption of the existence of a "state" as real in and of itself lies at the heart of much of our problem with the current conflicts we are fighting. We are required by cultural and inter-social conventions to act as if "states" exist but, when we do, we have a nasty tendency to assume they are real, and that leads to all sorts of problems and operational paradoxes when our cultural assumptions about what a "state" should be and how it should act run up against other peoples assumptions. This type of "the emperor has no clothes" realization is even more readily apparent when we kick out the existing "state" and put in a new one.


Cheers,

Marc

Was thinking about just this a couple days ago.

I've often wondered if in reality the "state" as we so often perceive it isn't one of the biggest examples of -

A solution in search of a problem.

Not dissing the institution but rather trying to recognize that just like most things states come into existence as a coordinated effort to solve various delimmas. As such once those are addressed effectively it should be fluid enough to adjust to new and more pressing issues yet quite often is too rigid to do so effectively.

The why and whats of that are fodder for all you polisci guys to work on.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

In post No.57 I said:

(Taken from)..surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. ...In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.

Jon Custis replied:

(Taken from) Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village... It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288

(In part)Yes, the Afghans are great fighters, but that does not mean they wish for a war all their life. We needed to fight against the Russian invasion and I still strongly believe we have done the right thing defending our country and nation against Communism; as I said earlier, things went wrong when these so-called Mujahideen or Freedom fighters leaders started fighting one another. I believe every Afghan wishes for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yes there are some who will continue fighting, but we all know they are small in numbers and are not significant. (My added emphasis)The reason many young men are part of the Taliban and other insurgents is the lack of employment , lack of better life conditions and of course lack of any positive attention from their government in Kabul. At this moment if you ask me, why are these young men are turning to Taliban and are fighting the US, NATO and the Afghan government? You will hear a simple answer from me and that is lack of employment opportunity for these youth who are mostly uneducated.

I believe the Afghan government and the US/NATO should provide training programmes to all those young Afghan men at around age of 16 and above who have lost the chance to go to school and get education. By learning skilled trades, I believe they will be in a position to earn a loaf of bread for themselves and their family and in this way we will prevent many young men from falling in the trap of believing being a suicide bomber means a life in the hereafter with the 72 virgins which will await them at the corridor of heaven.

I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.

[Ron Humphrey]

Jon,

In post No.57 I said:

Jon Custis replied:

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288



I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.

Pretty certain this is something thats been brought to the forefront time and again. The interview hopefully helps reinforce why its important.

[jcustis]

The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.

David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.

Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.

Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.

[Ron Humphrey]

The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.

David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.

Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.

That sounds about right

Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.

The easy answer is yes, The more difficult nuance is the fact that in order to lead one requires Capacity, capability, and an overall sense of requirement to do so. As they say Devils in the details

[MikeF]

"We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay."

Well stated, but the message must include.

Let's work for peace. Let us not work against each other. Let's cooperate for our children's sake not our own personal interest. If you choose the latter, if you attack us, then we will push every asset to destroy you. Please choose peace. The moment is ours to decide. Let us pray together.

[Surferbeetle]

Our nation has and continues to benefit from an steadfastly apolitical military skilled at the various ways of warfare.

Although we must at certain times and places, outside of our nations borders, walk, wade, or swim in the waters/solvent of politics with all of their unseen currents and various questionable additives it is not wise to drink of the same, nor foolishly conflate our role with that of politicians, native or otherwise.

In the spirit of gaining some understanding about the waters currently roaring through the floodplain and applicable/non-applicable TTP's....

The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq by Rory Stewart

In August of 2003, Rory Stewart (known to the Arabs of southern Iraq as Seyyd Rory) "took a taxi from Jordan to Baghdad to ask for a job from the Director of Operations". This was four months after the Coalition invasion. Shortly thereafter Stewart wound up as deputy governate coordinator of Maysan. He became, at age 30, the de-facto governor of a province of 850,000 in southern Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of the war. This is his story

"I had never believed that mankind, unless overawed by a strong government, would fall inevitably into violent chaos. Societies were orderly, I thought, because human cultures were orderly. Written laws and policy played only a minor role. But Maysan [province] made me reconsider."

[marct]

Hi Ron,

I've often wondered if in reality the "state" as we so often perceive it isn't one of the biggest examples of - A solution in search of a problem.

Years ago I read an SF book that made the off hand comment that institutions are problem creating constructs that allow people to have fun by trying to solve these problems. It's sort of an inverted logic but, I must admit, it really caught my attention.

Not dissing the institution but rather trying to recognize that just like most things states come into existence as a coordinated effort to solve various delimmas. As such once those are addressed effectively it should be fluid enough to adjust to new and more pressing issues yet quite often is too rigid to do so effectively.

The why and whats of that are fodder for all you polisci guys to work on.

Are states a solution looking for a problem? I suspect they are, and that is more "true" (in the probabilistic sense) within states that have a democratic form as politicians and other groups vie for selling problems to the populace. One really good article that I have used as a text in a number of classes is by Joel Best Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructing the Missing Children Problem, Social Problems, Vol. 34, No. 2. (Apr., 1987), pp. 101-121.

Other state forms seem to be much more "stable" - certain types of theocratic governance structures for example (e.g. the Temple States in Sumeria). The trick, however, seems to be in distinguishing what institutions actually make up a "state", and then focusing on them. Just as a quick example, there is a key, institutional difference between a constitutional monarchy / parliamentary democracy and a republican form in the institutional relationship between the head of state and the head of government. In many republics, the two are melded to a fairly large degree, which in parliamentary democracies they are quite separate (that allows for concepts like a "Loyal Opposition", as well as the reality of being able to dis your hed of government without dissing your head of state).

Not being a polisci type (hey, I got kicked out of intro to polisci for beating my prof in an election !), I tend to look at it more along organizational and institutional lines, coupled with the "lived experience" factor.

[Surferbeetle]

Rory Stewart in London Review of Books, with a piece entitled The Irresistible Illusion

The path is broad enough to include Scandinavian humanitarians and American special forces; general enough to be applied to Botswana as easily as to Afghanistan; sinuous and sophisticated enough to draw in policymakers; suggestive enough of crude moral imperatives to attract the Daily Mail; and almost too abstract to be defined or refuted. It papers over the weakness of the international community: our lack of knowledge, power and legitimacy. It conceals the conflicts between our interests: between giving aid to Afghans and killing terrorists. It assumes that Afghanistan is predictable. It is a language that exploits tautologies and negations to suggest inexorable solutions. It makes our policy seem a moral obligation, makes failure unacceptable, and alternatives inconceivable. It does this so well that a more moderate, minimalist approach becomes almost impossible to articulate.

What is this thing ‘governance’, which Afghans (or we) need to build, and which can also be transparent, stable, regulated, competent, representative, coercive? A fact of nationhood, a moral good, a cure for corruption, a process? At times, ‘state’ and ‘government’ and ‘governance’ seem to be different words for the same thing. Sometimes ‘governance’ seems to be part of a duo, ‘governance and the rule of law’; sometimes part of a triad, ‘security, economic development and governance’, to be addressed through a comprehensive approach to ‘the 3 ds’, ‘defence, development and diplomacy’ – which implies ‘governance’ is something to do with a foreign service.

Moderators note: this article was published in July 2009; still a good read.

[Ron Humphrey]

Thanks for the links gonna be getting through both as soon as I ring the new year in .