Rhodesian COIN (consolidated thread, inc original RLI)

[jmm99]

JMA: You mentioned in another conversation that you were not acquainted, when in RLI service, with the term "rules of engagement". I don't question that, as such, since our own current FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, does not use the term "rules of engagement" once.

Of course, FM 27-10 is full of ROEs for different situations - as have been US service regulations and doctrinal publications since the 1863 Lieber Code (which is mostly ROEs). In both the US and UK, the ROEs have come under different names from before WWI - e.g., U.S. War Dept. Doc. No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare (1914), and J.W Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).

So, unless Rhodesia was a rara avis in British colonial terms, it should have had "field service regulations" (including "rules of engagement") for both its police and military services. De Boer's sin was not one of illogic, as such - though, of course, one cannot over-extend or violate rules that do not exist. His sin was in not researching to find the rules that probably did exist for both military and police. If he couldn't find such rules, then he should have said so - and altered his conclusions.

Of course, just because written rules exist does not mean that everyone is aware of them (much less that people are really trained in them). So far as ROEs are concerned, I think Spaight's joke is on point (and perhaps not really much of a joke today):

..... for an ambitious subaltern who wishes to be known vaguely as an author and, at the same time, not to be troubled with undue inquiry into the claim upon which his title rests, there can be no better subject than the International Law of War. For it is a quasi-military subject in which no one in the army or out of it, is very deeply interested, which everyone very contentedly takes on trust, and which may be written about without one person in ten thousand being able to tell whether the writing is adequate or not.

cited here (in a prior conversation with you).

As to MR, I think the discussion here justifies the article's publication. I also could name a half-dozen writers who would say the article is just great - based on their own articles re: "war crimes", etc.

As an aside, I went back to Bruce Hoffman's 1991 RAND piece on Rhodesia. His Appendix C, Cross-Border Raids, summarizes several dozen raids in Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. A study of those raids (if there is more available factually than Hoffman's brief summaries) seems presently material in light of the loosening of restrictions by two US administrations on those direct actions.

---------------------

Another topic - briefly. Going into what soldiers call their enemies is not going to be useful here. I don't need an education on what those terms mean. If you want to know where I stand, I stand with Randall Kennedy (my gosh, JMM agrees with a Princeton, Oxford, Yale Law grad, who teaches at Harvard Law). If you want to know where he stands, buy and read his book. I'd suggest termination of "gook" posts.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

JMA: You mentioned in another conversation that you were not acquainted, when in RLI service, with the term "rules of engagement". I don't question that, as such, since our own current FM 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare, does not use the term "rules of engagement" once.

Correct, I did both the standard RLI recruits course and later a one year officers course. No such thing as rules of engagement.

What did apply of course were the laws of the country. In addition there was a “good faith” provision of the Indemnity and Compensation Act of 1975 to prevent law suit against the security forces and the government relating to actions by individual members of the security forces.

Of course, FM 27-10 is full of ROEs for different situations - as have been US service regulations and doctrinal publications since the 1863 Lieber Code (which is mostly ROEs). In both the US and UK, the ROEs have come under different names from before WWI - e.g., U.S. War Dept. Doc. No. 467, Rules of Land Warfare (1914), and J.W Spaight, War Rights on Land (1911).

So, unless Rhodesia was a rara avis in British colonial terms, it should have had "field service regulations" (including "rules of engagement") for both its police and military services. De Boer's sin was not one of illogic, as such - though, of course, one cannot over-extend or violate rules that do not exist. His sin was in not researching to find the rules that probably did exist for both military and police. If he couldn't find such rules, then he should have said so - and altered his conclusions.

Covered this above. The laws of the country and the Indemnity Act.

De Boer's 'sin' it appears is to have formed an opinion first and then finessed the facts to (kind of) fit the finding he wants. Anyway you look at it, it remains a really crappy piece of work ... which should not have slipped past the scrutiny of the MR editorial board.

Of course, just because written rules exist does not mean that everyone is aware of them (much less that people are really trained in them). So far as ROEs are concerned, I think Spaight's joke is on point (and perhaps not really much of a joke today):

If there were rules of engagement then they would have been enforced.

As to MR, I think the discussion here justifies the article's publication. I also could name a half-dozen writers who would say the article is just great - based on their own articles re: "war crimes", etc.

