Kashmir: a simmering, sometimes brutal small war

[Gurkha]

We had their parents begging us, trying to bribe the police and trying every political contact they knew to permit their children back. One of the most important reasons why they are coming back is the collapsing economy in Pakistan and the prosperity in India. Jammu & Kashmir had one of the lowest levels of poverty in India, even at the heights of insurgency. The militants who went to POK, are known as "Muhajirs" ( refugees from India ) and found it difficult to survive on the pittance paid by the ISI which gradually reduced. One of the other important reasons why the insurgency never really succeeded military is the extremely (even I say so myself ) successful light infantry campaign conducted by the Indian Army : no drones, no air support, no artillery( notwithstanding whatever tales you've heard), restrictive Rules of Engagements but the fight was always in the mountains.... the insurgents were relentlessly hunted worn down and eliminated. Own casualties... yes... but in comparison to the Iraq & Afghanistan campaigns.. low. I remember in the 90s the villagers used to tell us that the Afghans & Arabs used to boast to the : " We've driven out the Russians what will these vegetarian, puny, Hindus be able to do , we will massacre them !!" But though they fought the good fight, especially the Afghans, eventually they were eliminated or went back after their "posting". I also think that the very real threat of Human Rights prosecution forced us to conduct a more restricted military campaign which has contributed to this strategic victory. As platoon & company commanders we chafed at it, but in hindsight I think that was one of the best things that happened. When I read about nightime raids and the way the US forces operated in Iraq & Afghanistan I feel that cultural alienation plays a major part in generation of hatred & the accompanying military failure. If one does nightime raids in a culture where women are hidden in Burqas..... what do you expect ? Did I ramble on a bit.... ?!

[Bill Moore]

Gurkha,

I don't doubt what you're writting, but I can't help but think as I look at the statistics showing reduced violence in Kashmir since 2001 that it has something to do with the conflict in Afghanistan, and that after ISAF withdraws and the issue in Afghanistan is resolved one way or the other that violence will once again increase in Kashmir.

Tell me where I'm wrong.

The conflict in Kashmir is as much a state versus state (Pakistan and India) conflict as an internal conflict, so even if the average Kashmiri isn't excited about fighting for the reasons you listed, it seems probable that Pakistan will continue to send foreign fighters into Kashmir to stir up trouble even if they can't mobilize the population. Currently Pakistan is too busy with Afghanistan and dedicating their resources there to help the insurgents in Afghanistan.

It may not be an insurgency, but it will likely continue to be a fight against foreign militias until the issue is resolved between India and Pakistan.

Thoughts from an outsider.

[Gurkha]

True but it will not rise the way it did after the last Afghan war because, firstly the Kashmiris are no longer swayed (the vast majority of them) by calls for jihad, the Pakis now fully realize the extent of the demon they have created and finally because of the comprehensive anti-infiltration measures on the Line of Control & the CI grid in the Valley. The troop concentration In Kashmir is probably the highest ever achieved in the world.Attempts to infiltrate will increase and some will get through but unless the political establishment muffs it up yet again, the hearts & minds of the Kashmiri people are no longer with the fight. However, India is watching AfPak with trepidation and is preparing for the worst.......

[JMA]

One of the other important reasons why the insurgency never really succeeded military is the extremely (even I say so myself ) successful light infantry campaign conducted by the Indian Army : no drones, no air support, no artillery( notwithstanding whatever tales you've heard), restrictive Rules of Engagements but the fight was always in the mountains.... the insurgents were relentlessly hunted worn down and eliminated. Own casualties... yes... but in comparison to the Iraq & Afghanistan campaigns.. low.

I would like to hear/learn more about this aspect you speak of... if you have the time.

.

[Gurkha]

I would like to hear/learn more about this aspect you speak of... if you have the time.

.

Essentially the doctrine called for

1. The use of min force & collateral damage.

2. Area domination.

3. Intelligence based operations.

4. WHAM.

As Kashmir was mountainous, the standard operating units was a rifle company averaging a strength of 50 - 60 men ( the balance 60 being away on leave, training courses, administrative details, base security etc.). This company would on average have about 100 sq km ( 10km by 10 km) or a small valley to cover. Based on informer intel, surveillance patrols, or police intel, the company would split into 7 - 8 teams and lay a combination of ambushes & cordon around villages at night. A search would be carried by day ( DAY ONLY). The police, including policewomen, would assist in controlling the civil population except in really remote villages where we would do it ourselves. Normally 3 -4 militants would be caught / killed in such operations. The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs. A comparison with road bound , conscript & primarily mechanised armies like the Russians in Afghanistan will always see light infantry do better. In this light, please read the Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. I was quite taken aback when I read it : road bound operations, basic drills flouted & huge unwieldy columns detected from miles away. Apart from the SPETZNAZ, Airborne troops & to an extent their Naval Infantry, they appeared to have abysmal infantry skills & a very poor man management system of conscripts all of which lead to their military defeat. I wonder how you guys are doing it in Afghanistan.

