New Rules for New Enemies

[Tom Odom]

Among my pet rocks, the one most fondled is the issue of transformation and small units. I wrote a piece for Mil Review a couple of years ago; to get it published I had to sell it to the Mil Review editors as something truly related to transformation and therefore worthy.

Nagl and company address this issue and that is a good thing. Altjough I agree with Steve on the US Frontier Wars analogy; Nagl is an Armor officer so he would think Cavalry, not necessarily a bad thing. I still like the flexibilty and combat power we built into the ACRs.

But getting back to the issue of small units, the real issue is not simply numbers. It is experience. We have long equated small unit leadership with junior leadership, even as we add ever increasing loads on those same small units and their same junior leaders.

We have wasted the rank of Major for years and we need to change. Majors should command--at the company level.

For more see: Transformation: Victory Rests With Small Units

Best
tom

[marct]

Tom and Steve,

I have a little bell going off in the back of my mind. Back in the Seven-Years war, if I remember correctly, weren't the American colonial units "combined arms"? Also, was the pre-Jefferson army based on a combined arms/legion model?

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Yes, Marc. In the early days of the American Army it was organized as combined arms legions. This didn't last more than a few years before it was replaced. During the Seven-Years period there were some units that were sort of combined arms, but it was more typical to see them style themselves that way but in practice be light infantry.

And Tom, I tend to feel that the ACR in either its more current or (preferably) its Vietnam TOE would be outstanding for this type of warfare.

[marct]

Yes, Marc. In the early days of the American Army it was organized as combined arms legions. This didn't last more than a few years before it was replaced. During the Seven-Years period there were some units that were sort of combined arms, but it was more typical to see them style themselves that way but in practice be light infantry.

Thanks, Steve. I sort of remembered that from reading one of my ancestors journals. Okay, that gives a career re-organization an historical basis that can be sold as a "return to traditional values".

To win the Long War, the Army must change its culture to one that demands and rewards adaptation. This cultural change will serve as the catalyst for a comprehensive redesign of doctrine, organizations, training, leader education, material development and soldier recruitment.

To win the Long War, the Army must develop a more adaptive organizational culture. To create such a culture, the Army must change its focus from a centralized, specialized focus on major conventional wars to a more decentralized and less specialized focus on full-spectrum operations. This shift in organizational culture cannot occur within existing organizations — indeed these organizations can be an impediment to change. The best way to change the organizational culture of the Army is to change the pathways for professional advancement within the officer corps. The Army will become more adaptive only when being adaptive offers the surest path to promotion.

The problem with this recomendation is how to actually get it implemented politically. A "return to traditional value" argument is one way to do that.

The proposal to abolish branch affiliations after the rank of Captain seems interesting, but I would have to question whether or not that would work without fairly extensive retraining. Also, I expect that there is no way it could be implemented without grandfathering everyone who holds higher rank so that they don't have to meet the new requirements <wry grin>.

In some ways, the proposal reminds me of Heinlein's organization of the Mobile Infantry in Starship Troopers. I wonder if that is where they got the idea from?

Marc

[zenpundit]

I believe the Civil War saw a revival of "combined arms" units among the volunteers of certain northern States, early in the war.

[Steve Blair]

I believe the Civil War saw a revival of "combined arms" units among the volunteers of certain northern States, early in the war.

It was also very popular in the South. Wade Hampton's Legion springs first to mind, but there were other examples as well. These efforts tended to die out within the first year of the conflict, as the issues of equipment and replacements came to dominate matters.

[SWJED]

We have wasted the rank of Major for years and we need to change. Majors should command--at the company level.

I attended a 4GW PME at JFCOM on Monday - TX Hammes hit on this point several times during the panel discussions.

As has been pounded home many times on the SWC - experience combined with training and education is the key to success. When we throw in strategic compression and expect wonders from the strategic corporal (and all small unit leaders) we have to start looking at aging the force. TX talked about majors as company commanders and staff sergeants as squad leaders as a start. Of course simply aging the force is not the silver bullet - proper training, education and experience must go hand-in-hand.

[Steve Blair]

Again, from the frontier army example, one way to age the force may be to allow people to remain in certain ranks/grades longer than we have previously. This has been touched on by some of the military personnel system reformers, and I really feel it deserves a second (and third) look. Shoving majors down to company command level creates expensive companies, but allowing a captain to remain at that rank and lead his company effectively for a few more years gives us the baseline experience without clogging the ranks with more "leaders." Again, to draw from the frontier army level, majors were often used as either fort commanders or as squadron/battalion commanders (at this time in our organizational history the squadron/battalion was an ad hoc unit containing from two to four companies depending on tactical need). They served a purpose, but didn't clog the smaller units.

