I doubt that these examples are relevant to the AFG case.
The U.S. withdrew from conflicts when its interest in the region was little more than a delusion.
The TB's interest in the reason is almost a question of existence (I doubt that the Pakistan TB would last long as an important player if the AFG TB failed).
It's excessively difficult to break the enemy's will by killing under such conditions. KIA can be replaced and the fight can go on.
I already explained why I don't believe in a sustained higher KIA rate than replacement rate in this conflict.
The will needs to be broken by other means. The overall situation needs to become hopeless. High casualties that can be replaced are no indicator for hopelessness.
A radio series of a very high-ranking and charismatic cleric who explains that god doesn't influence wars - neither in favour nor against Muslim fighters - might be more helpful than 20,000 dead TB.
By the way; the decisive factor that lead to Carthago's defeat in the 2nd Punic War was the defection of their Nubian allies. The war was won by diplomacy long before Scipio was capable of doing so by force.
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