Interesting reads :

http://www.amazon.com/Bear-Went-over.../dp/0788146653

http://www.specialoperations.com/mout/soviet16.html

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Gurkha

The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs. A comparison with road bound , conscript & primarily mechanised armies like the Russians in Afghanistan will always see light infantry do better. In this light, please read the Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. I was quite taken aback when I read it : road bound operations, basic drills flouted & huge unwieldy columns detected from miles away. Apart from the SPETZNAZ, Airborne troops & to an extent their Naval Infantry, they appeared to have abysmal infantry skills & a very poor man management system of conscripts all of which lead to their military defeat. I wonder how you guys are doing it in Afghanistan.

Thank you, this is the best post I have on SWJ in weeks! Highlights, font changes, etc. are all mine to emphasize what used to be common sense in our infantry and special ops ranks. I wonder if we can ever get back to the basics?

Of course we would need blue force trackers for every individual so staff and commanders in the rear could manage tactical operations based on their keen insights, and the rear echelon would also have to have the means to monitor water and caloric intake for each troop because the troops/conscripts couldn't be trusted to do it on their own, body armor would remain mandatory, otherwise someone could get hurt, and we wouldn't be allowed to move without ISR support. Other than that I think we could get back to the basics and actually take the initiative.

[davidbfpo]

Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

[Gurkha]

Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

1. Locally recruited light infantry, the JAMMU & KASHMIR LIGHT INFANTRY, recruiting Hindus & Muslims from J & K , is a standard regiment of the line. It tends to do well as the Kashmiri (Muslim) soldiers are able to generate excellent intelligence.

2. There is very limited Army inetrafce with the Russians notwithstanding the IA equipment profile, so no exchange of tactics or docrtine. In fact the joke is that given our finances we are constantly trying to implement operations as per western doctrine with Russian equipment on Indian scales !!http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ons/icon12.gif

[Ray]

Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

The Scouts were the first who were raised from locals and they were to operate in their own native area. However, they got amalgamated. Only the Ladakh Scouts remain in such a role.

JAK Light Infantry were initially the JAK Militia funded by the J&K Govt, but under op control of the Indian Army, staffed by IA officers and they operated in J&K.

As far as I remember, one unit was of J&K Sikhs and Hindus and the remainder of the Regiment was composed of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims. I am not aware of the composition now. They have been amalgamated in the Indian Army and are posted all over India as any regular unit.

[Ray]

Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Try this:

Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, Ist issue Dec 2006, 45 Pg, 16.5 MB
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

[Ken White]

Of course we would need blue force trackers for every individual ...body armor would remain mandatory, otherwise someone could get hurt, and we wouldn't be allowed to move without ISR support. Other than that I think we could get back to the basics and actually take the initiative.

Got to have Mobile Cocoons to protect the roadbound and inculcate reticence...

What Gurkha describes is what we were doing 46 years or so ago. It really worked -- until about 45 years ago we quit doing it and got road and hide bound. That mostly due to the pernicious influence of the one year tour (practically for too many/Officers and more than a few NCOs, two six month tours doing two different things in different places) and excessive politicization.

It is noteworthy that politically driven efforts to reduce own casualties almost certainly produced far more casualties all sorts including our own and resulted in a failure to achieve the objectives...

Now, we're worse. We've lost our minds...

[Ray]

Gurkha has raised valid operational issues that has contributed to why the IA has been successful.

The IA does not take it that they are operating in a foreign land. Yes, there are cultural differences (as in every part of the country), but that fact does not niggle since we are all Indians.

Body armour is important, but the Indian body armour is so heavy that very few wear it and hence quite some casualties occur.

The IA infantry has never been road bound or supplies bound. It is capable of being self contained for more than a week. Been there, done that!

And what is most important that make it a win win is that we do not fire first and ask questions later. We draw fire and then we take action and this is seen by all who are there on the spot to include civilians.

There is no gung ho attitude and instead as if it is in the routine of a day's work, even though unpleasant.

I am looking forward to more posts of Gurkha.

[Madhu]

There is no gung ho attitude and instead as if it is in the routine of a day's work, even though unpleasant.

A touch of reflexive antipathy, or perhaps I am mistaken?



@ Gurkha: At any rate, interesting about day versus night. I thought the opposite was true during the Punjab insurgency, that night time meetings were important and used for a time to suggest more troops and police? But it seems that different approaches were tried at different times and in different ways in different places, because of multiple insurgencies in different parts of the country. Makes sense, I guess.

Interesting comments. To quote carl, this forever civilian looks forward to hearing more

Did WHAM didn't have as much of a place in that insurgency, or was it approached differently? I admit, it's difficult stateside to get good information, because there are so many parties to various conflicts that prepare a kind of mental space within American media and academia. I'm not saying that a particular claim is true or false, just that it's hard to know who is downplaying human rights violations and who is exaggerating said incidents. Also, Western human rights groups and academics have a tendency to inadvertently side with one group versus another, often due to the concerns of a particular diaspora. Some members of a diaspora are more concerned with overseas events and are persistent and interested in getting a message across. Just tough to know, to get an honest assessment from a distance. It really is quite a difficult environment, in terms of truth-getting. At least, that's what it feels like.