I disagree. Firstly (as stated before) they have elevated this piece of garbage to the status of a published work and by implication conferred upon the author the status of 'expert' on Rhodesia. Unforgivable.

If they had wished that the publication would generate discussion then surely they would have announced that at the time of publication and invited interested parties to respond through 'letters to the editor' of some other means. They have no excuses.

I suggest that the de Boer article, which was based on an Hons thesis should be weighed against its merits as an academic paper. It is obvious that fails to prove what it set out to. That he got an Hons degree from the Dutch university of Utrecht is by the by as they may have lower standards. I'm sure there are universities in the US whose degrees are not considered to be worth much.

As a kid he has no idea about the subject matter so that can be discounted.

But there is now no stopping the kid. Rhodesia was merely chicken feed ... he has now moved on and is now and 'expert' on the Arab Spring... I kid you not.

The Continued Importance of Broad Popular Support in Political Violence

[davidbfpo]

JMM in Post 261 'A Rose By Any Other Name ...' referred to:

As an aside, I went back to Bruce Hoffman's 1991 RAND piece on Rhodesia. His Appendix C, Cross-Border Raids, summarizes several dozen raids in Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and Angola. A study of those raids (if there is more available factually than Hoffman's brief summaries) seems presently material in light of the loosening of restrictions by two US administrations on those direct actions.

JMM,

The Rhodesians, later followed by the South Africans, used cross-border raids as a means of reducing the flow of guerillas into their territory - causing mass fatalities. Leadership attacks were unusual, IIRC attempts were made to kill Nkomo in Zambia, oddly I cannot recall a similar attack(s) on Mugabe & Co in Mozambique; the South Africans were more successful later with attacks on the ANC.

The cross-border tactic was controversial at the time within the Rhodesian military, IIRC Jakkie Cilliers wrote on this in his post-Independence book and others like Michael Evans. Partly as it avoided a serious strategic approach to what was vital inside Rhodesia; it is a long time since I read those sources.

The use made today by the USA, notably in Somalia, Yemen and NWFP, of the tactic cross border raids is very different - with selective targets, with far fewer fatalities. Yes the legal principles maybe the same, the method and effect are very different and so not similar.

[Firn]

This link, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry seems more suited in this thread. Needless to say that it shows the history through the eyes of one side only.

[JMA]

This link, The Saints: The Rhodesian Light Infantry seems more suited in this thread. Needless to say that it shows the history through the eyes of one side only.

I am fascinated by this comment.

A little late in the day to be concerned about hearing both sides to the story don't you think?

Probably 98% of all media coverage in North America and Europe had a distinct bias against the Rhodesian government and forces.

A Canadian who served in the RLI (with distinction I might add) wrote this a while ago:

Many years later back home in Canada I checked the archives of the public library for the newspapers during the time of the Chimoio (Op Dingo) raids. These historic raids had made the front pages of newspapers around the world. Sadly though, the ZANLA bull$hit terrorist propaganda version of ‘an agricultural training centre for refugees’ made bigger headlines and received bigger coverage than the official Rhodesian communiqué printed beside it.

(Of course the Zimbabwe government has long ago given up on that lie and have built a monument to their fallen comrades on the site. It is only the lunatic left who continue with the propaganda lie.)

It would be rather nice (even if belatedly) people were willing to hear both sides of the story and as Mike says as you have heard the 'ZANLA bull$hit terrorist propaganda version' now go find the Rhodesian version.

[jmm99]

I'll watch.

Mike

[Backwards Observer]

I'll watch.

Mike

Take it easy, Mike. No hard feelings.

[Firn]

I am fascinated by this comment.

A little late in the day to be concerned about hearing both sides to the story don't you think?

Probably 98% of all media coverage in North America and Europe had a distinct bias against the Rhodesian government and forces

I have to confess that I was too young for media coverage at the time and it is far easier now to find the military viewpoint of the Rhodisian army then the one of the other side. Of course it a whole different affair for somebody who shed sweat and possibly blood for a cause lost, I appreciate that.

[JMA]

I have to confess that I was too young for media coverage at the time and it is far easier now to find the military viewpoint of the Rhodisian army then the one of the other side. Of course it a whole different affair for somebody who shed sweat and possibly blood for a cause lost, I appreciate that.