[Tom Odom]

Steve,

The issue with Majors goes beyond adding experience to companies. It also targets adding experience to the force. At present a junior captain who successfully commands a company say at the 5 year mark willl not command again if he does everything correct until another 10-13 years. That gap in troop leading for maneuver officers especially is critical for them, for the army as a whole, and for the companies who would have benefited. Expensive? Perhaps but the infantry has already become a most precious asset, one spread way too thin. And the model I look at puts captains at platoons and lieutenants at sections. In any case, in wars costing billions of dollars every month to sustain, wars being fought, won, or lost by small units, does it not make sense to strengthen those units?

best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Tom,

I think that we do need to strengthen our small units, but it also has the very strong potential to undermine the learning ability and authority of the NCOs in those units. Increasing the officer to NCO ratio just rings lots of bells with me, but that may be because I've been around the Air Force too long. What I see there, with heavy officer supervision, is a whole set of NCOs that may be good technicians, but have little in the way of leadership skill (on the average). Then when they hit E-7 or so they're expected to have leadership skills. I know I've mentioned this before on another thread, but I do worry about the effect shoving officers further down in the chain will have on our enlisted force.

[marct]

Steve,

From what I understand, the air force is an anomaly as far as the officer - NCO relationship is concerned, at least that's what my brother in law says (22 years USAF, E8, ret'd). I doubt that, if you compared actual tasks, you would find that much similarity, and task definitions are the basis of career tracks.

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Marc,

Yeah, I know the Air Force is something of an anomaly in this regard. But you do run into something of an organizational issue when you start over-supervising folks and then expect them to show leadership and initiative. To an extent I'm playing devil's advocate here, but I do view it as a real concern. I agree that we do under-use the rank of major now, but even after reading Tom's article I'm not totally convinced that shoving them down a command level is a complete answer to the problem.

I'm not knocking your ideas in the least, Tom, just raising a concern I have about the process and how it may impact other areas and levels of command.

[zenpundit]

SWJED wrote

"As has been pounded home many times on the SWC - experience combined with training and education is the key to success. When we throw in strategic compression and expect wonders from the strategic corporal (and all small unit leaders) we have to start looking at aging the force. TX talked about majors as company commanders and staff sergeants as squad leaders as a start. Of course simply aging the force is not the silver bullet - proper training, education and experience must go hand-in-hand."

Tom wote:

"But getting back to Nagl and ideas of adaptive leadership, the key to adaptive leadership is experience. You cannot train experience; you can train from experience. Adaptive leadership for inexperienced soldiers is a certain part smarts and a large part guessing. Adaptive leadership based on experience is infinitely preferable and certainly more survivable."

Well said. Now check this out:

From H-Diplo Listserv

"Forwarded From: "Herrera, Ricardo A Dr CSI"
<Ricardo.A.Herrera@us.army.mil>

CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT

Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors:
Implications for the U.S. Army
11-13 September, 2007
Fort Leavenworth Frontier Conference Center
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Organizers: The United States Army Combat Studies Institute,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Combat Studies Institute will host
a symposium entitled "Warfare in the Age of Non-State Actors:
Implications for the U.S. Army." The symposium will include
a mixture of guest speakers, panel sessions, and general
discussions.

This conference will explore the impact of conflict between
nations and non-state combatants within a historical context.
The conference will examine current issues, dilemmas, problems,
trends, and practices associated with conflict between
constituted nations and trans-national, religious, ethnic or
criminal groups.

Proposed Program: CSI will issue a Call for Papers in October
2006. While the symposium program is tentative and flexible,
CSI expects it to include the following panels and topics:

- Non-State Actors and their impact on strategic communications
and Information Operations.

- Law of War and Military Doctrine dealing with Non-State Actors.

- The military's role in conflict termination and securing the
political end state especially if one or more combatants is a
Non-State Actor (e.g. Hezbollah, IRA, FARC, FMLN, al Qaeda).

- The armed forces as part of the interagency process.

- Military operations with International Government Organizations
and Non-Governmental Organizations.

- Tactics of militaries and rogue organizations or Non-State
Actors on the battlefield.

- The military and cultural awareness.

- The role of technology in empowering and combating Non-State
Actors.

- Impact of Non-State Actors on Global economics and Non-State
Actors' financing.

For more information on the symposium, please contact CSI at
913-684-2139 or email: CSIconference07@leavenworth.army.mil
<mailto:CSIconference07@leavenworth.army.mil> .

Ricardo A. Herrera, Ph.D.
U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute
201 Sedgwick Ave
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027

O: (913) 684-2126
F: (913) 684-4861

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/INDEX.asp
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/INDEX.asp>"

That might be a good place for SWC regulars to make their points.

[marct]

That might be a good place for SWC regulars to make their points.

Is someone thinking of putting a panel together? If so, I would be interested in putting a paper together - maybe on "symbolic warfare".

Marc

[selil]

- The role of technology in empowering and combating Non-State
Actors.

Would that be a place to publish a paper on high speed acquisition of data from items like cell phones, PDA’s, and computers in the field for intelligence analysis or to far out for the audience?