[carl]

As Kashmir was mountainous, the standard operating units was a rifle company averaging a strength of 50 - 60 men ( the balance 60 being away on leave, training courses, administrative details, base security etc.). This company would on average have about 100 sq km ( 10km by 10 km) or a small valley to cover. Based on informer intel, surveillance patrols, or police intel, the company would split into 7 - 8 teams and lay a combination of ambushes & cordon around villages at night. A search would be carried by day ( DAY ONLY). The police, including policewomen, would assist in controlling the civil population except in really remote villages where we would do it ourselves. Normally 3 -4 militants would be caught / killed in such operations. The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs.

Gurkha:

I have some questions that are probably obvious to others but not to me.

How long would the 60 man unit stay in its small valley or 10x10 km area?

Where would they stay? Would they stay in houses, police stations, purpose built facilities etc.?

Would the 60 man unit put out 7-8 cordons or ambushes every night or only on some nights? How many guys did you normally have on each ambush?

How far would each little ambush group normally walk to get to their set-up site? What was the max distance they could set something from where they slept and ate?

In the little area or valley, who was the king so to speak, the Indian Army commander, the local police commander or did the the two work together?

Where did the intel used by the 60 man unit mostly come from, the unit itself, the police or a source outside the small area or valley?

Could outside units swoop in to do things without the approval or knowledge of the king of the little area or valley?

If you have time, I'd be obliged to you if you could answer some of these questions. They are probably blindingly obvious to most but not to me.

[Ray]

Gurkha:

I have some questions that are probably obvious to others but not to me.

How long would the 60 man unit stay in its small valley or 10x10 km area?

Where would they stay? Would they stay in houses, police stations, purpose built facilities etc.?

Would the 60 man unit put out 7-8 cordons or ambushes every night or only on some nights? How many guys did you normally have on each ambush?

How far would each little ambush group normally walk to get to their set-up site? What was the max distance they could set something from where they slept and ate?

In the little area or valley, who was the king so to speak, the Indian Army commander, the local police commander or did the the two work together?

Where did the intel used by the 60 man unit mostly come from, the unit itself, the police or a source outside the small area or valley?

Could outside units swoop in to do things without the approval or knowledge of the king of the little area or valley?

If you have time, I'd be obliged to you if you could answer some of these questions. They are probably blindingly obvious to most but not to me.

There are no hard and fast rules of deployment.

It depends on the degree of threat in that area of responsibility of a Battalion.

In some areas, they operate from Battalion bases, and in some areas, the Battalion is dispersed in Company Posts. These posts are located on dominating features and on the estimated likely approaches of the terrorists, as also to have observation over villages that are known to be havens for terrorists.

Based on the intelligence, ambushes are sent out, the strength being such that the post or base has adequate numbers for administration as also capable of defending itself from any terrorist attack.

These ambushes are coordinated on a Battalion grid.

There is no King as such. It is a tacit understanding that since the Army has to do the actual operation, the command and control is that of the Army echelon. The Police are basically to act for Liaison and oversee that no law as such is violated.

Ambushes are laid within a few hours of turnaround from the post. However, when intelligence is there of mass infiltration, the strength goes up and so does the distance and turnaround time.

Intelligence is bottom up and top down. It is constantly collated and disseminated. Electronic surveillance gives immense amount of information of terrorists plan.

[carl]

Gurkha:

I second JMA's request.

I also request, if you can, that you expand on your following comment because it is very interesting. It shows some mature wisdom.

I also think that the very real threat of Human Rights prosecution forced us to conduct a more restricted military campaign which has contributed to this strategic victory. As platoon & company commanders we chafed at it, but in hindsight I think that was one of the best things that happened. When I read about nightime raids and the way the US forces operated in Iraq & Afghanistan I feel that cultural alienation plays a major part in generation of hatred & the accompanying military failure. If one does nightime raids in a culture where women are hidden in Burqas..... what do you expect ? Did I ramble on a bit.... ?!

And welcome to SWJ. We, or at least me, are thrilled to have guys who aren't American.

One last request, what are good Indian sources that may cover some of the things you commented upon?

[Gurkha]

http://www.indiandefencereview.com/n...tions-in-jk-i/

http://www.ipcs.org/publications/


THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired

[carl]

THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired

This was a good piece. It was easy to read and gave good review of all the small wars ops the Indian Army has been involved in, and there have been a lot. It had almost no acronyms! Imagine that, plain English that anybody can follow. Its free on the net.

Gurkha: Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

[Gurkha]

This was a good piece. It was easy to read and gave good review of all the small wars ops the Indian Army has been involved in, and there have been a lot. It had almost no acronyms! Imagine that, plain English that anybody can follow. Its free on the net.

Gurkha: Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Try
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

[JMA]

Try
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

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