Perhaps what I am suggesting is that it is possible to study military history (strategy/tactics/weapon employment/etc) without getting bogged down in the politics behind the war itself.

Some time back right here on SWC someone suggested that because the French had resorted to torture in Algeria there is little if anything to be learnt from that war. Nonsense of course, but such beliefs persist.

Just the other day I read something up in Liddel Hart's 'History of the First World War' and noted that of the 500 pages just 20 odd were dedicated to 'Origins of the War'. That IMHO is how it should be.

Now your primer on Rhodesia should be the 6,500 word chapter, 'Countering the Chimurenga' written by JRT Wood, in the book 'Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare' - Marston/Malkasian you can get a used copy for around $7 on Amazon.

Read it, digest it and move on and study the war.

[JMA]

JMM in Post 261 'A Rose By Any Other Name ...' referred to:

JMM,

The Rhodesians, later followed by the South Africans, used cross-border raids as a means of reducing the flow of guerillas into their territory - causing mass fatalities. Leadership attacks were unusual, IIRC attempts were made to kill Nkomo in Zambia, oddly I cannot recall a similar attack(s) on Mugabe & Co in Mozambique; the South Africans were more successful later with attacks on the ANC.

The cross-border tactic was controversial at the time within the Rhodesian military, IIRC Jakkie Cilliers wrote on this in his post-Independence book and others like Michael Evans. Partly as it avoided a serious strategic approach to what was vital inside Rhodesia; it is a long time since I read those sources.

The use made today by the USA, notably in Somalia, Yemen and NWFP, of the tactic cross border raids is very different - with selective targets, with far fewer fatalities. Yes the legal principles maybe the same, the method and effect are very different and so not similar.

David, the SAS were landed in Maputo by a South African Navy submarine and paid a visit on Mugabe... who surprise, surprise (like Nkomo when they visited him) was not at home at the time.

Here is the detail from the BBC here

[JMA]

JMM in Post 261 'A Rose By Any Other Name ...' referred to:

JMM,

The Rhodesians, later followed by the South Africans, used cross-border raids as a means of reducing the flow of guerillas into their territory - causing mass fatalities. Leadership attacks were unusual, IIRC attempts were made to kill Nkomo in Zambia, oddly I cannot recall a similar attack(s) on Mugabe & Co in Mozambique; the South Africans were more successful later with attacks on the ANC.

The cross-border tactic was controversial at the time within the Rhodesian military, IIRC Jakkie Cilliers wrote on this in his post-Independence book and others like Michael Evans. Partly as it avoided a serious strategic approach to what was vital inside Rhodesia; it is a long time since I read those sources.

The use made today by the USA, notably in Somalia, Yemen and NWFP, of the tactic cross border raids is very different - with selective targets, with far fewer fatalities. Yes the legal principles maybe the same, the method and effect are very different and so not similar.

David, I have a copy of:

Top Secret War: Rhodesian Special Operations
CHARLES D. MELSON
From:
Small Wars and Insurgencies
Vol. 16, No. 1, 57–82, March 2005

PM me if you don't have/want a copy. (220KB pdf)

[JMA]

I must admit to being gobsmacked (sarcasm)

de Boer states:

Another goal was to make soldiers aggressive fighters. This took place explicitly in exercises where recruits had to charge at sandbags with a bayonet while swearing.

Isn't this just too terrible ! (sarcasm)

Note: I have the training programme of the last recruit run in the RLI in late 1979. I note that in week two two periods are allocated for Bayonet Training (FN Rifle 9) followed by a further two periods in week three for Bayonet Fighting (FN Prac 5). Can't think what the Training Officer (Maj Peter Cooper) was thinking. Such barbarity... shame on him. Four whole periods out of 19 weeks on the bayonet. I ask you.

Then the killer:

Moreover, abusive instructors caused anger and resentment among the recruits, which they released on the enemy. Some suggest that these same techniques were used in American training during the Vietnam era.

Damn, ... the yanks too. (sarcasm)

I mean how can it be allowed that a recruit instructor (or gunny) be allowed to say 'hurtful' things to recruits? This all just too much to handle!