[marct]

Would that be a place to publish a paper on high speed acquisition of data from items like cell phones, PDA’s, and computers in the field for intelligence analysis or to far out for the audience?

I don't know - it might be. There's also a stream on "Non State Actors and their impact on Strategic communications and Information Operations." and another on "The role of technology in empowering and combating Non-State Actors". Maybe one on integrating high speed data acquisition into combat units?

Marc

[Tom Odom]

I am already writing my proposal--started 2 days ago

best
Tom

SWJED wrote


Tom wote:


Well said. Now check this out:

From H-Diplo Listserv



That might be a good place for SWC regulars to make their points.

[marct]

I am already writing my proposal--started 2 days ago

best
Tom

Okay, so what's the topic and is it for a paper or a panel?

Marc

[Tom Odom]

Paper will be on Rwanda/DR Congo and non-state actors.

No panel as yet; we could put a proposal on the table as the SWJ. I know the guys who are organizing this thing. One is actually doing a project on the DR Congo since 96 and yours truly will probably be a critical source.

Any thoughts from the "board"?

Tom

[Rob Thornton]

I think one of the first things that would have to be addressed is the issue of resourcing. You either pay for the type of people you want up front (incentives or appeal), or you develop them (time, money, investment). To paraphrase a recent article by retired General Scales – this is a people business, and without good people you will not have a good military. This resourcing issue is exacerbated by competing requirements – we have both a mass based set of requirements in the Army, as well as an increasingly technical set of requirements (the range of attributes covers all of the leadership traits).

We are competing for the same types of leaders (in terms of realized or unrealized potential) as the profit based organizations which can afford to offer these people what they desire within the context of an 18-25 year old’s sense of what is important. Certainly we have an appeal, but when you add up incentives, which option do we think comes out ahead? Further, we often cannot afford, or choose not to afford providing the incentives at critical points in these leader’s lives where they make choices about staying or leaving (could be a branch, a service, an organization or the military). We all know Business covets the military leadership experience brings to the table, just look at the ranks of the contractors right now in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere. We need to consider what made the difference in that Soldier/Airman/Marine’s decision to go, or stay; then we need to adjust to compensate.

If you look at the erosion of benefits that active duty service offers, it most often targets people. Consider who and when the erosion of benefits like family medical and dental care, DODs schools, Housing, and social services targets. It impacts the family of a soldier at a time when his loyalties are divided between taking care of his family (this is of course compounded when deployed) and serving his country. The family weight in his decision making process should not be under valued. Consider the skill set this man or woman has in the context of COIN – he is by virtue of having a family, somewhat more emotionally stable – he is probably slightly older and his cumulative experience is worthy. He is a combat multiplier in his unit by his ability to provide calm and wisdom – having a family builds patience and exposes you to problem sets outside the normal military experience, and by such infect/influence many others with the same qualities. Consider the value of this man or woman when considering the use of lethal force. This is just one example of how we either undervalue people skills in favor of hardware.

Resourcing the types of educational investment to build the leaders we want is critical to realizing the goal. While Knowledge Networks, Communities of Practice, and Distance Learning offer opportunities in experience transferal and education on the cheap, the context upon which they draw is limited to the personal ability to internalize it an apply it, therefore it should not be a substitute for small group instruction, but a supplement. So how do we resource pulling out leaders at all level and giving them the right tools to succeed? Granted a bigger pool to rotate is attractive and provides more flexibility, but it also means more resources required for education, recruiting, and retention. Given the people we want often have families that must be entered into the equation; this has a large price tag.

I realize that culturally we are much more comfortable with a MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) equation vs. the subjective human one, but if we do not resource the kind of people we know we need we will have to lower our expectations in reference to our capabilities. We have to balance our appetite for hardware with requirements for quality people we can recruit, train and retain. I’ve been on the Army’s cutting edge for technology for about 6 years (Stryker, FCS) and for the last 8 months I’ve been doing the advisory job here in Iraq. I can tell you, sophisticated equipment only bears good results when there are good people using it. Do we need to modernize, yes; but do we need everything on the buffet table right now? I see some great vehicles here in Mosul that would be perfect for COIN, it’d be great to replace every 1114/1116/LVL II 998 with the RGR Engineer vehicle. COTs is not necessarily a bad thing and relooking our hardware acquisition strategy to match our personnel one may not be a bad idea. Reevaluation of our genesis for hardware in the context of new alternatives and requirements for the 5-25 year mark seems militarily prudent in light of the strategic, operational and tactical consequences of not doing so.

Our strategy needs to be people centric with the goal to equip them with the best technology that meets their needs. Conversely, if we show a long term trend of taking care of people at the DOD level ( I mention it because I’m not sure it happens for most above the BN & BDE levels), then our reputation for doing so will spread. People want to belong to good organizations that they can both believe in and which believe in them. One of the things you learn early on is that it is not so much what you are doing that makes you happy, it’s the climate of the organization, and purpose or esprit de corps which accompanies it.