What have we learned (2000-2010)?

[Tom Odom]

Appropriate investments in the small unit leader, in the way of training, equipment, and education, can make him a force multiplier beyond our wildest imagination. I have seen it in some of the young men who fill billets that I had direct command over during the invasion of Iraq. There is a definite difference between the strategic corporal of then, and now. Can't quite put my finger on exactly what, but it's there.

This is what I hope will be the enduring lesson. I fear however because it is neither sexy in terms of procurement nor revolutionary in its inherent truth it will be shelved as too obvious and too simple to excite the collective id of the Big Army.


Tom

[Steve Blair]

This is what I hope will be the enduring lesson. I fear however because it is neither sexy in terms of procurement nor revolutionary in its inherent truth it will be shelved as too obvious and too simple to excite the collective id of the Big Army.


Tom

I really hope you're wrong, Tom, and that they do learn that lesson. However, if history is any guide I think it's very likely that they won't.

[MikeF]

I just read this from Andrew Bacevich in a blog post on The New Republic.

The United States leaves Iraq having learned nothing.

[Joske]

- "Good" Governance versus "Military" Solution

As i see it both are possible ways to accomplish the goal of defeating an enemy, and the decision on which one to use should be decided by the specific circumstances of an individual conflict and according to what will be the best and most effective option according to the pre-stated political objective.

So both methods should be studied and particularly when looking at an insurgency both options should be kept in mind.

[jmm99]

"Political Solution" and "Military Solution", if you use the latter; or perhaps better, in the terms used by brothers Mao and Giap, "Political Struggle" and "Military Struggle". The appropriate mix of the "Political" and the "Military" in a given situation is really the graduation question, isn't it.

One point of confusion regarding the "Political Struggle" is that its "politics" are not necessarily the same as the "politics" that drive the "policy" - of which, the "Military Struggle" and the "Political Struggle" are continuations.

E.g., In both China and Vietnam (I and II), land reform was the major component of the anti-feudal "Political Struggle"; and would have resulted in a vastly increased number of independent farm owners. However, the Communist politics and policy required ultimate collectivization of farming, with "land reform" being only an intermediate step (sufficient to bring the communists to power).

We (US) are far from integrating the "Political Struggle" and the "Military Struggle" into our doctrines concerning armed conflicts.

Regards

Mike

[slapout9]

I was going to post this on my thread about the second american revolution because it is probabaly one of the most important documentaries I have ever seen. With the recent events about book burning and mosque building it is more important than ever. It origanlly aired September 7, 2010 so I could not post it on the other thead but it will air again on September 11,2010 check local HBO listings. It is the story of a reporter/writer/producer who tried to understand AL-Qaeda and find out why they attacked out country and what we need to learn about it. And yes he uses good old police methodsso you know it is good stuff! A link to the short conclusion is below. His conclusion is so important I will write it out even though I kant spel stuff two good.

http://www.lawrencewright.com/scripts.html

"The country that we were is being sucked inside. Al-Qaeda cannot destroy our country only we can do that to ourselves!"

[Fuchs]

Cross-posted from my blog:

Years ago (2004) I watched a video of an Iraqi insurgent kneeling on a street, aiming a RPG-7 and getting shot (by a Bradley IFV's coax machine gun). Like probably most Western viewers of that video, I though "What an unskilled moron. Kneeling on an open street - no camouflage, no concealment!".

Well, today I had a Déjà vu.


The apparently ultra-low marksmanship skill of the average current opponents coupled with hard body armour plates will probably burn very, very stupid lessons into Western armies' institutional memories.
Remember the blunders of Israeli army forces in Lebanon 2006 after raiding marginally defended Palestinian territories for years!